


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bulletin **October 1979**

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
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Refugees in Southeast Asia
(Black Star photo by Stern)

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor

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
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Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees April 1975-June 30, 1979



Total Resettled: 544,726

U.S. PROGRAM TO ASSIST THE WORLD'S REFUGEES

BACKGROUND

In the 4½ years since the collapse of the governments of South Vietnam, Cambodia (now called Kampuchea), and Laos, more than a million Indochinese have fled their homelands to seek temporary or permanent asylum elsewhere. Some 350,000 refugees have resettled in non-Communist countries, and about 350,000 remain in countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia. In addition, an estimated 250,000 Indochinese have fled to the People's Republic of China, and about 150,000 Kampuchians are in camps in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The exodus from the countries of Indochina initially consisted primarily of those who had fought the Communists, who had been associated with the previous regimes or with the U.S. Government, or who had opposed the new authorities.

In 1978, however, conditions within Indochina began to change radically. The Hanoi government instituted policies designed to restructure society, shift city dwellers to the countryside, and eliminate the business and professional class. These policies were principally aimed at Vietnam's 1.5 million ethnic Chinese, who were seen as a security threat at a time of worsening relations with China. The ethnic Chinese, including those who had lived peacefully in the north since 1954, were increasingly faced with the threat of dismissal from jobs, conscription, or transfer to remote areas of the country without services, called "new economic zones."

As a result, by the summer of 1978 there was a marked increase in both the number of people fleeing Indochina and the percentage of ethnic Chinese among the refugees. Other factors contributing to the outflow of refugees were the war between China and Vietnam, the occupation of areas of Laos and Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces, military operations against the Hmong tribesmen in Laos, deteriorating economic conditions (particularly food shortages), and violations of political and other rights. In addition, Vietnamese authorities began to assist the departures of ethnic Chinese and others they considered undesirable.

The number of Indochinese seeking asylum in non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia jumped from about

6,000 a month in August 1978 to a peak of 65,000 in May 1979. Partially as a result of the Vietnamese decision announced at the Geneva refugee conference in July to stem "illegal departures" from Vietnam, the arrival rate dropped to about 12,000 in August 1979. These figures reflect only the numbers of people who succeed in seeking asylum. It is not known how many people actually attempt to leave Indochina, but there are estimates that from 30% to 60% perish before arriving at a safe haven.

Since the beginning of 1979, about 240,000 Indochinese have joined the more than 200,000 refugees who were already in camps in first-asylum countries awaiting resettlement elsewhere. In this period, however, some 75,000 have been moved from the camps to permanent homes in other countries.

Despite increased international efforts to resettle the Indochinese, the presence of large refugee populations in the countries of first-asylum continues to be a source of domestic concern and regional instability. The first-asylum countries have resisted efforts to resettle any Indochinese within their borders because they already feel overburdened by their own population pressures, economic problems, and religious and ethnic tensions, and they are concerned about the possibility of subversion and insurgency. The lack of resettlement opportunities in Southeast Asia has increased the need for greater international participation in the refugee assistance program. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for the protection and care of refugees in camps in Southeast Asia until permanent resettlement can be arranged.

In May and June 1979 the refugee situation reached crisis proportions, as the countries of first asylum reacted in desperation to the mounting refugee populations, the increasing arrival rates, and the apparently inadequate response to the problem by the rest of the world community. Southeast Asian governments began refusing to grant asylum to new arrivals—causing death to tens of thousands of refugees pushed back out to sea or back across land borders—and in some cases they threatened to expel refugees already admitted to U.N.-sponsored camps. As a result of the dramatic deterioration of the situation, there was widespread

support for British Prime Minister Thatcher's proposal that the United Nations convene a special meeting on the Indochinese refugee problem. U.N. Secretary General Waldheim invited 72 nations to attend the meeting, which he convened in Geneva July 20-21, 1979. Vice President Mondale headed the U.S. delegation and delivered the following address on July 21.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

Once again the countries of the world turn to the United Nations. When problems touch the whole human community, no other forum provides a vision more encompassing. When national interests conflict and collide, no institution convenes us with greater moral authority. The United Nations is often criticized and sometimes even maligned. But the common ground it provides us deserves our thanks and praise. On behalf of the United States—and I believe, on behalf of all nations in the world community—I thank Secretary General Waldheim and High Commissioner Hartling [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling] for their leadership in convening us here today.

Some tragedies defy the imagination. Some misery so surpasses the grasp of reason that language itself breaks beneath the strain. Instead, we gasp for metaphors. Instead, we speak the inaudible dialect of the human heart.

Today we confront such a tragedy. In virtually all the world's languages, desperate new expressions have been born. "A barbed-wire bondage." "An archipelago of despair." "A floodtide of human misery." With this new coinage our language is enriched, and our civilization is impoverished.

"The boat people." "The land people." The phrases are new, but unfortunately their precedent in the annals of shame is not. Forty-one years ago this very week, another international conference on Lake Geneva concluded its deliberations. Thirty-two "nations of asylum" convened at Evian to save the doomed Jews of Nazi Germany and Austria. On the eve of the conference, Hitler flung the challenge in the world's face. He said: "I can only hope that the other world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at least be gener-

ous enough to convert this sympathy into practical aid." We have each heard similar arguments about the plight of the refugees in Indochina.

At stake at Evian were both human lives and the decency and self-respect of the civilized world. If each nation at Evian had agreed on that day to take in 17,000 Jews at once, every Jew in the Reich could have been saved. As one American observer wrote: "It is heartbreaking to think of the . . . desperate human beings . . . waiting in suspense for what happens at Evian. But the question they underline is not simply humanitarian. . . . It is a test of civilization."

At Evian, they began with high hopes. But they failed the test of civilization.

The civilized world hid in the cloak of legalisms. Two nations said they had reached the saturation point for Jewish refugees. Four nations said they would

accept experienced agricultural workers only. One would only accept immigrants who had been baptized. Three declared intellectuals and merchants to be undesirable new citizens. One nation feared that an influx of Jews would arouse antisemitic feelings. And one delegate said this: "As we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one."

As the delegates left Evian, Hitler again goaded "the other world" for "oozing sympathy for the poor, tormented people, but remaining hard and obdurate when it comes to helping them." Days later, the "final solution to the Jewish problem" was conceived, and soon the night closed in.

Let us not reenact their error. Let us not be the heirs to their shame.

To alleviate the tragedy in Southeast Asia, we all have a part to play. The United States is committed to doing its share, just as we have done for generations. "Mother of Exiles" it says on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty at the port of New York. The American people have already welcomed over 200,000 Indochinese. Their talent and their energies immeasurably enrich our nation.

We are preparing to welcome another 168,000 refugees in the coming year. The governors and the Members of Congress in our delegation—as well as outstanding religious and civic leaders throughout America—are a symbol of the enduring commitment of President Carter and the American people.

Many nations represented here have risen to history's test, accepting substantial numbers of refugees. The ASEAN states [Association of South East Asian Nations], China, and Hong Kong have offered safety and asylum to over half a million refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea since 1975. And others have opened their doors.

But the growing exodus from Indochina still outstrips international efforts. We must work together or the suffering will mount. Unless we all do more, the risk of fresh conflict will arise and the stability of Southeast Asia will erode. Unless this conference gives birth to new commitments, and not simply new metaphors, we will inherit the scorn of Evian. It is a time for action, not words.

I would like to outline seven areas where action is needed.

First and foremost, the fundamental responsibility must rest with the authorities of Indochina, particularly the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. That government is failing to insure the human rights of its people. Its callous and irresponsible policies are compelling countless citi-

zens to forsake everything they treasure, to risk their lives, and to flee into the unknown.

There must be an immediate moratorium on the further expulsion of people from Vietnam. We must stop the drownings and establish a humane emigration program. The policy of expulsion which has led to so many tragic deaths must end. It must be replaced by a policy which enables those who wish to leave their homes to do so—in safety and by choice and in an orderly manner.

At the same time, we must not forget the land people driven from their homeland by conflict and foreign invasion. The nations of the world must promote a political settlement in Kampuchea. The survival of a whole people is in grave doubt. Neither the Pol Pot nor Hang Samrin regimes represents the Kampuchean people. The conflict, and the human tragedy in its wake, must stop. The international community must not tolerate forced expulsion of entire populations.

I call on all governments to allow normal free emigration and family reunification. My government supports efforts to negotiate a program of orderly direct departures from Vietnam—but not at the expense of those in camps elsewhere in Southeast Asia already awaiting resettlement and not as part of a program of expulsion of ethnic or political groups.

Second, I urge the countries of first asylum to continue to provide temporary safe haven to all refugees. The compassion these nations have shown earns them the respect and admiration of the world's community. But these nations cannot bear this responsibility alone. We call on them to persist in their spirit of humanity so that our common effort can proceed.

Therefore, third, the rest of us must provide assurances to first-asylum countries that the refugees will find new homes within a reasonable period of time. To meet this objective, we call on all nations to double their resettlement commitment, as the United States has already done. Moreover, we must all be prepared to commit ourselves to multiyear resettlement programs—for the problem will not be solved quickly. The U.S. Government is now seeking that authority.

Fourth, each of us must make a greater contribution to the relief efforts of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR will need increased resources now and in the coming years to care for growing refugee populations and to alleviate the misery in refugee camps. The UNHCR may require an estimated \$400 million for its Indochina programs in 1980.

Rescue of Refugees at Sea

Tradition provides that ship captains shall rescue individuals in distress at sea and bring them to the closest port for disembarkation. Thousands of Indochinese refugees have been rescued on the high seas, but in some cases vessels have reportedly ignored distress signals.

In December 1978, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization issued a joint appeal to governments, shipowners, and ship masters to continue the rescue of refugees on the high seas. Three times since mid-1978 the U.S. Government has reminded American line operators and their captains of their obligations in this regard and has also provided a guarantee of resettlement for refugees rescued by U.S.-owned or U.S.-registered vessels if those refugees are not accepted by another country.

Major maritime nations, for the most part, have stated that they have instructed their carriers to rescue refugees at sea. The major problem appears to lie with carriers operating under flags of convenience. Ship masters are coming under additional pressure as a result of stiffening resistance among the ports of the region to the landing of refugees without guarantees of resettlement. □

To do our part to help, I am privileged to announce today that my government will ask our Congress to allocate \$105 million for those programs—more than double our current effort. We are also ready to assign highly qualified Peace Corps volunteers to work in the camps in Southeast Asia—to work not only with the individual countries but also in the programs of the U.N. High Commissioner. We urge other nations to undertake similar programs of support.

Fifth, it is essential that we relieve pressures on existing camps and create a network of new transit centers for refugees destined for permanent resettlement elsewhere. Given the magnitude of the refugee population, such centers must accommodate at least 250,000 refugees. My government has endorsed the initiative of the ASEAN states for U.N.-sponsored refugee processing centers. President Carter applauds the Government of the Philippines for the bold and exemplary steps it has taken—a model of responsible world leadership. Today I am especially pleased to announce that we are requesting more than \$20 million from the Congress to finance our share of such new UNHCR facilities.

Sixth, we must extend refugee resettlement to nations which are ready to receive them—but which do not have the resources to do so. Today, on behalf of the U.S. Government, I propose the creation of an international refugee resettlement fund. If other nations join us, we will ask our Congress for contributions to the fund totaling \$20 million for the first year. We ask today that other nations match us. We recommend that the fund be capitalized at \$200 million. This fund could, for example, endow an international corporation which would help developing countries embark on their planning and secure additional resources for this high humanitarian purpose.

Seventh, and above all, we must act to protect the lives of those who seek safety. The United States is acting vigorously to save refugees from exposure and starvation and drowning and death at sea.

As Commander in Chief of the military, the President of the United States has dramatically strengthened his orders to our Navy to help the drowning and the desperate. Today the President has ordered four additional ships from the Military Sealift Command to be dispatched to the South China Sea—where they will be available both to transport tens of thousands of refugees from camps to refugee processing centers and to assist refugees at sea. At the same time, the President has also ordered long-range Navy aircraft to fly

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (Million U.S. \$)			
Country	1975- June 30, 1979	Balance of 1979	1980
Australia	9.8	5.0	
Austria	.04		.10
Belgium	.59		.73
Canada	1.9	.40	
China		1.0	
Cyprus	.001		
Denmark	5.8	1.9	
EEC	8.0	25	5.5
Finland		1.0	
France	*	*	*
Germany, West	7.0	3.8	10.9
Greece	.015		
Iran		.09	
Ireland	.08	.4	
Italy	.78	.8	
Japan	23.6	(50% of future costs)	
Korea		4.8	
Mauritius	.01		
Neitherlands	3.8	4.9	
New Zealand	.36		
Nigeria		.12	
Norway	6.0	2.0	
Philippines	.03		
Sweden	3.3		
Switzerland	1.2		
Taiwan	**		
U.K.	5.6	5.4	5.4
U.S.	42.9	34.0	105.0
TOTAL	120.780	90.61	127.63

* France contributes to the overall UNHCR budget but does not earmark contributions for the Indochina program.

** Taiwan contributed \$500,000 to the International Rescue Committee for assistance to Indochinese refugees.

patrols to locate and seek help for refugee boats in distress.

And the President is asking our private shipping industry and unions to persist with their time-honored efforts to help refugees at sea. We appeal to other governments to do the same—and to accept for resettlement those who are picked up.

In conclusion let me reiterate two points.

First, the international community must not tolerate this forced expulsion. We call upon Vietnam to cease those policies which condemn so many to flee. There must be an immediate moratorium on expulsions.

The freedom to emigrate is a fundamental human right. But no nation is blind to the difference between free emigration and forced exodus. Let us impose a moratorium on that exodus. Let us have a breathing spell during which all of us—governments, voluntary agencies, and private individuals alike—mobilize our generosity and relieve the human misery. And let us

urge the Government of Vietnam to honor the inalienable human rights at the core of every civilized society.

Second, our children will deal harshly with us if we fail. The conference at Evian 41 years ago took place amidst the same comfort and beauty we enjoy at our own deliberations today. One observer at those proceedings—moved by the contrast between the setting and the task—said this:

These poor people and these great principles seem so far away. To one who has attended other conferences on Lake Geneva, the most striking thing on the eve of this one is that the atmosphere is so much like the others.

Let us not be like the others. Let us renounce that legacy of shame. Let us reach beyond metaphor. Let us honor the moral principles we inherit. Let us do something meaningful—something profound—to stem this misery. We face a world problem. Let us fashion a world solution. History will not forgive us if we fail. History will not forget us if we succeed. □

The Indochinese Refugee Situation

by Secretary Vance

Statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee on July 31, 1979.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the Indochinese refugee problem with you. I appreciate the active support and interest members of this subcommittee have shown in the tragic situation in Southeast Asia and in U.S. programs to assist Indochinese refugees. In particular, we valued the participation of [Congresswoman Elizabeth] Holtzman and [Congressman Hamilton] Fish, as well as members of the Judiciary Committee staff, at the recent Geneva meeting. We also value the visits that members and staff have made to Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. The firsthand understanding you have obtained of all sides of the complex, difficult refugee issue has been of great benefit to the executive branch as well as to the Congress and the public.

In the weeks ahead, we will need your continued support and guidance, especially in providing the legislative framework we need to deal with refugee crises of such grave proportions.

This morning, I would like to bring you up to date on the magnitude of the Indochina refugee situation, the steps that have been taken, and the tasks ahead. Ambassador Clark [Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs] will go into more detail about the specific commitments and proposals that were made in Geneva, what we are doing to implement them promptly and effectively, and what more we must do.

All of us are aware of the stark dimensions of the problem. Over 375,000 men, women, and children are languishing in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, awaiting resettlement. Thousands of others who fled never reached a safe shore. What we face in Southeast Asia is first and foremost a human tragedy of appalling proportions.

It is also a threat to peace in the region and to the stability of our friends there.

And as Vice President Mondale made very clear, publicly and privately, in Geneva, it is a world problem which requires a world solution. The international community cannot

turn away from the plight of these people.

As the international community has begun to grasp the dimensions of the problem, the response has been building. The United States has been at the forefront of this gathering international effort. But while there is reason to be encouraged by the progress that has been made in recent weeks, we cannot afford in any way to slacken our efforts. The situation remains explosive. The suffering remains acute. The next weeks and months will be critical. We must now reinforce the progress that has been made and sustain the momentum that is building.

Let me briefly review the events of the past several months.

The situation began to deteriorate rapidly last fall when the number of refugees arriving in first-asylum countries suddenly began to outpace the numbers leaving for permanent resettlement. The camps were quickly swamped. The Southeast Asian states became increasingly alarmed at the prospect of permanently absorbing large refugee populations.

In the face of the challenge in Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas of the world where the United States provides refugee assistance, it became clear that we would have to strengthen our own refugee programs. We created the position of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, a role that Dick Clark is filling with great skill and dedication. In December, the United States took the lead, both in increasing the

number of our Indochinese refugee admissions from 25,000 a year to 53,000, and in urging others to do more. However, these efforts were soon outstripped by the increasing rate of arrivals, as you saw on your trip to the region last February. As a result, in April the President approved admissions at a rate of 84,000 a year, a figure which, together with the cooperation of other nations, we then hoped would be adequate.

As you know, however, a funding crisis forced us during April and May to cut back actual admissions below that rate. This raised questions about our commitment among first-asylum countries, particularly Thailand and Malaysia. And, at the same time, the refugee crisis exploded. The upsurge in arrivals was due in part to the conflict involving Vietnam and China and in part to Vietnamese internal conditions and policies.

Some 160,000 refugees arrived in U.S.-sponsored camps in Southeast Asia in April through June, while only 27,500 were resettled. In addition, there was a sharp increase in the number of refugees fleeing into Thailand as a result of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, the continued human rights abuses by the Pol Pot forces, and dislocation in the Kampuchean economy.

A rapid hardening of positions in the ASEAN countries [Association of South East Asian Nations] followed. Their previously generous position of accepting refugees from Indochina was replaced by a trend toward refusing to accept new arrivals. Many who had already found safety and asylum were expelled.

Once again, the growing crisis called for redoubled efforts. At the Tokyo summit, we joined with Japan and our

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ARRIVALS

August 1979

Country	Arrivals	Departures for U.S.	Population as of Aug. 31
Thailand			
Land	3,188	13,130	166,218
Boat	163	220	8,104
Malaysia	2,650	5,015	55,742
Hong Kong/Macao	3,409	1,024	70,199
Indonesia	813	1,185	45,856
Philippines	503	277	5,939
Singapore	774	15	1,399
Japan	447	10	966
Others	33	3	868
TOTAL	11,980	10,879	355,291

major European allies in announcing our intention to increase refugee assistance significantly.² To give substance to our pledge and impetus to a greater international commitment, the President decided that our admissions of Indochinese refugees should be doubled, from 7,000 to 14,000 per month. For their part, the Japanese pledged to underwrite 50% of the budget of the Indochinese assistance program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This means that the United States will no longer need to pay 50% of that budget, as we have in the past.

In the following days, during the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] meeting at Bali, we discussed with the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN nations, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Ireland—representing the European Community—the need to mount a global response to all aspects of the problem. We also discussed the issue with the Chinese.

The conference earlier this month in Geneva, held under the auspices of the United Nations, was a further step forward in mobilizing an international effort commensurate with the challenge. Since Tokyo, the process has brought the total number of permanent resettlement offers to over 260,000 refugees and new contributions of about \$190 million to the UNHCR. Importantly, the Philippine Government generously offered to provide a site for a new refugee processing center to accommodate up to 50,000 people.

Dick Clark will report to you in greater detail about the actions that were taken in Geneva and what we must now do to build on this progress. Let me simply outline the course which the Vice President set forth in Geneva, for it is our agenda for action.

First, we will continue to press for a solution to this problem at its source. The fundamental responsibility lies with the authorities of Indochina. The Indochinese authorities must respect the human rights of their people and put an end to the strife that disrupts the peace and displaces people from their homes. We are particularly concerned about the Kampuchians, who now face a serious threat of famine. We hope that Vietnam and all other parties will cooperate with the international community in a program for humanitarian relief in Kampuchea.

At this point, we do not know how the Vietnamese plan to implement the approach to departures which they discussed with Secretary General Waldheim. Nor do we yet know the extent to which they will implement the plan of the UNHCR to regularize family reun-

Memorandum of Understanding Between the UNHCR and Vietnam

Following is the text of the memorandum of understanding between the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam concerning the orderly departure of persons who wish to leave Vietnam for countries of new residence, agreed to May 30, 1979.¹

Following discussion held in Hanoi between representatives of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and a delegation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 26 February to 5 March and from 25 May to 30 May 1979, it is agreed that UNHCR will facilitate the implementation of the 12 January announcement by the Vietnamese Government to permit the orderly departure of persons who wish to leave Viet Nam for countries of new residence. Regarding the programme to implement such orderly departure, it is understood that:

1. Authorized exit of those people who wish to leave Viet Nam and settle in foreign countries—family reunion and other humanitarian cases—will be carried out as soon as possible and to the maximum extent. The number of such people will depend both on the volume of applications for exit from Viet Nam and on receiving countries' ability to issue entry visas.

2. The election of those people authorized to go abroad under this programme will, whenever possible, be made on the basis of the lists prepared by the Vietnamese Government and the lists prepared by the receiving countries. Those persons whose names appear on both lists will qualify for exit. As for those persons whose name appear on only one list, their cases will be subject to discussions between UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government or the Governments of the receiving countries, as appropriate.

3. UNHCR will make every effort to enlist support for this programme amongst potential receiving countries.

4. The Vietnamese Government and UNHCR will each appoint personnel who will closely co-operate in the implementation of this programme.

5. This personnel will be authorized to operate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and, as necessary, to go to other places to promote exit operations.

6. Exit operations will be effected at regular intervals by appropriate means of transport.

7. The Vietnamese Government will, subject to relevant Vietnamese laws, provide UNHCR and the receiving countries with every facility to implement this programme. □

¹Text from U.N. press release REF/800.

fication. We are prepared to cooperate with the High Commissioner and the Vietnamese in a program which allows Indochinese to seek freedom elsewhere without risking their lives in the process. As soon as the UNHCR informs us that arrangements have been made with Hanoi, we will be prepared to send consular officers on temporary duty to Vietnam to work in the UNHCR office, to speed the processing of such cases.

But we have also made clear that our support for direct departures must not downgrade the plight of people who have already risked their lives and are awaiting resettlement in refugee camps. Nor must a direct departure program become a means for the forced expulsion or discriminatory, harsh treatment of ethnic, political, or other groups who do not meet their government's favor.

Second, we will continue to urge the countries of first asylum to provide safe haven to all refugees. But if these countries are to continue to bear this burden, the international community must provide assurances that the refu-

gees will find new homes within a reasonable period of time.

Therefore, third, to help meet our commitment to double our Indochinese refugee admissions, the State Department is seeking \$202.3 million for fiscal year 1980 to cover processing, transportation to the United States, and initial reception and placement grants to the voluntary agencies that help resettle these refugees. We are also streamlining and accelerating the processing of refugees. This will enable us to meet, as early as this coming month, the President's goal of 14,000 monthly admissions, and it will also enable us to maintain this rate on a consistent basis. We are also taking steps to improve the medical examination process for those coming to the United States.

Fourth, we must make a greater contribution to the relief efforts of the UNHCR. The UNHCR may require an estimated \$400 million in 1980 to care for growing refugee populations and to alleviate the misery in refugee camps. To do our part, we are seeking \$105 million for these programs. We also

will be assigning Peace Corps volunteers to UNHCR operations in the field, and we are taking other steps to improve the care afforded refugees in camps, particularly with regard to hygiene, health, and food.

Fifth, we must relieve the pressure on existing first-asylum refugee camps and create a network of new transit centers for refugees destined for permanent resettlement elsewhere. We will be requesting \$20 million from the Congress to finance our share of the construction costs of such new UNHCR facilities.

Sixth, to extend refugee resettlement to nations which are ready to receive them but do not have the resources to do so, we have proposed the creation of an international refugee resettlement fund.

Seventh, we are taking concrete steps to enhance our efforts to save the lives of refugees in distress on the high seas. The 7th Fleet has already picked up at least 65 refugees and is also providing information from air patrols to other ships in the region on refugee boats in distress.

Finally, with the continued cooperation of this committee, we expect to have the refugee act of 1979 in effect by the beginning of FY 1980. This vital legislation will provide, for the first time, a comprehensive framework for responding effectively to refugee crises of this gravity. As you are aware, the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act is scheduled to expire on September 30. Without the new refugee act, we will have to seek emergency legislation to extend the existing authority to assist Indochina refugees in this country. We will also have to request that the Attorney General issue a new parole program to authorize the admission of Indochinese refugees into the United States in FY 1980.

In the weeks immediately ahead, we must assure that others live up to the commitments they have already made. We must also continue to expand the circle of nations contributing their full share to this international effort. But to do these things, we must fulfill our own obligations. We must back our concern and compassion with our resources and energies. These efforts will be costly. They will be protracted. We will not solve this problem, or alleviate the suffering, quickly or easily. But I have no doubt that the American people want us to do our full share.

We are a nation of refugees. Most of us can trace our presence here to the turmoil or oppression of another time and another place. Our nation has been immeasurably enriched by this continuing process. We will not turn our

Significant Quotes on Refugees

by Dick Clark

Excerpts from statements before two Senate and House committees and subcommittees and at the opening session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). The full texts of these statements may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.¹

MARCH 14, 1979²

"... refugee programs are an important element in our foreign policy. The refugee crisis is a pervasive problem that strains the resources of the international community. In offering assistance, we can ease the pressures on friendly governments in Southeast Asia created by the arrival of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Elsewhere, our programs support the victims of conflicts while the search for peace continues. Our aid to refugees offers a beacon of hope to people fleeing repression in Eastern Europe, and it figures in our relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, our aid sets an example for other countries and reinforces our position as a nation of leadership and humanitarian concern.

"Until now, we have carried out our refugee programs through... a patchwork of different programs that evolved in response to specific crises. The resulting legislative framework is inadequate to cope with the refugee problem we face today. . . .

"In recent years, we continually have seen dramatic conflicts and internal developments force new groups of people to flee for their lives. The numbers of refugees are growing on every continent. While the plight of the boat

backs on our traditions. We must meet the commitments we have made to other nations and to those who are suffering. In doing so, we will also be renewing our commitments to our ideals and to ourselves. □

¹Press release 183. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²For text of the joint communique issued June 28, 1979, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1979, p.5.

people in Southeast Asia presents today's most dramatic case, it must not blind us to the hardships of refugees fleeing oppression and persecution in Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. To deal successfully with these difficult challenges, our policies and programs must recognize that refugee problems unfortunately have become a regular feature of our world.

"If we are to respond to this unprecedented refugee situation, our refugee policy must expand the definition of refugees beyond the present reliance in immigration law on narrow geographic and ideological criteria. Human suffering recognizes no such distinctions."

APRIL 10, 1979³

"... Dramatic increases in worldwide refugee populations have forced us to adjust our requests substantially above those we have already submitted... for FY 1979 and 1980... not only are more people fleeing political persecution but in certain areas, closed borders and repressive policies have forced refugees to seek more desperate means of escape... countries of first asylum are beginning to refuse further aid to refugees because of overflowing refugee camps, ethnic hostility, and preexisting economic and population problems.

"... the State Department is requesting \$51.7 million beyond the supplemental appropriation of \$54.3 million that you received in January for FY 1979. This latest increase brings our supplemental request to a total of \$104.9 million—compared with the appropriation of \$91.5 million that Congress has already enacted for this fiscal year. These funds will increase our contribution to the care and maintenance of hundreds of thousands of refugees overseas, and they will finance the resettlement to the United States of 64,000 Indochinese refugees and 35,940 Soviet, Eastern European, and other refugees.

"The State Department has also requested an amendment for FY 1980 of \$87.1 million beyond the request you have already received for \$136.9 million. This raises our total appropriation request for FY 1980 to \$223.9 million. This proposed appropriation will finance a total of 120,000 refugee resettlements to this country, or about

34,000 from Indochina and 36,000 from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other regions. . . .

"Finally, the Department of State is also requesting a supplemental appropriation of \$10 million for the emergency refugee and migration assistance fund for the balance of FY 1979 plus an amendment of \$25 million for FY 1980. . . . our total request for the fund for FY 1980 is now \$40 million. . . .

"The difficulty of predicting our needs for refugee assistance is evident in reviewing our recent experiences in the areas where we have our largest programs—Africa, Southeast Asia, and Europe. In each case there have been substantial increases in refugee flows in the last 9 months. . . .

" . . . in Africa a series of political conflicts in recent years has created the largest refugee population of any continent. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 2 million Africans qualify for refugee status, and about half are in need of assistance. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assists hundreds of thousands of refugees whom the UNHCR is unable to reach, such as those within Rhodesia. . . . Since there has been little demand for resettlement in the United States, our policy has been primarily to contribute to the care and maintenance of African refugees through support for UNHCR and ICRC programs. . . .

" . . . in Southeast Asia the refugee population has also reached a critical point. During the latter part of 1978, the number of people fleeing oppression in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. . . at times exceed[ed] 20,000 a month. . . . there is little hope that most of the Indochinese refugees can be repatriated or resettled in neighboring states. Our approach is. . . to provide a combination of relief to refugees in camps and resettlement opportunities for many in the United States.

"The third major component of the State Department refugee program assists people fleeing religious and political persecution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. . . . In the last 6 months, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of refugees from the Soviet Union, primarily because the Soviet Government has liberalized its policy on issuing exit visas. . . . our present plans are for about 36,000 resettlements each for this year and the next two fiscal years.

MAY 21, 1979¹

" . . . It is obvious to even the most casual observer of world events that the

refugee problem is more critical than at any time since World War II. Daily we see conflicts and internal developments forcing new groups of people to flee for their lives and their dignity. In dismaying contrast to earlier periods of history, the number of refugees has grown simultaneously and dramatically on every continent. . . .

" . . . just as the refugee problem itself is beyond our collective efforts to correct totally, our collective capabilities to assist refugees effectively have been outstripped.

" . . . Clearly, the international community has not responded to their needs to the extent that common dignity and decency demand. As a consequence, the deteriorating refugee situation is also creating serious political and economic strains on countries of first asylum. . . .

"Let me share with you briefly the steps the United States has initiated in response to these concerns. . . . President Carter created the position of ambassador at large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. . . [to develop] an overall U.S. refugee and resettlement

policy; [coordinate] all U.S. domestic and international refugee and resettlement programs which this year will exceed \$500 million; and [represent] the United States in discussions and negotiations with foreign governments and international organizations on refugee matters. . . .

" . . . the Administration sent to the Congress new refugee legislation. . . . The President has approved refugee admissions of about 108,000 for this fiscal year and. . . has also authorized us to request funds from Congress to provide for 120,000 admissions in FY 1980. . . .

" . . . The Congress is concerned that [multilateral organizations, such as ICEM] should be strengthened to perform more effectively the tasks for which they were established. . . . Members of Congress believe that there must be a more equitable sharing of the burden.

"We feel . . . that we must request all governments to reexamine their own policies and programs and to make significantly more generous contributions to the care and maintenance and resettlement

U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS

Dick Clark was born September 14, 1928, on a farm in Linn County, Iowa. He served with the U.S. Army in Germany from 1950 to 1952. He received a bachelor's degree from Upper Iowa University (1953) and a master's degree in history from the University of Iowa (1956). While completing course work for a doctorate in history, he was a teaching assistant at the University of Iowa (1956 to 1959).

Ambassador Clark was an assistant professor of history and political science at Upper Iowa University (1959-64) and was president of the university faculty in 1962. During this period, he also served on several

State commissions, including chairman of the Iowa Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Emergency Planning in 1963 and 1964.

From 1965 to 1972, he was the Administrative Assistant to Iowa Congressman John Culver (now Iowa's senior senator). He served as a national political organizer in the presidential campaign of the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy in 1968.

Ambassador Clark was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1972, after a 1,300-mile campaign walk across the State of Iowa. While in the Senate, he was a leader in the areas of foreign policy, congressional and campaign reform, and agriculture. He chaired subcommittees on African affairs and rural development. He was a U.S. delegate to the U.N. World Food Conference in Rome (1974) and was cochairman of African-American Institute conferences in Lesotho (1976) and Sudan (1978). His 1978 bid for a second Senate term was unsuccessful.

Ambassador Clark is a member of the American Historical Association, the Conference on European History, the American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies, and the Conference on Slavic and East European History. He has been awarded honorary degrees by Upper Iowa University, Loras College, Parsons College, Mt. Mercy College, Cornell College, and St. Ambrose College.

He was sworn in as U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and Ambassador at Large on May 1, 1979.



tlement of refugees both in financial contributions to international organizations and resettlement opportunities.

JULY 25, 1979³

"... the delegations [to the Geneva conference on refugees] generally expressed support for regularized departures from Vietnam directly to resettlement countries. As you know, the UNHCR has negotiated a seven-point plan with Hanoi to facilitate legal departures. We are supporting this plan to the extent that it promotes family reunification and freedom of emigration and to the extent that it does not jeopardize efforts to resettle refugees who have already risked their lives to flee and are now languishing in camps in Southeast Asia.

"We have notified the High Commissioner that in principle we are prepared to send U.S. consular officers to Vietnam on temporary detail to work with UNHCR personnel in screening Vietnamese destined for the United States under this plan. The details still have to be worked out, but we are hopeful that this step will permit us to accelerate legal departures from Vietnam. Since the first people to come to this country in this manner qualify under U.S. immigration laws, they are considered immigrants rather than refugees, and they do not divert refugee admissions numbers from the camps in Southeast Asia."

JULY 26, 1979²

"One of the major initiatives proposed by Vice President Mondale at the Geneva meeting was the idea of establishing an international fund for refugee resettlement under the auspices of the UNHCR. The purpose of this fund would be to assist developing countries to accept refugees for permanent settlement. As you know, many countries of the developing world have significant potential to open new areas and otherwise accept refugees on a permanent basis in a manner which would benefit their own economic development. The fund would facilitate this process and relieve the heavy financial burden for transportation, training, and placement of the refugees.

"The United States proposed that the fund be capitalized at a level of \$200 million, and we indicated our intention of seeking \$20 million from the Congress as an initial contribution. Before proceeding, however, we will want to be sure that other donors will match our contribution by at least another 70% so that our costs will not exceed 30% of the total.

"The reaction to the proposal... was very favorable on the part of potential donors. The Danes immediately pledged an initial contribution of \$5 million; the Australians said they looked forward to contributing; and Germany, the United Kingdom, and others... are also likely to contribute. The Japanese and other potential donors indicated they wanted to have more details on the idea from UNHCR before committing themselves. U.N. High Commissioner [Poul], Hartling said he would be developing the concept and plans to present it to the UNHCR Executive Committee for approval in October." □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²Made before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

³Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee.

⁴Made at the ICEM council meeting in Geneva.

U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs

President Carter created the Office of the U.S. Coordinator in February 1979 to provide policy guidance and coordination for all U.S. refugee programs, both international and domestic. Since much of the Coordinator's international responsibilities involve discussions and negotiations with foreign governments and international organizations on refugee matters, he also has the rank of ambassador at large.

The Coordinator is chairman of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for Refugee Affairs which consists of representatives of all Federal agencies involved in U.S. refugee programs, including the Departments of State, Justice, and Health, Education and Welfare, and the Agency for International Development. When necessary the committee also meets with representatives of the Office of Management and Budget; Immigration and Naturalization Service; National Security Council; Domestic Council; Central Intelligence Agency; and the Departments of Labor, Commerce, and Defense.

In addition the Coordinator's responsibilities include developing overall U.S. policy on refugee assistance and resettlement, guiding the development

and presentation of budgets for refugee programs, advising the Attorney General on admissions policies for refugees, and facilitating liaison between the Federal government and the voluntary agencies and State and local governments concerned with the domestic resettlement of refugees.

The U.S. Coordinator also develops reorganization plans for refugee programs wherever necessary to insure a coordinated refugee effort. As an inter-agency coordinator, he serves at the direction of both the Secretary of State and the President and is assisted by a staff located in the Department of State. □

Results of Refugee Conference

Many have hailed the U.N.-sponsored refugee conference, held in Geneva July 20-21, 1979, as a success because of the many specific offers of assistance made at and shortly before the conference.

- The pledges for international resettlement have doubled. At the time of the Tokyo summit June 28-29, the number of pledges totaled 125,000. By the end of the conference, the number of pledges had reached 265,000.

- An additional \$200 million has been pledged to support the operations of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, plus the 50% share of the budget which Japan has stated it would contribute.

- Significant progress was made toward the establishment of refugee processing centers with the Philippine Government offer of a site to accommodate 50,000 refugees.

There is, however, some unfinished business. The United States would like to get agreement on the establishment of additional refugee processing centers to accommodate up to 250,000 Indochinese refugees.

We will continue to seek additional resettlement opportunities. We also will continue to pursue the idea of an international refugee resettlement fund as proposed by Vice President Mondale at Geneva.

The key questions still unresolved are whether Vietnam is willing to provide protection of human rights and livelihood for its people as called for in the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights and whether it is willing to seek a political, rather than a military, solution in Kampuchea. □

THE PRESIDENT:

News Conference

of July 25 (Excerpts)

Q. Are you planning to install any foreign exchange controls or capital controls in order to protect the decline of the dollar, and are you planning any further appointments from the corporate section?

A. I do not contemplate taking action of that kind. I think the dollar is sound. In the long run, the principles which will decide the value of the dollar are determined by how effective we are in dealing with the energy question, how effective we are in dealing with the inflation question, how much we act to resolve the adverse balance of payments, how we deal with the Federal budget deficit, and so forth. The basic underlying economic factors will be what causes the value of the dollar, not some contrived action that I might take to interfere with the normal operation of the international monetary scene.

I have just announced today that I'm appointing Paul Volcker [to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board], a highly qualified person, internationally respected as a knowledgeable man on monetary systems, on whom I can depend. There's no doubt that he will work harmoniously with me, with Bill Miller, who will be the new Secretary of the Treasury. And I believe that this new team will be very effective.

I would like to reserve the right to make future appointments from the corporate world or the academic world or the journalistic world or from among mayors and Governors or Members of the Congress. But I can't exclude the corporate sector. But I can't say now where I'll make future appointments from.

Q. I wonder, in looking at Nicaragua, if we are in danger of another Cuba there, and what the White House plans to do in terms of

taking some positive steps to assure their safety?

A. It's a mistake for Americans to assume or to claim that every time an evolutionary change takes place, or even an abrupt change takes place in this hemisphere, that somehow it's the result of secret, massive Cuban intervention. The fact in Nicaragua is that the incumbent government, the Somoza regime, lost the confidence of the Nicaraguan people. There was a broad range of forces assembled to replace Somoza and his regime as the head of the Nicaraguan Government.

We worked as closely as we could without intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua with the neighboring countries and with the so-called Andean group in the northern part of South America to bring about an orderly transition. Our effort was to let the people of Nicaragua ultimately make a decision on who should be their leader, what form of government they should have. We also wanted to minimize bloodshed and to restore stability. That is presently being done. We have a good relationship with the new government. We hope to improve it. We are providing some minimum humanitarian aid for the people of Nicaragua, who've suffered so much.

I think that our posture in Nicaragua is a proper one. I do not attribute at all the change in Nicaragua to Cuba. I think the people of Nicaragua have got enough judgment to make their own decisions, and we will use our efforts in a proper fashion without interventionism, to let the Nicaraguans let their voice be heard in shaping their own affairs.

Q. You said earlier that you think that the U.S. dollar is sound. The dollar seems to be taking a pounding

on the foreign exchange markets, and it's approaching the low levels that once before you had to launch a dramatic rescue program last November.

In addition to that, you've just named Paul Volcker, a conservative Republican, to head the Federal Reserve Board. How do the poundings that the dollar is undergoing on the exchange markets and your naming of Mr. Volcker square with your earlier description?

A. I see no incompatibility at all. Mr. Volcker, by the way, happens to be a Democrat. But he, I think, is a conservative in that he believes in controlling inflation and he believes in maintaining a sound dollar.

I can't guarantee what the exact value of the dollar might be in months ahead. We don't freeze the value of the dollar. That's determined by international monetary considerations. What I said was that the basic value of the dollar will be determined not by the identity of a President or even the identity of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve; it will be shaped by how effectively our nation moves to meet the energy challenge. There is some present doubt that the Congress will pass the proposals that I have put forward. I have no doubt that the dollar will increase in value when the Congress has passed the programs that I proposed. And, obviously, the dollar will be adversely affected if inflation should increase.

My prediction is that inflation will decrease in the months ahead. And I'm sure that the dollar would be adversely affected if I abandoned my commitment to a responsible Federal budget and start on wild spending programs when they are not needed.

So, basic decisions made of fiscal soundness in our government is a much more important factor in shaping the value of the dollar than is the identity of officials who might serve in a transient time.

□

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 30, 1979.

VICE PRESIDENT: Visit to East Asia

Vice President Mondale departed Washington, D.C., August 24, 1979, for a trip to the People's Republic of China (August 25–September 1), Hong Kong (September 1–3), and Tokyo (September 3). He returned to the United States on September 3.

While in China, he visited Beijing (Peking—August 25–29), Xi'an (Sian—August 29–30), and Guangzhou (Canton—August 30–September 1). Following are the texts of his address at Beijing University on August 27, which was broadcast on radio and television and reprinted in the People's Daily and local newspapers throughout China, his dinner toast made at a welcoming banquet in Beijing on August 26, and his remarks at the opening of the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou on August 31.

BEIJING UNIVERSITY, AUG. 27, 1979

I am honored to appear before you, and I bring you the warm greetings and the friendship of the President of the United States and the American people.

For an American of my generation to visit the People's Republic of China is to touch the pulse of modern political history. For nearly three decades our nations stood separate and apart, but the ancient hunger for community unites humanity. It urges us to find common ground. As one of your poets wrote over a thousand years ago: "We widen our view three hundred miles by ascending one flight of stairs." We are ascending that flight of stairs together. Each day we take another step. This afternoon, I am privileged to be the first American political figure to speak directly to the citizens of the People's Republic of China.

And no setting for that speech could be more symbolic of our relationship than this place of new beginnings. The history of modern China is crystallized in the story of Beijing University and the other distinguished institutions you represent. At virtually every turning point in 20th century China, *Bei-Da* has been the fulcrum.

Sixty years ago, it was at *Bei-Da* that the May 4th movement began, launching an era of unprecedented intellectual ferment. It inaugurated an effort to modernize Chinese culture and society. It established a new meeting ground for eastern and western cultures. And its framework of mutual respect sustains our own cultural cooperation today.

Forty-four years ago, *Bei-Da* was where the December 9th movement galvanized a student generation to resist external aggression. And its message of sovereignty and nonaggression underpins our own political cooperation today.

As China looks to the future, once again it is *Bei-Da* and your other research centers which are leading the drive toward "the four modernizations." And the closeness of your development goals to our own interests will provide the basis for our continuing economic cooperation.

Today we find our two nations at a pivotal moment. We have normalized our relations. The curtain has parted; the mystery is being dispelled. We are eager to know more about one another, to share the texture of our daily lives, to forge the human bonds of friendship. That is a rich beginning, but it is only a beginning.

A modern China taking its place in the family of nations is engaged in a search not only for friendship but also for security and development. An America deepening its relations with China does so not only out of genuine sentiment and not only out of natural curiosity; it does so out of the same combination of principle and self-interest that is the engine of mature relations among all modern states.

Our job today is to establish the basis for an enduring relationship tomorrow. We could not have set that task without our friendship. But we cannot accomplish it with friendship alone. On behalf of President Carter, this is the message I carry to the people of China—a message about America, its purposes in the world, and our hopes for our relations with you.

A Message About America

The Americans are historically confident people. Our politics are rooted in our values. We cherish our fundamental beliefs in human rights and compassion and social justice. We believe that our democratic system institutionalizes those values. The opportunities available to our citizens are incomparable.

Our debates are vigorous and open. And the differences we air among ourselves—whether on strategic nuclear policy or on energy—are signs of our society's enduring strength.

My country is blessed with unsurpassed natural resources. Moreover, we also have unparalleled human resources—workers and farmers and scientists and engineers and industrialists and financiers. With their genius we are able to transform our natural assets into abundance, not only for ourselves but for the world.

Of course we face unsolved problems. But the high goals we set for ourselves—and our determination to meet them—are measures of our national spirit. In that striving, in that restless pursuit of a better life, we feel a special affinity for the people of modern China.

In the world community, the United States seeks international stability and peace. But we have no illusions about the obstacles we face. We know that we live in a dangerous world. And we are determined to remain militarily prepared. We are fashioning our defenses from the most advanced technology anywhere. We have forged alliances in Europe and Asia which grow stronger every year. Together with our Japanese and Western allies, we will insure that our investment in security is equal to the task of insuring peace—as we have for 30 years.

But we want to be more than a firm and reliable partner in world affairs. We also believe in a world of diversity.

For Sino-American relations, that means that we respect the distinctive qualities which the great Chinese people contribute to our relationship. And despite the sometimes profound differences between our two systems, we are committed to joining with you to advance our many parallel strategic and bilateral interests. Thus any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests. This is why the United States normalized relations with your country, and that is why we must work to broaden and strengthen our new friendship.

We must press forward now to widen and give specificity to our relations. The fundamental challenges we face are to build concrete political ties in the context of mutual security, to establish broad cultural relations in a framework

of genuine equality, and to forge practical economic bonds with the goal of common benefit.

As we give substance to our shared interests, we are investing in the future of our relationships. The more effectively we advance our agenda, the more bonds we build between us—the more confident we can be that our relationship will endure.

And so what we accomplish today lays the groundwork for the decade ahead. The 1980's can find us working together—and working with other nations—to meet world problems. Enriching the global economy, containing international conflicts, protecting the independence of nations—these goals must also be pursued from the perspective of our bilateral relationship. The deeper the relationship, the more successful that worldwide pursuit will be.

That is the agenda President Carter has asked me to come to the People's Republic of China to pursue. That is the principal message President Carter has asked me to bring to you. It is the agenda we share for the future.

Economic Cooperation

In the 8 months since normalization, we have witnessed the rapid expansion of Sino-American relations.

We have reached a settlement on claims-assets and signed the trade agreement. Trade between our countries is expanding. American oil companies are helping you explore China's off-shore oil reserves. Joint commissions on Sino-American economic relations and on scientific and technical exchange have been established. We have exchanged numerous governmental delegations, including the visits of many heads of our respective ministries and departments, and the flow of people between our two countries is reaching new heights. We have gained a cooperative momentum. Together let us sustain and strengthen it. For a strong and secure and modernizing China is also in the American interest in the decade ahead.

In agriculture, your continued development not only provides a better life for the Chinese people, it also serves our interests—for your gains in agriculture will increase limited world food supplies.

In trade, our interests are served by your expanding exports of natural resources and industrial products. And at the same time your interests are served by the purchases you can finance through those exports.

As you industrialize, you provide a higher standard of living for your people. And at the same time our inter-

ests are served—for this will increase the flow of trade, narrow the wealth gap between the developed and the developing world and thus help alleviate a major source of global instability.

Above all, both our political interests are served by your growing strength in all fields—for it helps deter others who might seek to impose themselves on you.

Efforts in the 1920's and 1930's to keep China weak destabilized the entire world. For many years, China was a flashpoint of great power competition. But a confident China can contribute to the maintenance of peace in the region. Today the unprecedented and friendly relations among China, Japan, and the United States bring international stability to northeast Asia. That is why deepening our economic, cultural, and political relations is so strategically important—not only for your security but for the peace of the world community.

We are taking crucial steps to advance our economic relationship.

First, before the end of the year, President Carter will submit for the approval of the U.S. Congress the trade agreement we reached with you. This agreement will extend most-favored-nation treatment to China. And its submission is not linked to any other issue.

Second, I will be signing an agreement on development of hydroelectric energy in the People's Republic of China. U.S. Government agencies are now ready to help develop China's hydroelectric power on a compensatory basis.

Third, the United States is prepared to establish Export-Import Bank credit arrangements for the P.R.C. on a case-by-case basis up to a total of \$2 billion over a 5-year period. If the pace of development warrants it, we are prepared to consider additional credit arrangements. We have begun discussions toward this end.

Fourth, the Carter Administration this year will seek congressional authority to encourage American businesses to invest in China—by providing the guarantees and insurance of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

We also stand ready to work with the Chinese Government to reach textile, maritime, and civil aviation agreements in the shortest possible time.

Culture and Education

As we advance our cultural relationship, universities will again be a crucial meeting ground between Chinese and Americans, just as they were in an

earlier era.

Today gifted Chinese scholars study in America, and American scholars—many of whom I am delighted to see here today—study in China. That exchange inherits a distinguished tradition. On campuses all across the United States, Americans who lectured and studied in China in the 1930's and 1940's today are invigorating our own intellectual life—none of them with greater distinction than Professor John K. Fairbank, who honors us by joining my traveling party. At the same time, we are proud that Chinese scholars who study American agronomy, engineering, and medicine have been able to contribute the skills they gained in our country to the progress of Chinese society.

It is a mutual relationship—a true reciprocity—we are now engaged in building. From us, you will learn aspects of science and technology. Our anthropologists and archaeologists have tools to share with you as you explore your own past. American and Chinese social scientists and humanists have insights to offer each other—a fuller understanding of our respective institutions and values.

And so with your help, we intend to broaden our horizons. Chinese researchers pioneer in key areas, from medical burn therapy to earthquake prediction, and we want to learn these skills from you. Where the progress of science requires global cooperation—in astronomy, in oceanography, in meteorology—our common efforts can benefit the world. And our social scientists and humanists have hardly begun to share your understanding of history, of social change, and of human potential.

Strong bilateral relations serve our strategic interests. Through them, both of us can foster the world community we seek—a world that respects diversity and welcomes constructive change.

A Just World Order

Today there are 162 nations in the world, most of them poor. Eighty percent of the world's population live in developing countries. Every day, people in these nations are lifting their heads to demand independence and justice. Every day efforts by rulers to oppress their people are meeting increasing resistance. Governments are coming to understand not only the necessity but also the fundamental wisdom and decency of protecting the rights of their people through law.

When political power is more equitably shared within nations, when that power shifts from the few to the many

among nations, when an era of colonialism gives way to a more just international order—these changes deserve worldwide support.

In the last few years, as the preeminent military and economic power in the world, the United States faced a fundamental choice. Were we to resist those winds of change, attaining our national security by defending the status quo? Were we to collude with a few other countries in an effort to dominate the world? Or were we to welcome change, to make the necessary adjustments and to help shape a more just world order?

Let there be no doubt about the choice my country has made. The United States believes that any effort by one country to dominate another is doomed to failure. Neither by relying exclusively on an increasing stock of arms nor by direct or indirect military intervention can any nation hope to attain lasting security. On the contrary, nations which embark on that course will find themselves increasingly isolated and vulnerable.

And nothing more vividly demonstrates our belief in those principles than the normalization of Sino-American relations. Normalization signals our understanding that American security in the years ahead will be attained not by maintaining the status quo, not by colluding for purposes of domination but by fostering a world of independent nations with which we can build positive relations.

That is the world community we seek. It is a vision of diversity, of constructive ties, and above all, of peace. In a world that hopes to find new energy sources, peace is essential. In a world that aims to eliminate hunger and disparities in wealth, global equilibrium is vital. In a world that is working to eradicate communicable diseases and to safeguard our environment, international cooperation is crucial.

To secure that peace, to maintain that equilibrium, to promote that cooperation, the United States is totally committed.

A World of Diversity

During the visit to the United States by Vice Premier Deng and Madame Zhuo in January, President Carter said this:

We've not entered this new relationship for any short-term gains. We have a long-term commitment to a world community of diverse . . . and independent nations. We believe that a strong and a secure China will play a cooperative part in developing that type of world community. . . .

I would like to underscore that point. Anyone who seeks to understand America is invariably drawn back to the idea of diversity. The United States is a nation of immigrants, all of whom contribute to our society their distinct talents and traditions.

The American people find their common heritage not in a single bloodline, not in thousands of years of shared national history but in their shared ideals. And we have a profound faith in the very diversity that shapes us. We value tolerance and pluralism and mutual respect.

We aim to honor those same principles in the conduct of our foreign policy in the decade of the 1980's. For Sino-American relations, that does not mean we will always agree. But in a world that respects diversity, countries as different as the United States and China can work side by side toward common goals. Together, we can enrich our two cultures, strengthen our two economies, build better lives for both our peoples, and together we can help stabilize the world community—fostering respect for diversity and standing firmly opposed to intolerance and domination.

Last month, China and the United States joined many other nations in Geneva to confront the agony of the Indochinese refugees. The enormity of their human tragedy defies the imagination. In a world that seeks to alleviate such suffering—suffering that transcends national boundaries—the way of conscience is the way of common cause.

Today the world watches us. In a sense, we are testing whether a developed nation and a developing nation—each with different traditions, each with different systems—can build a broad, enduring, constructive relationship. Certainly there will be serious barriers to overcome. But if we can work together, future generations will thank us. If we fail, not only will our children suffer, the entire world will feel the consequences.

Diversity and stability are not new themes in Sino-American relations. President Roosevelt once said this:

It is to the advantage—and not to the disadvantage—of other nations, when any nation becomes stable and prosperous; able to keep the peace within its own borders, and strong enough not to invite aggression from without. We heartily hope for the progress of China. And so far as by peaceable and legitimate means we are able, we will do our part toward furthering that progress.

It was a bright vision three generations ago, and subsequent events only postponed the fulfillment of its prom-

ise. As we look to the future, let us resolve to rekindle the light of its insight.

DINNER TOAST, BEIJING, AUG. 26, 1979

Mr. Vice Premier [Deng], my wife Joan and I were honored to meet you and Madame Zhuo 7 months ago on your historic visit to the United States. Your trip broke through diplomatic barriers that had stood high for 30 years. And you did more than that. In Washington, and on your journey around the United States, you rekindled the friendship and affection of the American people for the great people of China.

I look forward to the next few days—to my talks with you, Premier Hua and other leaders, to my speech at Beijing University, and to my visits to Xi'an and Guangzhou. But already on this visit I have sensed the theme that will run through it. For this afternoon I had a brief chance to see Beijing's historic Front Gate and to explore some city streets. At the Front Gate, I began to understand the legacies of your past. And on Beijing's streets, in the healthy and strong determined faces of the people I saw and met, I was moved by the enormous potential you have for the future.

Though this is my first visit to China, it is not my first trip to Asia. A year ago, I visited the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] countries and our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, U.S. pact] allies. They all saw the wisdom of the strengthened Sino-American relationship which has brought me here today.

Visits at the highest levels have marked each milestone in our relationship. Journeys by two Presidents were integral parts of our mutual quest for normalization. The visit of Vice Premier Deng and Vice premier Fang brought that quest to an end and launched us into a new era. In the months since, we have witnessed a profusion of Cabinet-level visits, agreement-signings, and new ties at all working levels of our governments. We have laid the institutional basis for a flourishing relationship. And we have set the tone of cooperation that will mark our ties in the decade ahead.

The time has now come to insure that in the 1980's our relationship fulfills its potential. That is the purpose of my visit.

If we strengthen our bilateral ties, we can both make dramatic economic progress; we can both enrich our cultures. But above all, an enduring Sino-American relationship will pro-

mote the stable international environment we both need to meet our domestic challenges and address problems of global concern.

And so what has brought our two nations together is this: We both seek a world of stability and peace—of independent and diverse nations cooperating for their common economic progress. And we both are opposed to efforts by any country to dominate another.

The decade of the 1980's will bring years of challenge in international affairs. But let there be no doubt that the United States will do everything it must to remain as secure and prosperous in the future as we have been in the past.

Through your four modernizations you, too, are determined to attain the same goal for yourself. The United States agrees that the modernized China of the future can make an even greater contribution to the creation of a just international order than the China of today.

We believe that the Sino-American relationship can emerge in the 1980's as one of the major bulwarks of peace and justice in the world. To achieve that goal, I wish to join you in widening our consultations on world affairs—and where possible, achieve a common purpose through our separate action.

To reach that goal, and to consolidate our friendship, we must widen and deepen our bilateral relations. A flourishing relationship between us in the 1980's—in commerce, in culture, in the sciences and technology—will demonstrate to the whole world the significance we attach to our common purpose—a world of independent nations, of equilibrium, and of peace.

U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL, GUANGZHOU, AUG. 31, 1979

Today we take another important step in translating normal relations between the United States and China into concrete reality. In my talks with Chinese leaders in Beijing and Xi'an, one thread that ran throughout all our conversations was the need to deepen and broaden our relationship. That is



Vice President Mondale and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping shake hands after document-signing ceremony. (Photo courtesy of the White House)

more than a polite diplomatic convention. It means that our political ties must now be accompanied by literally a profusion of economic and cultural ties. It means that our relations must not only join government to government but also forge new Sino-American links between scientists, engineers, artists, and business leaders.

This afternoon we advance that effort by opening the first American consulate general in China in 30 years. This is not just another ceremony: It is a symbol of all we mean by truly normal relations. With this step—and with the opening of Chinese consulates in American cities—we lay the groundwork for broader relations between citizens of both our countries in the 1980's.

It is appropriate that the first American consulate be opened in Guangzhou. By far the largest portion of Chinese-Americans trace their ancestry to this area, as we found out this morning. Guangzhou was the historic first point of contact between our two countries. When George Washington was sworn in as President, American ships were in Guangzhou harbor. And today, as increasing numbers of

Americans coming to China's trade fairs know, Guangzhou is a linchpin of China's developing economy.

No one could do a finer job as America's first Consul General in the People's Republic of China than Richard Williams. Dick is a fine career Foreign Service officer who has devoted his whole professional life to China, and his broad background in economic and commercial affairs will be put to good use. We are working to set up permanent headquarters for the consulate at the earliest possible moment.

Today the United States and China are actively negotiating a consular treaty which will put our consular relations on a firm and permanent footing. That treaty will enable us to open additional American and Chinese consulates general beyond the four already set for Guangzhou, Shanghai, San Francisco, and Houston.

In the spirit of Sino-American friendship, as an important step toward making normal relations a concrete reality, it is my privilege at this moment to declare the Guangzhou Consulate General of the U.S. Government officially opened. □

THE SECRETARY: *News* *Conference of September 5*

Let me begin with a few comments on the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. We regard this as a very serious matter affecting our relations with the Soviet Union. The presence of this unit runs counter to long-held American policies.

The identification of this unit as a combat force has recently been confirmed by our intelligence community. They have now concluded that this force has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970's. Reanalysis of the older, fragmentary data in the light of more recently acquired information suggests that elements of a Soviet brigade may have been there since the early 1970's and possibly before that. The process of reanalyzing our earlier information continues.

The unit appears to consist of 2,000-3,000 personnel. It includes motorized rifle battalions, tank and artillery battalions, and combat and service support units. These figures are separate from the Soviet military advisory and technical military personnel in Cuba, which we now estimate to be between 1,500 and 2,000.

The specific mission of the combat unit is unclear. There is no air or sealift capability associated with the brigade which would give it an assault capability nor is the presence of this unit covered by our bilateral understandings with the Soviets in 1962 or 1970.

Nonetheless, the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern. I will be pursuing this matter with the Soviets in the coming days.

I will be discussing this issue with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon and setting forth the approach which we plan to take with the Soviets. We will keep the press and the public informed to the fullest extent that we can as we proceed. I know you will understand that the interests of our country would not be served by my now going into the specific nature of our approach.

Q. Have you or will you ask the Soviets to remove those troops?

A. The discussions with the Soviets will affect the action which we will take. Let me say very simply that I will not be satisfied with maintenance of the status quo.

Q. How will this affect the national

debate on SALT and other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations?

A. As I have indicated, this is a serious matter and will be treated as such. At the same time, SALT is a matter of fundamental importance.

I believe that the hearings on SALT ratification should proceed. However, we will be keeping in close touch with the Senate Committee and the Members of the Senate as we proceed in our discussions with the Soviets.

Q. How could the Soviets have stationed a brigade of this size and this caliber in Cuba for several years without U.S. intelligence finding out about it?

A. First, the information which has been assembled over a period of years has been fragmentary and it is very difficult to piece together.

As you know, in evaluating intelligence information, it is like putting a jigsaw puzzle together, and one has to continue to examine the various fragments. And sometimes the fragments all fall together and then you can arrive at a conclusion. This is what happened in this case.

Q. How does the inability of the intelligence community to detect this Soviet brigade for several years reflect upon its ability to detect small differences in Soviet rocket configurations and other SALT related intelligence problems on a much broader land area in the Soviet Union?

A. There is a clear difference between determining whether a particular unit or element of a unit is, when covered by photographic intelligence from a satellite, a unit which belongs to a particular country, such as the Soviet Union, as opposed to the Cubans. This is much more difficult to monitor than monitoring such things as the establishment of new missile sites, of receiving an analysis of telemetry, and the kinds of things which are important for SALT monitoring.

Q. If I may follow up on your response that you will not be satisfied with the status quo. Is it the combat characteristics of this unit that are so disturbing to us or is it the presence of the forces? In other words, are you or will we call for the removal of the forces themselves?

A. It is the combat nature of the

units which is a matter of very serious concern to us. We have realized, as you all know, that there were training units and signal units stationed there over a considerable period of time.

Q. Something you said earlier implied to me at least that you may, with time, reconsider the question of linkage between SALT and whatever action you may request from the Soviets regarding the removal or reduction or whatever of these Soviet troops. Am I hearing you wrong?

A. What I said is that I think that the hearings on ratification should go forward because of their fundamental importance. I have also said, however, because this is a matter of a serious nature, that we must keep in close contact and in discussion with Members of the Senate as we go forward in our discussions with the Soviets.

Q. Senator Stone recently said that everything is not yet out; there is more to come. Some of us have been told that the Soviets have constructed a military airfield and have been working on a missile boat base and that there might be even another base with combat troops. Can you address that?

And, secondly, on the matter of the intelligence just becoming known, some of us were told last month, before you wrote your letter saying to the Senator there was no significant Soviet military force other than the advisers, we were told that there was intelligence, at least in July, to suggest very strongly that they had combat infantry artillery battalions there.

A. Let me say at the time that I wrote my letter to Senator Stone, I reviewed this within the government with full interagency coordination among all of the intelligence elements of the government. At that time they concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a combat presence in there.

I told Senator Stone after I wrote him the letter that we were going to intensify our investigation and collection activities and our analysis of the information as it came in and that as soon as we felt that we had additional information which might bear on the subject and give us a clearer reading of what the situation was, I would immediately make this information available to him, to members of the relevant Senate Committees and others. And that is just what we have done.

Q. Has the public been told the full story of Soviet military activity in Cuba?

A. I think we have told the public everything at this point that is of significance. We are continuing to investigate other matters as well. And if we get information that is of importance, we will, of course, make it available.

Q. To move the matter to a slightly different area, as we all know, action has been taken against the CIA acting through journalists abroad. But here is another matter of interest, which is foreign intelligence services using the media in this country. And specifically I would like to ask if anything can or will be done about the case of the Mossad working through certain newspapers, including *The New York Times*, through certain agents, including Roy Cohn—and this has all been publicly documented—and through the old Permindex assassination network at his point to set up an assassination of presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche and possibly others as well? And isn't it time that we started cleaning up these kinds of rather filthy foreign operations?

A. I think you are leaping to conclusions on some of the matters that you have referred to. I do not want to endorse or give any credence to the allegations which you have made.

We will continue to pursue our activity in following the activities of any foreign intelligence agencies in the United States. But there is nothing more that I can add at this point to our statement.

Q. One, do you consider what the Soviets have in Cuba as a base? And, two, I am not quite sure how to ask this, but if they had been there for several years, have had a combat capability or a combat unit there for several years, why is it a serious matter?

A. Let me answer the second half of your question first. The presence of combat troops in Cuba—Soviet combat troops—at any time, is a serious matter. And if we had known about that fact and could have demonstrated that fact in the mid-1970's or in the early 1970's, that would have been a serious factor then and would have been raised at that time as a serious matter to be dealt with.

With respect to the question of whether or not the presence of these forces constitute a base, the answer I must give you on that one is a very simple and straightforward one: We do not know at this time whether it constitutes a base. Our conversations and discussions with the Soviet Union will shed light on this, and we will have to

arrive at our conclusion as we proceed with those discussions.

Q. Early on in this Administration, the United States, as a gesture of good will to the Cubans, cut off surveillance flights, specifically U-2 flights.

I am just wondering if you can tell us whether these were reinstated and, secondly, whether the lack of those surveillance flights may have contributed to the lack of information that you have had over the past couple of years?

A. No. I don't think so. I think that the flights which were conducted have been sufficient—as one goes back and goes over the take that has come from those flights—to, in hindsight, as the final pieces fell into place which made it possible to come to this conclusion, on reanalysis, to take a look at the past information and conclude that that information—now that we have the final piece or two which puts theigsaw together—to give you the conclusion that we have now arrived at.

Q. I am wondering on what basis you can now be so certain that those troops were introduced in the mid- or possibly even in the early 1970's when for so many years you apparently did not have sufficient information to even respond.

A. Because we have corroborating evidence of different kinds now that we did not have before.

Q. What I am asking is in response to some of the questions that were raised in July, both your office and that of the Secretary of Defense were not even allowing the possibility of the presence of Soviet troops. It was being flatly denied at that time.

A. That was the conclusion, at that point, of the intelligence community. Since then, as I said, additional evidence has become available, evidence which was redundant but backed up and corroborated other types of evidence. And once that pattern was put together, then the intelligence community was able to come to a firm conclusion.

Q. On that same question, do I understand you correctly to be saying that the 2,000 to 3,000-man brigade essentially was in place in Cuba before even this Administration took office?

A. A force of approximately that size was, yes. That is the conclusion that has now been arrived at.

Q. So all that has happened in the

last few weeks is that the intelligence community has now reached that conclusion. The Soviets haven't done anything special in the last year or two?

A. That is correct.

Q. Is there any reason now why the 1962 agreement with the Russians at the time of the Cuban missile crisis could not be made public so that people would have a way of knowing whether the Russians are keeping that agreement or not?

A. The essence of the 1962 agreement is generally known to the public, and let me give you as much as I can about it. The 1962 agreement is not just a simple piece of paper. It consists of an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev;¹ it consists of discussions between Russian officials, including Minister Kuznetsov, Minister Mikoyan, and individuals in the United States and representatives of the U.S. Government. It includes discussions between officials of the United States and Ambassador Dobrynin. So that it is a series of both exchanges of letters and discussions that make up the total agreement.

Q. Why couldn't that whole package be made public now? What is the reason that it can't be made public? Seventeen years have passed.

A. This is a matter which I think is a fair question to ask. We are reviewing the situation to determine whether or not we can at least put out a full summary of what the essence of that agreement and the agreement of 1970 is as well, and I hope that we may be able to do so.

Q. Are there any plans by the U.S. Government to reinforce ground forces and Air Force units in Guantanamo at this time?

A. I don't want to go into any actions which we might take in the future. Let me say, however, that is not to be taken in any way as an indication that we are planning to do that.

Q. Did the reanalysis of the Cuban data follow the Nicaraguan—I'm sorry, the insurrection in Nicaragua by the Cuban-backed—

A. It was not—

Q. No correlation?

A. It was not sparked in any way by that. This analysis was going on as a result of the reevaluation that we had been involved in; and as soon as we got the necessary information to arrive at

the conclusions, we immediately released the conclusions.

Q. Do you have any comment on the thesis that this is essentially a hand-holding operation for the Cubans who have forces around the world?

A. There are many different theories as to what the purpose of the maintenance of that battalion or brigade in Cuba is. At this point, we do not know which of these various hypotheses is correct. Obviously, one of the issues which we will be discussing with the Soviets is the statement by the Soviets with respect to the purpose and intentions which relate to the brigade.

Q. In view of the fact that another U.S. Ambassador had met several times with PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] officials, why was Ambassador Young singled out for holding a session with that group's U.N. representative, particularly since Young's action could have been justified by the fact that he was then President of the Security Council?

A. Insofar as the situation of Ambassador Young's resignation is concerned, let me say several things. First, the situation has been gone into at length. The situation has been reviewed time and again by the spokesman for the Department, and I wish to make very clear that I stand behind the statements of the spokesman with respect to this matter.

I want to also make very clear that I stand fully behind the statement which I issued at the time that Andy's resignation was offered and accepted—namely, that Andy has made great contributions to the United States and to its foreign policy.

I think that it would not do any good—it would be fruitless, and, indeed, an unwise step—to rehash all of this ground again.

Q. It has now been a full week since the Soviet charge d'affaires was called in to the State Department and informed of American concern over the Soviet troops in Cuba. During that time, the only public response from the Soviets has been a rather scoffing one in the press. I understand further that the Soviet charge's response was similar. Do you consider at this time that the Soviet response has been timely and serious?

A. I have asked Ambassador Dobrynin to return at the earliest possible moment, and I will then be meeting with him. I do not feel, until I have had a chance to meet with him, that we will

have had a serious chance to discuss this issue.

Q. When do you expect that?

A. I don't know exactly. I will get a response, I hope, today to the message which I sent to him in regard to his return.

Q. You seemed to imply earlier that it is the combat nature of the Soviet force that bothers us, and to me, at any rate, implied that the men can stay if the combat nature of the force is removed. Is that what you meant to imply?

A. What I meant to say is that the combat nature is of great importance. It is of serious concern to us. I want to have further discussions about this whole matter, including the purpose and intention of the presence of the brigade. I don't want to, at this point, comment any further than I have already about the matter of what we will do.

Q. What impact does the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba have on problems in the Caribbean and in Central America?

A. I don't think we have any evidence at this point as to what the impact may or may not be. One can speculate on what the impact might be, depending upon the situation, the facts, and what their purpose is. But it would be, I think, fruitless for me to speculate.

Q. North Korea has rejected the joint U.S. and South Korean proposal for three-way talks. What is the next U.S. step toward North Korea?

A. Our position is that we shall watch and wait and see what happens. I do not necessarily consider the response which has been given by the North Koreans as the final response, and, therefore, we will wait and watch and see what happens.

Q. Will the United States reconsider its contacts with the PLO in light of [Israeli] Foreign Minister Dayan's contacts? Is the United States seeking a release from its commitments? And, thirdly, is a summit on the Middle East planned here in the autumn, and if so, why?

A. There are no plans at this point to have a summit here in the autumn. I think, as you know, Minister Dayan and, I believe, [Egyptian] Minister Ali will be coming here later this month to discuss with us the situation relating to the monitoring force for the withdrawal

from the Sinai. That is the only meeting that is planned at this time.

Turning to Minister Dayan's meetings, those meetings were with individuals located in the West Bank and Gaza. It has always been clear from the outset that insofar as discussions with Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza were concerned, both the Israelis and the United States could have discussions with them because this would be both helpful and useful in connection with the negotiations which are going forward with respect to the autonomy negotiations, or the so-called West Bank-Gaza negotiations.

Q. A series of situations and reports, since we last met in this room several months ago, have raised a question about your willingness to continue in this job; and some of them in recent days have even raised questions about your authority to continue as the man in charge of U.S. foreign policy. I would like to ask you, have you considered resigning, other than this mass resignation which took place sometime ago? And is there any doubt in your mind, or have you taken up the matter, about your authority over U.S. foreign policy?

A. I had an idea somebody might raise a question like this.

First, insofar as what I have done, let me say very clearly that these kinds of stories arise time and time again with anybody in this job. These kinds of stories go with the job. I am not losing any sleep about this, and I would advise you not to lose any sleep about it.

On the other question, with respect to authority, I have the responsibility under the President for the development and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States, and that includes all aspects of that policy. I will do just that, and I will continue to do so.

Q. Back to the Cuban thing. What particularly prompted this reanalysis? I'm not certain whether Senator Stone's charges or what particularly came to your attention, and when, actually, did this reanalysis take place?

A. The reanalysis was done in the early part of July, as I recall it—maybe even late June. There was some additional information which was again fragmentary, and on the basis of that, as I recall it, it was determined that we should do a reanalysis. We, subsequently, as I recall it, had conversations with Senator Stone and with

others, and we indicated to them that we planned to not only do our reanalysis but to intensify our efforts just to make sure that there wasn't something that we were missing. That's how the process got started and continued.

Q. What is the matter with the United States and Mexico? Why can't we get along? We seem to have broken down on negotiations on gas and illegal aliens and the oil spill. What's the matter?

A. We really haven't broken down on negotiations with respect to gas. Let me start with that. Mr. Christopher [Deputy Secretary of State] went down to Mexico recently to continue the negotiations—they are very difficult negotiations—and in the process of 2 days of talks, they were able to make further progress. However, important differences remained. It's a tough negotiation; there isn't any doubt about it. And just because you can't reach agreement in several sessions doesn't mean you give up. They are not broken off. They are going to continue, and they will continue.

Insofar as the question of undocumented workers is concerned, those discussions are proceeding at a pace and in a fashion which is satisfactory to both of our countries, and we will be continuing to press forward with those.

Insofar as the oil spill is concerned, the problem of the oil spill is one of those events that happens in the relationships between two countries. We, quite properly, have raised this question with them. They are considering the matter. They have matters which they would like to raise of a similar nature, going back into the past, with respect to some problems that were raised from the rivers and waters that flowed from the United States into Mexico. These are the kinds of problems that we, as neighbors and allies and friends, will be able to discuss and work out; and therefore, I really cannot accept your overly alarmist views of a breakdown of relations.

The President and President Lopez Portillo will be meeting around the 28th of September to go forward with the meeting which they had planned. This is part of a series of meetings. They have many things to discuss, and I look forward to, I believe, a good and constructive meeting. I know that's the way we view it, and I believe it's the way the Mexicans view it.

Q. On Friday Senator Stone said that the presence of the Russian troops in Cuba was of the same gravity as the 1962 Cuban missile

crisis confrontation. Number one, do you believe that that is a correct assessment? And number two, if it is, is the United States making any contingency plans for reactions that would be of the same gravity as we took in 1962?

A. Let me say I wish to repeat that I believe this to be a serious matter. However, it does not involve, as did the 1962 missile crisis, the question of offensive nuclear weapons. So there is a vast difference between the two. However, that does not mean that it is not a serious matter.

Q. In the wake of Ambassador Young's resignation, there was a sudden rise in tensions between the black and Jewish community in the United States, and some black leaders talked about the fact of there being a perception in the street that either the American Jewish community or Israel was behind the Young resignation. I would like to ask you, what is the Administration view? Was the Young resignation brought about in fact by the American Jewish community or Israel, or was it brought about as a result of his own actions, or whatever?

A. Let me say that in my judgment it was not the result of actions by the Jewish community. I want to make that very clear, and I think that I have spoken to the rest of the question.

Q. On the matter of the role of intelligence in forging foreign and national security policy, I would like your observations. It seems to me sometimes we make the policy, and then go get the intelligence. I'm thinking of North Korea, when the army, after the President made his policy of withdrawing the troops, the army went back on a zero-based intelligence analysis, started from scratch, and found out there were a hell of a lot more troops there than they had thought. We seem to be doing the same thing on Cuba. We lifted the U-2 or SR-71 aircraft flights as a gesture of good will, and then a year or so later we discover Soviet combat troops. Do you have any observation on that?

A. Yes. I think in the case of the Korean analysis which was done, the analysis was part of a continuing review process that goes on in the intelligence community with respect to the threat that is posed to our forces and the forces of our allies; and this was part of an ongoing process that had been going for a long period of time.

And again in that case, as one went forward, bits of information, as we proceeded over a period of years—starting back before this Administration—began to begin to build a pattern which was not at all clear when you first started picking up these bits and pieces of information. This is one of the problems particularly when you are dealing with ground units. It is a lot harder when you're dealing with ground units and that type of thing than it is dealing with the kind of matters which are before you when you have to deal with the monitoring of a SALT agreement where you have large installations, large types of equipment like missiles. It is much easier to deal with a large missile than it is with a tank or even a number of tanks.

Q. As you know, Prime Ministers Lynch and Thatcher are meeting today. You or the Department recently suspended arms sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary. In the meantime, people like Governor Carey have even stepped in to offer mediation. My question is, when will this study that you are doing now on this be completed, and are you contemplating suggesting to Mrs. Thatcher and the British Government a new political initiative to try and solve the problem?

A. The answer is that we are not planning to suggest a new political initiative. Our position has been—and President Carter stated it very clearly in 1977—a position of impartiality. It is a position of condemning terrorism and violence, and it is a position which supports the bringing together of the various factions in an attempt to try and move toward a peaceful solution.

It's an immensely difficult problem, as all of us know—one of the most difficult of these types of problems that exist throughout the world.

The position which we have taken is supported by the British Government, by the Irish Government, and by the political parties in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. For us to intrude ourselves at this point into the Irish situation, in my judgment, would not be wise. I think it would be resented by the parties concerned, and they are the ones that should deal with this issue. □

Press release 216.

¹For texts of the letters exchanged between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev Oct. 22-28, 1962, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1973.

AFRICA: Report on Southern Rhodesia

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 23, 1979. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.¹

I am pleased to be here this morning to brief the subcommittee and other interested members on recent developments with respect to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. As you will recall, the President in his statement of June 7 [1979] promised that the Administration would report to and consult with the Congress on a monthly basis on progress being made toward a solution to the Rhodesian problem. He did so in the belief that close and continuing consultations with the Congress would help to establish a policy toward Rhodesia that best serves the interests of the United States and of the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I am here today in fulfillment of that commitment to close consultations between the Administration and the Congress.

You will have received by now the first in a series of monthly written reports on developments since June 1, when [Prime Minister] Bishop Muzorewa's administration was formally installed. I would like to take just a moment, before turning to any questions you may have, to highlight some of the key aspects of that report and to bring you up to date on events that have taken place subsequently.

Role of the United Kingdom

First, I want to emphasize that we are continuing to consult closely with the British Government on the Rhodesian situation. Those consultations indicate that the British have embarked on a serious effort to resolve the Rhodesian problem in a way that satisfies the legitimate aspirations of the people of Rhodesia for self-determination under a democratic form of government that safeguards the rights of all citizens. They are also consulting extensively with leaders in Africa and elsewhere in order to establish a basis for bringing Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions of peace and wide international acceptability.

As [U.K. Foreign Secretary] Lord

Carrington indicated in his July 10 statement to the House of Lords, there is a widespread feeling that a solution in Rhodesia must stem from the British Government, as the legally responsible authority. The British intend to carry out that responsibility. And we have given our support to their efforts.

The meetings which President Carter and Secretary Vance had with Bishop Muzorewa and the other efforts we have made to improve our knowledge and understanding of developments in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, form a part of our effort to assist the British in the search for a lasting solution. In those meetings, the President and the Secretary each reiterated our view that a solution can be found through the establishment of constitutional and administrative arrangements that would allow for full political participation. We believe that this can be done in a way that will protect the rights and legitimate concerns of all elements of the population and will enable all to play a role in the country's political and economic future. Finally, the President and the Secretary urged Bishop Muzorewa to work closely with the British Government in seeking solutions to the problem of the continuing conflict and of international acceptability.

As Lord Carrington has noted, the British intend to continue their consultations on Rhodesia at the upcoming Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka beginning August 1. Thereafter, they hope to put forward proposals which will be accepted by all concerned as fair and reasonable, and which take account of what has already been achieved in Rhodesia. It is too early to anticipate what precise line those proposals may take. But we believe that they will be developed in close consultation with the United States and others concerned. (We understand that Prime Minister Thatcher may address this issue further during the July 25 debate in Parliament.)

Recent Developments

Secondly, I would like to say a word about the recent developments in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia itself. I believe it is too early to make definitive judgments about the direction the new government intends to take in meeting the aspirations of the people of Rhodesia

for peace and a clear demonstration of majority rule. We are deeply mindful of the difficult problems which Bishop Muzorewa faces in pursuing these objectives. Our discussions with him here, as well as the discussions which Mr. Davidow [Jeffrey Davidow, U.S. First Secretary at U.S. Embassy in Pretoria] has had with government officials and others in Salisbury, have given us a better appreciation of these problems. Certainly we are not unsympathetic to the immense difficulties facing Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. We have no doubt of Bishop Muzorewa's sincere desire to find workable solutions. We are hopeful that as he looks to the task of assuring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's future peace, stability, and prosperity, he will take fully into account the advice which the British Government and others are prepared to offer.

African Attitudes

Finally, with respect to African attitudes toward the situation in Rhodesia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) concluded its annual summit conference in Monrovia, Liberia, last Saturday. Prior to adjourning, the conference passed a resolution calling upon the international community to withhold recognition from the Muzorewa government and describing the externally based guerrilla groups as the sole representatives of the people of Zimbabwe. That action was taken despite our approaches and those of the British to OAU members urging that they refrain from resolutions that might complicate the search for a peaceful solution.

We do not believe that OAU's passage of this resolution will contribute to efforts to find a fair solution. Nevertheless, we do not believe this diminishes the importance of involving concerned African states in the search for a solution. We believe the resolution should be understood in the context of African concern over what they regard as a disposition by Britain and the United States to accept the present constitutional and political arrangements in Rhodesia as a basis for recognition and the lifting of sanctions.

From our contacts, we know that a number of African states, including some of the front line, concurred in the resolution for that reason. At the same time, however, there continues to be considerable African interest in and support for a further effort to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia in a way that will insure a clear demonstration of majority rule.

**REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA
JUNE 1-JULY 13, 1979**

During the past month, the United States has (1) improved its communication with the Muzorewa administration and our ability to monitor developments in Rhodesia; and (2) given its full encouragement and support to British consultations with all concerned aimed at developing proposals for bringing Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions of peace and wide international acceptability.

Several important steps have been taken to improve our knowledge and understanding of developments in Rhodesia. Approval was granted June 12 for two officials of the Muzorewa administration, Prof. James Kamusikiri and Mr. Jonathan Maswoswe, to come to Washington to prepare for Bishop Muzorewa's planned visit to Washington in July. They met several times with officials of the Department of State, including two meetings with Assistant Secretary Richard Moose. As indicated by Secretary Vance on June 7, the Department announced June 25 the assignment as First Secretary to our Embassy in Pretoria of Mr. Jeffrey Davidow, who will be making frequent and extended visits to Salisbury. The first of these visits began with Mr. Davidow's arrival in Salisbury July 5.

On June 24, Secretary Vance responded to an earlier message from Bishop Muzorewa and expressed his desire to meet with him during his visit to Washington. Following his arrival in Washington July 9, Bishop Muzorewa met July 10 with Secretary Vance and the following day with President Carter at Camp David. In those meetings, the President and the Secretary each reaffirmed the US commitment to a peaceful transfer of responsible political authority to the black majority and their belief that an end to the bloodshed can be achieved through the establishment of constitutional and administrative procedures that are responsive to the legitimate aspirations of all citizens of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They expressed the hope that Bishop Muzorewa would work closely with the British government, as the legally responsible authority, in seeking a peaceful solution to the problems of full political participation and internationally recognized independence. Following the meetings, Bishop Muzorewa reiterated his appeal for immediate recognition and a lifting of sanctions, but reserved comment on the substance of the discussions pending his talks with Prime Minister Thatcher in London.

U.S. Support for British Initiatives

There have been close and continuing consultations with the British government. Assistant Secretary Richard Moose and Policy Planning Director Anthony Lake, accompanied by Mr. Davidow, traveled to London June 27-28 for intensive discussions with British special

emissary Lord Harlech and other British officials. There have been several subsequent exchanges between our two governments.

The British government is actively pursuing a process of consultation with all concerned. In June, Lord Harlech visited Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Nigeria for discussions with the leaders of these states and with representatives of the externally based Rhodesian parties. Another British envoy, Mr. Richard Luce, held discussions with the leaders of other African states. In his July 10 statement in the House of Lords, Lord Carrington reported that the consultations had been both encouraging and useful and that they revealed a willingness on the part of most African states to recognize that major changes have taken place in the Rhodesian situation. Nevertheless, they also indicated widespread African criticism of the Rhodesian constitution, particularly with respect to the blocking power of the white minority over a wide range of legislation, and the character of the public service commissions.

The British have also been in close communication with the Muzorewa administration. British Under Secretary Derek Day visited Salisbury at the end of May and returned there July 5 on his second visit. Lord Harlech also visited Salisbury July 2-5 to initiate discussions with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues of issues that were later pursued during the Bishop's visit to London (July 12-13). British Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington held talks with Bishop Muzorewa July 13 in London.

The British will continue their consultations at the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in Lusaka beginning August 1. As Lord Carrington indicated in his July 10 statement, they are hopeful that once the process is completed, they will be able to put forward proposals which will be accepted as fair and reasonable, and which will provide a basis for bringing Rhodesia to legal independence in conditions of peace and wide international acceptability. The United States has given its full encouragement and support to this process of consultation. We have contributed to it by urging all concerned to cooperate fully with the British effort, and by joining with the British in asking African states and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to support efforts that would facilitate the search for a peaceful solution. African leaders at the July 6 opening of the OAU Ministerial Meeting in Monrovia, Liberia, expressed reservations concerning the elections and constitutional arrangements in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but reaffirmed African interest in further settlement efforts.

Internal Political Developments

Internal political developments during the past month have centered on the installation and organization of the new government and the activities of the black political parties.

Bishop Muzorewa was sworn in as Prime

Minister June 1, along with an ethnically-balanced, seventeen-member cabinet representing on a basis of rough parity the tribal, political and racial composition of the new parliament. Ian Smith was appointed Minister without Portfolio. In his first formal address on June 2, Bishop Muzorewa repeated his amnesty offer to ZANU and ZAPU [Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People's Union] and his willingness to attend an All-Parties Conference. In a June 6 press interview, Ian Smith offered to leave the government if "official negotiations" would thereby be aided; but he said he would not step down "simply to facilitate Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's enemies."

**Visit of
Bishop Muzorewa**

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the current administration in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, visited Washington, D.C., July 9-11, 1979, and met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is a White House statement issued on July 11.¹

President Carter met with Bishop Muzorewa this afternoon because of the President's deep personal commitment to help find a solution for the peaceful transfer of responsible political authority from the white minority to the black majority in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

In a frank exchange of views, the President emphasized his sincere desire to see an end to the bitterness and bloodshed in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. He believes this can be accomplished by the establishment of a broadly based consensus on constitutional procedures and administrative processes which are responsive to the legitimate political aspirations of all the peoples of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The President restated his intention to work closely with the Government of the United Kingdom, which has the primary legal and historic responsibility to bring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to independence based on full political participation and human rights guarantees for all its citizens. He expressed the hope that the Muzorewa administration would work closely with the United Kingdom in seeking nonmilitary, political means to further this goal. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 16, 1979.

Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole [head of the African National Council/Sithole] and eleven others elected on his party's ticket continued their boycott of parliament. Sithole told reporters June 11 he would pursue his court case alleging that the April elections were rigged and that officials intimidated black voters. His call for new elections under British supervision was supported by Chief Jeremiah Chirau, leader of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization. Fifteen members of Sithole's party were arrested in two sweeps (June 2 and 5) in connection with an alleged plot to assassinate Bishop Muzorewa, a charge which Sithole strongly denied. Sithole's own home was searched June 29.

Within Bishop Muzorewa's own party, the United African National Congress (UANC), First Vice President James Chikerema led a walk-out of seven members of parliament (all from the same tribal group) who then formed the Zimbabwe Democratic Party. On June 28, the UANC obtained a temporary injunction from the High Court barring the new party's members from taking their seats in parliament on the grounds that they had been elected on the UANC slate. The court began hearing the case July 11.

Following the installation of the new government, Bishop Muzorewa visited Pretoria July 15-18 for discussions of military and economic relations with South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha and Foreign Minister R.F. Botha.

The Muzorewa government announced its program at the first session of Parliament June 26, declaring that it would have as its primary objectives international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. There was no announcement of proposed new economic and social legislation.

An Amnesty Directorate was established to encourage members of the guerrilla forces to lay down their arms. The amnesty offered promises of a safe return, no interrogation, and food and clothing for surrendering guerrillas. Estimates of the results to date vary. On July 3, the government announced the release of 141 persons detained under security legislation stemming from the state of emergency. The step was described as being in line with the government's policy to release all those who were no longer considered "a danger to the state." Various estimates place the number of persons still in detention for political offenses at approximately 1,000. In a related development, Bishop Muzorewa declared that all missionaries previously deported from the country would be free to return.

Military and Security Developments

There has been no change in the pattern of military activity over the past month. According to Rhodesian government statistics, the number of deaths resulting from actions inside the country in June were 685, down from the record level reached in May of 891. Martial law remains in effect throughout most of the

The U.S. Role in Southern Africa

by Richard M. Moose

Address before the Southern Africa Research Program Symposium on Race Conflict in Southern Africa at Yale University on April 18, 1979. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

Within the past 2 years southern Africa has been propelled into the front ranks of U.S. policy concerns. This has occurred because the region is undergoing fundamental, irreversible political change—and the pace is accelerating. At the heart of this process is racial conflict—the subject of your conference.

Stock assumptions, widely held in the past, such as the survivability of the minority white regimes, have been quickly, even suddenly, cast aside. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonies, the remaining systems of minority privilege in southern Africa have come under increasing challenge.

territory as a result of continued insecurity in the countryside.

In two series of raids on June 26 and July 1-3, Rhodesian security forces struck at ZAPU camps around Lusaka, inflicting substantial casualties and loss of materiel on the defenders. The June 26 strike included an attack on the ZAPU intelligence headquarters in the populated Roma suburb of Lusaka. ZANU staging areas in Mozambique were also hit in early June.

ZANU and ZAPU representatives met during June to discuss the coordination of their military activities. On July 4, guerrillas attacked the Salisbury residence of the Greek Orthodox Archbishop, who apparently was mistaken either for his neighbor, General Walls, or for Bishop Muzorewa. ZAPU leader Joshua

New stresses and strains have appeared or have reinforced earlier ones. These strains affect not only the focal points of racial conflict—Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa—but the entire surrounding region—everything from Zaire, south. And, as the momentum of nationalism has picked up, so too has the tendency of outsiders, for their own reasons, to involve themselves in the problems of southern Africa.

The key issue today is not whether the changes we now see unfolding will be peaceful or violent, but whether there is still a chance to render less violent the inevitable transition to majority rule.

Why is the U.S. Involved?

At the outset of this Administration, we decided that the United States could and should try to play an active and positive part in helping to bring about the full participation of all races in the political life of southern Africa. We

Nkomo announced July 6 that his forces would suspend cross-border infiltrations into Rhodesia from July 25 to August 10, to coincide with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka. Bishop Muzorewa publicly stated in Washington July 11 that Rhodesian forces would not launch attacks in the area of the Zambian capital during the period of the meeting.

Economic Developments

General economic trends do not seem to have been significantly affected during the new government's first month in office. The government has published no official figures on white emigration since April, when net white emigration that month was 1,600. Estimates for May and June indicate that white emigration is continuing at a rate of over 1,000 per month.

Economic analysts report no evidence of a reversal in adverse economic trends in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (GDP declined an average of 4 percent per year between 1974 and 1978). The agricultural sector in particular is feeling the combined effects of insecurity in the countryside and the drought which has affected wide areas of southern Africa. □

Letters of Credence

On May 10, 1979, Mamady Lamine Conde of Guinea, Yao Grunitsky of Togo, and Ousman Ahmadou Sallah of Gambia presented their credentials to President Carter as their countries' newly appointed Ambassadors to the United States. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

believe there are sound reasons for this policy.

- We believe it is the right thing to do. Concepts of free participation in political life, majority rule, and national independence are ideals to which all of us can subscribe.

- The promotion of this objective is very much in our long-term interest. Bringing our policy in line with our own values eases a major source of conflict with the African and nonaligned nations. Relations with these governments are of growing importance to us politically, as trading partners and as sources of natural resources.

- We believe that over the long term our interests are best served by encouraging the emergence of leaders and governments reflecting the values of the western political tradition—a tradition which, as you know, provided the impetus behind today's demand for change.

- And, finally, the peaceful resolution of conflict offers the best possible protection against continued poaching in the area by outside powers which thrive on violence and disorder.

In practical terms, our southern Africa agenda consists of simultaneous efforts to find workable formulas leading to peaceful solutions of distinct—yet interrelated—problems, some of them at, or near, the flashpoint.

We have no rigid formulas to insist upon. But we are convinced that only by recognizing the role of all political elements, and only by seeking to insure the political rights of all persons, can lasting settlements be found. We are seeking progress toward that goal by working with the Africans—including the South Africans—and with other Western governments.

Because our agenda in Washington so closely parallels that of your conference, I would like to describe briefly for you what we are trying to accomplish, what we have done, and where we stand. Finally, in each case, I would like to pose some of the questions which we currently face in seeking to implement U.S. policies.

Namibia

In Namibia our objective is an internationally acceptable settlement centered on U.N.-supervised elections which would enable Namibians to decide their own political future.

We and our four Western partners have tried to cut through the legal, political, and rhetorical impasse which has so long surrounded the Namibian

issue by crafting a practical settlement proposal acceptable to all principal parties.

Front-line cooperation has been invaluable in this effort. Our success in obtaining that cooperation has faced the U.S.S.R. with a difficult situation. Notwithstanding their endorsement of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the front-line states have had enough confidence in the West to work with us toward a peaceful settlement in Namibia. In effect they told the Soviets to stay out. The U.S.S.R. was obliged to abstain on the critical vote in the Security Council last July, which approved the Namibia settlement.

As you know, South Africa and SWAPO have both officially accepted the Western settlement plan. But, unfortunately, the South African Government, over the past several months, has raised a series of objections to the manner in which the Secretary General proposes to implement it. Most recently, the South Africans have demanded the ouster of any armed SWAPO personnel from Namibia after the cease-fire. They have also insisted that SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia be monitored by the United Nations. Neither of these actions is called for in the original agreement.

With SWAPO aboard, and the front-line promising its cooperation, the chief question now facing us is what the South African Government will do. While asserting that they favor an international settlement, the South Africans have also kept open the alternative of an internal settlement. We note with concern that key elements of that option, such as the so-called Constituent Assembly, are already in place. In the course of the last 3 weeks, we have undertaken major diplomatic efforts to assuage the concerns of the Namibian parties and to ascertain South Africa's intentions. We are now awaiting their reply.

If South Africa opts for an internal settlement in Namibia, the consequences will be grave, not only for South Africa but for the region as a whole and for the world community.

The broader question facing South Africa in Namibia, and in Rhodesia as well, is one of strategic choice. South Africa can have a democratic, internationally recognized settlement in Namibia if it is willing to cooperate with the West and its African neighbors. Or, South Africa can retreat from that challenge and, on the basis of a hard-edged, psychologically more familiar calculation, rely on its own strength in defiance of the world community.

Angola

Angola will have a crucial role to play in any Namibia settlement. Its leaders recognize that success in Namibia could well open the way to the resolution of some of Angola's other pressing problems.

We wish to see an Angola free of entanglements involving outsiders with its internal conflict peacefully resolved and its people able to enter into the full enjoyment of their long sought independence. Our policy toward Angola has focused in a very practical way on security issues along its borders. Acting in concert with other interested governments, we have actively sought to help defuse Angola's problems with Zaire and South Africa. Although we have not recognized the Luanda government, we have found it possible to work constructively with the Angolans on regional security problems. Meanwhile, a number of American business concerns have also developed mutually beneficial relationships with the Angolans.

For the future, however, one must ask how and whether Angola will be able to solve peacefully its internal difficulties? To what extent are these problems inherent in its history and its ethnic makeup? To what extent are they encouraged or even the product of outside interests? In a more general sense, we must consider whether Angola will be able to determine its own future, or will it, for the moment, remain hostage to events beyond its control in neighboring territories?

South Africa

In many ways South Africa seems to hold the key to the solution of the problems of its region. And yet, as recent events have shown, its own domestic problems and the resulting complexity of its relations with Africa and the West make cooperation with them exceedingly difficult.

It has been a basic tenet of our policy that there must be change in South Africa, including an end to the apartheid system, and eventual full participation by all South Africans in the nation's political and economic life.

Another premise of our policy is that we will attempt to work with South Africa on solutions to the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia. At the same time, we have made it clear that progress in one of these areas will not be traded for forbearance on the others.

Early in this Administration, Vice President Mondale told then Prime Minister Vorster that unless there was a move away from apartheid, our rela-

tions would inevitably deteriorate. We have reiterated that view in word and deed since then, including our going beyond the U.N. mandatory arms embargo following Steve Biko's death with our own ban on all exports to the South African police and military.

Unfortunately, as we all know, there has been no significant diminution of apartheid in the past 2 years. During this time we have sought to emphasize to the Afrikaner leadership that they cannot continue to have both apartheid and the ties with us to which they seem to attach such great importance. Regardless of what attitude we take toward South Africa, their problem will remain: The hard choices are theirs to make.

While there is more introspection and questioning going on among white South Africans today than ever before, the fundamental question remains whether their present system is capable of beneficial change and regeneration. Until such time as we conclude—God forbid—that such change is impossible, we must continue to seek a rational balance between actions which may enhance the prospects for change, and those which intensify the *LAAGER* instinct.

Internationally, South Africa is ambivalent on Namibia and Rhodesia. Recently, we have heard of a South Afri-

can "grand vision" of a southern African commonwealth of nations stretching north from Cape Town to the Cunene and the Zambezi. Unless the South Africans are able to bring themselves to think about their long-term security in a different dimension, their choice seems to lie between the greater or lesser *LAAGER*—and our relations with them will face the prospect of further deterioration.

Rhodesia

In early 1977, we and the British began an effort to find a formula for a peaceful, negotiated settlement for Rhodesia. We have sought to fashion a plan for a settlement which would include both internal and external groups and permit the holding of free and fair elections under international auspices.

Present prospects for peace are not bright. The Salisbury parties are intent on an internal settlement. The patriotic front is intent on thwarting one. The violence on both sides grows. Under these inauspicious circumstances, elections within Rhodesia have begun.

Today is the first day of voting in Rhodesia for the 72 black seats in the 100-Member parliament. By any measure, this marks a turning point which may influence decisively the future course of events. Many questions arise.

- Will there be a greater or lesser willingness in Salisbury to strive for a settlement embracing all parties to the conflict after the elections?

- Will the attitudes of Rhodesian whites toward negotiations differ from those of the newly elected black leaders?

- With their growing military confidence, will the leaders of the patriotic front be able, or be willing, to put aside their personal rivalries and negotiate with Salisbury if such an opportunity can be created?

The response to these questions will have a profound significance in judging whether a peaceful settlement is still possible. In terms of our own policy. To put the question in a different and more ominous manner: We must weigh the domestic political costs of an ongoing U.S. negotiating role against the consequences of failure to achieve a negotiated settlement. Among the costs, if there is no political settlement, likely would be:

- An increasingly destructive impact on the surrounding states;

- Greater Soviet and Cuban involvement; and

- An irreversible polarization of the southern African problem along racial and ideological lines.

The Front-line and Other African States

Over the past 2 years we have achieved some success with the front-line and other African states in breaking through the barrier of mistrust and misunderstanding which grew up in the past. We have welcomed them as full partners and have demonstrated our commitment to racial justice and a peaceful settlement in southern Africa. At the same time we have made clear to the front-line that we will not take sides among the nationalist parties. As we reject the right of the Salisbury parties to determine Zimbabwe's political future, so do we reject the claim of the patriotic front for dominance in a transitional political process. We believe that we have made ourselves understood on this point—perhaps better to the Africans than to our own domestic audience.

The potential tragedy of the black southern African states is their apparent lack of ability to avert the tragedy which threatens to engulf them. While the leaders of the front-line rightly refuse to compromise on the central issue of racial justice which lies at the heart of the Rhodesian question, they see all too clearly the consequences of the rapidly spreading violence. It is for this

Uganda

PRESIDENT'S MEMORANDUM, MAY 15, 1979¹

Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce

Subject: Trade with Uganda

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 5 of Public Law 95-435, I hereby determine and certify that:

The Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights.

The Secretary of State is requested to report this determination to the Congress on my behalf, as required by law.

The Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce are requested to take the appropriate steps permitting the immediate resumption of imports from and exports to Uganda.

This determination shall be published in the **FEDERAL REGISTER**.

JIMMY CARTER

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MAY 15, 1979²

All Americans were appalled by evidence of the truly deplorable human rights violations which occurred during the Amin regime. While my Administration publicly condemned this situation, I would particularly like to commend Senators Hatfield and Weicker and Congressmen Pease and Bonker for the intense concern which they exhibited about the human rights situation in Uganda. The breaking of the pattern of gross violations of human rights heralds a brighter day for Ugandans and, indeed, for all in the world concerned with human rights. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 21, 1979.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 21, 1979.

reason that they have so strongly supported, and continue to support, our efforts to find a political solution based on internationally supervised elections.

As we approach a crucial period in our southern Africa policies we must consider the consequences of our decisions:

- What more can we do to bring about negotiations among parties seemingly unwilling to compromise?
- What choices will remain for the front-line states if we simply allow events to take their course?
- How would U.S. interests in Africa and beyond be affected by an abandonment of our present impartial stance?

Conclusion

I have probably asked more questions—and answered fewer—than you would have liked. But I did so for a purpose. During the coming week, you will be examining some of the difficult choices this nation faces, or will be forced to face, in southern Africa.

While our real leverage on events in southern Africa has always been small, it may be further constricted by domestic perceptions and constraints; and, while any kind of active effort to resolve peacefully the longstanding conflicts in southern Africa would be difficult, the task has been made immeasurably more onerous by:

- Our late entry onto the scene;
- African perceptions (and not a little recent American history) which had to be overcome; and
- The fact that we chose that most difficult of negotiating vehicles—multilateral diplomacy.

[U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.] Andy Young has frequently said that since we're getting attacked with equal vigor from the right and from the left, in this country and in Africa, we must be doing something right. I agree with this.

What we are doing right is this.

- We have enunciated principles with which no one—here or there—can disagree.
- We have faithfully applied these principles throughout the continuous negotiating history of the last 2 years.
- We firmly believe that these principles can still provide an equitable process leading to fair solutions for all the people of southern Africa.

Some may, indeed do, disagree with this or that tactic. But no one can challenge the principles we have advanced. By fealty to these principles—

OAU Summit Meeting

by William C. Harrop

*Statement before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 27, 1979. Mr. Harrop is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*¹

I welcome the opportunity to report to the Africa subcommittee on the sixteenth assembly of heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). These deliberations, which took place in the capital of Liberia from July 17–21, were preceded by and actually overlapped a preparatory meeting of ministers, mostly foreign ministers, where a great deal of the most important debate apparently took place. The two meetings are now generally referred to together as the OAU Monrovia summit.

This year's OAU summit has been characterized in the press as "one of the most acrimonious in recent history." Although the description fits the boos and cheers and walkouts at the meeting, I believe the spirited tenor of the assembly demonstrated that the political leaders of Africa showed greater willingness this year to confront the tough issues openly and to discuss the differences which divide them.

Noteworthy examples were Tanzania's and Libya's military interventions in Uganda, the status of the Western Sahara, and the legitimacy of the Government of Chad. Other questions engendering lively debate were the status to be accorded to the patriotic front and the Middle East peace process.

Although these divisive issues attracted a great deal of attention, the summit was also of special interest be-

cause of the broader attention paid for the first time to economic matters and to human rights. Revision of the OAU Charter itself was also discussed. I shall summarize briefly the principal developments at the summit and offer our general appraisal. I will, of course, be happy to discuss the summit in greater depth as desired by the members.

Military Intervention in Uganda and the OAU Charter

Tanzania's military intervention in Uganda was the subject of severe criticism, particularly by the outgoing OAU chairman, President Nimeiri of Sudan, and the Nigerian Chief of State, Gen. Obasanjo. President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Binaisa of Uganda defended the action, said that Idi Amin was the original aggressor, and drew attention to the Libyan military intervention on the latter's behalf. Many attacked Idi Amin's gross violation of human rights, and to our knowledge no one rose to defend Amin. Rather, the question was whether such violations justified jeopardizing the OAU Charter's cardinal principles of nonintervention and territorial integrity. The formal debate was eventually closed without any resolutions having been introduced.

Although the issue is unresolved, the possibility of revising the OAU Charter was given considerable attention as a result of it. Following President Nimeiri's proposal that a council of five heads of state be created to intercede in conflicts—with the power to make decisions binding on the parties—the summit passed a resolution recommending the establishment of a committee to review the charter.

The Western Sahara

By a close vote, the summit adopted the so-called Wisemen's report on the Western Sahara and asked that the five states composing the ad hoc committee (Nigeria, Mali, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Guinea) plus Liberia continue its work. The report calls for a referendum in the Western Sahara to permit the people to exercise the right to self-determination. However, a high OAU official has said that it would be difficult to hold a referendum without the cooperation of Morocco, which remains opposed to

and by a growing recognition that so-called unilateral "solutions" will not solve southern Africa's worsening problems—we shall preserve our ability to mediate. That—it's now more clear than ever—will be needed someday. We will also preserve a policy, for the first time in this part of the world, which faithfully reflects ideals as a nation.

In the past, our worst problems as a people have come when we lost sight of these ideals. In the difficult days ahead—let me assure you—we will not. □

the concept of holding a referendum. During the proceedings the Moroccan delegation walked out, as did the Presidents of Senegal and Gabon, two strong supporters of Morocco.

Chad

The delegation representing the government presently in Ndjamena was excluded early on from the council of ministers and, to the best of our knowledge, it did not then attempt to be seated at the assembly of heads of state and government. Nigeria and Libya actively sought exclusion of the Chad-ian delegation. To exclude Chad because of the unclear internal political situation in the country and the claim that the government is unrepresentative appears to be unprecedented in OAU history. Traditionally, the organization has taken the position that it recognizes states rather than governments and has avoided divisive debate over legitimacy.

Recognition of the Patriotic Front

Of particular concern to us were the actions taken in reference to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A resolution was voted "reaffirming that the Patriotic Front is the sole, legitimate and authentic representative of the People of Zimbabwe." This degree of recognition had not before been accorded by the OAU, despite the term "reaffirming." There is also language in this resolution which criticizes Western, and, in particular, "US and UK diplomatic maneuvers to stifle the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for genuine independence." It also expresses indignation "at the moves of Britain and the USA towards recognition of the illegal regime resulting from the illegal elections." There are implied threats in the passage which "decides that member states shall apply effective cultural, political, commercial and economic sanctions" against any state which accords recognition or lifts mandatory U.N. sanctions against the Muzorewa government.

We believe—and so informed our African friends before the summit—that actions such as the resolution eventually voted would make more difficult the task of achieving a solution to the Rhodesian conflict. There is considerable evidence that a number of African states share this concern; several states entered official reservations to parts of the text concerning the status of the patriotic front while others continue to express their reservations less officially.

In this regard, the Secretary General of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, pointed out to the press that interest was shown during the summit debate in round table negotiations. He said explicitly that the OAU does not feel that it has closed the door on all party talks. We are pleased that such assurances were made and do, in fact, believe that the OAU can be helpful in our efforts to get all the parties to negotiate a peaceful political accommodation. We will continue to discuss this issue with the

U.S. Ambassadors to African Countries, September 1979

Benin—Vacant
Botswana—Horace G. Dawson, Jr.¹
Burundi—Thomas J. Corcoran
Cameroon—Mabel Murphy Smythe
Cape Verde—Edward Marks
Central African Empire—Goodwin Cooke
Chad—Donald R. Norland
Comoros—Vacant
Congo—William Lacy Swing
Djibouti—Vacant
Ethiopia—Frederic L. Chapin
Gabon—Arthur T. Tienken
Gambia—Herman J. Cohen
Ghana—Thomas W. M. Smith
Guinea—Oliver S. Crosby
Guinea-Bissau—Edward Marks
Ivory Coast—Nancy V. Rawls
Kenya—Wilbert John Le Melle
Lesotho—John R. Clingerman
Liberia—Robert P. Smith
Madagascar—Vacant
Malawi—Harold E. Horan
Mali—Patricia M. Byrne
Mauritania—E. Gregory Kryza
Mauritius—Samuel Rhea Gammon
Mozambique—Willard A. De Pree
Niger—James Keough Bishop
Nigeria—Stephen Low
Rwanda—Vacant
Sao Tome and Principe—Arthur T. Tienken
Senegal—Herman J. Cohen
Seychelles—Wilbert John Le Melle
Sierra Leone—John Andrew Linehan
Somalia—Donald K. Petterson
South Africa—William B. Edmondson
Sudan—Donald Clayton Bergus
Swaziland—Vacant
Tanzania—Richard Noyes Viets
Togo—Marilyn Priscilla Johnson
Uganda—Vacant
Upper Volta—Thomas D. Boyatt
Zaire—Vacant
Zambia—Frank George Wisner II

¹Nominated by the President but not yet confirmed by the Senate.

OAU Chairman, President Tolbert, and OAU Secretariat officials.

Middle East Situation

It is significant that the suspension of Egypt from the OAU did not become a serious issue during the conference, as had earlier seemed possible. On the Egypt-Israel treaty and the Camp David process, we understand that the radical states held out until very late in the summit for condemnatory language, but were obliged to fall back when they could not assemble the votes.

The final version of the Middle East resolution does not attack either Egypt or the treaty itself, although it does contain language condemning "all partial agreements and separate treaties which violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people." The resolution condemns Israel in the strongest terms and reaffirms support for the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. I believe it is safe to say, however, that the moderate states of Africa see the resolution as a very favorable compromise.

Other Issues

Africa's difficult economic situation and its perilous future were focused upon and discussed publicly during the summit with great realism. The Secretary General called this a "break-through" in the consideration of economic questions. This is a new emphasis; although there were no substantive decisions, the assembled heads of government called for an extraordinary summit to discuss economic integration and development. The Secretary General was also directed to prepare the groundwork for the establishment of an African economic community. This recognition of economic problems and determination to address them collectively is certainly a step in the right direction.

References to human rights were made in many of the speeches, perhaps most notably in President Tolbert's keynote address as OAU chairman for the coming year. A resolution reaffirming the need for improved respect for human rights, and in particular the right to development, was proposed by Senegal and Gambia and accepted by the summit. This resolution also calls upon the Secretary General to organize a meeting of experts to prepare a draft of an African charter on human rights and provides for "the establishment of bodies" to protect human rights. One high OAU official reporting on the proceedings said: "We cannot talk about the denial of human rights in

ARMS CONTROL: *An Evaluation of SALT II*

by George M. Seignious II

*Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 30, 1979. Mr. Seignious is Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.*¹

When I speak for SALT, I do not speak for good will or for detente or for a political party or for trust. I speak in favor of an arms control treaty that will strengthen the national security of the United States.

Today, equitable and verifiable arms control goes hand in hand with a strong defense. The cold, hard fact of life in the nuclear age is that we have no other practical choice. A strong defense makes arms control possible, for it is precisely because we are strong and intend to remain so that we do not fear to negotiate. And arms control, carefully conceived and vigilantly negotiated, has defense as its guide and security as its result.

I could not advocate to the President, to the Senate, or to the American people any form of unilateral disarmament. Over three decades in the military service of my country have taught me that we must first see to the security of our nation. I could not advocate an agreement that ties our hands while the Soviets are allowed a free hand. In

strategic arms we must be ahead of, or at least equal to, the Soviet Union, never number two. And I could not advocate an agreement based on trust. The very survival of our nation is at stake—and trust is not a basis for national survival.

SALT II is a careful and major step forward to limit strategic offensive nuclear arms. It is a negotiated compromise that compromises neither our own security nor the stability of the strategic nuclear balance nor the continuing quest to limit nuclear arms. SALT II is a consensus treaty that provides progress for the present and hope for the future.

SALT II is not a panacea; it is not the millenium. Ratification will not stop competition or eliminate all the challenges we face or guarantee permanent stability. Above all, ratification does not mean that we as a nation can go to sleep. National security is a continuing requirement. It requires national will. And it requires vigilance.

I have studied SALT II carefully from three professional vantage points—as Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the at-large member of the SALT delegation, and as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I want to focus the first part of my statement on

five fundamental standards against which I have measured SALT II.

First. SALT II must place limits on Soviet forces;

Second. SALT II must permit us to undertake the military programs we believe are necessary for our security; we must be able to maintain the strategic balance under SALT II;

Third. SALT II must be adequately verifiable.

Fourth. SALT II must not interfere with existing patterns of cooperation and support for our NATO allies;

Fifth. SALT II must enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

SALT II meets each and every one of these standards.

Limiting Soviet Strategic Forces

My first standard—limiting Soviet strategic forces—exemplifies a unique contribution that SALT II brings to our national security. In an arms race without limits, we can build more but so can the Soviets. I am concerned about the Soviet buildup. We all are. It is massive and relentless. I believe we should meet it by maintaining military forces equivalent to whatever forces the Soviets build and by capping the Soviet buildup through SALT. We are going to have to do both at the same time if we want to maintain the strategic balance in a realistic, practical way.

The simple fact is that the Soviet Union has vast economic resources and a national will, no less determined than our own, to expend those resources for what it perceives to be necessary military purposes. Without arms control agreements, we cannot stop the Soviets from building as many strategic weapons as they wish, and we cannot force them to dismantle existing weapon systems. We can certainly match the Soviets in any nuclear arms race, but SALT is the only way I know to limit the number of Soviet missiles and nuclear warheads targeted at our country.

As a former military man, I believe that any time you succeed in limiting the destructive forces that could be marshalled against you by your adversary, you have accomplished something of significance. Let me detail for you some specific ways in which the

South Africa without insuring that we ourselves are the defenders of human rights.”

I find this African interest in promoting human rights to be entirely positive and a reflection of the emphasis the Carter Administration has placed upon the issue. It behooves us to encourage these African initiatives which are so consistent with our own human rights policies.

Summary

Developments at this year's OAU summit are on balance encouraging. It seems safe to expect that President Tolbert will play an active role in guiding the OAU during the coming year and that he will be a force for moderation. It should be remembered, however, that the OAU was never designed to be a supranational body, and this organization of sovereign states

will continue to encounter extreme difficulty in reaching decisions and enforcing them whenever individual states or groups of states refuse to compromise. Whatever their views of OAU actions and inactions, African leaders seem to be unanimous in finding that OAU summits are excellent occasions to push and swap ideas.

It is in our interest to consult frequently with President Tolbert and senior OAU officials during the coming year. We will try to encourage a broader appreciation of our positions and at the same time, ourselves, to develop a better understanding of African concerns and political dynamics. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

SALT II treaty accomplishes this objective.

- Under SALT II, the Soviets must reduce the total of their central strategic systems (launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) from over 2,500 at present to 2,250 by the end of 1981. We estimate that without this limit, the Soviets could have as many as 3,000 such systems by 1985. Thus, what otherwise would probably be a 20% increase in Soviet strategic systems is converted by SALT II to a 10% decrease.

- Under SALT II, the Soviets will be limited to 1,200 launchers of ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently targetable warheads, or MIRV's [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles]. This figure is about 600 less than we estimate they could have by the end of 1985.

- Under SALT II, the Soviets will be limited to 820 launchers of MIRV'ed intercontinental ballistic missiles—the most threatening part of their strategic force. We estimate that they could deploy at least 300 more than this figure by the end of 1985 without SALT II.

- Under SALT II, the Soviets will

agreed to ban this system to avoid a verification problem. The SS-16 ICBM appeared to be compatible with the launcher for the shorter range SS-20 which is not limited by SALT II.

- Under SALT II, rapid reload of ICBM launchers and storage of extra ICBM's at ICBM launch sites will be banned.

Thus, under SALT II, there will be many hundreds fewer Soviet strategic systems and many thousands fewer deliverable strategic warheads in their arsenal than they could have without SALT II.

These limits on Soviet systems are not all we would like to see if we could dictate to the Soviet Union. But they are also not meaningless restraints on totals already much too high.

I need hardly remind this committee of the destructive power contained in the Soviet systems to be dismantled or of the destructive power we would have to face if Soviet programs went forward unimpeded. While some commentators have attempted to characterize the Soviet weapons likely to be dismantled as obsolescent, I want to note that the Soviets will be forced to select from among nuclear-powered submarines with missiles built in the early 1970's, aircraft carrying their

of the Soviet Union to which I cannot subscribe.

U.S. Strategic Forces

My second standard concerns our own forces. We must be able to preserve the strategic balance under SALT II. SALT II will not tie our hands. We will be able to proceed under SALT II with all of the force options we have decided are necessary for our security.

- We have improved the accuracy and explosive yield of our existing Minuteman III land-based missiles. SALT II will not prevent similar improvements in the future.

- We are about to fit some of our existing Poseidon nuclear submarines with the longer range Trident I missile which means that these submarines can patrol and hide in vastly increased ocean areas and still hit their Soviet targets. They will be even more difficult to detect. This program will be completed in 1982. SALT II does not hinder this in any way.

- We have just launched the first of our Trident nuclear missile submarines, each of which can hit about 200 Soviet targets. By the end of SALT II, we plan to have seven of these submarines. SALT II does not hinder this in any way.

- We are developing and testing air-launched cruise missiles for placement aboard approximately 150 of our heavy bombers. We plan to start installing these air-launched cruise missiles in 1981. By late 1985, we expect to have nearly 1,500 of these cruise missiles deployed. They are highly accurate and can be launched from outside the range of Soviet air defenses. SALT II will permit this deployment.

- We are developing and testing long-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's and SLCM's). Deployment is prohibited by SALT II until after 1981, but these missiles would not be ready for deployment before this date anyway. When these are ready for deployment, it will be our decision to make whether deployment or negotiated restrictions, which also limit the Soviet Union, are in our best national security interests. During the protocol period, SLCM's and GLCM's can be flight-tested to any range.

I should add in this regard that when the United States insisted that the protocol be of a short, fixed duration, we meant precisely that. The protocol expires on December 31, 1981; nothing could be clearer. Any decision to put legal restrictions upon U.S. GLCM's and SLCM's after 1981 would require an entirely new negotiation and another

SALT II is a consensus treaty that provides progress for the present and hope for the future.

be permitted to flight-test and deploy only one new type of light ICBM during the treaty period. This means that all but one of the fifth generation of Soviet ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] will be held to small modifications of earlier generations which will not represent a significant increase in military capability.

- Under SALT II, Soviet ICBM's will be limited in the number of MIRV'ed warheads per missile to currently tested levels. And the one permitted new type of light ICBM will be limited to 10. This "fractionation" limit significantly restricts the use the Soviets can make of their ICBM throw-weight. We estimate that the SS-18 could carry 30 warheads instead of the 10 SALT II will permit. With over 300 SS-18's in their forces in the 1980's, that means that SALT II reduces the Soviet warhead potential by over 6,000 warheads—on just one type of missile.

- Under SALT II, the production, testing, and deployment of the SS-16 ICBM will be banned. The United States proposed and the Soviet Union

largest multimegaton bombs, and SS-11 ICBM's.

Each strategic Soviet system to be destroyed is associated with a warhead many times more powerful than the one that leveled Hiroshima—in the case of the aircraft, a thousand times more powerful. The 250 systems in question could suffice to demolish the 250 largest American cities. The people of Houston or Seattle or Des Moines would take little comfort in knowing that the missile or bomber carrying a nuclear weapon toward their city was obsolescent. I believe that any limits on Soviet power and capabilities are a step in the right direction.

I also want to take exception to the view that SALT II only limits Soviet programs to already planned levels or that they wouldn't exceed the SALT II levels anyway. This contention is totally at variance with our intelligence estimates, and it does not square with the pace and momentum that is causing such concern today. Anyone who looks at the Soviet buildup today and concludes that it won't continue unabated without SALT II is taking a rosy view

submission to the Senate for your consent.

- And SALT II does not prevent us from developing a solution to the problem of the increasing vulnerability of land-based missiles. This vulnerability is not the result of SALT. It is due to the increasing capabilities, particularly improving accuracy, of the missiles of both nations. Under SALT II, we will be able to deploy our new ICBM, the MX, in a mobile, survivable mode. We have considered a number of basing schemes for the MX.

It is a demonstration of the importance of arms control to national security that, with SALT II, the mobile missile land-based alternatives that we have considered are unquestionably more feasible and more economical. Without the SALT II limits on numbers of Soviet warheads, the Soviets could add more warheads over time which would necessitate a significantly larger number of shelters for our missiles.

The recent decision to proceed with the MX missile is clear, demonstrable evidence, for our friends and our adversaries, that we will proceed with the programs necessary for our security. Each part of our strategic forces will be survivable so that deterrence will never be in question. And each part will be adequately verifiable, so that confidence in strategic stability will accrue to both our nations.

I respect deeply those who are worried about present trends in the strategic balance, for I am concerned as well. But confidence is also vital to our freedom in the nuclear world when deterrence is the essence of stability and security. We have not built and maintained our strategic forces—at the cost of billions—in order to weaken their deterrent impact by telling the Russians and the world that we are inferior when, in fact, we are not.

There is no doubt that the Soviet strategic force is formidable and growing rapidly. But there is also no doubt that the Soviet Union does not have strategic nuclear superiority now, and they will not have it in the future if the will and determination of the United States persist, if we continue to modernize our strategic forces, if we do what we must do to maintain equivalence.

I want to make one point very clear. It is central to the debate over SALT II. SALT II will not prohibit us from proceeding with the programs we need to maintain the strategic balance. But SALT II is not a substitute for national will. SALT II permits us to go ahead with necessary programs; it does not provide the programs themselves. The programs we undertake to keep our

deterrent strong will be determined by the American people, their leaders, and their representatives. SALT II does not foreclose our choice.

We would be deluding ourselves as a nation if we believed that we will not have to increase our spending for strategic programs, with or without SALT II. The scope and pace of Soviet strategic programs leave us little choice but to modernize our own strategic nuclear forces. But there is no doubt that the cost without SALT II would be tens of billions of dollars more than it will be with SALT II. Within the framework of SALT II, we can maintain strategic equality and a more viable and more effective strategic force with less risk and at a much more moderate cost. Furthermore, the danger of siphoning resources away from conventional forces is lessened.

Adequate Verification

My third standard for SALT II is adequate verification. If SALT II did not fulfill this requirement, then I could not support it. After careful study, I have concluded that SALT II is adequately verifiable and that it will be so from the day the agreement enters into force.

To verify SALT II, we rely on our own independent, national intelligence capabilities. We survey the Soviet Union regularly, thoroughly, and accurately with a vast array of sophisticated and powerful intelligence-gathering systems, such as photoreconnaissance satellites, radars, and other monitoring devices in space, on land, on sea, and in the air. The result is a network of collection systems which complement each other and provide us with overlapping coverage of the Soviet Union.

We have spent billions of dollars on these systems, and it has been money well spent. I find our intelligence capabilities truly astonishing in their technological capacity—especially to a soldier who began his career in World War II, when we seldom knew what was happening 600 yards behind enemy lines, let alone 6,000 miles away.

For example, we know where the Soviets build their submarines. It takes several years to construct a ballistic missile submarine. We carefully observe it during this period. We count its missile tubes as they are being built, and we determine which types of missiles will be installed in those launchers. When the Soviets launched their latest Delta class strategic missile submarine, it was no surprise to us. We had been aware of its construction for years.

Similarly, we know where Soviet ICBM launchers are deployed and what types they are. We observe new missiles as they are flight-tested, and they are tested extensively. We know whether a missile is tested with one warhead or more than one. We can count the number of Soviet reentry vehicles as they reenter the atmosphere.

We monitor the conversion of older Soviet ICBM launchers so they can handle new MIRV'ed missiles. Well before the conversion is finished and the launcher is again operational, we know not only whether it is a launcher for a MIRV'ed missile but also the type of MIRV'ed missile it is designed to contain.

In the case of Soviet heavy bombers, we have an adequate count of how many bombers there are, where they are produced, and where they are based. We can observe important modifications that are made to these bombers.

Several factors help us in verifying the provisions of SALT II.

- One factor is time. Many of the systems limited in SALT are very large and complex and cannot quickly be constructed. For example, it takes many months to construct an ICBM silo launcher and years to develop and deploy a new missile. This gives us time to monitor activities.

- Another is the need for reliability. New strategic systems have to be tested to have operational reliability. We can observe these Soviet tests.

- And a third factor is support requirements. Strategic systems need personnel to run them and extensive logistic and security support. These requirements compound the task of keeping deployments hidden, and they increase the chance that we will detect them, especially if such activities were to take place in significant numbers.

Some charge that the Soviets could stockpile extra missiles and then one night change the strategic balance. Let me say that it is one thing to produce a missile in a factory; it is quite another to have the trained personnel, the logistics, the large amounts of heavy equipment to handle the missiles and the launchers themselves—without our being able to spot them.

I might add that the Soviets, if they wanted to violate the provisions of SALT II, would face another difficulty—uncertainty. Our use of multiple intelligence sources complicates any Soviet effort to disguise or conceal important activities. The Soviets know that we have a large, sophisticated intelligence operation, and they know a

certain amount about how it works. They do not, however, know the full capabilities of our collection systems and analysis techniques. This uncertainty will further complicate any Soviet attempt to conceal an evasion of the SALT II limits.

The question has been asked: "What do we do if we discover a Soviet violation or if we even suspect one?" As a result of the SALT I agreements in 1972, we established at Geneva a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) where any compliance questions, any suspected activities, can be challenged at once. We

new or modified Soviet strategic missiles could be completed.

The limits of SALT II are adequately verifiable with our own national technical means. By restricting launchers and not missiles, by counting rules, we have no need for more intrusive measures in SALT II. On-site inspection is not mandatory for adequate verification of SALT II. For example, the SALT II MIRV counting rules are a better device than on-site inspection for counting MIRV's. We are able to use these rules to count Soviet MIRV's on a total, national basis. We will not have to rely on inspectors who can be de-

bers they are deploying and what their military capabilities and characteristics are. The Soviets would be free to take steps to complicate our ability to predict accurately the size and capability of Soviet strategic forces.

No leader, military or civilian, wants to plan with less rather than more information about an adversary. I believe that in SALT we have used verification to good advantage—for our own security, for strategic stability, and to help turn uncertainty into confidence.

That is a clear, specific example of the contribution arms control can make to our national security.

SALT II will not prohibit us from proceeding with the programs we need to maintain the strategic balance.

thus have an established forum where even the slightest suspicion of a violation can be raised with the Soviets. This forum has worked well under SALT I.

Some also question whether we actually would challenge the Soviets if they appeared to be in violation of SALT II. I believe our record under SALT I is solid proof that we would. We have not been hesitant to challenge the Soviets about questions of concern to us—eight times. The fact is, however, that there is not one outstanding challenge that we have made against the Soviet Union that has not been resolved to our satisfaction. If a violation persisted without correction or if a violation threatened our security, then we could abrogate the agreement and build the forces necessary to meet the threat. This would be a very serious development, and the Soviets know it.

In assessing the capabilities of our network of collection systems, it is important to recognize that intelligence is a dynamic process in which our effort will need continual improvement. We must be prepared to take the necessary actions to exploit the new opportunities that advancing technology offers us and to offset the loss of sources, as happens from time to time. The recent loss of important intelligence stations in Iran is a clear example. Because of our extensive capabilities, we continue to be able to monitor adequately the testing of Soviet ICBM's, although some uncertainties are temporarily larger than we would like.

As you know, we are aggressively pursuing a number of alternatives and specific programs to collect the information formerly gathered in Iran in order to reduce these uncertainties to their previous, lower level. We expect to do this before a test program for any

ceived and who cannot watch all of the launchers all of the time.

We would monitor the Soviets even if there were no SALT agreement. It is essential for us to have good, solid intelligence on Soviet strategic forces, totally apart from any arms control agreement. In fact, only a portion of the total intelligence we collect on Soviet strategic forces is related to SALT II limits.

There are specific provisions in SALT II, proposed by us and accepted by the Soviets, that make the job of monitoring the Soviets easier than it would be without SALT.

- Under SALT II, the Soviets will not be allowed to interfere with the intelligence systems we use to verify SALT II.

- Under SALT II, deliberate concealment, including encryption of telemetry, which impedes verification of compliance is banned. This ban applies not only to concealment of construction and deployment of systems limited by SALT but also to concealment of testing of those systems because some provisions are verified by observing testing. Without this ban, the Soviets could use any and all means of concealment.

- Under SALT II, neither side is allowed to conceal the association of a missile with its launcher. Without this provision, it could be much more difficult for us to assess which missile goes with each type of launcher.

These are just some of the SALT II verification provisions. Without them, it could be much more difficult to collect needed intelligence on Soviet strategic programs. Without the bans on concealment and interference, we could find it much harder to determine how many strategic missiles and bom-

Security of NATO Allies

My fourth standard by which I have measured SALT II concerns our NATO allies. The NATO alliance, basically, looks to the United States to accomplish two tasks:

- To maintain a strong deterrent and a strong defense, and
- To lead in managing the East-West relationship to avoid a war that would devastate the nations of Europe as well as our own.

SALT II contributes to both.

In 1944, I stepped ashore in Europe for the first time as a member of the 10th Armored Division. During the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961-63, I commanded a cavalry regiment at the Iron Curtain. In 1969, I commanded the 3d Infantry Division, and in 1970 I was U.S. commander in Berlin. I am convinced that NATO's basic security interests are no different than our own—stability, prevention of nuclear war, and preservation of the strategic and conventional military balance. The 20th century has taught Europe, as much as any other region on Earth, the destructiveness of war, the benefits of stability, and the necessity for a strong defense.

Stability is particularly important to Europe, where potent military forces are concentrated only a short distance apart, where thousands of nuclear weapons are deployed, and where an arena of historic confrontation is still today of the highest security interest to each superpower. The risk of nuclear war is as real to Europeans as it is to Americans and stability a requirement, not a luxury.

Fundamental to European security is the preservation of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance. SALT II, in combination with our own defense programs, will enable us to maintain that balance.

Equally fundamental is the preservation of the European theater balance.

NATO is currently embarked on an ambitious and expensive force improvement program. I believe that this program—important to European security—would be far more difficult to accomplish if our attention and our resources were focused instead on an unrestrained strategic nuclear arms race.

SALT II in no way handcuffs our cooperation with NATO or sells out our allies' interests.

- We have consulted extensively with our allies. For example, we have had some 40 meetings with the North Atlantic Council to discuss SALT II; half of these occurred in the last 2 years.

- We have taken into account allied security concerns in our negotiating positions. For example, SALT II places no restrictions on the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain, and it does not limit any of America's many nuclear weapons systems located in Europe.

- SALT II does not interfere with traditional patterns of cooperation with our allies, including the transfer of weapons systems and other sophisticated technology. The Soviets proposed a strict nontransfer provision early in SALT II. We rejected it and similar Soviet proposals. There is no nontransfer provision in SALT II.

- And, as I said before, the protocol limits on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles will expire before we are ready to deploy them. We will have ample time to plan carefully—in concert with our European allies—how best to modernize our theater nuclear forces in NATO. And that process is already underway.

After the Vienna summit, I returned home by way of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels and stopped by as well in Geneva and London. At each stop I briefed allied officials. I can say without exception that all were extremely supportive of SALT II.

The words of Europeans, however, speak to this point better than assurances I can give. In June, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt put it simply and clearly:

SALT II is, of course, not only a domestic matter for the Americans. For that reason the United States Government informed its allies on the progress of the talks and also consulted with them. This treaty is a piece of world history. It is also a piece of world security and a piece of my own country's security. For the present it is a climax of cooperative arms limitation. The Federal Republic of Germany supports the SALT II treaty and hopes that it will soon be ratified by Washington and Moscow.

Strategic Stability

My fifth standard for SALT II is that it must contribute to strategic stability and to reducing the risk of nuclear war. Nothing—I repeat nothing—is more fundamental to our security and our survival.

SALT II, with its clear ceilings and adequate verification, adds an essential element of predictability, a way of fencing in the threat and limiting uncertainty about Soviet programs. Neither rational planning nor nuclear stability is served by ambiguity.

We will still have to plan against the maximum Soviet capabilities possible under SALT II. Entrusted with the defense of our nation, we would not be doing our job if we did otherwise. But this is a far cry from the increased threat, and the worst case planning, that would confront this nation if there is no SALT II.

We have a long way to go in the SALT process. Nonetheless, we should be—and we are—proud of the accomplishments of SALT II.

- We have established—for the first time—equal ceilings on strategic nuclear forces.

- We have negotiated equal subceilings on MIRV'ed systems.

- We have begun the long-sought process of reductions.

- We have taken the first steps in controlling the technological arms race.

- We have placed limits on increases in three major indices of central strategic power—launchers, weapons, and throw-weight.

- We have strengthened verification.

- We have established a base of agreed definitions, counting rules, and even force data.

- We have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation. In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, SALT II is an essential bridge to deeper reductions and further qualitative restraints in SALT III.

Today, on a highly interdependent globe, cooperation is often a necessity. Ratification of SALT II would reinforce our efforts to maintain and enhance adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty and thus help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In these efforts we are joined by 109 other nations, including the Soviet Union. Apart from the collapse of the SALT process itself, the most important casualty of SALT failure could be our vitally important effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

As a former strategist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I can tell you that nu-

clear weapons proliferation would create a security nightmare of grave dimensions. Terrorism and local conflicts could escalate to threaten the security of every American. Those nations that have forsworn nuclear weapons for themselves by adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty are closely watching the two superpowers to see whether we are indeed credible in our own commitment to reduce the level of nuclear weaponry.

I would not come before you and promise that with SALT II we will prevent nuclear war or state that without SALT II the holocaust will surely come. Both statements deserve short shrift in this debate. I do believe, however, that SALT II is an essential step toward nuclear stability and reducing the risk of war. I cannot comprehend how either can be served by rejection of SALT II.

Linkage

I would like now to shift gears if I may and address directly seven questions that have arisen during the debate over SALT II.

I want to begin with linkage because it's a false argument and an argument that if carried to its conclusion would diminish, not enhance, our role in the world. SALT II has properly been debated in the context of our foreign policy, for SALT is the centerpiece of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and rejection of SALT II would have serious consequences for this relationship and for stability elsewhere. But, some would link SALT II to every world problem, and some would decorate SALT II like a Christmas tree with burdens it neither merits nor can endure.

SALT II will in no way hinder our ability to compete with the Soviet Union where competition is required. SALT II, however, will enable us to continue the important process of cooperation, a process in which, as in negotiations, one nation's gain need not be the other nation's loss.

I agree that we cannot quarantine SALT entirely from Soviet actions in other spheres. But to burden SALT with every aspect of the Soviets challenge would mean we could settle nothing with the Soviets unless we settled everything. The nuclear threat to everyone's security is so overriding that we cannot wait until that day.

The Soviet challenge today is a challenge to be met on many fronts. To use SALT to meet every aspect of that challenge is not only inappropriate, it means that we lack the imagination and the will to use the many other, more effective resources at our disposal.

For those who would discard SALT because of Soviet activities elsewhere, I ask: What would they offer in return? What Soviet challenge could they meet in the nations of Africa and Asia by rejecting SALT? Would we be better able to respond to the Soviet buildup in Europe while spending even larger sums on nuclear rather than conventional forces?

A nuclear arms race, with the gloves off, would not just mean billions and billions more for defense; it would focus our attention on strategic military rivalry and competition. Our response to other pressing problems—such as energy and economic problems of our own and of our friends—could not help but suffer, for strategic security would be our first concern.

A stable world is an arena best turned to our advantage. An unrestrained and tension-filled nuclear arms race is not the recipe for a stable economy, and it is not the recipe for a stable world.

Soviet Heavy Missiles

The second question concerns Soviet heavy missiles. In SALT II, the freeze on launchers of modern heavy ICBM's has been carried over from the SALT I Interim Agreement. Thus the Soviets can have up to 308 of such launchers while the United States will have none.

The United States has no plans for modern heavy ICBM's, and would not develop and deploy them even if permitted under the SALT II treaty. The MX missile, which has the same target coverage as the SS-18, better serves our military requirements. Thus, the SALT II limitations on modern heavy ICBM launchers have no effect on U.S. programs or plans.

It was in this context that the United States gave up the right to modern heavy ICBM's in the course of the SALT I negotiations and agreed at Vladivostok in 1974 to continue this situation in SALT II. At Vladivostok, President Ford was able to gain important concessions in other areas; in particular, the Soviets agreed to drop their insistence on limitations on U.S. European-based aircraft and on compensation for the nuclear systems of our NATO allies.

Furthermore, the Soviet right to heavy ICBM's only applies to silo-based ICBM's, an important consideration for the future as all fixed land-based ICBM's become increasingly vulnerable. Neither side is permitted mobile launchers of heavy ICBM's, heavy SLBM's or their launchers, or heavy air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBM's). We could have retained the

option to deploy heavy mobile ICBM's, since this option was still open in the treaty in the fall of 1978. However, if such an option had been left open, it was possible that the Soviets might well have deployed a heavy mobile ICBM, while the United States almost certainly would not have done so. We weighed this issue and, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed to the Soviets that mobile launchers of heavy ICBM's, heavy SLBM's and their launchers, and heavy ASBM's be banned. The Soviets accepted this proposal.

It is also important to recognize that the treaty sets a ceiling on the maximum number of reentry vehicles, on ICBM's, and, in particular, a limit of 10 on all Soviet heavy ICBM's of the SS-18 type. This has two consequences. First, it will prevent the Soviets from developing and deploying by 1985, for example, an SS-18 ICBM force with 30 or more reentry vehicles on each ICBM, which is within their capability to do. Second, this fractionation limit will have the effect of allowing the United States to build a light ICBM of equivalent effectiveness to the Soviet heavy ICBM's. The MX ICBM will be permitted the same maximum number of reentry vehicles, 10, as the SS-18, and will have better accuracy. The MX will be the equivalent of the SS-18 in both soft and hard target kill capability. Thus, the Soviets will not be able to exploit the greater throw-weight of their heavy ICBM's in any meaningful fashion.

Finally, the problem of the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. silo-based ICBM force does not depend on the presence or absence of Soviet heavy ICBM's. For example, even if all the Soviet heavy ICBM's and their launchers were banned, and thus subsequently dismantled or destroyed, the Soviets could deploy enough SS-19's with enough hard-target-capable reentry vehicles to threaten the entire U.S. Minuteman force and will have a large number of residual reentry vehicles for other missions. Thus, a total ban on all Soviet heavy ICBM's would not solve the Minuteman vulnerability problem.

Soviet Backfire Bomber

The third question concerns the Soviet Backfire bomber. The Soviet Union is currently deploying Backfires in both their long-range air force and in naval aviation units. Close observation over a period of years indicates that this bomber is being deployed for use in a theater or naval strike role and is a replacement for older Soviet medium bombers. However, this aircraft can

reach the United States from home bases on a one-way, high altitude, subsonic, unrefueled flight.

The ability to strike the territory of the other side is not the criterion for determining whether an aircraft is a "heavy bomber" and, thus, subject to the limitations in SALT II. For example, the United States has 67 FB-111's which are part of our strategic bomber force and dedicated to attack on the Soviet Union. They are not limited by SALT II. We also have over 500 aircraft deployed in the European and Pacific theaters which have the capability to strike Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union at one time tried to get these aircraft included in SALT on the grounds that they could strike the Soviet Union. With the firm support of our allies, we adamantly resisted that position on the grounds that these aircraft, whatever their theoretical capability, are deployed for theater missions and, thus, are not subject to SALT limitations. The Soviets have used this same argument with respect to the Backfire.

Nevertheless, the Soviets agreed to make certain important commitments concerning the Backfire. At the Vienna summit, President Brezhnev handed President Carter a written statement in which the Soviet Union informed the United States that it did not intend to give the Backfire bomber the capability of operating at intercontinental distance, would not increase the radius of action of the Backfire in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States, and did not intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling.

This statement also stated that the Soviets would not increase the production rate of the Backfire over the current rate. President Brezhnev confirmed that the Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter, in return, stated that the United States enters into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that the United States considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations under the treaty.

These commitments are consistent with the U.S. objective of constraining the strategic potential of the Backfire force, while continuing to exclude our own European- and Pacific-based theater aircraft from SALT. These commitments will inhibit Backfire from being given an operational intercontinental role, and they will give us a basis for challenge if we should detect any evidence that Backfire is being

given an intercontinental mission. Additionally, limiting the number of Backfires available means that Soviet diversion of Backfire from its theater and naval missions to a strategic role would substantially reduce Soviet strength in those areas, while adding only marginally to overall Soviet strategic capability.

Finally, under SALT II we are permitted to build a bomber comparable to Backfire if we decide that it is required for our security. Such a bomber would not be counted in the overall SALT II aggregate limit, and it would be subject to none of the restrictions that we have gotten the Soviets to accept on Backfire in SALT II.

Comprehensive Proposal of 1977

The fourth question concerns whether we should have insisted on the comprehensive proposal of March 1977. I want to state at the beginning that this was a significant proposal that would have substantially limited the nuclear arms race. But, as stated recently during the hearings on SALT, it takes two hands to clap. The Soviets were simply not ready for this kind of sweeping progress. If we had "stuck to our guns," as some have suggested, the result would not have been a better agreement. It would have been no agreement at all.

March 1977 is not July 1979. In March 1977, the potential Soviet threat to our Minuteman ICBM's was imprecise; today, Soviet missile accuracy has improved to the point that in the 1980's the threat will be much less ambiguous. This passage of time demonstrates how little we can afford to delay. Technology is a powerful enemy of humanity's ability to place rational limits on arms. To discard the significant progress we have already achieved in SALT II in search of an ideal agreement would merely deal more time to technology, its strongest suit.

Those who advocate a return to the March 1977 comprehensive proposal from the reality of July 1979 are being unrealistic. Now, in view of the clear and imperative need to modernize and make more survivable our strategic deterrent, a return to the comprehensive proposal is out of the question.

- The proposal, particularly the heavy missile reduction to 150 and the MIRV ICBM reduction to 550, would not make it possible to preserve the invulnerability of Minuteman. Even with these deep reductions in Soviet ICBM's, the Soviet SS-17 and SS-19 could still adequately target our Minuteman.

- The proposal would ban the de-

velopment, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, as well as the development, testing, and deployment of new ICBM's; thereby, it would kill the MX program for both silo and mobile basing of any kind.

- The proposal would keep Backfire out of the SALT II aggregate total but with no limits on production or upgrade.

- The proposal would restrict air-launched cruise missile range to 2,500 kilometers, which SALT II does not.

- The proposal would ban modifica-

stipulated. Modifications in excess of the provision, that might go undetected, would add little capability. If the accusation is that a 5% enhancement is a new missile, I do not feel that it is of military significance.

Cruise Missile Range

The sixth question concerns cruise missile range verification. During the SALT II negotiations, we have also had to consider the tradeoff between verifi-

SALT II will in no way hinder our ability to compete with the Soviet Union where competition is required.

tion of existing ICBM's and therefore preclude improvement of Minuteman II and III and Titan II. Consequently, this restriction might prohibit the MK 12A warhead.

New Types of ICBM's

The fifth question deals with verification of the limitations on the modernization of ICBM's, the so-called "new types" provisions. One of the major problems in arms control is that the pace of technology exceeds the rate at which we can limit such technology. SALT II, however, begins to put bounds on the way in which ICBM's—the most threatening of all systems—can be modernized.

Our major goal in negotiating the ban on new types of ICBM's was to force the Soviets to make choices in such modernization. The precise point at which we drew the line between a modernization of an existing type and a new type was somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, we strongly preferred to draw the line tightly even though we would have higher confidence in monitoring a looser but less meaningful definition of a new ICBM type.

The new types provision accomplishes our major goal and is an important step in limiting technological advance. This provision will, for practical purposes, affect only the Soviet Union. For example, if they replace the SS-11 with a new, larger single-reentry vehicle missile, they will not be permitted to replace the SS-17 or SS-19 with a new 10-reentry-vehicle missile. They may not do both under SALT II. This provision will force them to make choices which they otherwise would not have to make while the United States can go ahead with its one new type, the MX. Both sides will, of course, be allowed to modernize within the 5% constraints

and the need to insure that we would be able to take the necessary steps under SALT II to maintain strategic equality. There are uncertainties in verifying the range of cruise missiles. Within the limits of airframe design, more fuel and a lighter warhead could be carried, thus increasing the range. We do, however, have extensive information on current Soviet cruise missiles as a result of monitoring tests over many years.

It would be easier to verify a total ban on all cruise missiles than it will be to verify some of the cruise missile provisions in the agreement, such as those which temporarily limit the range of deployed ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles to less than 600 kilometers, but which permit full development and testing of these missiles. The Soviets wanted to ban all cruise missiles; we did not.

However, the United States decided that, on balance, it was in the interest of our national security to be allowed to pursue these development and test programs, even though allowing the Soviets the same options may complicate verification in the future. Mobile ICBM's are an area where we made a similar choice, deliberately preferring to keep important military options open to us after the protocol period, at the price of a potentially more difficult verification job.

Value of the SALT Process

The seventh question concerns value of the SALT process as arms control. I do not measure the process against an ideal we might want to achieve; I do judge the process against what would have occurred had the process never existed at all. Is there anyone who can maintain that the arms race would not have been significantly greater without SALT I?

If there is, they overlook the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty which has prevented a destabilizing and extremely expensive arms race in defensive systems that would have triggered an accelerated offensive arms race as well. They overlook the fact that the Soviet Union dismantled 209 large, older missiles under the SALT I Interim Agreement and replaced those missiles with smaller, less threatening submarine-launched ballistic missiles. They overlook the fact that our intelligence estimated at the time of SALT I that the Soviets were going for a force of over 400 heavy ICBM's, not 308. They overlook the fact that, after the Soviets reached the allowed ceiling on ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles near the end of the 5-year term of the Interim Agreement, they have continued to stay within the terms of the Interim Agreement by dismantling perfectly good submarine-based launchers. These launchers are newer than some of those we now have deployed on our own submarines.

I have already stated my belief that by the end of 1985, without SALT II, the Soviets would certainly exceed the SALT II limits in enormous numbers. For instance, current Soviet programs indicate that they will attain the ceiling of 820 MIRV'ed ICBM launchers next year—5 years before the end of the treaty. I find it hard to believe that the Soviets would stop at 820 unless SALT II required them to.

To be sure, SALT II legalizes high limits, but it does limit. It provides predictability; it provides a measure of mutual confidence through this predictability and through verification provisions that enhance our intelligence; and it gives us time to modernize our forces so that equality and momentum will be our companions when SALT II expires.

Conclusion

I would like to end on a personal note, to illustrate a basic point about SALT II.

In 1973 and 1974, I was Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since the first time I had anything to do with SALT II, one of the fundamental goals we had in the Joint Chiefs was equal aggregates of strategic forces with freedom to mix the forces within the aggregates. For us in the military, this was practically synonymous with SALT—equal totals to set the stage for balanced reductions. The Soviets strongly pushed to maintain the SALT I asymmetry in numbers favorable to them. I had a boss at that

by Secretary Vance

Address before the Council on World Affairs in St. Louis, on August 1, 1979.¹

I want to spend most of the time we have this evening responding to your questions. But let me take a few minutes at the outset to talk about an issue of fundamental importance to our country and our future—the second strategic arms limitation treaty, known as SALT II.

I sympathize with the frustration many Americans must feel as they listen to the SALT debate and try to reach an informed judgment. It is an extraordinarily complex subject. It even has its own language. GLCM's and SLCM's, MIRV's and MARV's, telemetry and throw-weight—it must seem at times like a conspiracy to obscure.

The technical detail obviously is terribly important. For we all know that we are talking about matters that have a profound bearing on our nation's security.

But how does a nonexpert make a reasoned judgment? The first step, in my view, is to frame the issue clearly: not whether the SALT II treaty solves all our security problems—because it doesn't; not whether it will lull us into a false sense of security—because it certainly won't; not whether it achieves everything we want in the way of arms control—because no single agreement can.

The paramount question to be settled is this: Is America better off with the agreement or without it?

time who said over and over that we're going to start reductions from equality.

We got the Soviets to agree to this fundamental precept. We got them to agree to a lot more. For example, to lessen ambiguity, we insisted, against strong Soviet objection, on the inclusion of detailed definitions of systems to be limited under SALT. Article II of this treaty has a full range of definitions. It shows how far we've come.

My point in mentioning these two examples is not to maintain that we wrote our own treaty. No agreement constructed on unilateral gain can long endure, even if it was possible to achieve in the first place. But we have

If the answer to that question is yes, then we should ratify the treaty, secure the gains we have made, and move on to SALT III. If the treaty, as negotiated, serves our national interest, then there is no good reason to risk unraveling it by seeking now to shift the bargain more in our favor.

Viewed from this perspective—whether the SALT II treaty helps us or hurts us—I believe the answer is clear: It will be a substantial help to the United States.

Let me very briefly discuss the treaty's contributions to four aspects of our nation's security.

Preserving the Military Balance

First, the SALT II treaty will help us to preserve the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It will do this both by restraining the Soviet military buildup and by permitting and in fact assisting the modernization of our own strategic forces.

• With the treaty, both sides will be limited, through 1985, to an equal overall number of long-range bombers and systems for launching long-range missiles. The agreed total—2,250—is lower than the present Soviet level and above our present level. Therefore, to comply with the treaty, the Soviets will have to destroy or dismantle about 10% of their systems. These will be the first agreed reductions in the history of nuclear arms.

Without the treaty, we estimate that by the end of 1985, the Soviets could have 3,000 of these systems. With the

carefully guarded our interests as have the Soviets their own.

The result in SALT II is a complex structure of objectives achieved, mutual advantage, compromise, and tradeoff. But in the world of two sovereign nations—achieving what it is possible to achieve in negotiations on basic issues of national security and national survival—SALT II is in our favor. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

treaty, they can have 750 less. That is the choice.

- With the treaty, there will be useful limits on the number of individual weapons those systems can carry. This is critically important, because it is in this area that the Soviet Union has the greatest potential for dramatically expanding its forces in the years immediately ahead.

Under the treaty, no missile will be able to carry more warheads than it has been tested with already. For example, each of the biggest Soviet missiles—the SS-18's—could carry 20 or 30 warheads if they were not restrained. The treaty holds them to 10.

Even with these limits, the number of warheads will increase. But the treaty means they will have several thousand fewer warheads by the end of 1985 than we estimate they could have if there were no limits. That is the choice before us.

- With or without this treaty, we will have to modernize our own strategic forces. We will increase our defense spending to assure that we maintain forces equivalent to those of the Soviet Union in the 1980's. We have underway programs to upgrade each component of our strategic forces—land, sea, and air. The treaty will not interfere with any of these programs. In fact, it aids our planning by giving us a clearer picture of the military threat we will face in the 1980's and by setting boundaries on what the Soviets can do.

Without the treaty, we would have to do more than we are already planning, because we would have to maintain the balance at a higher level. With the treaty, therefore, we can buy greater security, with more certainty, at less expense.

Assuring Verification

Turning to a second aspect of our security, the treaty will preserve and enhance our access to essential information about Soviet strategic programs.

Let me emphasize in this connection that we will not rely on trust to enforce the SALT II treaty. Our own monitoring systems—our satellites, our radars, and our other electronic equipment—are fully capable of detecting any violations before they could affect the strategic balance.

It is important to understand that whether we have an arms control treaty or not, we must be able to monitor Soviet military activities and programs. The more we know about their forces, the better we can plan our own. Constant monitoring is a vital security need.

The treaty will help us fulfill this requirement. It bans any interference with our monitoring system. It also prohibits the deliberate concealment of strategic forces, so that they cannot be hidden from our view.

With the treaty we will have continuous, dependable information on the nature of the threat and what we must do to meet it. Without the treaty there would be no limits on Soviet secretiveness. And that is another element of the choice.

Supporting U.S. Foreign Policy

A third way in which the SALT II treaty contributes to our security is by supporting our foreign policies—in helping us manage East-West relations, in sustaining our alliances, and in enhancing our position of leadership in the world.

With or without the treaty, our relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to be essentially a competitive one. With the treaty, however, we strengthen the central element of stability in our relationship—the mutual effort to control nuclear arms. If the treaty fails, we will enter a period of greater uncertainty in our relations. The prospects for an all-out arms race will increase. And each crisis, each confrontation could be more dangerous for it would take place in a context of unregulated military competition.

Our closest allies have strongly endorsed ratification of the SALT II treaty. They have made it clear that they see this as a way to help preserve a balance of strategic forces and to help stabilize East-West relations. Failure to agree on the treaty would shake the confidence of our allies in our leadership.

We must also be sensitive to the connection between this treaty and other urgent international concerns such as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. To put it bluntly, our credibility is on the line. Other nations with the capacity to develop nuclear

weapons will be watching our decision on SALT with particular care—to see if we accept restraint for ourselves as readily as we urge it upon others.

If we cannot agree on SALT, the authority of our position on a broad range of issues, and especially in other arms control efforts, would be weakened. With SALT, we will strengthen our international leadership for peace.

Continuing Arms Control Efforts

In a fourth, and final, area, the SALT II treaty builds the framework for continued progress to curb nuclear arms.

This treaty is an important milestone in itself. For the first time there will be agreed reductions in forces. For the first time there will be equal limits on all basic strategic systems. And there will be some first limits on the so-called qualitative arms race—the continual effort to make existing systems even more deadly.

But I agree that the SALT II treaty does not go as far as we want in controlling nuclear arms. That is no reason, however, to reject the treaty. It makes no sense to refuse to take a step forward with SALT II just because the stride is not as long as we would wish.

The objective of deeper cuts and further limits is best served by securing the gains we have made in SALT II and moving on to the next stage in this continuing process in SALT III.

Conclusion

This then is the choice we face—not between this treaty and some other agreement we could imagine that would accomplish everything. The issue is whether we will be in a better or worse position, whether our national security will be enhanced or harmed by the approval of this treaty.

As you listen to the debate, I hope you will keep that basic question in mind. For I believe that if you measure the arguments by that standard, you will conclude that we should ratify the SALT II treaty. That is the choice that clearly serves our nation's interest. □

¹ Press release 185.

EAST ASIA: Vietnam and Indochina

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 13, 1979. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I welcome this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations on normalization of relations as well as to provide you with an appraisal of the current situation in Indochina.

Normalizing Relations With Vietnam

To begin with, I believe that it would be useful to address briefly the various factors which originally led the Administration to seek improved relations with Vietnam. Soon after taking office, President Carter noted that it was his hope that the United States might eventually have normal diplomatic relations with all countries.

In a similar spirit, I believe, the Congress has also addressed the general desirability of diplomatic relations. Section 607 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, states:

The Congress finds that the conduct of diplomatic relations with a foreign government has as its principal purpose the discussion and negotiation with that government of outstanding issues and, like the recognition of a foreign government, does not in itself imply approval of that government or of the political-economic system it represents.

Hence, it seems clear that the Congress and the Administration share the general view that diplomatic relations are a valuable tool for achieving our larger purposes and that, in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary, the United States should have relations with all countries.

Turning to the specific question of establishing relations with Vietnam, the Administration's policy was influenced by several considerations. With a population exceeding 50 million, Vietnam is the third most populous Communist nation and maintains one of the world's largest military establishments. As recent events in Southeast Asia have graphically demonstrated, Vietnamese actions toward other nations in

the region, peaceful or otherwise, are of concern to U.S. policy and inevitably affect our relations with other Asian countries.

We, therefore, wanted to be in the best possible position to communicate with the Vietnamese and, if possible, exert a positive influence on their policies and actions. In addition, we wanted to be in the best possible position to influence the Vietnamese on providing an accounting of our MIA's [missing in action], on allowing family reunification to move forward, on resolving the refugee situation, and on moving toward the observance of internationally accepted human rights. There is also the possibility of trade and opening the way for American business to compete.

Paris Meetings With Vietnamese

Against this background and following a report on the MIA situation from the Woodcock Commission which visited Vietnam in March 1977, President Carter announced that the United States was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Vietnamese aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between our two countries. Accordingly, and as the subcommittee is aware, a U.S. delegation, which I led, met with the Vietnamese in Paris in May and June and later in December of 1977. At each of these meetings, we stated the U.S. position that we were prepared to normalize relations with Vietnam without preconditions; that we believed this could be best accomplished by an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and exchange embassies; and that once relations were established and embassies in place, we would lift the trade embargo we maintain against Vietnam.

In addition, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Oakley made clear during his recent testimony before this subcommittee, we emphasized that two factors would have an important effect on the pace and timing of normalization and on the substance of relations between us: Vietnamese willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region and continued Vietnamese efforts to provide us with the fullest possible accounting of our missing men.

The Vietnamese refused to accept our position and instead demanded

that, linked to S.R.V. [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] efforts to provide an accounting of our MIA's, the United States agree to provide direct economic assistance as part of any agreement to establish relations. This was their interpretation of the Paris accords. In addition the Vietnamese argued that the United States should unilaterally lift the trade embargo before relations were established. In response, we stressed that neither the Congress nor the Administration believed the United States under any obligation to provide aid or a commitment of aid to Vietnam. With regard to the trade embargo, we stated our position that the interests of all parties would be best served when commerce could be conducted in the context of normal diplomatic relations.

At the conclusion of the December 1977 meeting, both sides agreed that additional discussions would be useful and that they would be scheduled at a mutually convenient time and place. As you may recall, in January 1978 a grand jury named Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations Dinh Ba Thi as an unindicted coconspirator in an espionage case involving a U.S. Government official and a Vietnamese resident of this country. Following our request that Ambassador Thi leave the United States, there was a considerable pause in communications from the Vietnamese.

Soon after the conclusion of the espionage case in May, however, the Vietnamese informed us of their willingness to accept our invitation, extended in Paris the previous year, to send a team of experts to our MIA identification facilities in Hawaii. Following the successful conclusion of this visit in July, the Vietnamese again began to indicate a desire to meet with U.S. representatives and hinted publicly and to other governments that they might be on the verge of dropping their demand that U.S. economic assistance be part of an agreement to normalize relations. Vietnamese statements in this regard were somewhat ambiguous, however. There were no official communications on the subject and a congressional delegation that visited Hanoi in August was unable to elicit a direct statement that the Vietnamese were no longer demanding an advance commitment on aid.

Continuing Discussions

We next met with the Vietnamese in New York for several rounds of informal discussions in the fall of last year. Initially, the Vietnamese appeared reluctant to abandon their position on aid but eventually stated flatly that they

would no longer demand a U.S. commitment on bilateral economic assistance as a *quid pro quo* for normalization. In addition, the Vietnamese indicated they would continue to make efforts to provide us with an MIA accounting. For our part, we reiterated our belief that the Vietnamese should be doing more to provide us with an accounting of our MIA's. As Bob Oakley indicated during his testimony last month, when troublesome developments of concern to us began to appear in Vietnamese actions and statements during the fall, we asked the Vietnamese for clarification.

We requested that the Vietnamese inform us of their intentions toward Kampuchea, given the massive S.R.V. troop buildup then underway along their border with that country, increasingly harsh Vietnamese public statements attacking the Kampuchean Government and calling upon the Kampuchean people to rise up in revolt against it, and announced Vietnamese support for the so-called National Salvation Front as the preferred replacement government. In so doing, we made clear that we were not taking sides in Vietnam's dispute with Kampuchea, that we ourselves had long been at the forefront of those nations denouncing the Pol Pot government for its terrible human rights abuses, and that we were not supporting that regime. We stressed, however, that even that regime's unparalleled crimes would not justify a Vietnamese military violation of Kampuchean sovereignty and replacement of the government by force. We urged that the dispute be settled peacefully.

In this regard, we repeated that Vietnam's willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region and its attitudes and actions toward its neighbors constituted an important factor influencing our ability to proceed toward normalization. We also asked for clarification of the implications of the November 1 S.R.V.-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in light of previous Vietnamese assurances that they would follow an "independent" foreign policy and never allow foreign bases on their territory.

And, we expressed deep concern over the growing refugee exodus from Vietnam—including reliable reports that Vietnamese officials were forcing refugees to pay bribes to arrange their departure—the resulting costs in human suffering and lives, and the massive burdens imposed upon other Southeast Asian countries. We noted that the United States did not want to see emigration from Vietnam cease but suggested that a more humane approach

which made provision for regularized departures at a rate causing less hardship and loss of life would be in the interest of all concerned.

The Vietnamese responded that their treaty with Moscow was a natural consequence of the long friendship between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples, that Vietnamese attachment to their nation's "independence and sovereignty" ruled out any Soviet bases on their territory, and that the treaty was not directed at any third nation.

Regarding their intentions toward Kampuchea, they stated that the S.R.V. troop buildup was purely defensive and gave assurances that Hanoi had no aggressive plans toward the country. The Vietnamese also asserted that they were powerless to control the flight of "malcontents" who were not willing to work to build a new Vietnam and denied that government officials were facilitating departures in return for bribes. In light of these responses, movement toward normalization came to a halt, as we awaited further developments.

On December 25, the Vietnamese mounted a major invasion of Kampuchea and now occupy large areas of that country. They have shown no inclination to heed repeated calls by large segments of the international community to withdraw their troops and permit the establishment of a neutral regime representative of the Kampuchean people.

In addition, they have demonstrated no willingness to relent in their harsh domestic policies, which have prompted ever-increasing numbers of their citizens to flee, with heavy loss of life, and have imposed heavy burdens on the other nations of the region. Over 60,000 refugees from Vietnam reached safehaven in Southeast Asia last month—a record.

As I noted earlier, we had repeatedly stressed to the Vietnamese that their policies and actions toward their neighbors would affect the pace and timing of our ability to normalize relations. The major reason we had sought to normalize relations was to enhance regional peace and stability. Since recent events had the opposite effect and endangered regional peace and stability, our caution in not moving further last fall was justified. It is hard to envision progress toward normalization under existing circumstances, although we do not preclude continuing informal discussions from time to time in which we exchange views on regional and bilateral matters.

In addition to addressing the record of our negotiations with the Vietnamese, the subcommittee has asked

that I provide you with an appraisal of certain other aspects of the Indochina situation. Before doing so, however, I would like to elaborate somewhat on my earlier comments regarding Vietnamese refugee policies.

Vietnamese Refugees

It appears clear that the Vietnamese Government has embarked upon a deliberate effort to rid itself of those elements of society which it considers undesirable. Refugee reports indicate that Vietnamese of Chinese extraction, including those whose families have been in Vietnam for generations, have been under increasing pressure since the end of last year either to depart the country or face the prospect of having their property confiscated and being shipped off to harsh "new economic zones," areas which *Le Monde* has termed the "Vietnamese Gulag."

While the Vietnamese Government has increased its pressure on Vietnamese of Chinese extraction, Hanoi officials have also apparently made it easier for this group of people to depart the country. Numerous reports indicate that officials are registering ethnic Chinese, finding them boats, and towing them out to sea—all for a fee. There appears to be a sliding scale of bribes to be paid in order to acquire passage on a boat leaving the country, with ethnic Chinese eligible for a lesser bribe than ethnic Vietnamese.

You undoubtedly have read recent articles out of Hong Kong reporting details on the Vietnamese traffic in refugees. Our own information confirms such reports. Ethnic Vietnamese are also fleeing the country in ever-increasing numbers, with some passing themselves off as ethnic Chinese, and others taking any opportunity available to them—no matter how dangerous.

So far this year, 131,299 boat refugees from Vietnam have reached temporary havens in nations of first asylum, compared to 16,078 by this time last year. Heretofore this burden had largely fallen on Malaysia and Thailand, but now this exodus has moved eastward as well, and the numbers reaching Hong Kong have leapt from some 17,000 in haven in April to over 50,000 there today. Although the numbers perishing at sea will never be known with certainty, they are estimated in the range of between 40-70%.

This subcommittee with its close scrutiny of the situation is well aware of the policies we have followed to provide assistance to the countries of first asylum and to resettle refugees in this country. Of some 300,000 refugees resettled since 1975, the United States

has taken over 200,000, and we are currently committed to taking an additional 7,000 per month.

This is not to say that others have not shared this burden. They have, and, indeed, on a per capita basis, the Australians have resettled more refugees than have we. Nevertheless, the staggering numbers of refugees now scrambling ashore in Southeast Asia, swelling the numbers already there, requires all nations to do more. The Japanese, for example, have been stepping up their financial contributions to the refugee resettlement efforts of the UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees] and other organizations as well as for the newly approved refugee resettlement center in Indonesia. They have also agreed to resettle their first small group of refugees. We are working with them, and we hope that they will be able to do even more.

Nations in Europe like France and Germany and our Canadian neighbors have been forthcoming in their response to this international crisis, but we hope that they too can do more. We are exploring means to resettle refugees in other areas, like Latin America, and in particular are looking at the feasibility of a suggestion you made, Mr. Chairman [Lester L. Wolff of New York], about the possibility of international financial institution funds being channeled to development projects for refugee resettlement in these areas.

The Vietnamese Government recently announced that it will permit its citizens to depart the country legally for family reunification or to "take employment abroad." Under this proposal, up to 10,000 people per month would be allowed to leave with UNHCR assistance provided their names match those on lists submitted by other governments. To the extent that such a plan would alleviate the human suffering of potential refugees and the burdens now imposed on other countries in its absence, it would be welcome. However, it would not solve the problem of those already in refugee camps, who must receive our immediate attention. Nor is it likely to stem the tide of people who are willing to risk the sea on their own rather than test the sincerity of the Vietnamese Government.

We are prepared to accept family reunification cases directly from Vietnam but we wish to review carefully the results of the recent UNHCR mission to Hanoi before making any definitive decision on how to proceed. We remain committed as a first priority to taking refugees from the countries of first asylum.

To sum up on refugees, we believe

that the essential reason for the refugee flow so dangerous to refugees and so upsetting to other countries, is the Vietnamese Government's own internal policies, its disregard for human rights, and its responsibilities to its people under the U.N. Charter. We hope that the international community will make clear to the Vietnamese that it expects the S.R.V. to meet its obligations to apply humane policies to its own people rather than continuing conditions which force them to flee.

While it normally might be argued that the domestic policies of the Vietnamese Government are an internal matter, it seems clear that the consequences of these policies in terms of lives lost and burdens unilaterally imposed on Vietnam's neighbors are of legitimate concern to all nations. We wish to see free emigration from Vietnam but under conditions that are not so desperate that people flee knowing half of them may die in the attempt.

Soviet Presence in Vietnam

I should now like to address those other aspects of the present situation in the region on which the subcommittee has invited my comments. These include the Soviet presence in Vietnam, Vietnamese-Chinese relations, the situation in Kampuchea, and the effect of recent events on Thailand.

In preparing my remarks on these subjects, I was struck by the role that deep-seated ethnic and historical antagonisms have had in the current situation. In virtually every case, the current conflicts reflect centuries of rivalry and hatred, which Communist "internationalism" has been unable to put to rest. Indeed, the introduction of Soviet power and Moscow's rivalry with Beijing into the region have made this most recent round of Indochina conflicts much more difficult to resolve.

Developments in Vietnam over the last 12 months have resulted in the expansion of Soviet influence. After a lengthy courtship, Hanoi entered COMECON, the Communist economic organization, last June 1978. In November 1978, Vietnam signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which stipulated that if either country were threatened with attack, they would "immediately consult each other with a view toward eliminating the threat." As events unfolded, this treaty provided an important measure of security to Hanoi for its Christmas invasion of Kampuchea.

Following the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Chinese attack on Vietnam, the Soviet military pres-

ence in Vietnam has grown rapidly, including large-scale military supply and logistics support of Vietnamese Armed Forces and use by Soviet ships and aircraft of Vietnamese military facilities. Soviet personnel support both the delivery of military equipment to Vietnam and the movement of Vietnamese personnel and equipment to various points throughout Indochina, representing a significant new development. Use of ports began on April 1 when a Soviet destroyer visited Da Nang and, most recently, a Soviet diesel submarine and submarine tender visited Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet TU-95's—long range reconnaissance aircraft—have used Vietnamese facilities at Da Nang on at least two occasions. The Soviets and the Vietnamese explain these activities as normal aspects of relations between the two countries made necessary by the threat from China.

Use of Vietnamese territory and facilities gives the Soviet an increased reconnaissance and intelligence collection capability, primarily against China but also against U.S. and other military forces in the area. This is a source of serious concern to us and to most Asian countries, not only militarily but because of the dangers to the region from increased great power rivalry and the consequent risk of increasing tensions.

S.R.V.-P.R.C. Negotiations

As the subcommittee is aware, the Vietnamese and Chinese recently concluded a first round of negotiations in Hanoi aimed at settling their differences. We found the agreement to talk a hopeful sign, but the talks failed to move the two sides toward any sort of accommodation. Vietnam has stressed limited measures to stabilize the border—mutual withdrawal of forces from the border region, creation of a demilitarized zone, and prisoner exchanges—while making only passing reference to the broader range of S.R.V.-P.R.C. relations.

The Chinese, for their part, have insisted instead that "crucial and fundamental problems," such as Vietnamese ties to the Soviet Union, Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and Laos, and conflicting claims in the Paracels and Spratlys, will have to be resolved before relations can be improved. Although discussions are likely to resume later this month in Beijing, the underlying differences in the Vietnamese and Chinese positions appear to offer little hope for rapid resolution. It would appear that, over the near term at least, Chinese-Vietnamese relations will be marked by acrimony, distrust, and indirect combat, such as that taking place

in Kampuchea, but that a second major round of direct fighting across the border is probably not imminent.

Kampuchea

While talks continue, the Vietnamese are showing no sign of wavering in their determination to eliminate remaining Pol Pot resistance forces from Kampuchea. Vietnamese forces have been able to clear significant areas of major resistance concentrations, relying on their superior mobility and fire power to locate and drive major Kampuchean forces into isolated redoubts and in some instances across the border into Thailand. Kampuchean resistance forces appear to have tried to avoid contact in order to conserve their strength until the rainy season necessitates a slow-down in Vietnamese offensive actions. However, resistance forces have apparently been able to mount limited counterattacks against isolated Vietnamese units and to deny the Vietnamese unimpeded use of roads and highways, especially during the hours of darkness.

With the beginning of the rainy season, the Vietnamese now face the task of maintaining control over newly won areas while at the same time attempting to extend administrative control beyond the main towns and cities where the Heng Samrin regime now has a presence. In this latter regard, the Vietnamese face a formidable challenge, given historical Khmer-Vietnamese antagonisms and the acute shortage of experienced Kampuchean administrative cadre, many of whom were killed by the Pol Pot regime.

As in all wars, the fighting has brought further death, destruction, and severe economic dislocation to the most unfortunate country of Kampuchea. People moved westward by Pol Pot years ago are being trucked back by the Vietnamese to eastern regions. Urban residents moved to the countryside under Pol Pot are trying to return to the cities, although the Vietnamese appear to be preventing them from entering. People caught up in the fighting move randomly seeking safety, some cross the border into Thailand, others to areas where the fighting is less intense.

Obviously, there has been inattention to seasonal agricultural tasks. Harvesting early in the year was not completed. Planting, in advance of the rainy season, may have been only partially initiated depending upon the region. Seed stocks may have been consumed by migrant refugees or destroyed by contending forces. As a result, certain normally rich agricultural

areas are beset by problems which could mean famine later this year for the Kampuchean people in these regions. We, and other concerned nations and international agencies like the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], UNICEF, and the World Food Program, are carefully monitoring the situation to determine how great the need and how best to respond.

Any response to a food crisis in Kampuchea will have to take into account two major factors. First, food should be made available to Kampuchians in all parts of the country—those under control of the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces, those in areas controlled by Pol Pot, as well as those who remain in contested or peaceful areas. This can be assured only through some sort of an international presence and monitoring. Should a major food shortage develop and should these prerequisites be realizable, the United States would also have to consider what it could do to provide appropriate assistance, given the legislative restrictions on aid to Kampuchea. We are already helping the ICRC which is providing essential food and medicines to refugees on the Thai side of the border.

Concerning the political situation in Kampuchea, the United States has repeatedly made clear that it supports the concept of an independent system of states in Southeast Asia, that this system should include an independent and stable Kampuchea, and that we would be ready to support an international conference to try to achieve such an outcome. At the same time, we have stressed that we believe that the people of Kampuchea deserve at long last a government which is representative of their aspirations and which respects their human rights. In our view, neither the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime nor the Pol Pot government satisfy these criteria.

We remain prepared to support initiatives aimed at bringing about an internationally facilitated end to the fighting. And although the parties directly involved have so far demonstrated no willingness to accept international involvement, the nature of the conflict and the dangers which it poses to the stability of Southeast Asia as a whole make it imperative that we continue to work for a solution. We have discussed these matters with all the governments involved, including China and the Soviet Union.

Thailand

Of all of the Southeast Asian nations, Thailand has been the most seri-

ously affected by the fighting in Kampuchea. During recent months, as a direct result of the conflict, Thailand's refugee burden has increased by the amount of perhaps 100,000 Kampuchians at various times. Many of these are of Chinese origin, deliberately expelled by Vietnamese troops. The result has been an immense new political and economic problem, given the inability of the international community to resettle many of the 200,000 refugees already in Thailand. Worse, it has created a security problem since it is most difficult to distinguish between

Issue of U.S.-S.R.V. Relations

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUG. 9, 1979¹

We have read press reports quoting Vietnamese Vice Minister Nguyen Co Thach as stating that talks toward normalization of relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) are now underway.

I want to state that there have been no talks, secret or otherwise, on normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam since last fall. As we indicated at that time, Vietnam's actions toward its neighbors and its policies toward its own people resulting in a flood of refugees have made it impossible for us to continue with normalization.

We have made this position clear to the Vietnamese both publicly and we have made it plain to them privately. We have had and continue to have contacts with Vietnamese officials on matters which are not related to the question of normalization of relations.

It is not true, however, that renewed movement toward normalization of relations is underway. Our ultimate objective remains unchanged. But in the circumstances which prevail in the region at the moment and which circumstances prevail because of Vietnam's policies and actions, this is not an appropriate time to move forward on this particular matter. □

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston in the name of and on behalf of Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke.

Pol Pot forces and supporters on the one hand and actual refugees on the other. Large concentrations of these persons on the border could become a provocation for the Vietnamese to send forces into Thailand, expanding the war to a dangerous level.

The fighting in Kampuchea has also forced the Royal Thai Government to reevaluate its military posture and to take steps to upgrade its armed forces. Thailand is accordingly increasing its purchases of military equipment from the United States and other suppliers.

The Thai Government has announced a policy of neutrality toward the contending forces in Kampuchea. The task is more difficult than might be supposed in view of the long and, in places, rugged Thai border with Kampuchea and the ebb-and-flow of military operations and refugee migrations which either threaten or spillover into Thai territory. The fact that the Pol Pot forces are generally backed up to the Thai border by Vietnamese pressure tends to give an appearance of Thai partiality. However, when Heng Samrin groups are similarly exposed, the Thai have followed a consistent policy of allowing both to return to Kampuchea at a safe point along the border.

Thailand's relations with China improved markedly during 1977-78 well in advance of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. This was in keeping with the policy of the Thai Government to improve its relations with all of its neighbors including Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Thailand also sought to confirm its relations with other countries having interests in the region and Prime Minister Kriangsak visited Tokyo, Moscow, and Washington as well as Beijing. We believe Prime Minister Kriangsak is trying to pursue a policy of neutrality in a very difficult situation with numerous conflicting pressures.

We strongly support him in these efforts.

In recognition of this situation, as well as recognition of our longstanding ties by treaty and friendship to Thailand, the President assured Prime Minister Kriangsak during his visit to Washington last February that the United States supports the integrity of Thailand as a stable, secure, and peaceful nation in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

I would like to stress that the United States is committed to a stable, peaceful system of nation states in Southeast Asia, Communist or non-Communist. We seek improved relations with former adversaries in this context and in pursuit of this objective. We will also continue to support, in this context, the security and peaceful development of our ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] friends, particularly that of Thailand.

The suspicions of the ASEAN states over the ultimate intentions of the Communist powers in the region, including the Soviet Union, have been amplified by the current conflicts. As a case in point, the recent overtures made by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong through a third party suggesting nonaggression pacts between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries were greeted with a substantial degree of skepticism. And the agreement on refugees between Hanoi and the UNHCR is greeted with equal skepticism in light of its irrelevance to the main refugee problem.

Vietnam is a country rich in natural resources with a talented and productive population. If the Vietnamese people were able to turn their energies to developing their economic potential, instead of serving policies that bring instability and warfare to their

neighbors and provide a foothold for Soviet military and political penetration of the area, they could begin to share the benefits of the extraordinary growth that now characterizes most of Southeast Asia. We, and I believe all of the countries in the area, would welcome the constructive role that Vietnam can play. No one who wishes the peoples of Southeast Asia well can have an interest in encouraging its division into hostile camps. The basic choice is up to Hanoi, whose current policies have caused massive human suffering for the peoples of Indochina and serious problems for its non-Communist neighbors.

The continued emphasis of the ASEAN countries on economic and social development is the best long-run defense against destabilizing influences at home or threats from outside. In the meantime, they have each undertaken in varying degrees to strengthen their individual military capabilities as well as continuing their economic progress. They are also looking to their friends for support.

It is therefore highly significant that Secretary Vance will be traveling to the region [July 1-3, 1979] to meet with the ASEAN foreign ministers next month. His presence there will be symbolic of America's determination that, as President Carter said at Georgia Tech, we will "... stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we will protect the vital interests of the United States ...". No one should doubt that the continued stability and prosperity of the ASEAN nations is of great importance to us. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Continuing Efforts To Account for MIA's

by Robert B. Oakley

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 7, 1979. Mr. Oakley is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I appreciate this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee to discuss the Department of State's role in the Administration's continuing efforts to obtain an accounting of Americans lost in Southeast Asia.

Woodcock Commission

From the outset this Administration and the Department of State have consistently followed a policy aimed at obtaining the fullest feasible accounting of our missing personnel. In keeping with this policy and as one of his very first foreign policy initiatives after taking office, President Carter sent a presidential commission to Indochina [March 16-20, 1977] to explore directly with the Vietnamese and Lao how such an accounting might be obtained. The Commission was headed by Mr. Leonard Woodcock and included congressional representation.

In a statement issued by the White House March 12, 1977, the President noted that in sending the Woodcock Commission to Vietnam and Laos, he was

... hopeful that this step we are taking will meet with a positive response and put in motion a process that will obtain the fullest possible accounting for our men who sacrificed so much for their country. At the same time, we recognize that information may never be available on many of them. Some were lost over water, or over heavily forested areas and mountainous terrain, where information may never be found or will be very slow in developing. So we are not unrealistic in our expectations.

On the Commission's return from its March 16-20 trip to Vietnam and Laos, it issued a report detailing its findings and conclusions.² According to the report: "The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was the S.R.V.'s [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] formal undertaking to give the U.S. all available information on our missing men as it is found and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed." The report concluded that:

"In the Commission's view, the best hope for obtaining a proper accounting for our MIA's lies in the context of ... improved relations" between the United States and Vietnam.

After considering the Commission's report, and following a meeting he had with Commission members on their return to Washington, the President stated at a March 23 joint press conference with Leonard Woodcock that the Vietnamese:

... have promised to set up a permanent study mechanism by which the U.S. Government can provide information that we have about the potential whereabouts or identity of servicemen who were lost, and the Vietnamese have promised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence that we might present to them in the future.

The President then announced that it was on this basis that he would respond favorably to a Vietnamese proposal that our negotiators meet in Paris to begin talks on the possibility of normalizing relations.

President Carter took the opportunity of a March 24 press conference to expand on his remarks of the day before. The President stated:

I have always taken the position that when I am convinced that the Vietnamese have done their best to account for the service personnel who are missing in action, at that point, I would favor normalization, the admission of Vietnam into the United Nations, and the resumption of trade and other relationships with the Vietnamese. I believe the response of the Vietnamese leaders to the Woodcock Commission was very favorable.

Subsequent Meetings

As the subcommittee is aware, we met with the Vietnamese in Paris on three occasions—May, June, and December 1977—to discuss the prospects for normalizing relations between our countries. At all three meetings, we stressed that two factors would have an important effect on our ability to proceed toward normalization: Vietnamese willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region and continued Vietnamese efforts to provide us with the fullest possible accounting of our missing men.

Specifically, regarding the MIA [missing in action] issue, we stressed that we do not consider our missing men as something to be bargained over, which had been the case on occasion in

the past between Vietnam and the United States, as it had in similar circumstances between France and Vietnam. We stated that the United States would reject any attempt to link this question to aid. We emphasized that the Vietnamese have a simple humanitarian obligation to help resolve the MIA question.

The Vietnamese refused to accept the U.S. position on normalization of relations. Instead, they insisted that together with Vietnamese efforts to resolve the MIA question the United States should accept its "obligations" under the Paris accord of 1973 to provide economic assistance to Vietnam.³

We rejected this approach, noting that the Paris accord was no longer valid in view of the massive North Vietnamese military attack on South Vietnam in 1975, that the United States was under no obligation to provide aid, and that we could not accept Vietnamese attempts to link continued cooperation on MIA's to the question of U.S. economic assistance.

We next met with the Vietnamese in New York for several rounds of unofficial discussions during the fall of last year. These discussions appeared to make some progress, and the Vietnamese indicated that they were no longer demanding U.S. aid as a *quid pro quo* for normalization or for continued progress on MIA's.

For our part, we reiterated our belief that the Vietnamese could and should be doing more to resolve the MIA question, and referring to recent events in the region, asked for clarification on three developments of importance to us: the implications of the November 3 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Vietnam's intentions toward Kampuchea, and the upsurge in refugees from Vietnam. With regard to the Vietnam-Kampuchea border conflict, we again indicated that peaceful Vietnamese intent and actions toward its neighbors, even one as universally deplored as the Pol Pot regime, would affect our ability to normalize relations with Vietnam.

Vietnam of course mounted a major invasion of Kampuchea on December 25 of last year. It now occupies large areas of that country and has shown no inclination to seek a political rather than a military solution or to consider an independent Kampuchean Government representative of its own people rather than beholden to another country. Under the circumstances, there is no question of any movement toward normalization of relations with Vietnam at this time.

Thus, throughout our talks with the

Vietnamese in Paris and elsewhere, U.S. negotiators have stressed, in keeping with the President's policy enunciated at the beginning of his Administration, that Vietnamese good faith in helping us to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our missing men would have a direct bearing on our ability to normalize relations with them. Vietnamese behavior toward their neighbors is also extremely important. This remains our policy and you can be sure it will be fully reflected whenever we might meet with the Vietnamese again for talks on normalization of relations or any other subject.

Other Initiatives

Various initiatives and actions by the Congress have been extremely helpful as a means of demonstrating to the Vietnamese that U.S. policy, with regard to obtaining the fullest possible MIA accounting, has the complete support of the entire U.S. Government and the American people. As recently as February of this year, Representatives Elizabeth Holtzman and Billy Lee Evans visited Hanoi and pressed the Vietnamese for MIA results. Last August, in one of the most successful such efforts to date, Representative G.V. Montgomery led a delegation composed of six other Congressmen to Hanoi and Vientiane, where they were able to obtain 15 sets of MIA remains.

As I have already noted, the Woodcock Commission also included congressional representation, which no doubt increased the respect with which it, and the policies it expressed, were viewed in Hanoi and Vientiane. And there is of course the work of this subcommittee, which has clearly demonstrated that we as a government—Administration and Congress combined—will not flag in fulfilling the obligations this country owes its missing servicemen and their families.

I should also note in this regard the fine work of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia in insuring that the views of the segment of the American public most affected by the MIA issue—the relatives of our missing men—are made known to the Administration so that they can be reflected in our official statements to the Vietnamese. In recognition of the league's valuable work, Department officials have met regularly with its representatives so as to keep them informed regarding the status of U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations and the possibility of normalization, as well as to see how we can best work together to

achieve further progress on MIA matters. In addition, Department officials have attended league meetings in order to respond directly to concerns expressed by MIA families and have carried on extensive correspondence with league officers and members.

Question of Normalizing Relations

It has been asked in connection with the question of normalizing relations with Vietnam, what assurance does the United States have that the S.R.V. will cooperate on an accounting of MIA's should relations be established. I cannot state with assurance that this would be the case. However, I would simply note that it has been our experience that the Vietnamese have generally been more forthcoming in terms of remains returned and information made available during periods when prospects for normalization appeared more promising than when they did not. For example, during the period of our talks in Paris in 1977, the Vietnamese returned 22 sets of remains in October of that year.

Last summer, following a pause seemingly precipitated by U.N. Ambassador Dinh Ba Thi's expulsion from the United States on charges of spying, the Vietnamese sent their experts to our MIA identification facilities in Hawaii. And in early August, when the Vietnamese seemed anxious to renew talks about normalization, Congressman Montgomery and his colleagues from the House were able to obtain 11 sets of remains.

I would also note that our efforts to date to send our MIA experts to Vietnam—either to talk to the Vietnamese search teams first hand or actually conduct searches themselves—have been to no avail. Following normalization, we would be able to place people in Hanoi, and perhaps later Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), who could at least talk to Vietnamese experts on a regular basis. There would also be at least a faint hope of actually taking part in searches in the field.

Our experience during the July 1978 Vietnamese visit to the MIA identification facilities in Hawaii has demonstrated that discussions between U.S.

Famine in Kampuchea

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUG. 9, 1979¹

The United States is deeply concerned over growing evidence of famine in Kampuchea resulting from the invasion and occupation of that country, and also from prior years of despotism.

The United States wholeheartedly supports efforts by international organizations, private voluntary agencies, and others which are attempting to open channels through which humanitarian assistance to needy Khmers can flow.

The United States continues to urge that this assistance be aimed at meeting the basic human needs of the Khmer people, irrespective of their location in the country or the political authority under whose control they fall.

The United States also believes that maximum effort should be exerted to assure through effective international monitoring that emergency relief supplies reach the needy, for whom the assistance is intended.

Thus far, the humanitarian efforts of various organizations and nations to

provide relief supplies to the Khmer people have had only limited impact. The competing forces in Kampuchea have sought to impose political conditions on these international humanitarian undertakings.

The United States deplores the attempts of the fighting sides in Kampuchea to obtain political advantage from these relief efforts. The losers are the starving Khmer people.

It is imperative that all sides in Kampuchea cooperate to the fullest with international humanitarian relief efforts in Kampuchea. No political entity or government which impedes the flow of this emergency humanitarian assistance to the Khmer people can lay claim to representing their aspirations.

The United States, for its part, stands ready to contribute further within the limits of U.S. law to an international relief effort aimed at assisting all Khmer people in need under international supervision. □

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

and Vietnamese experts are decidedly more effective when conducted on a face-to-face basis. I would not want to overstate the usefulness of such direct liaison—since actual results will still depend on Vietnamese willingness to carry out search efforts and on what can be located—given the problems of terrain, time, and weather. Nevertheless, direct liaison in Hanoi would provide us with at least some capability of monitoring Vietnamese MIA efforts—a capability which we do not have under current circumstances.

I have discussed the question of normalization of relations with Vietnam at some length because I fully appreciate the interest of the subcommittee in this subject and its relationship to our MIA accounting and recovery efforts. I would now like to address the measures which the Department of State is and has been undertaking to obtain an accounting, irrespective of the prospects for normalization.

One of our most important procedures in this regard is the MIA liaison arrangement in Bangkok which came into being as a result of agreements reached during the July 1977 Vietnamese visit to our MIA identification facilities in Hawaii. U.S. personnel responsible for MIA matters in Bangkok consult on a regular basis with their counterparts at the S.R.V. Embassy there. As part of these consultations, U.S. personnel hand over dossiers containing information on specific MIA cases for use by the Vietnamese in their recovery efforts.

At the conclusion of hostilities, we had provided information to the Vietnamese on all of our missing men. The dossiers that are passed to the Vietnamese in Bangkok, and elsewhere as the occasion arises, serve to pinpoint those cases where we believe positive results would be particularly likely. The Vietnamese have acknowledged that these procedures are useful. Approximately one half of the remains returned thus far have been those of individuals for whom dossiers had been passed to the Vietnamese.

Another important program involves efforts by our embassies and consulates in Southeast Asia to obtain information from refugees regarding Americans lost in Indochina. As part of this program, American missions in appropriate countries have formally notified the various voluntary agencies involved in refugee relief and resettlement efforts, the local UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees] office, ICEM [Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration], and the missions of France, Canada, and Australia of the continuing U.S. interest in acquiring

all information relating to MIA's and have asked them to bring any such information to our immediate attention. In addition, personnel engaged in interviewing refugees have been requested to be particularly alert for any indication of information regarding MIA's. Should such information come to light, the refugees are immediately contacted by MIA specialists for extensive debriefing sessions.

Information From Refugees

Our interest in obtaining information on MIA's is well known among the refugee camps in Asia. We have taken specific steps to insure that this is the case including making arrangements for the display of posters at refugee transit centers overseas. These posters in the Lao, Hmong, Khmer, Vietnamese, and Chinese languages specifically solicit MIA information from the refugees and provide instructions on how to contact us.

In addition, UNHCR, ICEM, and voluntary agency personnel manning transit centers have been alerted to the need to direct any refugees with information to us. Once refugees arrive in the United States, INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] officials have been helpful in obtaining MIA information during their interviews. Also, the voluntary agencies who help to resettle refugees cooperate both with the Department of State and with the League of Families in seeking information. Since 1975, refugees have provided 234 reports on possible MIA's or MIA remains, 176 of these during the past year.

I should note that many refugees are understandably eager to be accepted for resettlement in the United States, and we have to be alert to the possibility of exaggerated or fabricated reports being brought to our attention in the hope of gaining favor with U.S. diplomatic or immigration officials. Nonetheless, all information from whatever source is transmitted to the Defense Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense where it is analyzed and correlated.

Case of PFC Garwood

The Garwood case provides a good example of how these procedures function. As soon as we received a report that PFC Garwood was in Hanoi and were able to form a positive opinion of its reliability, Secretary Vance personally sent a message to the Vietnamese requesting that they provide us at once with all possible information on his situation and that he be allowed to leave Vietnam immediately. In their

response, the Vietnamese indicated that Garwood was indeed living in Vietnam and that he was free to leave for the United States. We also alerted Representatives Elizabeth Holtzman and Billie Lee Evans—who were already en route to Hanoi at that time—and the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] to Garwood's situation. As you know, we were eventually able to arrange through the ICRC for his return to this country.

A similar effort was made with regard to the information made public by the refugee, Ngo Phi Hung, to the effect that he had seen and had contact with "49" American prisoners in South Vietnam during the period 1975-77. We asked the S.R.V. authorities for information on this report. They replied promptly denying this claim and stating that there were no American prisoners in Vietnam.

The Garwood case, in particular, highlights again the question we have constantly before us of whether there are other Americans like PFC Garwood in Vietnam, and if so what can we do to effect their departure. This possibility was raised with the Vietnamese during the Woodcock Commission visit to Hanoi. At that time, in response to numerous direct questions, the Vietnamese assured us that all Americans who had been taken prisoner and were alive had been returned to the United States under article 8(a) of the Paris accord on Vietnam, and that all Americans who remained in Vietnam after April 30, 1975, and who registered themselves with Vietnamese authorities had been allowed to leave Vietnam. This response leaves a loophole which can be made to fit a case like Garwood. Obviously, we do not consider helpful the use of this sort of debating tactic rather than a frank, full response.

In conjunction with our efforts to obtain PFC Garwood's departure, we again asked the Vietnamese whether there were any other Americans living in that country, voluntarily or otherwise. As you know, they have categorically denied the existence of any such Americans, dropping the references to categories. Since we take nothing on faith in this area, and we have no means of directly determining whether this latest Vietnamese statement is accurate, the next step will be to evaluate whatever information PFC Garwood might have on possible Americans in Vietnam. If, as in the case of the report that Garwood himself was in Vietnam, he is able to provide specific information which appears credible on MIA remains or living Americans, we will again be in a position to approach the Vietnamese with

the expectation of getting a satisfactory response.

However, before this can be done, we will have to await a thorough debriefing of Mr. Garwood, which we understand will not occur until his situation with the Marine Corps has been clarified. In the meantime, we will continue to gather information from all available sources and, as I have said before, if after careful analysis any of this information should suggest the existence of other Americans in Vietnam, we will immediately contact the Vietnamese.

Conclusion

In concluding, I would like to stress again that we believe that the Vietnamese could be doing more to resolve the MIA issue, which has caused so much anguish for so many American families for too long. We have reiterated our position in this regard both directly to the Vietnamese and publicly to the American people and will continue to do so.

At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that past experience has demonstrated, unfortunately, that the problem of obtaining a full MIA accounting is never an easy one. Following the Korean war and World War II, for example, we were unable to account for approximately 22% of those who had been lost. Moreover, in the case of World War II we had free access to virtually all of the former battlefields to conduct our search operations. The corresponding figure for personnel unaccounted for following the Vietnam conflict is approximately 4%, despite our lack of access to much of Indochina.

I have cited these figures not with any view toward excusing performance to date by the S.R.V. on MIA's but to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the tasks to which we all—in the Congress and in the Administration—are committed to seeing through to a successful conclusion. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1977, p. 366.

³For text of Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1979, p. 169.

ECONOMICS: Interdependence in North America

by Julius L. Katz

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance on June 6, 1979. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.¹

I am pleased to respond to the committee's invitation to discuss the prospects for and problems posed by increased economic interdependence in North America and with the Caribbean.

The economies of this region are in many ways complementary and this fact is reflected in the rapidly growing economic relationship among the countries. Trade flows, investment, tourism, migration, transportation links, and financial ties have all expanded dramatically in recent years. In some sectors and between some of the countries integration has proceeded rather far. Rapid change brings with it opportunities as well as problems of adjustment.

In this statement, I would like to review briefly some of the recent developments in our economic relations with our neighbors in North America and to discuss both the opportunities and problems presented by our growing interdependence. Because of the limits of time I do not deal directly with the Caribbean area in my statement but I would be glad to respond to any questions the committee may have with respect to Caribbean countries.

First, let me review some of the facts bearing on our economic relationship with our neighbors in North America. Two-way trade with Canada has risen from \$39 billion in 1974 to over \$63 billion last year. Even allowing for inflation, the increase is dramatic. Our bilateral trade in the integrated U.S.-Canada automotive industry alone increased by over 15% per annum for the past 5 years, or as much as \$3-4 billion per year.

The growth of U.S.-Mexican trade, on a relative basis, is as impressive. U.S. trade with Mexico has increased from \$6.4 billion in 1974 to almost \$13 billion at present. Mexico's rapid economic growth provides U.S. exporters with significant expanded opportunities to export capital goods and technology.

Energy Trade

Energy trade has been and will be an important element of trade between the

three countries. U.S. crude oil imports from Canada are well below the peak of 1 million barrels per day reached in early 1974. At present, our net oil imports from Canada are only 155,000 barrels per day. However, we import from Canada almost 3 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, or about 4½% of U.S. consumption. There are now pending before Canada's National Energy Board additional applications for natural gas exports to the United States which could eventually amount to another billion cubic feet per day. We have an extensive electricity exchange with Canada, with the United States being a net importer of some 17.5 million megawatt hours per year.

Our energy relations with Mexico are less extensive than with Canada but they are growing. We import more than 400,000 barrels per day of crude oil, and this volume should increase as Mexico's crude oil production expands. The United States now takes 80% of Mexico's crude oil exports. The Mexican Government has indicated a desire to diversify its exports so that Mexico might eventually export only 60% of its oil to the United States. But in absolute terms the volume should increase well above present levels. We do not now import natural gas from Mexico, but, as the committee is aware, discussions are underway with the Mexican Government with respect to possible gas exports to the United States. We also have the potential for growing electricity exchanges—the United States now is a net exporter to Mexico of some 68,000 megawatt hours annually.

Investment Flows

Investment flows are another substantial element of our economic relationship. In 1977, the net book value of U.S. investment in Canada was more than \$35 billion, representing about one-fourth of total U.S. direct investment abroad. Canadian investment in the United States has increased markedly in recent years reaching almost \$6 billion in 1977. U.S. direct investment in Mexico in the same year was over \$3 billion. With our rapidly growing economic relationship has come a growing integration of our economy with those of Canada and Mexico.

The most dramatic example of this is the U.S.-Canadian automotive industry which has been substantially ration-

alized and integrated across the border pursuant to the U.S.-Canada automotive agreement of 1965. As a result of this agreement trade in automotive products between the two countries has grown explosively (from \$740 million in 1964 to over \$21 billion in 1978) with great benefits to both countries in terms of increased employment opportunities, more efficient production, and thus benefits to consumers as well as investors in the industry.

Issue of Increasing Economic Integration

As the result of successive trade negotiations since World War II a substantial part of our trade with Canada is presently duty-free both into Canada and the United States. In 1978 about 70% of U.S. imports from Canada entered free of duty, and 60% of U.S. exports to Canada entered duty free. If our MTN [multilateral trade negotiations] offers of duty elimination had been in effect last year, 80% of Canada's exports to us would have been duty-free as would 65% of our exports to them.

Our trade relations with Mexico are at a lower volume and the evidences of integration fewer. As part of its economic development program Mexico has pursued a highly restrictive trade policy. Until the recent MTN, Mexico abstained from participation in international trade negotiations and did not become a member of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In 1977 we signed a small bilateral trade agreement with Mexico, the first since 1942, and have been negotiating a fuller MTN agreement with the Mexican Government, which is now actively considering GATT membership.

The rapid expansion of our economic relations with Canada and Mexico and the evident benefits derived therefrom have raised the question whether we should not more actively pursue a deliberate policy of integration of the North American economies. Clearly all three countries would benefit from the freer movement of goods, services, and people. Integration of the three economies would promote more rapid economic growth in the three countries. It would promote greater efficiency of production and the development of resources. It is in the latter area that many people see particular advantages having in mind the potential energy resources available in Canada and Mexico.

On the other hand, efforts toward economic integration confront a number of hard realities. First the people of Canada and Mexico, not unlike the people of the United States, are sensi-

tive about the development or utilization of their natural resources and particularly their energy resources. They believe these resources must be used to serve their own national interests, having in mind the need to conserve those resources to the maximum extent possible for future generations. Thus those who see Canada and Mexico as either the salvation or at least a substantial answer to our energy problems are likely to be severely disappointed.

This is not to say that we do not have the possibility of a substantial and even growing energy trade with Canada and Mexico. We must, however, recognize and be sensitive to the national policy concerns of our neighbors to the north and south with respect to energy resources.

The prospects for increased integration of the U.S. economy with those of Canada and Mexico exist in a number of sectors. To some extent integration will progress as our trade in particular sectors grows and as our barriers to exchanges between the three countries are dismantled. We should recognize at the same time that with the benefits of integration come some problems. Rapidly growing trade in particular sectors, particularly sectors that involve commodities, with established producers brings with it problems of adjustment. Thus we have found calls for protection against rapid imports of particular products such as horticultural imports from Mexico. Also with the rapid expansion of trade has come resort to various provisions of law dealing with unfair competition such as antidumping, countervailing duties, etc. Frequent resort to such provisions have produced considerable irritation in our trade relations with our neighbors. Such measures are not, of course, limited to U.S. producers. Canada and Mexico have taken similar actions or have resorted to other means to protect their domestic producers.

Notwithstanding the occasional problems we have had in our trade relations with Canada and Mexico, we have made significant progress both in dealing with these problems and in laying the basis for further trade expansion through the recently concluded MTN. With Canada, we have agreed to cut tariffs on a bilateral basis by about 40%. Canada has agreed to adhere to the customs valuation code and progressively to eliminate valuation practices that have irritated American exporters for many years. Canada has also agreed to modify its practice of imposing a 15% duty on machinery imports when Canada produces machinery like that imported.

The United States, for its part, has agreed, in exchange for stricter rules

on the use of subsidies, to add an injury test to our countervailing duty statute as Canada, among others, had requested. The improved dispute settlement mechanisms under the GATT negotiated in the MTN will improve our ability to deal with various bilateral trade problems.

Our bilateral negotiations with Mexico are not yet concluded. We are optimistic that, in the settlement we hope to conclude, a basis will be laid for a substantial increase in trade between our two countries.

Another element of the growing interdependence of the North American economies has to do with investment. The United States has traditionally favored two-way investment flows. Increased investment promotes economic growth and employment and contributes to expanded international trade. On the other hand, investment can be a problem when countries or governmental units compete for investment in particular sectors by offering extraordinary incentives. Such practices can distort rational investment decisions creating employment opportunities in one region at the expense of employment in another region.

The problems arising from investment incentives have been a matter of growing concern—one that we have been discussing not only with our neighbors but with our trading partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as well. We have undertaken bilateral discussions with Canada in particular to explore means of limiting investment incentives in both countries. A bilateral understanding in this area might well build on procedures negotiated in other areas in the MTN.

In conclusion, I have in this brief statement tried to reflect the elements of our growing interdependence with our neighbors in North America, with the opportunities that such growing interdependence presents to the three countries and, finally, to certain of the problems that are raised thereby. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

MIDDLE EAST: *Forces of Change*

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 26, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

The annual review before this subcommittee of events in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwestern Asia has become a valuable opportunity for all of us to step back from the details of particular situations and to seek an overall sense of direction in that part of the world.

A year ago during this review, my statement concentrated on defining the interests of the United States in this region where more important and diverse American interests come together than in any other region of the developing world. I discussed how the energetic pursuit of an Arab-Israeli peace is central to pursuit of the full range of American interests throughout the region.

In the year since, peace has been achieved between Egypt and Israel, but the negative reaction in the Arab world has demonstrated the validity of our premise that there must be a comprehensive peace that achieves acceptance of Israel by all of its neighbors and an honorable and secure peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. The search for peace thus remains central to our strategy.

In the year since, we have also witnessed a revolution in Iran, increasing instability in Afghanistan, continued internal strife in Lebanon, and threats to political and economic stability in other countries. How often we hear the question: Where will instability strike next?

We have also seen with increasing emphasis how the actions of the oil producers of this region affect our national strength and, indeed, our daily lives.

This year, I would like to focus on the forces of change in the region and how these forces may affect the pursuit of our interests there. I will not dwell on the point made with great emphasis by the Administration in recent weeks—that there is need for dramatic change in our own reliance on foreign energy if we are to bring our relation-

ships with this region into healthier balance.

A REGION OF RAPID CHANGE

This region is among the fastest changing in the world. Many of its nations have had to respond in a relatively brief period to the impact of large accumulations of oil revenues, modern education and technology, accelerating economic growth, and growing regional and international interdependence. The issue for those of us who formulate policy for this region is to devise a strategy sensitive to the nature of the changes that are taking place and not to be misled by imagined causes.

In this connection, I would like to cite the speech Secretary of State Vance made on May 1 in Chicago on meeting the challenge of a changing world.² His remarks seem particularly appropriate to the complex region we are discussing today. Our future, he said, will be endangered if we react in frustration and use our power to resist change in the world or if we employ military power when it would do more harm than good. If we Americans appreciate the extraordinary strengths we have, he went on, and if we understand the nature of the changes taking place in the world, then we have every reason to be confident about our future. Our challenge is to use effectively the various kinds of power and influence we possess in order to insure the evolution of these events in the manner least disruptive and most congenial to our interests.

I believe our country has the versatility and breadth—greater than any adversary or rival—to adapt to change and to influence its course in constructive directions if we understand it. With few exceptions, the peoples of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwestern Asia want a good working relationship with us. They value our know-how, our practicality and inventiveness, our technology, our educational system, and share many of our values. They know we respect their right to solve their own problems and to preserve their own freedom. They know that we do not ask them to be like us—but only to work with us in a shared desire for an orderly and

peaceful world. Our acceptance of a pluralistic world enables us to contribute rather than to try to dominate. They also know that we have interests of our own in the area as well but that we will pursue them with respect for their integrity.

My purpose here today is to encourage a dialogue on the nature of change in this area, which can serve as a basis for the decisions that will face us in the coming year. My simple point is that the second critical element in U.S. strategy for this region—in which the search for an Arab-Israeli peace is a principal instrument—is to attune ourselves to the nature of change and to work with the governments there in directing it constructively. In this approach, we are leading from our strengths.

THE FACES OF CHANGE

The Middle East and Southwestern Asia have had more than their share of the headlines in the past year. In fact, rarely has such a variety of developments hit one region in such a short period of time.

The Economic Revolution

Profound economic developments in the region have potential consequences that are not yet fully understood. To elaborate on this point, it would be enough for me to present figures on the rapidly increasing accumulations of oil revenues, per capita income figures, and increases in the rates of investment for several countries in the region. I could go beyond that and speak of the impact on these very traditional societies of modern technology and education and the rapidly rising horizon of expectations and opportunities. The exact impact of such change—all in the life of one generation—on the social and political futures of these nations is something that we are actively analyzing and will continue to study in increasing breadth and depth.

Similarly, there is much to be said about the social and political impact on those other nations in the region where expectations have risen but where resources are lacking and the rate of development has not produced visible change in the lives of people.

I want to go beyond these important developments, however, to make a further point about some of their effects on relations within the region and on our relationship with the region. The point is simply this: At a time when some of the nations of this area are just beginning to enjoy the independence and power which their resources give them, we must learn together to manage relationships—both among the states of the region and between the United States and these states—that are characterized by dramatically increasing interdependence.

There is no question that the major oil producers enjoy an accretion of power and influence which, while reflecting their macroeconomic strength, is disproportionate to their populations or military strength. The least developed countries of the area, and indeed elsewhere as well, are reluctant to offend the oil-rich countries, whose economic assistance can partly offset skyrocketing fuel bills and the costs of development and modernization. At the most basic level, food production itself depends in many of the developing countries on imported petroleum products—from diesel fuel for irrigation pumps to petrochemical fertilizer.

On the other hand, the oil boom has led to greater interdependence in the region, as the demand for labor in the booming economies and the availability of labor in neighboring countries has led to labor migrations of unprecedented proportions. Development in the sparsely populated oil-rich states depends on skilled and unskilled labor, both from poorer states in the area and the Indian subcontinent and also from more developed states. There are now 2.5 million foreign workers in the oil-exporting countries. Nearly 40% of the Yemen labor force is working in Saudi Arabia; Egypt has 7% of its labor force working abroad; Jordan has 35% of its labor force working in the gulf area; India and Pakistan together have nearly 1 million workers in the region.

The remittances which flow back in turn now constitute a major portion of the foreign exchange earnings of several poorer countries. For example, remittances from Indian workers in west Asia now exceed \$1 billion a year, and Pakistani workers send home even more. The remitted earnings of all these workers in 1977 were over \$6 billion, far exceeding the level of foreign aid provided these developing countries and clearly their most important source of foreign exchange. In fact, remittances now dominate any analysis of the economies of non-OPEC

[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] Arab states. In addition, shortages of technical and managerial skills have developed in the labor—"sending" countries, but these very shortages have created new opportunities for women and other groups not previously in the labor force. Economic linkages are being created that make economic regionalism a necessity.

One word needs to be said about another resource—the scarcity of water. Over the next few years, water issues will increasingly occupy the attention of the political leadership of the region. The Maqarin Dam and questions of water management in the West Bank have made the availability of water a matter of crucial importance in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. However, there is an even broader perspective. Water has always been a scarce resource in the Middle East. As incomes rise and development takes place, demand for water for personal consumption, agriculture, and industry increases. In many areas, however, there are few remaining underdeveloped water resources. The pressure of rising demand for a fixed and limited supply of a resource even more vital than oil could have far-reaching political significance—both as a cause of conflict and as an imperative for cooperation.

As interdependence reaches beyond the region, the Middle East may be a critical case where, however difficult, mutual accommodation to an unprecedented degree will become indispensable if we are to live together in peace, prosperity, and civility.

Whether we Americans like it or not, we carry heavy responsibilities in the intensifying relationship between the industrial world and both the oil rich and the traditionally poor of this region. Our NATO allies and Japan share our interest in this relationship. Therefore, what happens in our relations with this region can have a major impact on our relations with the industrialized world, which has traditionally been of primary importance to us. As these mutually important relationships converge, we are living through a great historic change: A part of the world we once thought remote is on our doorstep—and we on theirs. Conducting this relationship in mutual respect and in imaginative and creative ways will require changes in attitude on both sides.

In the forefront of the public mind today is our relationship with the oil-producing states of the region. Some of these have traditionally sought close relations with us while others reflect some bias—often ideological—against

American interests. All, however, appear to recognize the need for close interaction with the industrial economies. While the price of oil may, in the final analysis, be determined by the market, certain of these countries—notably Saudi Arabia—have a special impact on the nature of the market. They are in an economic position to produce below their full capacity, and they increasingly appear sensitive to arguments that it is in their economic self-interest to do so. They have also shown, however, that they are responsive and responsible in recognizing the contribution they can make to the stability of the global economy by increasing their production.

Beyond that, the wealthier of the oil-producing states have realized that

**Kerosene, Fuel Oil
Export Licenses
for Iran**

**DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 22, 1979¹**

The Department of Commerce on August 3 approved two licenses for the export of kerosene and #2 fuel oil to Iran aggregating \$47,040,000. The Commerce Department action was concurred in by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy as an exception to the normal restriction on the export of petroleum products from the United States.

The United States currently imports directly and indirectly about 900,000 barrels of crude oil and oil products per day from Iran. The exporter of the petroleum products to Iran imports a substantial portion of its available crude oil from Iran and applied for a license to export the above products to Iran on an exceptional basis to meet a temporary shortage of cooking and heating oil there caused by refinery problems. Approval of the transaction was based both on humanitarian considerations as well as our self-interest in assuring a continuing supply of crude oil from Iran.

In effect this transaction represents the provision of temporary refinery service to Iran. The amount exported represents the equivalent of about 2–3 days of oil imports from Iran. □

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

their long-term futures—when their oil production drops significantly—will depend on their developing viable economies in the meantime and on the soundness of the global economy of which they will be a part. Their ability to convert oil sold now into investments which will help them build for the future requires a sound global economy. They, in turn, will play an increasing role in the search for solutions to global problems.

Nationalism

At a time when nations are facing the demands of regional and global economic interdependence, they are also confronted by the renewed pressures of nationalism from within the region—nationalisms that in themselves often cut across conventional national borders. Interwoven with the problems of rapid economic and political evolution is the accelerating self-consciousness of nations and peoples trying to define their identities, interests, and natural associations. These problems complicate the political lives of individual countries, the relationships between nations, and efforts to achieve peace throughout the area. They have played a role in generating civil war and international terrorism and have the continuing potential of leading to war between nations.

The problem takes many forms.

- Peoples such as the Palestinians and those in the Sahara with a new or recently intensified sense of nationhood have asserted their right to self-determination.
- Nations like Lebanon have discovered deep fissures in their national coherence and are struggling to restore unity.
- Within nations, minorities with a particular sense of identity have sought greater autonomy. In the past year, with a change in the character of central national authority, this has complicated the tasks of those nations undergoing political soul-searching or change, such as Iran and Pakistan.
- In some cases, separate nationalisms come into conflict. This is best exemplified by the contest between Israeli nationalism and Palestinian nationalism. The general awareness of the centrality of this conflict to an Arab-Israeli settlement has brought this issue to the top of the agenda in the continuing peace negotiations.
- Reflecting the ambivalent character of Middle East nationalism, the ideal of pan-Arab nationalism remains pervasive, and individual Arab coun-

tries continue to seek ways of relating their particular political systems to a larger identity. Arab nationalism again came into unusual prominence in the wake of the Egyptian/Israeli Peace Treaty, although it has not reached the dimension of the Nasser years. Moderate Arab states felt compelled to shift the balance between interests which had linked them to the West over the years and a sense of Arabism which found the Egyptian-Israeli treaty more dramatic a move than they were able to accept.

Regional Conflicts

Complicating the lives of many of these nations and their efforts to conduct relationships with nations around them are familiar regional conflicts. The Arab-Israeli dispute affects relationships throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world. Although both countries have made serious efforts to overcome it, the continuing distrust between India and Pakistan colors the national policies of both and affects the ability of powers outside the area to carry on constructive relationships with those countries. The rivalry between Morocco and Algeria—along with Saharan nationalism—has so far prevented international efforts, which are continuing, to resolve the conflict over the western Sahara peacefully. Other longstanding and short-term conflicts affect relationships in the region.

The Search for Security: Nuclear Proliferation

Overshadowing some of these regional conflicts is the potential of some of the nations in this area to move toward the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The motivation for states to acquire nuclear weapons can be a complex mix of concerns for security, regional preeminence, international prestige, and domestic impact. Once again, technological change has brought to the fore a problem which complicates the resolution of other relationships. India has detonated a nuclear device and Pakistan is proceeding on a course that will put it in a position to do likewise. Israel is believed by some to have nuclear weapons, and some Arab states are believed to have the ambition to acquire them.

Nuclear proliferation in any region poses the risk of local nuclear war with the potential for catalytic war and superpower involvement. In regions of historic and continuing hostilities like the Middle East and South Asia, proliferation makes nuclear conflict a

plausible and predictable if not an inevitable outcome. It is also wasteful of resources in countries where governments are struggling to provide for the basic human needs of their people. The global psychological firebreak that now separates conventional from nuclear war is thus put at risk, with attendant consequences for U.S. and international security.

CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE

Against this background, there have been two major contemporary reactions to change which warrant special discussion this year: the reassertion of cultural and religious identity, most notably in the Islamic context, and the pressures of existing political systems.

Islamic Revival

The Iranian revolution took place in a particular political context, and it should not be seen as a harbinger for the Moslem world as a whole. However, consciousness of Islam is high here and abroad, and an analysis is necessary.

For millions in this area, Islam, for centuries, has provided a unifying world view. Events of the last four to five decades, however, have created in many countries of the region trends in conflict with this long-accepted and highly principled value system. Modernizing leaders, in their quest for rapid development, often with the best intentions, sought to import and implant not only Western technology but Western political value systems. Frequently, an effort was made to push aside Islamic institutions as an obstacle to progress. Widespread acceptance of the belief that imported technology and culture would dramatically improve the quality of individual life sent expectations spiraling upward.

Modernization and development did produce for many people a better material life in Western terms, but in some cases these were accompanied by massive social dislocation and urbanization as labor forces moved away from traditional agricultural pursuits and family life in the established Islamic context. Education and mass communications further fed the appetites. With the passage of time, however, it became apparent that for most people the gap between expectation and fulfillment increased rather than narrowed. This, in turn, resulted in mounting frustration, individual and collective—a growing perception that

Middle East Peace Process

by Robert S. Strauss

Excerpt from an address before the American Bar Association in Dallas on August 13, 1979.

I have been deeply disturbed in recent days and weeks by the unfortunate character of debate on the Middle East peace process. This does not help the peace process, it hurts it; it does not help Israel, Egypt, or the Palestinians. We must do what we can to make possible a climate for discussion, debate, and negotiation that will move the peace process forward and help secure the legitimate interests of all the parties.

The idea that there has been any lessening of the U.S. commitment to keep Israel strong—so that it will remain secure—to promote Israel's future, or to fulfill all of our undertakings or commitments to Israel is false. The idea that we reject or are insensitive to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is equally false.

As the President's personal representative to the Middle East peace negotiations, my mandate is Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Camp David accords, in their entirety. Secretary Vance took the lead in developing and fully supports that mandate.

I will work with Egypt and Israel under that mandate, as expeditiously as possible. But no artificial deadline—no position of the United States—will be set that goes beyond that mandate.

In carrying out that mandate, we are also doing our utmost to work with other parties in the Middle East to try to gain their support for the peace effort. I have been to Israel and Egypt and to other Arab countries as well. I want to broaden and deepen this effort, within the framework of established U.S. policy.

All parties recognize, in the Camp David agreements and elsewhere, that the Palestinian people have a right to participate in determining their future. The Camp David framework not only affirms this

right, it commits the parties for the first time to a practical program of negotiation by which Palestinian rights can be translated into concrete reality. We must recognize the historical importance of this achievement, and we must be certain that we proceed now in a manner that does not weaken it.

In support of these rights we are working hard to create a self-governing authority that will meet the needs of all the parties and give the Palestinians a stake in the process and in their future. We would like to see the Palestinians in the talks now, as the Camp David agreement provides. And their acceptance of Resolution 242 and of Israel's right to exist would be a major step along the road to peace.

The autonomy talks need a chance to succeed. Israel, Egypt, and the United States need time to make them succeed. In our efforts to achieve that success, we must and we will always have as our absolute requirement the security of Israel, its borders, and its people. This nation will never walk away from any

of its commitments to Israel. Let me reaffirm that today in the clearest possible terms.

Let me assure you that the peace process will build on the indestructible bonds between our two immigrant nations—nations devoted to principles of freedom, democracy, and opportunity and nations bound together by enduring values that give us strength both at home and abroad.

A strong, vital, and independent Israel is indispensable to enduring peace and stability in the Middle East. The solution to the Palestinian problem, with the cycle of terrorism, violence, and destruction it has caused, is not only morally essential, but it, too, is indispensable to enduring peace and stability in the Middle East.

President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are both confident that the peace process can succeed. We need now to build on what they have achieved so far, without sacrificing any of the principles I have stated above. President Carter has instructed me, as his personal representative, to make every constructive effort to be of assistance to them. I expect to discharge that responsibility.



AMBASSADOR STRAUSS

Robert S. Strauss was born in Lockhart, Texas, October 19, 1918, and was raised in Stamford, Texas. He received an LL.B. degree from the University of Texas in 1941. After serving as a special agent of the FBI, he entered private law practice in January 1946.

Ambassador Strauss served on the Texas Bank Commission (1962–68) and was Chairman of the Board of the Valley View Bank of Dallas for 6 years. He has also served as a Director of Xerox Corporation, Braniff Airlines, Columbia Pictures, and Wylain Corporation.

In March 1970 he was elected Treasurer of the Democratic National Committee and served through the 1972 Democratic convention. He then became Chairman of the National Committee to Reelect a Democratic Congress for the 1972 elections. He was elected Chairman of the Democratic National Committee in December 1972 and served in this capacity until January 1977 when he returned to his private law practice. In 1976 he was cochairman of the Democratic National Campaign Steering Committee.

On March 30, 1977, Ambassador Strauss was sworn in as the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; he resigned from this position on August 8, 1979. On April 24, 1979, President Carter appointed him as Ambassador at Large with special responsibilities for Middle East peace negotiations.

benefits were not being shared equitably.

In Iran, collective anger was a sign of underlying pervasive psychological disorientation, and it expressed itself in political agitation. It was natural that individuals came to resent the imported cause of dislocation and reached for comfort in a value system more indigent and satisfying to their needs. The abiding values of Islam were at hand, institutionally eroded but never eradicated or even basically weakened; thus, the "Islamic revival" of which we read so much. As we have seen, it was on such a base that the revolution in Iran was justified. However, we see aspects of the revival, although in more moderate form, in practically every Islamic nation today.

We believe we will continue to see an Islamic aspiration to reassert identity and self-esteem through reasserting the importance of religion. This need not be a basis for contention, however, if we in the West evidence better general understanding of what is taking place and find appropriate ways to attest our sympathies and our respect for their religion.

Pressures on Political Systems

Rapid economic and social change has obviously had its impact on political institutions. Political instability is a fact of life in many countries of the region, but its causes vary from country to country.

One major problem is that the concept of the nation-state—a concept imported into the region—has only a fragile hold in some countries. Central governments have difficulty in asserting authority in countries where the basic unit of political identity is the religious or ethnic or linguistic subgroup or area of the country.

In Lebanon, the central government is trying to reweave the torn fabric of Lebanese nationhood in the wake of factional strife. In Iran, various tribal and ethnic groups have reasserted claims to local autonomy in the wake of the revolution. In Afghanistan, the Marxist government is facing traditional tribal and ethnic resistance to central government authority. There is less strain on countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia with more homogeneous populations. Iraq and Syria on the other hand, with governments drawn from minorities, have promoted in the name of national unity a secular ideology—Baathism—which formally bans distinction among their Sunni, Shi'a, and Alawite Arab populations, as well as Kurds and Christians.

Whatever the value system in a

country, whether radical secular ideologies or close identification with Islam, governments will succeed in the long run to the extent that they provide a sense of basic social justice and responsiveness to their people and basic respect for human rights. Each government makes its own record in this regard and the record it makes has much to do with its stability over the longer term.

ISRAEL IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

Within this regional context it is important to look at the significance of these forces of change for Israel's place in the region. We must do so because we have a particularly close relationship with Israel and a strong commitment to its security and well-being. The United States also has substantial interests in the achievement of peace—and beyond peace, normal relations of real comity and cooperation—between Israel and other nations of the region.

Israel's economy—already burdened with heavy defense expenditures, a very high rate of inflation, and heavy balance of payments deficits—is at least as much affected by the economic problems of energy and their effect on the world economy as are the Western industrial nations, and for Israel also energy supply is a matter of national security. In addition, the problem of water resources has long been recognized as critical for Israel.

Because it and its neighbors must ultimately and inescapably find a way to live in peace with one another, Israel must, as much as we and the other regional neighbors, come to terms with the forces of change in the region. Israel is already experiencing dramatic changes in this regard. The reality of peace with Egypt and the real prospect of a broader peace in the region have had a profound effect in Israel. A fundamental reassessment of policies and of goals is taking place within Israel to determine how it can move toward peace while assuring its security.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Against this perspective on our regional interests, I would like to discuss at some length the Middle East peace process.

The effort to move steadily toward resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the principal element in our overall design to contribute to con-

structive change and to secure our interests in the Middle East. The peace effort itself carries with it dramatic potential for effecting change in the region by reducing the causes of conflict and helping people in the region turn constructively to other problems. If the peace process fails to achieve comprehensive results, we can expect not only a continuation of strife in Lebanon and the persisting cycle of retaliation between Israelis and Palestinians but also increased radicalism and the probability over time of widened and renewed armed conflict, with all that entails in squandered human and material resources and danger to global peace.

If on the other hand a durable and comprehensive peace is achieved, we will have helped prompt a very different kind of change in the region, one that supports not only our most critical national objectives but also those of the Middle East peoples. The degree to which a peace settlement will serve U.S. interests will depend on its responding to the interests of the peoples in the Middle East, because a settlement can be durable only if each party has a stake in its durability. One of the purposes of this analysis is to encourage an understanding of those interests.

The year that has passed since our last report to this committee has witnessed developments of momentous consequence in the 30-year search for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In September 1978 Egypt and Israel agreed at Camp David on two "framework" documents, the first setting forth the principles of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East and the basis for proceeding with negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza where the Palestinians would participate in determining their own future; the second establishing the basic terms governing a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.³ On March 26, 1979, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, and simultaneously the two leaders signed a joint letter addressed to President Carter setting forth a timeframe for the West Bank-Gaza negotiations.⁴

After so many years of failed initiatives, false starts, and recurrent outbreaks of warfare, the accomplishments of last year loom large indeed. With the achievement of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace, there has been a decisive reduction in the potential for war between Israel, the most powerful military force in the region, and Egypt, traditionally the most influential as well as the most populous Arab country.

Equally important, the negotiations

set in train by President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and Prime Minister Begin's return visit to Ismailia have demonstrated that the process of negotiation *can* resolve issues that were considered intractable only a few years or even months before. The spirit of negotiation is infectious. Difficult as the task is that the Egyptian and Israeli delegations are facing in the West Bank-Gaza negotiations that have just begun, both sides share an underlying assumption that negotiation is the only way of resolving the problem and that with sufficient patience and resourcefulness this objective can be reached.

But it obviously must be of concern to us that there is a sizable body of opinion in the Arab world that remains unconvinced that the course we are embarked on is the right one. I think it is fair to say that we expected a certain amount of this. There are a number of Arab governments which have been so adamantly opposed to President Sadat's initiative from the beginning that it would not have been realistic to expect them to be brought around by our arguments alone.

Of more concern to us is that several moderate governments of the area—ones with which we have maintained close relations over the years—have perceptions about the peace process that seem so different from ours. Tactical handling may have had something to do with the polarization and misunderstanding among the Arab states at present, but the more basic cause is lack of confidence among the skeptics that the present format of negotiations can produce a result that will be acceptable to them.

The polarization that these first steps in the peace process have produced in the Arab world is not in the U.S. interest. It obviously makes more difficult the realization of further progress toward the comprehensive peace that remains our ultimate goal. It has also produced strains in our relations with the Arab states whose friendship we value and need. Therefore, one of our chief policy tasks in the months ahead will be to do what we can to lessen this division, to increase understanding of the peace process, and to ameliorate the strains caused in bilateral relations with the U.S.

Of primary importance will be the results that can be achieved in the negotiations in the next few months. Those results can only be achieved by negotiation, in which the parties painstakingly explore the possibilities for accommodation, and by the passage of time, during which practical arrangements leading toward peace can be tested and a chance given for un-

derlying governmental and public attitudes to change. We believe results can be achieved by this process—indeed, that it is the *only* way to achieve results that are likely to be on terms that both sides can ultimately accept. President Carter's commitment to put the full weight of the United States behind these negotiations is clear.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

Beyond our central continuing effort to achieve progress toward resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this analysis of the pressures and interests which the governments of this region face, and of the real nature of the problems we face in pursuing our interests, suggests two points to bear in mind for the conduct of our policy toward this region.

The leaders of the nations in this region are attempting to strengthen effective central authority in the face of demands for broader political participation when they must at the same time

cope with mounting political and economic pressures that cut across national boundaries. They will be dealing with problems in this broader context. The issue is how we will take into account in our decisions their objectives and pressures as well as our own. We can ask comparable understanding from them.

Our own policies will play a critical role in establishing our credentials as full and valued partners in the new interdependence that is rapidly emerging between this region and the industrialized world. The issue again is how to assure that our relationships operate to the fullest extent possible as a two-way street.

On the political side, this means, for instance, that efforts to deal with an issue, such as the Palestinian problem, must be seen not only in the context of the Arab-Israeli negotiations but also in the context of the Arab world's need to deal honorably with the legitimate interests of a Palestinian community with sizable and influential numbers in the key Arab states. It also means that a solution to the problem in Lebanon, while requiring new understandings

Egyptian Vice President Meets With President Carter

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 11, 1979¹

President Carter and Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak met in the Oval Office for 50 minutes.

In accepting the special message that Vice President Mubarak conveyed on behalf of President Sadat, President Carter expressed his personal pleasure at being able to welcome Vice President Mubarak again to the White House. He reiterated his warm personal regard and high esteem for President Sadat and welcomed the opportunity to continue close consultations with Egyptian leaders.

President Carter and Vice President Mubarak reviewed the status of Egyptian-American cooperation in a number of fields. The President expressed great interest in Egypt's priority efforts to expand its economic and social development. Bilateral military relations were also discussed. Citing the administration's proposal for \$1.5 billion in foreign military sales credits over the next 3 years, the President reaffirmed his intention to assist Egypt

in meeting its legitimate defense needs. He also said that they discussed how the United States might help to meet Egypt's longer term defense needs and the desirability of regular and systematic consultations toward this end. Referring to the Middle East peace negotiations, the President stressed the Administration's determination to help resolve the difficult issues that must be addressed so as to achieve a comprehensive peace.

In addition to his meeting with President Carter, Vice President Mubarak today met separately with Secretary Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Ambassador Strauss [Robert S. Strauss, Ambassador at Large with special responsibilities for Middle East peace negotiations]. Vice President Mubarak will meet with members of Congress before he departs for London on the evening of June 13. □

¹List of participants not printed here. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 18, 1979.

among the Lebanese themselves, is intimately related to progress in dealing with the Palestinian problem through the Arab-Israeli negotiations.

On the economic side, for instance, regional attitudes on meeting world oil demand will be increasingly influenced by the perception in the producing countries of how effectively we in the industrial world are working to check the growth of demand for Middle Eastern oil by adopting effective measures to conserve energy and to find alternate sources.

Another growing influence on these oil producers is their sense of how meaningful a role they are going to play in the wider international economy and its institutions, of whether we and other industrial nations truly seek an economic interdependence with them beyond mere access to their energy resources. This factor touches on a broad range of international economic issues we will have to face in the coming months, including future access for producer states to petrochemical markets and the quality of their participation in international finance and investment. A final aspect of the economic relationship with the region is how we are perceived as working in parallel with them to meet the development needs of the poorer countries.

With regard to nonproliferation issues, it will mean that we, and other governments, will have to increase our efforts to meet legitimate technology requirements for nuclear energy while also addressing underlying security concerns which motivate nuclear weapons programs.

In the field of security policy, the United States has modestly increased the security role it plays in the Middle East in the last year, but it has done so in response to the requests of friends for support. We are making sales of arms to meet real defense needs. We demonstrated that we could and would aid friends quickly when faced by attack from outside.

Increased shipments of arms to certain governments of the area by the Soviet Union, supply of Soviet advisers, and support for military operations had created an impression that the United States might be unwilling or unable to help its friends and protect its interests in the area. This impression was mistaken, and the visit of Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown to the Middle East in February was part of an effort to set the record straight.

We have begun a new arms relationship with Egypt in support of that country's legitimate defense requirements. We responded quickly to the re-

quests of North Yemen and Saudi Arabia for help to meet an invasion from South Yemen. We have expanded our consultations with other friendly governments about security conditions and threats in the area, and we have decided to increase marginally our military presence.

Our steps threaten no regime in the Middle East or beyond. They enhance security in the area. They are designed to support the peace process. They also reflect U.S. strategic interests. The steps are limited and measured and have been taken in consultation with area states. We intend to move deliberately but intelligently in our security efforts. We understand and appreciate that a larger U.S. military presence in the area would be inimical to the interests and desires of our friends.

In this context, it is important to say a word about the region as it relates to other, broader U.S. global and strategic interests. We hear much about the danger to American interests in the Middle East from unfriendly outside powers, particularly from the Communist world. About these dangers I would make two points.

First, there is no lack of understanding of the military power our adversaries can dispose over this region. Our security policy is meant to reassure our friends and deter adventurism by our adversaries.

Second, however, we have also come to realize that military power alone or even primarily, will be unable to secure and promote anyone's interests unless it supports and takes account of the indigenous forces for change within this region. Indeed it is clear that only an approach that permits the building of good working relationships with the governments and peoples of the Middle East will insure security for the interests of the U.S. and our allies.

Finally, we will continue to recognize the central role that our approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict will play in determining the ability of the United States to pursue its interests throughout the area. Because of the close interweaving of the forces in the area, progress on one front affects progress on another.

To sum up, we have the opportunity and resources to develop a full and mutually beneficial partnership with the fastest growing and most rapidly changing area of the world today. If change produces instability, it will also produce opportunity. Our approach will be to master the nature and direction of change and to collaborate with governments which wish to work with us in finding a new balance in their lives

Violence in Lebanon and Israel

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JUNE 27, 1979¹

The Syrian-Israeli air battle over Lebanon today has been a very serious event. It underlines the seriousness of the situation in Lebanon which has now brought Israel and Syria into confrontation for the first time since 1974.

For many months fighting between Israel, its allies in southern Lebanon, and Palestinian forces has thwarted all Lebanese and international efforts to bring stability to this troubled area.

The Israelis have been conducting a preemptive bombing strategy against Palestinian bases and concentrations in Lebanon in the wake of an increase in terrorist actions. Some of the targets have been extremely close to Syrian military positions. At the same time, the Syrians have been scrambling aircraft from time to time in response to the Israeli actions. This dangerous combination of events culminated in the air battle today.

We call on both Israel and Syria to exercise maximum restraint. We are in touch with both governments and with Lebanon to try to find ways to forestall more violence. There must be an end to the cycle of challenges, provocations, and military actions in Lebanon, which have caused so many deaths and injuries to innocent Lebanese. The time is overdue for a more responsible attitude on the part of all involved, including the Palestinians, whose terrorist actions in Israel have sparked off so many Israeli actions.

This air battle over Lebanon clearly heightens tensions and endangers the current stage of negotiations for Middle East peace. This event only reinforces our determination to seek a comprehensive Middle East peace which will bring an end to this bloodshed.

which can contribute to orderly global political and economic change. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For text see BULLETIN of June 1979, p. 16.

³ For texts of the frameworks, see BULLETIN of Oct. 1978, p. 7.

⁴ For texts of the Peace Treaty and related documents, see BULLETIN of May 1979, p. 3.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 23, 1979²

The United States strongly condemns the Israeli air attacks up and down the Lebanese coast on July 22, which hit targets in one case only 5 miles from Beirut. The press reports from Lebanon indicate that between 12 and 18 people were killed and that as many as 70 may have been wounded.

The Israeli air attacks were the first in 3 weeks, and we had hoped that these raids—which take such a toll in human life—would not be repeated. Recognizing that there is tragic violence on both sides, we urge that Israel and all other quarters—including the Palestinians and Haddad's forces—which have contributed to the cycle of violence, to exercise maximum restraint so that these tragedies can be avoided.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 22, 1979¹

We are deeply concerned and saddened by the violence in Lebanon and Israel in the past few days. Yesterday, bombs exploded in Israel, set by terrorists. For much of the past 2 days, and particularly yesterday, there were intense artillery exchanges in southern Lebanon. While much of this information has come to us in news reports, it appears that the Lebanese militias allied to Israel did most of the shelling but that shelling by Palestinian forces on militia positions also was heavy.

According to Lebanese news reports, some militia shells hit a school, killing one child and wounding others. There have been other casualties elsewhere. According to other news reports, the barrages have been so heavy that innocent Lebanese civilians are once again fleeing the area in large numbers, adding to the already existing exodus of many thousands from southern Lebanon in recent months.

Soldiers of the U.N. peacekeeping forces reportedly have been wounded in these latest exchanges. In addition, Israeli aircraft hit targets in the area on August 20, as we reported previously.

The terrible human tragedy is measured in innocent lives lost, maimed people, the destruction of homes and farms, and the flight of people to safety. We call on all involved in this violence to stop this continuing human tragedy. □

¹ Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

² Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

**Oil Supply Agreement
Signed by the U.S. and Israel**

The following memorandum of agreement was signed by Herbert J. Hansell, the Department of State's Legal Adviser, and Yaacov Nechush-tan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel, on June 22, 1979, in Washington, D.C.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States and Israel signed March 26, 1979,¹ Israel and the United States have entered into the Oil Supply Arrangement set forth herein as follows:

1. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel will act as follows:

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal domestic requirements is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet the shortfall in the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. Oil will be made available to Israel as soon as practicable after notification; the United States will make every effort to ensure this period is less than 60 days.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet the shortfall in Israel's essential requirements. Oil will be made available to Israel as soon as practicable after notification; the United States will make every effort to ensure this period is less than 60 days.

(c) If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport to Israel oil made available pursuant to this Agreement, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

2. Prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer. Israel will, in any event, reimburse the United States for the costs incurred by the United States in providing oil to Israel hereunder.

3. Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement and to develop and review any necessary contingency implementing arrangements.

4. This Memorandum of Agreement is subject to applicable United States law. The United States administration may seek additional statutory authorization that may be necessary for full implementation of this Memorandum of Agreement.

5. This Memorandum of Agreement shall enter into force on November 25, 1979 and shall terminate on November 25, 1994. The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States shall be in force during the period from the date of this Memorandum of Agreement to November 25, 1994 and shall be performed and implemented in accordance with the provisions of this Memorandum of Agreement.

HERBERT J. HANSELL
For the Government of
the United States

YAACOV NECHUSHTAN
For the Government of
Israel

June 22, 1979

In connection with the Memorandum of Agreement being entered into on this date between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States, Israel and the United States understand that:

Because of the unique security situation of Israel its oil reserves are and should be at the level equal to six months of Israel's oil consumption; and in this connection U.S. oil supplies should be at such levels that U.S. ability to meet its oil requirements will not be adversely affected

For the Government of
the United States
HERBERT J. HANSELL

For the Government of
Israel
YAACOV NECHUSHTAN □

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of May 1979, p. 60.

Military Equipment Programs for Egypt and Saudi Arabia

by *Harold H. Saunders*

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 20, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I take pleasure in being able to appear before you today to discuss certain military equipment programs. I understand you wish to discuss the sale of F-4 aircraft to Egypt and the modernization program for the Saudi National Guard.

F-4 Aircraft for Egypt

Under the \$1.5 billion package of foreign military sales credits we have asked the Congress to authorize and appropriate in connection with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, we would plan to sell two squadrons of F-4 Phantom aircraft and appropriate munitions. Thirty-five aircraft are involved in all. A list of the other military equipment—including armored personnel carriers, destroyers, and improved Hawk antiaircraft missiles—which we might be prepared to sell to Egypt has already been shared with Congress.

The question might be posed: Why is it that Egypt requires these F-4 aircraft when the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel has significantly reduced Egypt's security concerns? The answer is that Egypt has legitimate national defense requirements even while in a state of peace with Israel. The security of Egypt's close ally, the Sudan, is a major concern. The security of the Nile lifeline has always been a major preoccupation of Egypt. To the north and east, Egypt's coastlines, and especially the Suez Canal, demand a credible military deterrent.

Elsewhere in the immediate region, there are countries which are heavily armed with Soviet weaponry, and at least one country among them would like to derail the peace process and cause problems for Egypt.

While seeking U.S. assistance to maintain sufficient military credibility, President Sadat continues to take the position that economic development remains Egypt's highest priority. Over the years ahead, as Egypt acquires more modern equipment, it should be possible to streamline and reduce the

size of the Egyptian armed forces.

In the meantime, some of Egypt's military inventory is becoming obsolescent, and much of its Soviet-made equipment suffers from an absence of spare parts and consequent maintenance problems. Egypt needs a modern fighter aircraft for all-weather air defense and close air support.

All 35 aircraft will come exclusively from our Air Force inventories, but they are in good shape. The initial aircraft delivered will fly over Cairo during the October 6 Armed Forces Day parade. This will be a highly visible manifestation of America's readiness to cooperate with Egypt in meeting promptly some—although not all—of Egypt's legitimate self-defense requirements.

Saudi National Guard Modernization Program

The Saudi National Guard, in its early equivalent, has existed almost since the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its role is the preservation of internal security and the protection of key urban centers and installations, including the oil fields and oil facilities. Its strength is 16,000 men, but tribal levies can be raised in an emergency to bring its total strength to about 32,000 men.

In recent years, to take into account evolving security concerns, the Saudis decided that the capability of the Guard should be improved. It would remain a light defense force, but it would be more capable of supporting and complementing the larger and more heavily armed Saudi Army in a rapid way. To prepare the Guard for this role, it was necessary to reorganize it into modernized battalions with equipment designed for mobility and quick reaction.

The equipment would have to be highly mobile, rugged, and relatively easy to operate and to maintain. The Guard will not have the capability to repel a strong attack by regular military units but could deter and slow down any such attack until such time as the regular Army can be deployed to the area.

The United States agreed to be helpful. In March 1973, the United States and the Saudi Government signed a memorandum of understanding on U.S. cooperation in the modernization of the Guard. There will be

no increase in size of the National Guard. We started out by modernizing four battalions at a cost of approximately \$500 million. The units are equipped with V-150 armored cars, TOW missiles, towed Vulcan antiaircraft guns, and towed Howitzers. Training and equipping of three battalions has been completed; the fourth is currently in training.

In the spring of 1978, the Saudis requested modernization of four additional combat battalions and one logistics battalion. Information on U.S. assistance in the training and equipping of the logistic battalion was provided to the Congress, which posed no objections. This logistics battalion begins training early in 1980. The estimated cost of training and equipping the four additional combat battalions is \$1.23 billion, with the increased costs reflecting inflationary pressure on contractor support arrangements and on newer generation equipment.

We hope to go forward—with the support of the Congress—on the modernization of the four battalions, a 4-5 year program which will be completed in 1985. This is a reasonable, limited program which will help meet Saudi Arabia's legitimate internal security and self-defense needs without altering the regional arms balance. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. Policy Toward Israel

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, AUG. 8, 1979

I have seen Foreign Minister Dayan's recent interview in *Yediot Aharonot* in which he says that there has been a "turn" in U.S. policy concerning Israel. I want to state categorically that there has been no change in our policy toward Israel. Our longstanding support for the security and well-being of Israel is firm and unshakeable. It remains our policy to work toward a comprehensive peace settlement which is based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. □

Western Sahara

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 24, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I see this discussion today on U.S. policy toward the western Sahara as part of a series of consultations we have had with both houses of Congress on this subject beginning almost 2 years ago. These consultations have covered both the broad issue of the western Sahara and specific policy questions as they have faced the Administration.

It is important at the outset to put U.S. policy toward the western Sahara in the context of our policy toward northwest Africa in general.

Since the early days of our independence, this region has been important to us because of its location on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, controlling the lower half of the Strait of Gibraltar. It is important to us because of the role it plays both in Africa and in the Middle East. It is important because of its natural resources—petroleum and phosphates.

Morocco

In the modern era, we have had a close relationship with Morocco, which shared many of our interests, both globally and regionally.

On the strategic side, we had Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco until 1963, and we maintained naval communications bases there until we closed them at our initiative last year. Morocco continues to permit port visits by U.S. naval vessels and to allow U.S. military aircraft to transit to destinations such as Saudi Arabia.

Morocco has historically taken a moderate position on the Arab-Israel question. It has the largest Jewish population of any country in the Arab world—almost 20,000—and encourages the return to Morocco of Jews who have migrated to Israel. King Hassan was the first Arab leader to favor Egyptian President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. While associating himself with the majority of Arab countries in opposition to the Egypt-Israel treaty, King Hassan maintains his personal

friendship with Sadat and supports the principle of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Arab-Israel dispute.

In Africa, Morocco has consistently supported moderate forces. Morocco twice sent troops in response to requests from Zaïre to maintain stability in that country's Shaba Province. It opposes Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa.

Algeria

While we have not had the same similarity of views on regional and international issues with Algeria as we have with Morocco, our relations with Algeria have been steadily improving since we reestablished diplomatic relations in 1974. We are Algeria's largest trading partner. It supplies us with about 9% of our crude oil imports. American firms have won \$6 billion in contracts in Algeria in recent years for engineering and construction services. These economic relations are only one indication of a pragmatic approach of the Algerian Government, as a result of which we are able to maintain a frank and friendly dialogue on a wide variety of subjects.

Western Sahara Dispute

Into this fabric of bilateral relations which I have described there intervened in the mid-1970's the western Sahara dispute.

When Spain decided to withdraw from the African colony known as Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Government activated an historic claim to the territory. The government's effort reflected strong irredentist feelings throughout Morocco, which considered Spanish Sahara as part of Morocco's historic territory and viewed its reacquisition as the continuation of a gradual process of decolonization which began when the French protectorate regime ended in the Moroccan heartland in 1956. After a couple of years of intense diplomatic maneuvering, Spain transferred administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania under the Madrid agreement of 1975.

Morocco's quest aroused little sympathy in the region, particularly in Algeria and among some of the tribes which traditionally lived in and around the Spanish Sahara. The case had been referred to the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which ruled in effect that the disputed territory had had historic links to the Kingdom of Morocco but these did not constitute ties of sovereignty and that sovereignty could be established only by determining the will of the inhabitants.

Morocco, however, took the ICJ ruling as legitimizing its claim to sovereignty. It replaced the Spanish administration in the northern two-thirds of the territory, while Mauritania took over the rest.

The circumstances of the takeover were confused. Morocco claims that the inhabitants expressed their wishes through a vote by those members of the Spanish Sahara territorial assembly who were available after Morocco had entered the territory (a scant majority). This event has not been generally recognized as constituting an exercise of self-determination.

The United States, along with almost all other countries, recognized that Morocco and Mauritania had taken over administrative control of the territory but continued to believe that the question of its ultimate sovereignty remained unresolved. Tribal and other Saharan groups opposed to Moroccan control, which had coalesced before the Spanish departure into the Polisario movement, began a guerrilla movement against Moroccan and Mauritanian Armed Forces in the territory, with arms and sanctuary provided by Algeria.

The Polisario declared a cease-fire with Mauritania in July 1978 which it ended exactly a year later with a strong attack on the Mauritanian post of Tichla in the southernmost portion of the former Spanish Sahara. Meanwhile, Polisario attacks continued in the Moroccan portion of the western Sahara. In addition, the Polisario increased its activities in southern Morocco proper, with major attacks on January 28, May 31, June 4, June 11, June 27, and July 14 of this year. Some of these probably involved hundreds of Polisario troops.

It is difficult at this point to see how either side can win a military victory, but a peaceful solution to this dispute does not appear at hand.

Morocco has consistently rejected calls for a referendum, arguing that the population expressed its will through the meeting of the territorial assembly. A renewed appeal for a referendum, this time by the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Committee on Wisdom, was considered last week at the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia. A resolution was passed calling for a cease-fire and a referendum. The Mo-

roccan Government has not yet responded officially but appears willing to accept the principle of a cease-fire while continuing to reject the idea of a referendum.

A negotiated solution also seems distant. Both Morocco and the Polisario claim sovereignty over the entire Moroccan portion of the western Sahara. Recent information suggests that the Polisario may even have begun to lay claim to portions of southern Morocco proper. This leaves less room for compromise than ever. Moreover, Morocco claims that its dispute is with Algeria, without whose support the Polisario could not survive. It insists that negotiation should be directly with Algeria. Algeria, for its part, maintains that the dispute concerns Morocco and the Polisario and that any negotiations should be between those parties.

Many countries and international organizations have offered to try to help resolve the dispute. Spain, as the former colonial power, has discussed the problem with both sides, most recently during the visit of Prime Minister Suarez to Algeria in April and of King Juan Carlos to Morocco in June. France also examines the situation periodically with the countries involved, and Saudi Arabia has tried once and possibly twice to help resolve the issue. Finally, representatives of the OAU Committee of Wisemen talked to all concerned within the past few months in an effort to find common ground for a peaceful solution.

We favor a peaceful, negotiated solution which respects the rights of the inhabitants and have made this clear to all concerned parties. We have not ourselves offered to mediate because of the number of other countries and organizations which are already involved and which are better placed than we to perform this service. However, we have offered to help each of these countries and organizations in any way that we can.

U.S. Policy

This dispute has faced us with difficult policy choices.

Once again the United States found itself on the horns of a dilemma not of its own making. The Sahara dispute between Morocco and Algeria makes it difficult for us to pursue our interests in the way we would like to with either country, without incurring the suspicion and even hostility of the other.

In trying to work our way through this tangle of contradictions, we have sought to work as closely as possible with Congress. We have consistently agreed on recognizing Moroccan ad-

SOUTH ASIA: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan

by Jack C. Miklos

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 15, 1979. Mr. Miklos is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with your subcommittee U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan in the context of our regional policy toward South Asia.

The countries in this region have a number of characteristics in common as well as fundamental differences.

- Many of the states share a common British colonial or protectorate experience.

- All of the states except Nepal and Sri Lanka are either overwhelmingly

Islamic, or like India, have a large Moslem population.

- All the countries share a basic geopolitical importance as they are situated in proximity to the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., and the Persian Gulf.

- Several of the states in the area are unstable and most have turbulent internal political situations. The basic causes of instability in the region are internal, but the Soviet Union has and will continue to try and extend its influence where it can.

- In some parts of the area the demands of modernization have not been met by the pace of modernization and the promise of economic development remains unfulfilled. Economic frustrations have fueled political instability.

- There has been a revival of Islamic fundamentalism in the area, alongside growing tension and sometimes open

ministrative control while noting that the sovereignty issue remains unresolved. This is a reasonable and credible policy shared by most other countries; I have no intention of suggesting today that it should be changed. The problem is how we apply it in specific cases and most particularly the question of how it affects our relations with Morocco.

We wish to maintain our traditional close cooperation with Morocco to the extent possible. With congressional approval, we are continuing to provide financing for Moroccan military purchases and to furnish military training for Moroccan personnel. The President received King Hassan in Washington last November, and Secretary of Commerce Kreps and then Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan visited Morocco this year. We are seeking to expand academic exchanges, technical cooperation, and trade and investment with Morocco. However, in one area—our military supply relationship—the conflict between our bilateral interests in Morocco and our Sahara policy has proven increasingly difficult to resolve.

In practice, our general policy of recognizing Moroccan administrative control but not sovereignty over a portion of the western Sahara has meant a willingness to continue our historic role

of arms supplier to the Moroccan Government but only for weapons to be used to defend the territory of Morocco proper. As you are aware, this policy has been easier to enunciate than to implement, and at times it has become a sticking point in our bilateral relations with Morocco.

Furthermore, since the beginning of this year, the situation our policy is designed to cope with has changed in fundamental ways. The most significant new development is probably the fact that, as I have noted, this year the Polisario has been vigorously carrying the war into areas within Morocco's historic boundaries. Morocco is no longer fighting only to pacify a region it has annexed; it is also defending itself within its own territory against external attack. The Polisario's decision to increase the scope and intensity of the fighting has made the quest for peace more difficult. It has also made it more difficult for us to maintain Moroccan understanding for a U.S. arms supply policy of great restraint. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

clashes between traditionalists and forces of change.

- Governments range from democratic to strict authoritarian and from nonaligned to pro-Soviet. There are fundamental differences among the countries in religion, race, social structure, economic development, and language.

- In several countries of the region there is a sense of political and economic malaise and uncertainty.

When our respected colleague, the late Spike Dubs,² testified before this committee a little over a year ago, the situation in the region appeared to be far more stable than it is today, and we had reason to be relatively sanguine about future developments. Pakistan and India were making progress toward resolving their differences and the Indian Foreign Minister had just visited Islamabad. Pakistan and Afghanistan seemed to be moving toward settlement of their longstanding border dispute. India and Bangladesh had successfully negotiated an interim settlement of their dispute over the Ganges River water. Our policy was to encourage the countries of the region to settle their disputes among themselves and to keep great power involvement in the area to a minimum.

Afghanistan

Since then there have been dramatic changes in Afghanistan and Iran and a growing perception of instability in the general area. April 1978 saw a bloody revolution in Afghanistan which brought to power a leftist regime promising radical social and political reform. This new government, however, is now confronted by a growing insurgency from tribal and religious elements who believe it is atheistic and pro-Russian. Rather than attempting to ascertain the will of its people, the Afghan Government has sought to push rapidly ahead with its plans and to suppress—often brutally—any signs of opposition or suspected disloyalty.

Economically, the Afghan Government has announced major plans for land and credit reform. In some areas of the country, however, there have been strong reactions to such changes in this traditional and conservative agricultural society, especially since new institutions have not been developed to replace the former landowners and moneylenders. As a result, agricultural production has declined and Afghanistan faces a serious shortage of foodgrains this year.

During the last year, the Afghan Government has increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for military and eco-

nomic support. Similarly, it has reoriented its foreign policy so that it is almost indistinguishable from that of Moscow.

Our own relations with Afghanistan have regrettably deteriorated significantly. As the Soviet Union has become more directly involved in Afghanistan, we have detected a corresponding decline in interest in U.S. programs and insensitivity to our concerns. The Afghan Government's behavior at the time of the tragic and senseless death of Ambassador Dubs in February has been the most flagrant example of this attitude and of what we can only conclude is a fundamental shift away from Afghanistan's traditional nonalignment policy.

We have tried to make clear to the Afghan Government that good relations are a two-way street which require concrete steps from both sides to demonstrate their interest in cooperation. It distresses us that this is not the case in U.S.-Afghan relations, particularly because we know that there is still a great reservoir of goodwill among the Afghan people for the United States and Americans—as there is for Afghanistan in our own country. There are real benefits to be gained in our cooperation with the people of one of the world's poorest countries.

The poor state of our current relationship was not our choice. It is the inescapable result when one party to a relationship shows no interest in giving life and substance to those ties. Because of this lack of interest we have reduced our economic assistance program, terminated our military training program, and, for the time being, have withdrawn our Peace Corps volunteers and staff. The official American presence in Afghanistan is necessarily also being somewhat reduced.

We remain ready to listen to any ideas the Afghan Government may have as to how our relations can be improved. Certainly we cannot forget the humanitarian needs of Afghanistan's poor or the important effort which must be made to reduce illicit narcotics production and trafficking in that country. In addition, we believe there are still millions of Afghans who want to hear America's message and want a window on the world. We sincerely hope that the future will see the development of better relations between us. We would be happy to see some concrete signs that the Afghan Government shares this desire.

Pakistan

With regard to Pakistan, this country in a geopolitical sense is a pivot be-

tween the states of the Indian subcontinent and the oil-rich states of western Asia.

Internally, the most significant political development has been the announcement by President Zia that national elections will be held on November 17. We warmly welcome this announcement and look forward to the restoration of democratic government in Pakistan. We expect that the elections will be held as scheduled and believe the people of Pakistan would be disappointed if they were canceled or postponed.

Between now and November we see a period of political uncertainty and realignment as the various political parties and their leaders prepare for elections. The months ahead will be important for the future of Pakistan. President Zia has recently named a Cabinet of essentially nonpartisan figures to carry on the work of the government and prepare for the elections. We wish Pakistan well in this endeavor.

In recent years there has been renewed interest in the application of Islamic tenets to political and economic life. President Zia has introduced additional Islamic principles into the law and provided for the introduction of Sharia courts to bring Pakistani law into line with these principles. Additional measures would revise internal taxation and provide for the ultimate introduction of interest-free banking. Although these measures are generally popular and are being prepared with care, some foresee that Islamic edicts may fall haphazardly and unequally on different elements within the society.

The Islamic resurgence in Pakistan and other countries of the region is a very important development, and we welcome the movement to apply the humanitarian and social ideals of this great religion.

As the committee knows, in compliance with Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act we are presently winding down our development assistance programs to Pakistan. However, we hope humanitarian assistance in the form of PL-480 food aid will continue with the support of Congress.

Our substantial PL-480 program has been necessitated by a wheat harvest last year that was much lower than expected. The crop failure was primarily related to natural causes, specifically rust. However, the poor harvest reinforced the Pakistan Government's anxiety to increase food production to achieve self-sufficiency. With our encouragement, the government has taken steps to revise policies and is pressing forward with programs designed to in-

crease wheat production. Those measures, combined with good growing conditions, have resulted in Pakistan's farmers now bringing to market what appears to be a very good harvest. Our PL-480 assistance is designed to help the Pakistan Government undertake food policy reforms and a comprehensive agricultural production strategy leading to self-sufficiency.

During the past year the Pakistan Government has introduced a number of measures to rationalize the economy and encourage investment. The response to some of these measures has been encouraging. Many companies, for example, that were nationalized by Mr. Bhutto have been returned to their owners. The government has raised the procurement price paid to farmers in an effort to increase wheat production. Recently the government took the politically difficult step of increasing the price of wheat in the ration shops which serve urban dwellers, thus reducing the highly inflationary government food subsidy.

However, the country's overall economic performance has been disappointing and a number of problems continue to inhibit rapid economic development. Government subsidies and large capital projects, started under the previous regime, have contributed to a growing budget deficit. Those deficits have inflated prices and stimulated imports. Prospects are for a deterioration in the balance of payments during the coming year. We and other donors are encouraging the Government of Pakistan to undertake a balanced stabilization program that can deal effectively with external payments problems that have grown apace with the budgetary problem.

Narcotics Control

It is estimated by the Drug Enforcement Administration that Afghanistan and Pakistan will produce as much as 800 metric tons of opium during the 1978-79 growing season, making this area the world's single largest source of illicit opium. While heroin from this source currently comprises only a small percentage of the total heroin entering the United States, it has begun to enter Europe in increasing quantities and is readily available to U.S. troops stationed in Germany and other European countries.

As you are aware, the political circumstances in Afghanistan and Pakistan have permitted little or no direct U.S. bilateral assistance for narcotics control in these two countries. However, we are pursuing a determined effort to enlist increasing support on

both a bilateral and multilateral basis from industrialized nations for the global international narcotics control effort.

In Pakistan, \$944,000 of international narcotics control funds were expended from FY 1972-78 to support law enforcement operations. An additional \$10,000 has been obligated in FY 1979 for the same purpose. In addition, the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control is operating a pilot rural development program in the Buner District of Pakistan. In order to extend this program beyond the pilot phase, additional funds are required. The West German Government has expressed interest in the program but has not as yet committed financial resources.

While we have not made as much progress as we would have liked in this area, we shall continue to work with the Government of Pakistan and elicit the support of other nations to contribute to this effort either multilaterally or bilaterally.

Regional Policy Toward South Asia

The situation in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives Islands has been relatively calm. Democratic elections were successfully held in Bangladesh, a new Parliament has come into being and martial law lifted. We were very pleased by these developments. Our relations with India are good but troubled by the nuclear safeguards issue.

Despite the changes over the past year our general policy toward the region remains what it was a year ago.

- We believe that great power involvement in the region should be kept to a minimum.

- We believe that countries of the region should be encouraged to resolve their disputes among themselves without outside interference. We hope they will concentrate on their own internal problems and direct their energies toward fulfilling the economic aspirations of their people.

- We hope that the countries of the area will not follow policies which will encourage outsiders to intervene in regional affairs.

- We wish to assist governments in the region to meet the economic aspirations of their people. At the same time we are trying to avoid programs which stimulate aspirations more rapidly than they can be fulfilled.

- We are also encouraging economic reform and wider participation in government but recognize that change will usually be regulated by internal de-

velopments. We sympathize with many of the humanitarian and social ideals which Islam teaches.

- We have a major interest in preventing the development of a nuclear-weapons capability in the region.

- We wish to have assured access for U.S. trade and commerce.

- We have basic concerns regarding human rights in the area.

Nuclear Activities in Pakistan

I am aware that the committee feels that the United States should have a coherent policy toward the region which does not conflict with the bilateral concerns between the United States and any particular nation. We are all concerned that U.S. global concern over nuclear nonproliferation policies has led to serious difficulties with Pakistan and India.

Pakistan's activities in the nuclear field have presented us with a very real policy dilemma. Pakistan is important to us and to the region, especially given the chaotic situation in Iran and Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Politically Pakistan is a traditional friend of the United States, and as one of the more moderate states in the Third World can contribute to stability in the region. We are linked to Pakistan by a 1959 agreement, and the continuing independence and territorial integrity of this country is of fundamental importance to us. We have accepted the Durand Line as being the internationally recognized border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan's current nuclear activities, however, restrict our ability to assist it in meeting its considerable security and economic requirements. We have reliable information that Pakistan has been acquiring abroad the components of a uranium enrichment facility, and we have concluded that the Symington amendment required us to terminate our existing assistance programs in an orderly manner.

We view this matter with the utmost seriousness. Should there be proliferation of nuclear explosive capability on the subcontinent, it would have very serious consequences for global security and for our efforts to contain this awesome destructive power. We recognize that many countries with limited energy resources wish to develop the peaceful potential of the atom. With this we have no argument and, indeed, are willing to cooperate under conditions laid down in the Nonproliferation Policy Act—which is nondiscriminatory and applies to all alike.

We will continue to work to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive capa-

UNITED NATIONS: *Namibia*

by Donald F. McHenry

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 7, 1979. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you today the negotiations in which the United States has been involved during the past 2 years on the question of Namibia. Namibia is not well known to Americans, but a peaceful transition in that country could be of critical importance for the future of southern Africa.

Namibia, also known as South West Africa, was a German colony and became a League of Nations' mandate under South African administration following World War I. After World War II, South Africa sought to annex the territory and, when rebuffed by the United Nations, South Africa refused to place the territory under the trusteeship system of the United Nations. Thus began a long dispute between South Africa and the international community, involving numerous judgments of the International Court of Justice and even more numerous debates in the United Nations, culminating in the 1966 decision of the U.N. General Assembly, with the support of the United States, to terminate South Africa's mandate, an action subsequently upheld by the International Court.

The International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was obliged to withdraw. South Africa again refused to withdraw. In-

stead it embarked upon a policy which would have transferred power under a constitution so formulated as to insure the continued disproportionate influence of whites and which stood no chance of obtaining the necessary political consensus which would merit either Namibian or international acceptability. Nor would it stem the guerrilla war which—in opposition to South Africa's continued rule and application of apartheid in the territory—had gradually developed between South Africa and the Namibian nationalists, principally the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). To this day this cycle of violence continues to escalate with ominous implications for the future of the entire region.

Efforts of the Western Five

It was against this background that in April of 1977, the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council—Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—jointly launched an unprecedented effort to find a peaceful solution for the Namibian problem. The initiative was possible because we were able to build on a set of principles unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 385 in January 1976. I might add that the initiative was also possible because of the goodwill and great expectations which greeted President Carter's election and his appointment of Ambassador Young as U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

From the outset the five nations made clear that their goal was to formulate an internationally acceptable method of implementation of the principles contained in Resolution 385 which called for free and fair elections under U.N. supervision and control. The five made clear that they favored no particular Namibian political group. The five were interested not in the outcome of the elections but solely in insuring that all Namibian people would have an equal opportunity to freely and fairly elect their own government. The five also recognized that in order for a settlement to be meaningful and lasting it would have to be accepted by the two parties engaged in the armed conflict—the South African Government; and SWAPO, which enjoyed substantial

support within Namibia and internationally.

It is important here to emphasize two facts which these negotiations have had to take into account. South Africa, unlawfully in occupation of Namibia, was nevertheless the *de facto* governing authority there, and its assent was essential to any settlement. SWAPO, although only one of several Namibian political groups, carried the war effort; had the support of a major segment of the population; the unanimous support of other African governments and the majority of non-African members of the United Nations. No peaceful settlement could be achieved without SWAPO's participation.

Finally, we recognized that a successful undertaking must involve the cooperation of the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) and Nigeria in helping with the negotiating process, in assuring successful implementation of an agreement, and, most importantly, in assuring respect for the outcome of the elections. These states have fully supported our efforts.

Negotiating Problems

The negotiating process itself has been unique and extraordinarily complex; it could not have been undertaken without modern communications. Five nations have operated as one negotiating team, which has come to be known as the contact group. Each step has required careful coordination among our missions in New York, our capitals, our embassies in the front-line states and Nigeria and our embassies in South Africa.

In addition to the complexities of this five-nation arrangement, those involving the negotiating procedure have been numerous. For example, South Africa refuses to meet with SWAPO. This has necessitated various forms of shuttle diplomacy as well as so-called proximity talks in which the two parties travel to one city and meet with the contact group separately. There also have been a number of nations, groups, and organizations involved in the process in one capacity or another with whom we have maintained regular communications. We have met with all of the major Namibian political groups at each stage of the negotiations in order to insure that they were kept informed and to take their views fully into account. U.N. Secretary General Waldheim has played an important role in carrying the effort forward, as have his special representative for Namibia, Mr. Marti Ahtisaari of Finland, and the Security Council as a whole.

bility and we hope all concerned will keep an open mind on solutions to this problem. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs was kidnaped in Kabul on Feb. 14, 1979, by terrorists and killed the same day during an attempt by Afghan police to free him from his captors.

As in any longstanding dispute, the current negotiations have been hampered by attitudinal and political problems. First, whatever their ultimate motives, both South Africa and SWAPO have been anxious to avoid being seen internationally as the intransigent party. South Africa may have faith only in a so-called internal solution, and SWAPO may have faith only in a military one. However, neither wished to lose what support it had in the international community, and this desire not to lose support has tended to motivate them both toward a settlement.

Second, a constant problem throughout the effort has been the pervasive presence of distrust: distrust between South Africa and SWAPO; the distrust which each of them has of the five; and the distrust which South Africa has for the United Nations. SWAPO believes that South Africa aims at continued dominance through installation of a government favorable to South Africa and will only agree to a settlement which guarantees such an outcome. South Africa, for its part, believes that SWAPO aims only at the seizure of power and will not abide by the results of a fair electoral process.

South Africa and the United Nations have been at odds over Namibia since the United Nations' inception, and the United Nations has also soundly and regularly criticized South Africa for its policies of apartheid. In addition, the General Assembly's endorsement of SWAPO is well known. South Africa, therefore, views the United Nations not as an organization of neutrality but as one unalterably hostile. I should note in this regard that while the General Assembly has endorsed SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people," it is the Security Council working through international civil servants, and not the General Assembly, which will oversee the transition in Namibia, and the Security Council has adopted no such position. Moreover, the United Nations has an excellent record for impartial peace-keeping operations.

The distrust by SWAPO of the five stems from its view that South Africa's very dominance is dependent upon Western economic and political support. One manifestation of this distrust was SWAPO's initial objection to the inclusion of NATO nations in the composition of the proposed U.N. military presence in Namibia.

South Africa, on the other hand, fears that the five are susceptible to pressure from the Africans. South Africa's distrust has been dramatized in recent weeks by the repeated accusations made publicly by the South Afri-

can Government that the contact group, the U.N. Secretariat, and certain U.S. officials have during the negotiations displayed deceit, doubledealing, and a pro-SWAPO bias.

We have refrained from commenting publicly on these accusations, largely because we believe that the search for peace is best pursued through calm and private deliberation and with an acceptance of the good faith of all even in the presence of sharp disagreement. However, this forbearance should not be mistaken. There is not a shred of truth to South Africa's charges.

A third problem in the Namibia settlement effort has been the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of separating Namibia from the other occurrences in the region. It is difficult to isolate political developments in Namibia from those in Rhodesia; from the internal politics and political turmoil in South Africa itself; from South Africa's fear of being surrounded by radical black African states; or from the ultimate objectives of outside forces. All of these influences play on the prospects for a settlement in Namibia and in fact hold those prospects hostage.

A final problem which I would like to raise at this point is that neither South Africa nor SWAPO is monolithic though, publicly at least, each projects such an image of itself and of the other. Both have factions with differing views and different constituencies which make the decisionmaking processes on each side delicate and frequently time-consuming. Too frequently internal politics has prompted both sides to make decidedly unhelpful public statements which have either raised new problems or closed off potential avenues of accommodation.

Western Five's Proposal for a Settlement

These, then, are some of the attitudinal and political problems with which the five have had to deal in our settlement effort. That effort initially consisted of determining through lengthy discussions with the parties their concerns, their demands, and their areas of compromise. Agreement was quickly reached on a number of points. Before long, however, it became apparent that if the impasse over Namibia was to be broken, the five would have to develop their own proposal for a settlement and then try to bring about its acceptance.

On April 10, 1978, the five placed their proposal for a settlement before the U.N. Security Council.² We recognized that it did not meet all of the demands of either party. However, we believe that it offers a fair and balanced

solution based on the legitimate concerns of the parties and reasonably bridges the gaps between the parties.

The proposal submitted to the Security Council is based on the principles set down in Security Council Resolution 385 and consists of the following key elements.

1) A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base. Thereafter a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.

2) A South African-appointed Administrator General would administer the territory during the transition period leading to the election of a constituent assembly. However, all acts affecting the political process would be under U.N. supervision and control in that the U.N. special representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect.

3) A U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), consisting of civilian and military elements whose size and composition would be determined by the Secretary General, would be introduced in the territory to insure the observance of the terms of the settlement.

4) Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period would rest with the existing police forces. However, among other things, the Administrator General, to the satisfaction of the U.N. special representative, would insure the good conduct of the police forces. The special representative would make arrangements when appropriate for U.N. personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties.

5) All Namibian political prisoners and detainees would be released, exiles would be free to return, and conditions for free and fair elections would be established (e.g., freedom of speech, movement, press, assembly, and the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive legislation).

The settlement proposal does not attempt to spell out all of the details involved in such a settlement. Some points are of necessity general; to try to refine them more precisely would have entailed years of negotiations. Instead the proposal depends heavily on cooperation between the Administrator

General and the U.N. special representative.

Reaction to the Proposal

The settlement proposal of the five was not immediately accepted by either party, but by the end of July 1978 both parties had agreed that the Secretary General should be requested to draw up his report on how the proposal would be implemented. This agreement was not reached, however, without first addressing a number of contentious issues, the most notable of which was the question of Walvis Bay. Moreover, in their public statements each chose to emphasize certain aspects of the proposal while understating or even omitting counterbalancing provisions.

When the Secretary General's plans for implementation were announced they too became the source of controversy. South Africa, for example, objected to the holding of elections after December 1978, despite the fact that the proposal clearly required a 7-month process which, given the date of acceptance by the parties, could not be completed by the end of 1978. South Africa also objected to the size of the proposed 7,500-man U.N. military presence, despite the formidable size and nature of the territory; despite South Africa's own concern for security; and despite the fact that the settlement proposal left the formation of UNTAG to the discretion of the Secretary General.

These initial objections were resolved through further discussions but not before South Africa took another step which seemed to be directed toward an internal settlement. Over our strong objection, unilateral elections took place in December 1978, and a so-called constituent assembly was established. The elections were boycotted by several parties, and the resulting assembly consists almost entirely of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the party widely assumed to be favored by the South African Government.

The South Africans then advised Secretary General Waldheim at the end of December that they were prepared to cooperate with the implementation of the U.N. plan and suggested that the Secretary General's special representative visit South Africa for discussions. These talks took place this past January, and Mr. Ahtisaari also visited the front-line states and met with leaders of those countries and of SWAPO. These discussions made clear that both parties were seeking to obtain advantages in the implementation process which they were not able to achieve in the negotiations. For example, South Africa insisted on the monitoring by UNTAG of

SWAPO bases outside of Namibia, and SWAPO asked for a period of time after the ceasefire during which 2,500 armed SWAPO personnel would be moved to five bases to be established inside Namibia.

Secretary General's Report

Neither of these positions was accepted by the Secretary General. Instead the Secretary General issued a report on the 26th of February which presented his proposals for the resolution of the few remaining issues.

In that report Secretary General Waldheim stated that, while the settlement proposal made no specific provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases in neighboring countries, those countries, nevertheless, had been asked to insure that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, would be respected. In addition, the Secretary General was seeking the agreement of the Governments of Angola, Botswana, and Zambia for the establishment of UNTAG liaison offices in their countries to facilitate cooperation in the implementation of the proposal.

The Secretary General also specified arrangements for the handling of SWAPO armed personnel, carefully differentiating between those inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire and those outside. Any SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire would be restricted to designated locations inside Namibia. All SWAPO armed forces in neighboring countries would, on the commencement of the ceasefire, be restricted to base in those countries.

South Africa again reacted negatively to the Secretary General's proposals, in particular those relating to the absence of UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia and to the handling of SWAPO armed personnel who are in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire. To avert a breakdown of the initiative over these issues, another round of ministerial level "proximity talks" was held in New York on March 19 and 20 during which Secretary Vance and his colleagues presented our view to South African Foreign Minister Botha that the Secretary General's report was consistent with the original proposal which South Africa had accepted. During those talks, the SWAPO delegation:

- Accepted the restriction of their own forces outside Namibia to base outside Namibia;

- Accepted the Secretary General's proposal for designating locations to which any SWAPO armed personnel

inside Namibia at the start of the ceasefire would be restricted and monitored;

- Accepted the Secretary General's intention to designate only one or two such locations; and

- Stated that they had no intention of infiltrating any armed personnel into Namibia following the start of the ceasefire and that in fact they had no intention of infiltrating any armed personnel during the period between the signing of the ceasefire and the actual start of the ceasefire.

SWAPO has thus accepted the implementation plans of the Secretary General, which the five also fully support, and is now prepared to move ahead with that implementation. During these same proximity talks the front-line states reiterated their commitment to scrupulously insure the observance of the ceasefire agreement.

Principal Issues

Because South Africa's objections are still outstanding, I believe it useful to examine in greater detail the two principal issues which seem to stand in the way of South Africa's acceptance.

First, South Africa has called for monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. However desirable such monitoring might be, South Africa was informed prior to its acceptance of the five's proposal last year that such a provision was unacceptable to the neighboring states and that this element was taken into account in determining the size and functions of UNTAG. Neither we nor the United Nations can dictate to sovereign nations which are not a party to the settlement. As I have stated previously, the front-line states have committed themselves to insuring the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire. We accept these assurances.

The second issue, and the one which seems now to be South Africa's primary objection, is the Secretary General's proposal that any SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia at the start of the ceasefire will be restricted and monitored by the United Nations at designated locations inside Namibia. In making this proposal the Secretary General was faced with a very difficult practical question. The Secretary General decided, and the five support him in this decision, that those SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia, estimated at perhaps several hundred, should be identified and restricted in such a way as to facilitate their monitoring.

There were, of course, other alterna-

tives, such as safe passage out of the territory or disarming of SWAPO personnel. However, the level of SWAPO distrust of South Africa's intentions was such that SWAPO was not prepared to take these courses which, of course, would allow South Africa to gain in the peace that which it could not gain in the conflict, i.e., the elimination of SWAPO's armed presence in the territory. In this regard, South Africa's objective is no less objectionable than SWAPO's rejected proposal to introduce a large armed force after the ceasefire.

It is possible to engage in a legalistic argument over whether the establishment of such SWAPO locations was envisioned under the settlement proposal; however, it is only the practical problem which must be solved. The Secretary General was sensitive to the need to insure that the electoral process could not be adversely affected by the manner in which this issue was handled. The locations would be, as far as practical, away from population centers. The SWAPO personnel would be restricted to those locations and monitored closely by the United Nations.

I might add that two other Namibian political groups which had previously supported implementation of our settlement proposal, the SWAPO-Democrats and the Namibia National Front (NNF), initially opposed the suggestion of a SWAPO armed presence inside SWAPO, in part because they thought that Mr. Waldheim's plan was intended to accede to SWAPO proposals which had in fact been rejected. This misunderstanding has been corrected, and SWAPO-Democrats have now urged immediate implementation of the Secretary General's plan. The NNF is expected to announce its position soon.

There are several lesser issues which could be raised to a higher degree of importance. These include the composition of the military component of UNTAG and the timing of the U.N.-supervised elections. Neither SWAPO nor South Africa has yet given its formal agreement to the composition proposed by Secretary General Waldheim, but this should be relatively easily achieved once the major issues are resolved. South Africa has not withdrawn its earlier insistence on the holding of elections by September 30, a date which South Africa's delay in accepting implementation of the settlement proposal obviously has made impossible to meet. While we recognize the need to move ahead rapidly and recognize that deadlines can serve to spur events onward, we continue to believe that peaceful accommodation through free and fair elections is more important than an artificial deadline.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say that the five governments believe our settlement proposal and the implementation plan of Secretary General Waldheim offer a balanced and fair settlement of the Namibian question and the only viable settlement available which can bring about an independent Namibia which enjoys broad international support. To be sure, this settlement package does not satisfy every demand of everyone involved, but it does in our estimation satisfy every legitimate concern of the parties.

SWAPO is now prepared to proceed with this settlement. So are the five, the U.N. Security Council, and the international community generally. South Africa has not agreed and has said that it must consult with the other Namibian political groups before it makes its decision. We recognize South Africa's desire to hold these consultations. But it is the South African Government which must determine whether or not it will cooperate with the United Nations in an internationally acceptable settlement. That responsibility cannot be passed off to others.

Most African members of the United Nations are convinced that South Africa has never had any intention of proceeding with an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. The front-line states believe that, since they have brought SWAPO to accept the settlement, it is now up to the five to obtain South Africa's agreement. If South Africa does not agree, there will be increasingly strong calls at the United Nations for us to support our own negotiations by exerting real pressure on South Africa, in other words some form of economic sanctions.

We have continually told the front-line states and other African nations that negotiation is a real alternative to the armed struggle in southern Africa. Our inability to obtain South Africa's acceptance would almost certainly be seen as proof of an ultimate lack of will in the West to press South Africa to cooperate with a negotiated settlement. It would be seen by Africans as proof of the ineffectiveness of negotiation for peaceful change as a viable alternative to long and bloody military solutions. It would surely adversely affect the prospects for negotiated settlements in the rest of southern Africa.

It would result in an escalation of hostilities and chaos and open further opportunities for outside forces and alien ideologies.

At the present there are several serious developments which further complicate and even endanger the settlement effort. Once again South Africa

has arrested without charge or trial almost the entire internal leadership of SWAPO. There are reports of greatly increased South African military activity. Conversely there are reports of heightened SWAPO guerrilla action. All of this indicates that the cycle of violence is expanding.

At this stage Namibia is still a relatively small problem in southern Africa — and the one most susceptible to a negotiated solution. With time, however, it will become increasingly complex and difficult.

Bitterness will exceed reason. Today's compromise solution will be overshadowed by non-negotiable demands. For these reasons, we must continue to do our utmost not to let the opportunity of a peaceful settlement pass us by. □

¹Text from U.S.U.N. press release 40. The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²For text of the proposal for a Namibian settlement, see BULLETIN of June 1978, p. 53.

President Carter's Meeting With U.N. Secretary General

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 30, 1979¹

President Carter met this afternoon with U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim for 50 minutes in the Cabinet Room. The President congratulated Secretary General Waldheim on the results of the Geneva meeting on Indochina refugees. The President felt the Secretary General's efforts were a key factor in the progress made on substantially increasing funding pledges and commitments from a variety of countries to resettle refugees.

On the Middle East, the President discussed U.S. policies for advancing the peace process. The two leaders discussed the question of a continued U.N. presence in the Sinai. The President told the Secretary General that we will be consulting closely with Israel and Egypt on this question. The United States will remain in close touch with the Secretary General and his staff.

The President urged the Secretary General to continue to give top priority to his efforts to resolve the problem of

U.S. Policy On Lebanon

by Andrew Young

Statement before the U.N. Security Council on August 29, 1979. Mr. Young is U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.¹

I welcome the opportunity afforded by this meeting of the Council to address a problem which has long been a matter of grave concern to my government. In recent weeks and months, the sorry spectacle of the slaughter of innocent people through random violence, principally in Lebanon but also in Israel, has been an affront to the conscience of mankind. We are meeting now at the request of the Government of Lebanon, in response to the recent upsurge of violence in southern Lebanon.

In recent days alone, thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians have been forced to flee from their homes, and many have been killed and maimed by often indiscriminate shelling. This situation is intolerable. The people of southern Lebanon, Lebanese and Palestinian alike, and the people of Israel as well, deserve relief from the almost daily violence and fear of attack with which they have been forced to live for far too long. They look to us to point the way to a solution which will allow the people in Lebanon to return to their homes and for them and Israeli citizens to carry on their lives in freedom from fear of attack. We must not fail them.

U.S. Position

The U.S. Government's policy on Lebanon is well known: We support that country's sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity. We have special ties of sympathy with the people of Lebanon, and we have supported the government of President Sarkis in its efforts to restore its authority throughout the country—including throughout southern Lebanon. We will continue to do so.

Let me make absolutely clear the po-

Cyprus. He also discussed the Secretary General's continuing efforts to find a solution to the Namibian situation. □

sition of the United States with regard to events in southern Lebanon. In doing so, I speak with the full authority of the U.S. Government.

First, we condemn those who boast of the murder of an Israeli mother and her child, the attack on a bus filled with Israeli civilians, or the explosion of rockets and bombs in Israeli towns and cities. No political objective can ever justify such barbarism.

Second, and just as strongly, we condemn the policy of artillery shelling and preemptive attacks on Lebanese towns, villages, and refugee camps which Israel and the armed Lebanese groups Israel supports have followed in recent months. Let there be no doubt or ambiguity about this. We cannot and do not agree with Israel's military policies in Lebanon as manifested in the past few months. They are wrong and unacceptable to my government. They are painfully at variance with the values which Israel has traditionally espoused.

What Must Be Done

Let me turn to what the U.S. Government believes must be done to break the deadlock of terror and counterterror in which both sides seem to be caught.

First, both sides should cooperate fully with UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon] in enabling it to carry out its mandate. It is disgraceful that the men of UNIFIL have been subjected to attack and harassment from both Palestinian elements and groups supported by Israel because they seek to carry out the mission entrusted to them by this Council. A lasting end to the violence in the area can only be brought about through scrupulous observance of Security Council Resolution 425. UNIFIL should thus be allowed to fulfill its mandate by functioning in an unimpeded fashion throughout all of southern Lebanon. The objective remains to restore the authority and control of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country.

Second, Israel should end its policy of preemptive strikes on Lebanon soil. It should cease its artillery attacks in support of Lebanese militia groups and use its influence effectively over these groups so that random and indiscriminate violence can be stopped, especially against the men of UNIFIL. □

Third, the Palestinian leadership should help heal the wounds of Lebanon. It should stop attacks on the Lebanese militia groups in southern Lebanon and on Israel. It should renounce the use of Lebanese territory for this purpose. It should carry out its pledge of June 5 to withdraw its fighters from southern Lebanese villages and towns and remove all its armed groups from UNIFIL's area of operation. This step should be taken without precondition and without delay. There is no conceivable justification for the continued presence of Palestinian armed groups in southern Lebanon if the Palestinian leadership is prepared to cooperate with the Council and UNIFIL in carrying out Security Council Resolution 425.

Fourth, all parties to the fighting should carry out and strictly enforce a complete, immediate, and lasting halt to all shelling, terrorism, and other acts of violence.

Palestinian Rights

Members of the Council less than a week ago met to consider another aspect of the Middle East situation, the critical issue of the rights of the Palestinian people. If there is a strengthened understanding in my country of the importance of assuring that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are included in a comprehensive settlement—and I believe there is—then it is time for the Palestinian leadership to recognize that their objectives cannot be achieved through violence and terrorism. Indeed, it is time, past time, for wiser counsels to prevail on both sides of the border between Lebanon and Israel.

Tribute to UNIFIL

Finally, I want to pay tribute to General Erskine and the brave men of UNIFIL he commands. Their task has been thankless, frustrating, and dangerous. Subjected to attack in the performance of their duties, they have suffered heavy casualties. Tragically, three members of the contingent from the small nation of Fiji were killed in a recent clash with terrorists.

In difficult terrain and in a country where arms are widely available among the population, the men of UNIFIL have been subjected to a severe test of their steadfastness. They have risen to challenges with exemplary determination and courage. We all owe them a debt of thanks which words cannot repay. They can be proud of their continued contribution to the cause of peace. □

¹List of participants omitted; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1979.

¹Text from U.N. doc. S/PV. 2164 of Aug. 29, 1979.

World Radio Conference

Foreign Relations Outline¹

The 10-week World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), opening in September 1979 in Geneva, will influence development of radiocommunications systems into the 21st century. It will review all uses of the radio frequency spectrum, related technical questions, and regulatory procedures. The conference is a function of the U.N.'s 154-member International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Its responsibilities include allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different countries. The WARC will be one of the largest international conferences in which the United States has participated, with some 1,500 delegates from over 140 countries expected to attend.

Agenda

WARC's agenda establishes the basis for:

- New frequency allocations to meet changing social and economic needs;
- Review and possible revision of technical standards for use of frequencies; and
- Review and possible revision of general principles for allocations and orbital utilization and of procedures for coordination, notification, and registration of frequencies.

U.S. Goals

We have several major objectives at the conference.

- We seek agreement on necessary, incremental changes in frequency allocations and related regulations in order to enhance U.S. economic, social, and national security interests.
- We seek to maintain those procedures which provide maximum flexibility and adaptability to changing needs.
- We wish to strengthen ITU's role as the international organization re-

sponsible for implementing WARC decisions, without adversely affecting U.S. sovereign rights.

- We support changes in allocations and related frequency management procedures that will accommodate other nations' needs—consistent with our own requirements—while endeavoring to avoid or limit the impact of politically inspired efforts to impede fair and efficient use of the spectrum.

Frequency Bands

Low and Medium. In the low and medium frequency range, the United States proposes expanding AM broadcasting to accommodate new broadcast stations in region 2 (North and South America). We also propose changes in other services, including improved accommodation of amateur frequencies and changes in radiolocation.

High. In these bands, the United States proposes significant increases in international broadcasting and maritime mobile services and some increased accommodation for amateur service. The increases will require reducing some of the present exclusive allocations for fixed service. This will be highly controversial because of developing countries' dependence on fixed service allocations.

Ultra High (UHF). In the UHF bands, the thrust of U.S. proposals is for region 2 to increase allocations for land mobile services to be shared with the broadcast service. Our objective is to accommodate the rapid growth of land mobile frequencies by permitting sharing in the upper UHF bands now allocated exclusively to broadcasting. We propose a critically important frequency allocation to accommodate a new satellite navigation system that promises to revolutionize radionavigation. Also noteworthy are provisions for land, maritime, and aeronautical mobile satellite systems and for aural broadcasting by satellite. In addition, we propose to accommodate increased needs for amateur, maritime mobile, and aeronautical services.

Super High (SHF) and Extremely High (EHF). Above the UHF band, we have a variety of different service needs. A difficult problem has been encountered in fixed satellite service, where INTELSAT has major requirements; we propose several allocations to meet them. INTELSAT, with 102 member countries, provides most of the world's international communications via satellite. Also within the fixed satellite service, we propose significant changes in allocations for both fixed service and broadcast satellite service frequencies at 12 GHZ (gigahertz) to accommodate the growing need for those services. We propose allocations to meet important requirements for a mobile satellite service for civilian and government systems. We propose to accommodate the growing requirements for future generations of Earth exploration and space research satellites. We envision the need for satellite sensing of environmental and Earth resources throughout the SHF and EHF bands.

Regulatory Procedures

We anticipate that proposals will be made at the conference to revise present procedures giving recognition and priority of use to countries which first register frequency assignments with the ITU. Such proposals—which will have to be carefully evaluated—may include the establishment of allotment plans for distributing frequencies and/or orbital space slots on a country-by-country basis. While we endorse the principle of insuring fair and reasonable access by all countries to the radio spectrum, we have in the past opposed preassignment allotment plans except in limited situations. We are concerned that fixed allotment plans which distribute frequencies and orbital space to countries or areas independent of need or ability to utilize may not allow optimal utilization of the spectrum or provide adequate incentive for adopting spectrum- and orbit-conserving technologies and patterns of use. □

¹Taken from the Department of State publication in the GIST series, released Aug. 1979. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba

Following are the texts of Secretary Vance's letter to Senator Richard Stone of July 27, 1979, a Department statement of August 31, and President Carter's remarks to the press on September 7.

SECRETARY'S LETTER JULY 27, 1979

Dear Senator Stone:

The President has asked me to respond to your July 24 letter to him on Soviet military presence in Cuba. I very much appreciate your calling to our attention reports of a possible high ranking Soviet command structure in Cuba.

I wish to reaffirm the President's statement to you that it is the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere. However, there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of the presence of a Soviet military base. Apart from a military group that has been advising the Cuban Armed Forces for fifteen years or more our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet forces in Cuba. At the same time the President directed that we give increased attention to the situation and monitor it closely. This is being done. The President raised the question of the Soviet presence in Cuba with President Brezhnev in Vienna and made clear to him that a Soviet buildup would adversely affect our relationship.

You have also raised questions on the 1962 understanding in your letter to the President and during the appearances of Secretary Brown and myself before the SFRC. The United States and the Soviet Union both recognize that an understanding on Cuba exists. This understanding is reflected in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence of October and November, 1962, (particularly the letters of October 27 and 28, 1962)¹ and in communications between the two governments in the fall of 1970 concerning the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Cuba. We have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of this understanding.

President Nixon addressed the scope of the understanding in 1971, and stated, "in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding." Subsequently, in the early 1970's, submarines did make occasional port calls. According to the understanding with the Soviet Union such port calls do not constitute violations.

You have asked that we assure the American people that they have full knowledge of the understanding. The essential understanding is in the public record. The Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced into Cuba. In 1970 it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems.

Although the October 27 and 28, 1962, letters and many other documents from this period are not classified, there are additional diplomatic exchanges, made in confidence, which must remain classified. They are consistent with publicly available documents. The principle of confidentiality of diplomatic communication is respected throughout the international community and is carefully applied in our relations with the Soviet Union to ensure the free flow of communication that is essential to the maintenance of world peace. A breach of confidentiality in this context could easily impair our ability to deal with the Soviets in the future.

If you wish any further background, please do not hesitate to inform me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
CYRUS VANCE

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUG. 31, 1979²

We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.

Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000-3,000 men. The unit includes armored, artil-

lery, and infantry elements. In addition, we estimate that the Soviet maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba.

As currently configured and supported, the unit poses no threat to the United States.

Ground forces per se did not figure in our bilateral understandings with the Soviets which were directed toward offensive weapons systems. Nonetheless, we are concerned about the presence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba.

We have, in recent months, raised with the Soviets the issue of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. On August 29 we called in the Soviet Charge to express our concerns about the Soviet ground forces unit. We will continue our discussions with them on this subject.

We will, of course, continue to monitor all aspects of Soviet military activities in Cuba to insure there is no threat to the United States.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, SEPT. 7, 1979³

I want to take a few minutes to speak to you about the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. The facts relating to this issue have been carefully laid out by Secretary Vance, both in his public statement and in his testimony before the Congress. The facts, in brief, are as follows.

We have concluded, as the consequences of intensified intelligence efforts, that a Soviet combat unit is currently stationed in Cuba. We have some evidence to indicate that such a unit has been in Cuba for some time, perhaps for quite a few years.

The brigade consists of 2,000-3,000 troops. It's equipped with conventional weapons, such as about 40 tanks and some field artillery pieces, and has conducted training as an organized unit.

It is not an assault force. It does not have airlift or sea-going capabilities and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States.

The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear. However, the Secretary of State spoke for me and for our nation on Wednesday when he said that we consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable.

We are confident about our ability to defend our country or any of our friends from external aggression. The issue posed is of a different nature. It involves the stationing of Soviet com-

Letters of Credence

President Carter accepted the letters of credence of newly appointed Ambassadors to the United States of Roberto Arce Alvarez of Bolivia and Alfonso Arias-Schreiber of Peru on March 30, 1979, and of Marcial Perez Chiriboga of Venezuela and Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira of Brazil on July 24. □

U.S.-Mexico Cooperation

by Julius L. Katz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology on August 1, 1979. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.¹

I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss certain recommendations it has made on U.S.-Mexico relations and potentials regarding energy, immigration, scientific cooperation, and technology transfer. I understand that the subcommittee is particularly interested in hearing the views of the State Department on the recommendations in the subcommittee report of its May 3-7 visit to Mexico which propose a long-term plan for the export of energy technology and critical equipment to Mexico based on the import of Mexican oil. I will, therefore, confine my remarks to that specific aspect of the committee's report.

The Department shares the subcommittee's desire to search for ways to promote mutually beneficial cooperation between Mexico and the United States in the critical areas of trade, energy, and science and technology cooperation.

Cuba (Cont'd)

bat troops here in the Western Hemisphere, in a country which acts as a Soviet proxy in military adventures in other areas of the world, like Africa.

We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected. We are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union, and we are consulting closely with the Congress.

Let me emphasize that this is a sensitive issue that faces our nation, all of us, and our nation as a whole must respond not only with firmness and strength but also with calm and a sense of proportion.

This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration. As Secretary Vance discusses this issue

Trade

The Administration indeed is moving to strengthen our relations with Mexico in all of these areas. We have taken steps which we believe will lay the basis for a cooperative long-term economic relationship with Mexico. For example, in the trade area, our overall relations with Mexico are very good, and trade flows have expanded dramatically in recent years, increasing from \$6.4 billion in 1974 to almost \$13 billion at present. Mexico's rapid economic growth will continue to provide U.S. exporters with significant expanded opportunities to export capital goods and technology.

Not surprisingly, this rapidly growing trade has brought adjustment problems with it. Some affected sectors in the United States have called for protection against rapid imports of particular products from Mexico and, in some cases, have charged Mexican exporters with unfair competitive practices.

A further irritant to our trade relations has been Mexico's highly restrictive trade policy, an attempt to protect its domestic producers. We are encouraged that the present Mexican Administration has been moving Mexico in the direction of greater openness.

with Soviet representatives in the coming days, the Congress and the American people can help to insure a successful outcome of these discussions and negotiations by preserving an atmosphere in which our diplomacy can work.

I know I speak for the leadership in Congress, with whom I have met this afternoon, as well as for my own Administration, when I express my confidence that our nation can continue to show itself to be calm and steady, as well as strong and firm. □

¹For texts of the letters exchanged between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, Oct. 22-28, 1962, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1973, p. 635.

²Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

³Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 10, 1979.

We have been in the process of negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement with Mexico within the context of the multilateral trade negotiations. In addition, we and other members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are negotiating with Mexico for its possible accession to the GATT. While our negotiations with Mexico are not yet concluded, we are optimistic that a basis will be laid for a substantial increase in trade between our two countries and for a constructive long-term relationship between them.

Energy

Our energy relations with Mexico are growing rapidly, and cooperative mechanisms for discussion and problem management are being developed. During the visit of President Carter to Mexico in February several initiatives were taken. The United States-Mexico consultative mechanism has been restructured and broadened, and a new Energy Working Group, cochaired on the U.S. side by the Departments of State and Energy, is coordinating energy cooperation and problem management with Mexico. This working group will report to the newly established subcabinet advisory group to the consultative mechanism which will review its progress.

Discussions concerning possible natural gas purchases are continuing, and a joint study of electricity exchanges has begun. Both governments have reviewed a number of bilateral energy-related science and technology proposals, including solar research, geothermal cooperation, and enhanced oil recovery techniques. We fully expect that these initial cooperative activities with Mexico will prove mutually beneficial. We should strive to broaden such activities as our energy relationship matures.

Science and Technology

With respect to science and technology cooperation, formal cooperation with Mexico is based on an agreement signed in 1972 which established a mixed commission to coordinate bilateral programs. The importance of this cooperation was highlighted by President Carter during his visit to Mexico in February of this year when he and President Lopez Portillo signed a further Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

The third meeting of the mixed commission was held in Washington in June at which time the work program

for the next 2 years was approved. The mixed commission formed working groups on:

- New crops, arid lands, and agricultural productivity;
- Energy research and development;
- Industrial metrology and instrumentation;
- Railway research and development;
- Technical information transfer; and
- Cooperation between the National Science Foundation and the National Council for Science and Technology of Mexico.

In the area of energy research and development, the mixed commission agreed on 20 separate cooperative projects including solar and geothermal energy, uranium exploration, cost and planning of alternate sources of energy, industrial energy conservation, hydrogen storage, and fossil fuels research. The fossil fuels project will focus on a series of joint seminars covering enhanced oil recovery; design, construction, and operation of pilot plants; certain offshore drilling technologies; and other areas of mutual interest.

The outline of recent activities reflects a mutual recognition of the importance of U.S. technology to Mexico's long-term economic development on which depends the de-

velopment and production of Mexico's energy resources. For this reason we welcome the committee's interest in considering means of furthering technological cooperation with Mexico. Consideration of technical cooperation with Mexico should begin with an examination of current availability of commercial technology to Mexico as well as Mexico's own approach to trade and economic development. The vast bulk of U.S. industrial technology of greatest interest to Mexico is owned or controlled by private individuals or firms. Mexico presently has access to such technology through commercial arrangements. We need to consider whether and how an intergovernmental arrangement might increase that flow.

Technology

Flows of technology to Mexico appear related less to credit availability or supplier restrictions on access, than to overall absorptive capacity in terms of manpower skills and technology infrastructure, as well as to the local climate, including regulatory conditions.

In this regard, Mexico's major investment laws limit foreign ownership of new investment to a minority position in most industries and prohibit it completely in other cases. Since privately held technology most frequently flows with investment, restrictions on investment can act as a disincentive to

technology transfer. Moreover, the price and terms of transfer of technology contracts must be approved by the Mexican Government and, as the subcommittee report indicates, protection afforded by trademarks and patents is more limited than in many Western industrialized countries.

Other laws—particularly price controls and import curbs—can also have an adverse effect on foreign investment operating in Mexico. The negative effect of such controls on the transfer of technology have been pointed out during official U.S.-Mexican consultation on trade.

Oil Production

Let me now turn to Mexico's oil production policy. As the committee has recognized in its report, Mexican production of hydrocarbons is geared to that country's own development needs, rather than to the energy requirements of the United States or of the world generally. The Mexican Government has shown a concern about developing oil revenues at a greater pace than the ability of the Mexican economy to absorb the proceeds in sound economic development. They have seen in other countries how unbalanced economic growth can cause severe inflation and social unrest. These concerns of the Mexican Government are understandable and must be respected.

What this means however is that Mexican production of oil and gas will be expanded in a very deliberate way. Mexico plans to increase its oil production from its present level of about 1½ mmb/d [million barrels per day] to about 2.2 mmb/d by the end of 1980 or early 1981. This would permit a doubling of present Mexican exports of about 500,000 b/d. The revenues from these exports, along with Mexico's improved borrowing capacity, enable it to purchase whatever capital equipment and technology it requires from abroad. As its economic development progresses, Mexico's foreign exchange requirements will, of course, grow and almost certainly they will wish to expand their hydrocarbon production from their present planned targets.

Because of the transportation savings and consequent economic benefits to Mexico, the largest part of Mexican oil exports go to the United States. Currently, we take about 80% of Mexican oil exports. The Mexican Government has indicated a desire to diversify their markets and has set as a goal limiting U.S. sales to about 60% of total exports. With expanded Mexican exports, the total volume of our purchases from Mexico should, nonetheless, increase

Emergency Aid to Nicaragua

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 27, 1979¹

President Carter is sending a special flight to Nicaragua on Saturday, July 28, to deliver emergency food and medical supplies. The U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pezullo, will return to Managua on Saturday's flight. He will present his credentials to the new Government of Nicaragua early next week. The President is sending this special plane as an expression of his personal good will to the people of Nicaragua and to the new government and to symbolize the concern of Americans for the hunger and distress of the Nicaraguan people after many months of devastating conflict.

The United States has already provided 732 metric tons of emergency

food supplies to Nicaragua. Another 1,000 tons of food from the United States is on its way to Nicaragua by ship. In addition, the United States is providing supplies and financial assistance for airlifts being carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Of 9,600 pounds of medical supplies purchased by the U.S. Government for shipment to Nicaragua, 75% has already been delivered, and the remaining 2,500 pounds of U.S.-purchased medicines, together with 3,300 pounds of Red Cross medical supplies and 5,200 pounds of baby formula, are arriving in Nicaragua this weekend on a special flight chartered by the Agency for International Development. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 30, 1979.

Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico

by Robert Krueger

Statement made at a special briefing for news correspondents in the Department of State on August 23, 1979. Mr. Krueger is Ambassador at Large-designate and U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs.

For some time, the Governments of Mexico and the U.S.A. and many people in each of these countries have been working together in an effort to minimize the damage to the coastlines and coastal waters of our two countries from the oil spill in the Bay of Campeche. I would like today to review some of our joint efforts and to respond to inquiries about some of our governments' current actions.

If an accident occurs on a freeway, the first thing to do is to get any injured parties to the hospital, the second is to get the freeway open, and the third, perhaps, to get the names of the parties

involved so that later on attorneys and insurance companies can get together to determine whatever responsibility is involved. I'd say that it now appears that we are entering that third stage.

Yesterday afternoon the U.S. Government sent a cable to the Government of Mexico indicating that while it is too early to make a definitive assessment of the damage that may result to the U.S. coastline, we believe that we should now begin discussions on various issues related to the oil spill in the Bay of Campeche. One matter that we suggest be included in that discussion is the question of liability and possible alternatives for dealing with claims for compensation for clean-up costs and any damages that may have occurred to property and resources.

We are hopeful that the Mexican Government shares our desire to address this matter together, for our two countries have thus far cooperated very closely in attempting to control this oil

spill. We see these discussions as a continuation of the efforts of two neighbors to solve this problem jointly, for there are many ways in which we have cooperated to minimize the damage from the blowout of IXTOC 1.

First, since the well—IXTOC 1—went out of control in June, Pemex—the national oil company of Mexico—has contracted with various U.S. private companies to supply equipment and specialized expertise to help in controlling the well.

Second, the U.S. Government has been working with the Government of Mexico in whatever ways have been requested.

- The United States has provided aerial surveillance, and Mexico has authorized U.S. planes to use Mexican airports.

- The U.S. national response team sent scientific observers to Mexico in July with expertise in the areas of biology, dispersants, ecology, and clean-up operations to work with Mexican officials.

- Mexico has a liaison officer in Corpus Christi, Texas, to assist in coordinating the efforts at minimizing damage.

- U.S. ships monitoring the spill have been allowed to proceed into Mexican waters.

- Perhaps most immediately important, Mexico is paying the United States for two American skimmers that are now in operation at the well site, gathering approximately 5,000 barrels of emulsified oil each day that is then pumped into Mexican ships.

And, in order to address the problems of possible future oil spills, representatives of the two governments have been meeting for some months in an effort to form an agreement on how jointly to handle such problems. These discussions, in fact, were underway before the blowout at IXTOC 1.

I have met with Captain Charles Corbett, cochairman of the U.S. response team, and with Senor Jorge Diaz Serrano, head of Pemex. Both are working at maximum effort. And our government will continue to do everything it can to work with the Government of Mexico to lessen inconvenience and hardship resulting from the oil spill. □

Mexico (Cont'd)

even though our share of those exports declines from present levels.

As for natural gas, which is subject to regulation in the United States, we are, as you know, in the process of discussions with the Mexican Government aimed at agreement on a framework which we could both support for the export of Mexican gas to the United States.

We must realize that the people of Mexico, not unlike the people in the United States, are sensitive about the development and utilization of their natural resources, and particularly their energy resources. We must also recognize that there is a strong Mexican sensitivity about their independence and about foreign economic domination. Thus, U.S. initiatives which link energy with other issues will likely be viewed with suspicion. In designing our policies toward Mexico, we,

therefore, must take account of this fact and the need for the Mexican Government to demonstrate that any arrangements with us will not only further Mexican national interests, but will be seen as respecting Mexico's sovereignty and independence.

In summary, we need to promote cooperative arrangements with Mexico, arrangements which will contribute to Mexico's own development and to its expanded economic relations with the United States. The committee's strong interest in promoting expanded technological cooperation between Mexico and the United States is very supportive of this general interest and we would be pleased to work with the committee in realizing its goal. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

TREATIES: Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cotton

Amendment to the articles of agreement of the International Institute for Cotton of Jan. 17, 1966, as amended (TIAS 5964, 6184). Adopted by the General Assembly of the International Institute for Cotton at Washington July 31, 1979. Entered into force July 31, 1979.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952. TIAS 6129. *Acceptance deposited:* Holy See, Aug. 22, 1979.

Defense

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative full-scale engineering development of an advanced surface-to-air missile system, with annexes. Signed May 9 and 18 and July 6, 1979. Entered into force July 6, 1979. *Signatures:* Denmark, May 18, 1979; Federal Republic of Germany, May 9, 1979; U.S., July 6, 1979.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Iceland, Aug. 22, 1979. International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.¹ *Ratification deposited:* Iceland, Aug. 22, 1979.

Law

Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710. *Acceptance deposited:* Venezuela, July 25, 1979.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.² *Acceptance deposited:* Barbados, Aug. 20, 1979.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976.¹ *Accession deposited:* Guatemala, Aug. 13, 1979.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the interna-

tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions. July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions. *Ratification deposited:* Iraq, Aug. 15, 1979. *Accession deposited:* Trinidad and Tobago, Sept. 7, 1979.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. *Ratification deposited:* Denmark, July 25, 1979.³

BILATERAL

Bermuda

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Hamilton and Washington July 31 and Aug. 13, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979. Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 15, 1974 (TIAS 7801) on preclearance for entry into the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at Hamilton Aug. 28 and 29, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1979.

Canada

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Ottawa and Washington July 23 and Aug. 14, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 14, 1979; effective Aug. 1, 1979.

Denmark and the Faroe Islands

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with annexes and agreed minute. Signed at Washington Sept. 5, 1979. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes, upon the completion of the internal procedures of both parties.

Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 7 and 8, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1979; effective June 1, 1979.

Federal Republic of Germany

International express mail/datapost agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Bonn and Washington Dec. 15, 1978 and Jan. 22, 1979. *Entered into force:* Aug. 8, 1979; effective Feb. 1, 1979.

German Democratic Republic

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington May 4, 1979. Entered into force provisionally May 4, 1979. *Entered into force definitively:* Aug. 15, 1979.

Haiti

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Aug. 17, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1979; effective May 1, 1979.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17, 1977, (TIAS 8677) for sales of agricultural commodities and the exchange of letters of Dec. 16, 1977, (TIAS 8984) concerning development projects. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta July 19, 1979. Entered into force July 19, 1979.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul Aug. 24, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1979.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 4 and Aug. 1, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1979. Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 23, 1978, (TIAS 9254) relating to the provision and utilization of aircraft to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico July 26, 1979. Entered into force July 26, 1979.

Morocco

Agreement establishing a Provisional Commission on Educational and Cultural Exchange. Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat July 17, 1979. Entered into force July 17, 1979.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, (TIAS 9050) relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 7, 1978, and July 25, 1979. Entered into force July 25, 1979. Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 27 and 30, 1979. Entered into force July 30, 1979.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 22 and 24, 1979, (TIAS 9223) relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Aug. 3 and 16, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1979. Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 24, 1978, (TIAS 9187) with agreed minutes. Signed at Manila Aug. 6, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1979.

Portugal

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 22 and July 11, 1979. Entered into force July 11, 1979.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 18, 1976, (TIAS 8264) with agreed minutes. Signed at Lisbon July 26, 1979. Entered into force July 26, 1979.

Romania

Agreement renewing and amending the agreement of Dec. 4, 1973, (TIAS 7901) relating to civil air transport. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest Jan. 25 and 30, 1979.

Entered into force: July 25, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 6 and 25, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9166, 9212), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 24 and Aug. 27, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 27, 1979.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of June 4, 1976, (TIAS 8254) as extended, on maritime transport. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979.

Somalia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 20, 1978, (TIAS 9222) with agreed minutes. Signed at Mogadishu July 11, 1979. Entered into force July 11, 1979.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates of deceased persons

and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 1978.²

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Aug. 24, 1979.

Third protocol further amending the convention for avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains, signed at London on 31 Dec. 1975. Signed at London Mar. 15, 1979.²

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Aug. 24, 1979.

Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1976 (TIAS 8403). Signed at Kinshasa July 27, 1979. Entered into force July 27, 1979.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-scheduling of payments due under PL 480 Title 1 agricultural commodities agreements, with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. 1, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1979.

Zambia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 4, 1978. Signed at Lusaka July 19, 1979. Entered into force July 19, 1979. □

¹ Not in force for the U.S.

² Not in force.

³ With declaration.

PRESS RELEASES: Department of State

August 17–September 14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
*198	8/17	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Sept. 14.
*199	8/17	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on transborder data flows, Sept. 26.
*200	8/24	U.S., Sri Lanka establish textile agreement, Mar. 12 and 23.
*201	8/17	Conference on the U.N. Decade for Women, Sept. 12.
*202	8/17	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radio communications, Sept. 20.
*203	8/17	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, Sept. 11.
*204	8/22	U.S., Dominican Republic sign textile agreement, Aug. 7–8.
*205	8/22	U.S. Organization of the International Telegraph and Telephone Committee (CCITT), study group I, Sept. 19.
*206	8/23	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, panel on bulk cargoes, Sept. 13.
*207	8/27	ACDA Director George M. Seignious to address conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Houston, Sept. 5.
*208	8/27	U.S., Japan sign textile agreement, Aug. 17.
*209	8/28	U.S., Japan sign record of discussion dealing with trade in textile products, Aug. 22.
*210	8/28	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, July 27 and 30.
*211	8/29	CCITT, Sept. 24.
*212	9/4	Advisory Committee to the U.S. Section of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Oct. 4–5.
*213	9/4	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, Dec. 7, 1978, and July 25.
*214	9/4	State Department and Omaha Chamber of Commerce co-sponsor conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Sept. 18.
*215	9/5	U.S., Denmark, and Faroe Islands sign new fisheries agreement.

CHRONOLOGY: August 1979

Aug. 1	Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo is sworn in as Prime Minister of Portugal.	Aug. 11	Shehu Shagari is elected President of Nigeria.
	Conference of Commonwealth heads of government meets in Lusaka, Zambia, Aug. 1–8.	Aug. 15	U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young resigns.
Aug. 3	A military junta overthrows the government of President Masie of Equatorial Guinea.	Aug. 20	UNCSTD conference meets in Geneva Aug. 20–Aug. 31.
Aug. 5	Francesco Cossiga is sworn in as Prime Minister of Italy.		Prime Minister Charan Singh of India resigns.
	Egypt and Israel hold talks on Palestinian autonomy Aug. 5–6.	Aug. 22	Soviet ballet dancer Alexandr Godunov defects to the U.S.
Aug. 7	Bolivian Congress elects Walter Guevara to be provisional President until new presidential elections are held in 1 year.	Aug. 24	U.S. delays departure of U.S.S.R. airliner Aug. 24–27 to satisfy U.S. legal requirements that Mr. Godunov's wife, Lyudmila Vlasova, is not returning to the U.S.S.R. under duress.
Aug. 8	President Toure of Guinea visits the U.S. Aug. 8–15.	Aug. 25	Vice President Mondale visits China, Hong Kong, and Japan Aug. 25–Sept. 3.
Aug. 9	Secretary Vance visits Ecuador Aug. 9–12 to attend the inauguration ceremonies of President Roldos. Mrs. Carter heads the U.S. delegation.	Aug. 31	U.S. State Department announces that the U.S. has confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit consisting of some 2,000–3,000 members and has expressed concern over the matter to the U.S.S.R. □
Aug. 10	Jaime Roldos Aguilera is sworn in as President of Ecuador.		

- 216 9/5 Vance: news conference.
 *217 9/5 Harvey J. Feldman sworn in as Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
 *218 9/7 State Department and San Antonio Chamber of Commerce to present conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Sept. 19.
 *219 9/11 SCC, Oct. 3.
 220 9/10 "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. III, United Nations Affairs" released.
 *221 9/13 Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, study group of international child abduction by one parent, Sept. 29.
 *222 9/12 SCC, committee on ocean dumping, Oct. 10.
 *223 9/14 U.S., Colombia sign extradition treaty.
 †224 9/14 10th meeting of Antarctic treaty consultative parties, Sept. 17-Oct. 5.
 *225 9/14 Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, Fisheries and Marine Science and Technology, Nov. 14-15 (closed meetings) and Nov. 16 (open). □

* Not printed in the BULLETIN.

† Held for a later issue.

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

- | No. | Date | Subject |
|-----|------|---|
| *50 | 5/30 | Young: statement on behalf of the Western five governments on Namibia, General Assembly. |
| *51 | 5/30 | Sablan: TTPI, Trusteeship Council. |
| *52 | 5/30 | Petree: TTPI, Trusteeship Council. |
| *53 | 5/30 | Oller: TTPI, Trusteeship Council. |
| *54 | 5/31 | Petree: close of the 33d session of the General Assembly. |
| *55 | 6/1 | Petree: information activities, Committee to Review U.N. Public Information Policies and Activities. |
| *56 | 6/12 | Strasser: U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa, Subcommittee on Small Territories of the Special Committee on Decolonization. |
| *57 | 6/14 | Petree: UNIF in Lebanon, Security Council. |
| *58 | 6/15 | Wells: UNDP, UNDP Governing Council. |
| *59 | 6/15 | McHenry: UNFICYP, Security Council. |
| *60 | 6/19 | Strasser: U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa, Subcommittee on Small Territories of the Special Committee on Decolonization. |
| *61 | 6/20 | Hosenball: outer space, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. |
| *62 | 7/2 | Wilkinson: Indian Ocean. |
| *63 | 7/11 | Young: developing world, ECOSOC, Geneva. |

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|-----|------|---|
| *64 | 7/20 | Petree: occupied territories, Security Council. |
| *65 | 7/31 | Young: World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, Rome. |
| *66 | 8/15 | Statement on Puerto Rico. |
| *67 | 8/15 | Statement on U.S. contribution to UNRWA. |
| *68 | 8/15 | Statement on U.N. Committee of 24 and Puerto Rico. |
| *69 | 8/23 | Young: Namibia Day, Security Council. |
| *70 | 8/24 | Horbal: voluntary fund, Commission on the Status of Women, ECOSOC. □ |

* Not printed in the BULLETIN.

NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS DICTIONARY

The State Department Library recently published the *International Relations Dictionary* of words, acronyms, and phrases in foreign affairs. The dictionary fully documents 165 terms and contains over 250 cross references. Some of the terms included are "basket three," "the Club of Rome," "Group of 77," "MBFR," "new international order," "nonaligned countries," "the Nuclear Suppliers Group," "rejection front," "shuttle diplomacy," and the "Trilateral Commission." You may order the 48-page dictionary (stock no. 044-001-01715-6) from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Please enclose a check or money order for \$2.30.

PUBLICATIONS:

"Foreign Relations"

Volume on the United Nations Released

The Department of State released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume III, United Nations Affairs* on September 10, 1979. The *Foreign Relations* series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy. The volume released September 10 is the first of 16 volumes for the 1952-1954 triennium.

This volume of 1,581 pages presents high-level documentation (nearly all of which is newly declassified) on the policies of the United States in the United Nations on such major issues as the Chinese representation question, preparations for the U.N. Charter Review Conference, the initiatives of the United States to bring about the admission of Japan, U.S.-U.K. discussions regarding the basis of their U.N. policy, and the 1953 change in the draft covenants on human rights.

Papers presented in the volume were selected principally from the files of the Department of State, the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, and other U.S. Government agencies. This volume, like other forthcoming volumes in the triennium for 1952-1954, includes a detailed biographical list of persons appearing in the volume and a descriptive list of documentary sources used in preparing the volume.

Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Volume III, was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Listed as Department of State Publication 8957, this volume may be obtained for \$19.00. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. □

Press release 220.

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Documents on Disarmament. Series of volumes issued annually. This publication contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments in 1976. Pub. 97. 994 pp. \$8.00. (Stock No. 002-000-00060-1.)

U.S. Participation in the United Nations. Annual report by the President to the Congress for 1977. Pub. 8964. International Organizations and Conference Series 137. 335 pp. \$4.50 (Stock No. 044-000-01718-1.)

Shipping—Equal Access to Government-Controlled Cargoes. Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 8981. 8 pp. 80¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8981.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of May 17, 1977, as amended. TIAS 8984. 13 pp. 90¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8984.)

Military Missions. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8986. 23 pp. \$1.30. (Cat. No. S9.10:8986.)

Remote Sensing—Global Crop Information. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 9007. 18 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9007.)

Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of June 19, 1974. TIAS 9008. 5 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9008.)

Fertilizer Distribution and Marketing. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 9009. 32 pp. \$1.40. (Cat. No. S9.10:9009.)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Second procès-verbal extending the declaration of August 9, 1973, on provisional accession of the Philippines to the general agreement. TIAS 9010. 9 pp. 80¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9010.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel. TIAS 9012. 5 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9012.)

Rural Finance Experimental Project. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 9013. 34 pp. \$1.40. (Cat. No. S9.10:9013.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Afghanistan. TIAS 9014. 16 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9014.)

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Haiti, modifying the agreement of March 13 and April 2, 1953, as modified. TIAS 9018. 5 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9018.)

Cultural Relations. Agreement with the People's Republic of Bulgaria. TIAS 9020. 30 pp. \$1.30. (Cat. No. S9.10:9020.)

Provision of Services for Kimpo International Airport Expansion. Memorandum of agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 9021. 10 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9021.)

Mahaweli Ganga Irrigation. Agreement with Sri Lanka. TIAS 9023. 21 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9023.)

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement of May 28, 1975. TIAS 9024. 4 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9024.)

Defense—M-16 Rifle Production Program. Memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 9026. 15 pp. \$1.00 (Cat. No. S9.10:9026.)

Natural Gas Pipeline. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 9030. 48 pp. \$1.80. (Cat. No. S9.10:9030.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 9035. 22 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9035.)

Trade and Textiles and Textile Products. Agreement with India. TIAS 9036. 29 pp. \$1.30. (Cat. No. S9.10:9036.)

Air Transport Services—Low-Cost Fares. Agreement with India, modifying the agreement of February 3, 1956, as amended. TIAS 9038. 5 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9038.)

Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 9039. 21 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9039.)

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS 9041. 12 pp. 90¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9041.)

Air Transport Services—Low-Cost Fares. Agreement with the Polish People's Republic, modifying the agreement of July 19, 1972, as amended. 5 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9042.)

Basic Sanitation. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 9044. 27 pp. \$1.30. (Cat. No. S9.10:9044.)

Commodity Import Loan. Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS 9048. 16 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9048.)

Rural Electrification. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 9049. 31 pp. \$1.40. (Cat. No. S9.10:9049.)

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 9050. 16 pp. \$1.10. (Cat. No. S9.10:9050.)

Rural Community Health. Agreement with Tunisia. TIAS 9051. 51 pp. \$1.80. (Cat. No. S9.10:9051.)

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Volume 79 / Number 2032 / November 1979

Cover Photo:

Bronze statue in the north garden of U.N. Headquarters, created by Soviet sculptor Evgeniy Vuchetich, illustrates the Biblical injunction:

They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4)

(Photo by Ruth Helmich, U.S. Mission to the U.N.)

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor

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UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1979

A Proclamation

Thirty-four years after its founding "to save succeeding generations of mankind from the scourge of war", the United Nations remains mankind's last best hope for building a world community based on justice, tolerance for diversity and respect for the rule of law.

The United Nations has no magic formula for solving the increasingly complex problems of our revolutionary age. Yet it remains the symbol, and the standard, of mankind's desire to turn away from ancient quarrels and live in a world in which all people can share in the fruits of prosperity and peace.

More than ever, the international community is challenged by problems of global dimension which can be solved only through world-wide cooperation and dialogue. The 100 new nations which have joined the United Nations since its founding are a symbol of the increasingly complex and diverse world which the United Nations confronts today.

Protecting international peace and security is still the United Nations' greatest contribution and responsibility, but that political stability is only the precondition for fulfilling the larger aspirations of mankind. For all its imperfections, the United Nations remains the principal forum for the pivotal dialogue among the nations of the world on constructing a more stable, equitable, and productive economic order. It plays a leading role in the global management and allocation of vital natural resources. It offers an increasingly important channel for providing development assistance to many nations in the world. It offers a forum, and often a timely and effective mechanism for protecting basic human rights. The leadership of the United Nations in responding to the present refugee crisis, and the recent Geneva Meeting on that problem, represents one of the proudest exam-

ples of that world body's ability to harness world cooperation in the cause of human dignity.

The United States has historically been one of the United Nations' most active and dedicated supporters, and I have been proud to continue and expand on that support as President. Not a single day goes by when we in the United States do not call upon the United Nations, or one of its affiliates, to help deal with a problem of global dimensions. I join with many other Americans and citizens of all nations in expressing my sincere support for this unique world body on the thirty-fourth anniversary of its founding.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Wednesday, October 24, 1979, as United Nations Day. I urge all Americans to use this day as an opportunity to better acquaint themselves with the activities and accomplishments of the United Nations.

I have appointed O. Pendleton Thomas to serve as 1979 United States National Chairman for United Nations Day, and the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. to work with him in celebrating this very special day. And I invite all the American people, and people everywhere, to join me on this thirty-fourth anniversary of the United Nations, in strengthening our common resolve to increase its effectiveness in meeting the global challenges and aspirations that we all share.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the two hundred and fourth.

JIMMY CARTER

No. 4684 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17, 1979.

UNITED NATIONS: COMMON NEEDS IN A DIVERSE WORLD

by Secretary Vance

Address before the 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 24, 1979.¹

We met in this General Assembly on the threshold of a new decade. It will be a time of complex challenge—a period in which, more than ever, cooperative endeavors among nations are a matter not only of idealism but of direct self-interest.

The decade now drawing to a close has been characterized by rapid change—far-reaching and fundamental.

- Awesome technological developments are all about us.

- The assertion of national independence has reshaped the political geography of our planet.

- Within nations, we see an accelerating rise in individual economic, political, and social expectations.

- The unrelenting hostility of the cold war has given way to a more complex relationship between East and West, with elements of both competition and cooperation.

- The simple notion of a bipolar world has become obsolete. Increasingly there is a profusion of different systems and allegiances and a diffusion of political and military power.

- The world economic order is also undergoing inexorable transformations. Many nations, formerly among the disadvantaged, now are achieving global economic power. Economic interdependence has become a daily reality for the citizens of every nation.

These sweeping changes have, for the most part, worked in constructive directions—changing lives for the better and opening new possibilities for collective effort and creative diplomacy.

But while these developments demonstrate that progress is possible, they by no means demonstrate that it is inevitable. I say this for two reasons.

First, in a number of areas, the pace of current progress is dwarfed by the scope of coming challenges. The next decade will decide whether we have the collective wisdom and the common will to surmount a series of imposing and interrelated problems which must be dealt with in a comprehensive manner.

- The need to develop new forms of

energy will pose a continuing challenge. We have entered the difficult transition from a petroleum economy to one based on other forms of energy.

- Even without this added burden, we face an imposing task in providing for the basic needs of people and in narrowing the combustible disparity between wealth and despair. The food shortage facing developing countries, for example, was 12 million tons in 1975. It could be 70–85 million tons by 1990, unless productivity rises sharply.

- We must strike a decent balance between the burgeoning demands of more people for a better life and the inescapable reality of a fragile environment.

- Such prospects carry the seeds of future discord. As these seeds ripen, and the growth and spread of weapons continue, regional conflicts become all the more dangerous—in their toll of lives and resources and in the heightened risk of wider confrontation.

- And despite our emergence from the days of unrelenting hostility, the East-West relationship can deteriorate dangerously whenever one side fails to respect the security interests of the other.

Our ability to meet these tests depends on a **second** issue: Will we confront such challenges together and benefit together? Or will we let adversity divide us and thus conquer? I must be frank to say that I am not sure what the answer will be.

There are some reasons for encouragement. In recent years, the nations here represented have found it easier, in many different forums, to talk with each other rather than at each other.

East and West have entered into the broadest arms control agenda in history. The Soviet Union and the United States have negotiated significant limitations on strategic arms in a treaty that now awaits ratification.

North and South have made progress on financial, trade, and commodity issues—far more progress than has been acknowledged. Agreement has been reached on a sharp increase in the resources of the International Monetary Fund. Lending by the multilateral development banks has increased. Expanded trade opportunities have been opened by the recently concluded trade negotiations. We have moved ahead on other matters such as international debt and a common fund for commodities.

We should recognize such progress and build on it.

We have taken steps as well toward the resolution of some deeply imbedded regional disputes.

But I am concerned that there are also factors at work which could reverse this cooperative trend. The severity of the problems we face could drive nations to the pursuit of their own separate advantage at the expense of international cooperation. In times of economic trouble, even relatively prosperous countries find it more difficult to look beyond their internal concerns to meet international needs. Indeed, it is a vivid lesson of history that hardship can breed short-sighted insularity. It can arouse instincts for self-preservation at the expense of others. In such times, the voices of economic nationalism will be raised in all our countries. We must resist them.

We must resist, as well, the voices of international confrontation. In a number of international negotiations, political as well as economic, we have worked our way through to the toughest issues involved. We must not react now in frustration and unleash a spiral of rhetoric which can deepen rather than resolve our divisions.

The challenges of the 1980's can be met if each of us here represented meets the responsibilities we share.

Search for Peace

Our first responsibility is to persist in the search for peace, to reduce both the danger and the destructiveness of war.

The future of two regions—the Middle East and southern Africa—depends on specific decisions that will be made in the coming months.

Middle East. We believe the March, 26, 1979, treaty between Egypt and Israel has reduced the dangers inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict and has laid the foundation for a settlement that can be both durable and just.

But the dramatic achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt and the successful implementation of the first phases of the Treaty of Peace have not obscured the necessity to move toward peace between Israel and its other neighbors. Indeed, it remains the resolute view of my government that further progress toward an overall peace is essential.

We know that an ultimate settlement must address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian question must be resolved in all of its aspects.

As the peace process continues to unfold, it is our deepest desire that representatives of the Palestinian people and the Governments of Jordan and Syria will join in this great quest. This is consistent with, indeed it underscores, our unshakable commitment to Israel's security and well-being, now and in the future.

None of the parties involved in this difficult negotiation has any illusions that resolving the Palestinian issue will be easy. But the United States is convinced that progress will be made toward this goal.

Preserving the integrity of Lebanon is also critical to peace in the Middle East. There is now a cease-fire in southern Lebanon, the fragility of which is underscored by the events of

today. We need not only a cease-fire but a broader truce. We will be working toward such a goal in our discussions with other interested governments here at this Assembly. Lebanon has suffered all too much.

The desire for peace is shared by all the peoples of the Middle East. We recognize that there are disagreements about how best to reach that common goal. We believe the course on which we are embarked is the right one, indeed the only one that has shown practical results. We call on all who genuinely seek peace to join us in this endeavor.

Southern Africa. A step toward peace has been taken as well on the Rhodesian conflict. The parties are now engaged in negotiation toward a solution that could combine true majority rule with essential minority rights. The British Government, the Commonwealth nations, and the parties themselves deserve great credit for this

new step. Agreement on a fair constitution and new elections, as called for in the Lusaka communique, could end the deepening agony of war.

We have made substantial progress in Namibia. But obstacles remain. The contact group [Canada, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, United States] is working with the parties concerned to find ways to resolve the few outstanding issues. We do not understate the difficulties, but neither should any of us underestimate the opportunities that a settlement would bring for all of southern Africa.

In most negotiations, we can best make progress by stages. A knot can never be untied from the inside. We must begin with the parts we can grasp and work our way through to the end of the problem. History will judge us severely if we let our opportunities for peace slip away. As negotiations proceed, the issues we address become progressively more difficult. But we must not let future fears or ambitions undermine the progress that has been made.

Terrorism. As we work on these and other conflicts, let us also squarely face the fact that our planet is plagued by those who make war on innocents, as we saw just weeks ago in the tragic death of Lord Mountbatten. We must have greater international cooperation to combat the barbarous practices of the terrorist. The United States strongly supports the basic elements of the draft convention outlawing the taking of hostages. The conclusion of this treaty will contribute to a growing consensus that terrorism will not be tolerated, regardless of the political cause its perpetrators claim to pursue.

Arms Control. Finally, the requirement of peace carries with it an international responsibility to limit the spread and accumulation of arms.

A particular obligation falls to the largest nuclear powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—to contain the competition in strategic weapons. The SALT II treaty can be a major step toward fulfillment of that obligation.

The goal of strategic stability will be further served if the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States are able to agree on a comprehensive test ban.

As the nuclear superpowers seek the path toward mutual restraint, all nations must also recognize the direct threat to their security from the spread of nuclear weapons. Developments in recent years can bring new impetus to the nonproliferation effort—including progress in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which can help

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Donald F. McHenry was born in St. Louis, Mo., on October 13, 1936, and was raised in East St. Louis, Ill. He received his B.S. degree from Illinois State University (1957) and his M.S. degree from Southern Illinois University (1959) where he was a graduate teaching assistant (1957-59). He taught English at Howard University in Washington, D.C., from 1959 to 1962. At the same time, he continued to pursue postgraduate studies at Georgetown University.

Ambassador McHenry joined the Department of State in 1963 as a foreign affairs officer in the Dependent Areas Section of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs and was officer-in-charge of the section from 1965 to 1968. He was Assistant to the Secretary of State-designate and the Secretary of State (1968-69) and Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State (1969-1971).

During 1971-73, he took a leave of absence from the State Department to serve as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and as an international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. At the same time, he was a professorial lecturer in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Ambassador McHenry resigned from the Department of State in 1973 and joined the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he directed humanitarian policy studies. He served concurrently as a professorial lecturer at American University.

His international organization experience includes serving as an adviser and alternate



representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Council, alternate representative to the U.N. Seminar on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, delegate to the U.N. International Conference on Human Rights, and consultant to the U.S. congressional delegation to the Interparliamentary Union in 1966.

Ambassador McHenry worked on the Carter Administration's State Department transition staff. He was appointed U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council in 1977 and was chief U.S. negotiator on the question of Namibia, as a member of the U.N. Western five contact group. He was sworn in as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations on September 23, 1979.

Ambassador McHenry received the Department of State's Superior Honor Award in 1966. He is the author of *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed* and has had numerous articles published in journals and newspapers.

us find safer ways to develop nuclear energy for humanity; the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; the substantial increase in the number of parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the entry into force of the treaty of Tlatelolco, which now finally appears within grasp; and the pledge by a number of nuclear powers, under specific circumstances, to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states. But there have also been serious setbacks—further demonstrations of intent to acquire nuclear weapons, in disregard of the inherent dangers for regional and international security. The NPT review conference next year will be a critical time for taking stock and for redoubling our efforts to make progress on this urgent international priority.

Economic Nationalism

Beyond the search for peace, a second responsibility we share is to be sensitive to the international consequences of our national economic decisions and resist the temptation to solve our economic problems at the expense of others.

The imprudence of economic nationalism has been harshly demonstrated in the past. The world depression a half century ago was spread, deepened, and prolonged by a wave of protectionism. That memory has spurred us toward a new multilateral trade agreement intended to open markets and keep them open, even in a time of economic strain.

Today, let me address one of those issues which most clearly reflect the direct connection between national decisions and global consequences. That issue is energy. In almost no area is the need for common action more apparent or more urgent. It is an issue which now threatens to divide us, economically and politically. In a future of greater scarcity, these divisions could weaken the fabric of international comity which this Organization embodies.

All nations will suffer if all nations do not act responsibly—in their consumption of energy, in its pricing, and in its production. Despite a difficult prognosis for our energy future, I believe the basis may exist for progress.

Until the 1970's modern industrial economies operated on two basic assumptions, which also governed relations between oil importers and exporters—that oil was cheap and that supplies were unlimited. Now all nations realize that these assumptions no longer hold.

The commitments made by the major

industrial countries at the Tokyo summit demonstrate this clearly. My government is taking ambitious action to address the energy problem and is making efforts to exceed these commitments.

- President Carter has committed the United States not to import more than 8.2 million barrels of oil a day in 1979 and never to exceed the peak level our imports reached in 1977.

- Total U.S. energy research and development this year is \$3.2 billion. We are investing \$528 million this year—and \$600 million next year—in the development and use of solar energy.

- We are significantly expanding our development of synthetic fuels to take advantage of the abundant coal and oil shale supplies in our country.

Much of this new energy technology will have application in other countries as well. We will seek to make it available to others under mutually satisfactory conditions, for we recognize that by helping others resolve their energy problems, we help resolve our own.

Let me indicate some of the ways in which we are prepared to work with others to meet our common energy needs.

- We have joined other industrial nations in agreeing to establish a provisional international technology group which will recommend ways to broaden international participation in the commercial development of alternative fuels.

- I pledged last year that the United States would do more to mobilize its technical talents in behalf of the development of others. I am pleased to report that next month we will establish an institute for scientific and technological cooperation. This institute will work for the goals set by the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development. It will help the people of developing nations benefit from our technologies—and help them expand their own technological capacities. The institute's policy council will include experts from developing nations. Energy development will be among its highest priorities.

- We will participate actively in preparations for the 1981 World Conference on New and Renewable Energy.

- At the recent economic summit conference, the World Bank was invited to take the lead in coordinating our assistance to developing nations in the field of energy. We suggest that the World Bank bring together a group of experts to review the question of

U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 34TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY*

Representatives

Donald F. McHenry
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, U.S. Representative from the State of New York
Larry Winn, Jr., U.S. Representative from the State of Kansas
Esther L. Coopersmith

Alternate Representatives

Richard W. Petree
William L. Dunfee
Howard T. Rosen

*Text from USUN press release 80 of Sept. 18, 1979, which includes biographic data on each delegate.

energy research, development, and training in detail. Specifically, it could evaluate the work of existing energy research and training centers, both national and international, in developing countries. In addition, it could recommend how current institutions could be strengthened and whether new multilateral ones should be created.

- We are supporting expansion of the World Bank's program for exploration and development of mineral fuels.

- The Bank is also considering whether local programs of development finance are adequate to support the rapid application of solar, small hydro, and other renewable energy technologies in developing nations.

- The Inter-American Development Bank has proposed creation of a facility to provide political risk insurance and loan guarantees for private investment in energy and minerals projects in its region. This could be an effective means of stimulating energy development there. We are willing to pursue with the Bank its initiative and work with other countries to develop an acceptable proposal.

As the industrial countries make serious efforts to restrict oil demand and to help the developing countries meet their energy challenges, the question increasingly becomes whether the oil-producing nations are prepared to stabilize prices and, to the extent it is within their control, insure adequate supplies. A failure to do so will continue to have harsh consequences for the world economy, especially the poorer nations.

We understand the natural desire of oil-exporting nations to husband this valuable resource for future genera-

tions. And we accept the fact that oil prices must reflect not only the strength of demand but also the long-term scarcity of supply—so long as scarcity is never contrived to manipulate price.

But oil producers must understand that there is a limit to what the economies of the oil-consuming nations, and the global economy, can sustain. We must all proceed with a responsible recognition that our national energy decisions will have profound global effects—and will return either to haunt or to help their makers.

Commitment to Human Welfare

A third common responsibility is an intensified commitment to help im-

prove the lives of our fellow human beings—to provide the necessities of life, to afford the chance to progress, to assure a voice in decisions which will determine their future.

Human Rights. We have made progress in the field of human rights, but we must do more.

In the past year, some nations have taken steps to restore legal protections and democratic institutions. And we have seen the inauguration of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Organization of African Unity's forceful call for the creation of regional human rights institutions on the continent of Africa, and the activation of the U.N. Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization's human rights procedures.

The growing concern for human rights is undeniable. Yet the sad truth is that even as we sit here today, men and women face torture, death, and oppression for daring to exercise rights set forth in the charter of this body three decades ago. Our joint challenge is to advance the aspirations of all peoples for individual human dignity.

Our commitment must be to economic as well as political and social rights—for all are indispensable to human dignity. Improvements in economic well-being, opportunities for participation in the political process, and a growing sense of both economic and political equity can do much to defuse the grievances which can lead to national convulsions and international tensions.

Food and Population. To meet this commitment to a better life for all peoples, we must each strive to move the North-South dialogue beyond grand themes and on to specific cases—to priority areas in which practical development goals can be met. Let me discuss in this connection our efforts toward a goal we should adopt as a matter of simple humanity: that by the end of this century, no person on this bountiful earth should have to go hungry.

Last year, I noted that we must not be lulled by good weather and plentiful harvests into losing our sense of urgency. Since then, poor harvests in a number of countries have substantially increased the international demand for food. This situation underscores the need to accumulate adequate stocks to support world food security. I assure you that the United States will do all it can to prevent a global food crisis.

The American harvest this year will be of record size. We have removed all restrictions on wheat production for next year. We have established farmer-owned grain reserves which, through accumulation and release of stocks, have helped stabilize supplies.

An International Wheat Agreement still eludes our grasp. We should not abandon this goal. But we should move immediately to complete negotiations for a new food aid convention; the World Food Council has urged an agreement by mid-1980. We support that recommendation. In the meantime we are already implementing the higher food aid pledge the convention would entail.

At the same time, major emphasis must be placed on improving global food production. Over half of American direct development aid now is devoted to agriculture. We will continue

United Nations Headquarters in New York.



working to improve the yields of major food crops, to preserve croplands, and to expand research on ways to increase production of traditional and new crops, especially those grown by poor farmers.

These efforts have received effective support from the international agricultural research centers. We support proposals to double the resources contributed to those centers and intend to increase our contribution. We hope additional countries will become contributors.

We must be aware, however, that in the long run these efforts could be vitiated if the world's population is not slowed. Half the couples of child-bearing age still do not have adequate access to family planning services. We must strive to make family planning services—along with other elements of basic health care, adequate food supplies, and clean water—available to all as rapidly as we can.

And in the short run, we must be prepared to meet emergency needs wherever famine afflicts humanity or refugees seek haven—in Africa, in Latin America, in Southeast Asia, or elsewhere.

Refugees. The proposal made by Vice President Mondale at Geneva for a refugee resettlement fund reflects our belief that the international community should deal on a global basis with a global and grave refugee crisis. We urge broad participation in this fund.

Vigorous and large-scale international action is required to bring relief to the starving in Kampuchea, now facing one of the great human tragedies of modern times. Tens of thousands of sick and hungry Khmer are already pressing on Thailand's border; hundreds of thousands may soon follow them. Even more widespread famine and disease are in prospect, especially in view of recent reports of intensified fighting. To avert unthinkable catastrophe, an international program of humanitarian relief must be established in Kampuchea as soon as possible. International organizations must be able to bring a coordinated, massive, and adequately monitored program of emergency relief to all needy Khmer. We would endorse such an effort.

The food crisis in Kampuchea promises both to multiply the flow of refugees and to take a terrible toll among those who cannot escape. The flood of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea already has brought great suffering to hundreds of thousands of innocent people, as well as heavy burdens on countries of first asylum.

UNITED NATIONS— A PROFILE

ESTABLISHED

By charter signed in San Francisco, California, on June 26, 1945; effective October 24, 1945.

PURPOSES

To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to achieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.

MEMBERSHIP

152 (for complete list see p. 6).

BUDGET

U.N. expenditure budget for 1979 is about \$578 million. The U.S. share is \$137 million. The total U.N. system budget (including the U.N. and specialized agencies and programs, but not including the World Bank) was about \$2.5 billion in 1977. The U.S. share was \$600.1 million.

PRINCIPAL ORGANS

General Assembly. *Membership:* All U.N. members. *President:* Elected at the beginning of each General Assembly session. For this 34th session the President is Salim A. Salim of Tanzania. *Main Committees:* (First) Political and Security; (Second) Economic and Financial; (Third) Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural; (Fourth) Trusteeship; (Fifth) Administrative and Budgetary; (Sixth) Legal. Many other committees address specific issues, including peacekeeping, crime prevention, status of women, and U.N. Charter reform.

Security Council. *Membership:* 5 permanent (China, France, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.), each with the right to veto, and 10 nonpermanent elected by the General Assembly for 2-year terms. Five nonpermanent members are elected from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from Western



Europe and other areas. Nonpermanent members are not eligible for immediate reelection. For 1979 the nonpermanent members are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, and Zambia. *President:* Rotates monthly in English alphabetical order of members.

Economic and Social Council. *Membership:* 54, of which 18 are elected each year by the General Assembly for 3-year terms. *President:* Elected each year.

Trusteeship Council. *Membership:* U.S., China, France, U.S.S.R., U.K. *President:* Elected each year.

International Court of Justice. *Membership:* 15, elected for 9-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council from nominees of national groups under provisions of the ICJ Statute.

Secretariat. *Chief Administrative Officer:* Secretary General of the United Nations appointed to a 5-year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The current Secretary General is Kurt Waldheim (Austria) who has served since 1972. *Staff:* A worldwide staff of about 14,400 representing 150 languages. The Secretary General appoints the staff according to General Assembly regulations.

Taken and updated from the Department of State's BACKGROUND NOTE on the United Nations published October 1978. Copies of the complete NOTE may be purchased for 70¢ from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 100 or more NOTES mailed to the same address).

The international community has begun to respond. But humanitarian steps are not enough. The community of nations must make a more active effort to restore peace to the region and to resolve, by nonmilitary means, the problems that developments in Indochina have carried in their wake. They pose a threat to the stability of the region as a whole.

Demand for Global Responses

I believe we can meet the challenges before us. But let us not misjudge their magnitude. Resolution of regional disputes and placing new limits on the instruments of war will require new acts of national and international will. The 1980's could portend a prolonged energy crisis. It could be a decade of

widespread famine. Unless the swelling deficits of developing countries can be managed, many of their economies may stagnate; some could be threatened with collapse. Global problems like these demand global responses.

This Assembly will decide whether to launch a new round of negotiations on economic cooperation for development. Let me state today that the United States would participate, in the Committee of the Whole, in consultations to decide the most effective way of conducting such negotiations.

If new global negotiations are to succeed, their participants must be realistic about the political and economic capabilities of each other. We must assign priority to those issues on which concrete results are possible. And we should avoid duplicating the work of existing institutions. In this way, the negotiations could help build a global consensus for action.

Many of the issues I have addressed are already prominent on the agenda of the United Nations. The need for cooperation in addressing them requires that we continue to strengthen this institution. Financial, procedural, and management reforms are urgently necessary. As a first step, we urge that the Secretary General's recommendations, now adopted by this Assembly, be fully implemented.

The urgency of the requirements I have described calls for something more on the part of all members of the United Nations.

The distinctions between North and South, as those between East and West, reflect differing interests. They have a role in defining the issues and in clarifying our choices. But we must commit ourselves to finding areas where our interests converge.

Each of us has our special values to be nurtured, our particular goals to be served. I do not suggest it can or should be otherwise. The United States believes in a world of diversity. But let us resolve, here, at this Assembly, to find in our common needs and common humanity a renewed dedication to the search for common ground. □

THE 152 MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS¹

Afghanistan (1946)	German Democratic Republic (1973)	Pakistan (1947)
Albania (1955)	Germany, Federal Republic of (1973)	Panama
Algeria (1962)	Ghana (1957)	Papua New Guinea (1975)
Angola (1976)	Greece	Paraguay
Argentina	Grenada (1974)	Peru
Australia	Guatemala	Philippines
Austria (1955)	Guinea (1958)	Poland
Bahamas (1973)	Guinea-Bissau (1974)	Portugal (1955)
Bahrain (1971)	Guyana (1966)	Qatar (1971)
Bangladesh (1974)	Haiti	Romania (1955)
Barbados (1966)	Honduras	Rwanda (1962)
Belgium	Hungary (1955)	Saint Lucia (1979)
Benin (formerly Dahomey) (1960)	Iceland (1946)	Samoa (1976)
Bhutan (1971)	India	Sao Tome and Principe (1975)
Bolivia	Indonesia (1950)	Saudi Arabia
Botswana (1966)	Iran	Senegal (1960)
Brazil	Iraq	Seychelles (1976)
Bulgaria (1955)	Ireland (1955)	Sierra Leone (1961)
Burma (1948)	Israel (1949)	Singapore (1965)
Burundi (1962)	Italy (1955)	Solomon Islands (1978)
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Ivory Coast (1960)	Somalia (1960)
Canada	Jamaica (1962)	South Africa
Cape Verde (1975)	Japan (1956)	Spain (1955)
Central African Republic (1960)	Jordan (1955)	Sri Lanka (1955)
Chad (1960)	Kenya (1963)	Sudan (1956)
Chile	Kuwait (1963)	Suriname (1975)
China ²	Lao People's Democratic Republic (1955)	Swaziland (1968)
Colombia	Lebanon	Sweden (1946)
Comoros (1975)	Lesotho (1966)	Syria
Congo (1960)	Liberia	Thailand (1946)
Costa Rica	Libyan Arab Jamahirriya (1955)	Togo (1960)
Cuba	Luxembourg	Trinidad and Tobago (1962)
Cyprus (1960)	Madagascar (1960)	Tunisia (1956)
Czechoslovakia	Malawi (1964)	Turkey
Democratic Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) (1955)	Malaysia (1957)	Uganda (1962)
Democratic Yemen (1967)	Maldives (1965)	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Denmark	Mali (1960)	U.S.S.R.
Djibouti (1977)	Malta (1964)	United Arab Emirates (1971)
Dominica (1978)	Mauritania (1961)	United Kingdom
Dominican Republic	Mauritius (1968)	United Republic of Cameroon (1960)
Ecuador	Mexico	United Republic of Tanzania (1961)
Egypt	Mongolia (1961)	United States of America
El Salvador	Morocco (1956)	Upper Volta (1960)
Equatorial Guinea (1968)	Mozambique (1975)	Uruguay
Ethiopia	Nepal (1955)	Venezuela
Fiji (1970)	Netherlands	Vietnam (1977)
Finland (1955)	New Zealand	Yemen (Sana) (1947)
France	Nicaragua	Yugoslavia
Gabon (1960)	Niger (1960)	Zaire (1960)
Gambia (1965)	Nigeria (1960)	Zambia (1964)
	Norway	
	Oman (1971)	

¹Countries are listed with names as registered by the United Nations. Year in parentheses indicates date of admission; countries with no date were original members in 1945.

²By Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of Oct. 25, 1971, the General Assembly decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations."

THE PRESIDENT: Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT

Address to the nation on October 1, 1979.¹

I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern, as it has been for every President. That subject is peace and the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throughout the time of my service in this office. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world. Those defenses are stronger tonight than they were 2 years ago, and they will be stronger 2 years from now than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward with your support and with the support of the Congress.

Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO alliance is on track, with the full cooperation and participation of our European allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough to destroy any potential adversary many times over, and the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further assured by a new system of powerful mobile missiles. These systems are designed for stability and defense.

Beyond these military defenses, we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control of nuclear weapons—the adoption of the second strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT II.

This evening, I also want to report to you about the highly publicized Soviet brigade in Cuba and about its bearing on the important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union.

This is not a simple or easy subject. The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on Earth, and the relationship between us is complex because it involves strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

Our fundamental philosophies conflict; quite often, our national interests conflict as well. As two great nations, we do have common interests, and we share an overwhelming mutual concern in preventing a nuclear war. We must recognize, therefore, that nuclear arms control agreements are vital to both our countries and that we must also exercise self-restraint in our relations and be sensitive to each other's concerns.

Recently, we obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of

Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war or a major confrontation—but we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our wisdom—a challenge to our ability to act in a firm, decisive way without destroying the basis for cooperation that helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It's a challenge to our determination to give a measured and effective response to Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world.

Soviet-Cuban Military Relationship

Now, let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade and describe the more general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba: As most of you know, 17 years ago in the era of the cold war, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement to withdraw those nuclear weapons and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were more than 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. It was believed that those who stayed behind were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cubans and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that some of these Soviet forces had been organized into a combat unit. When attention was then focused on a careful review of past intelligence data, it was possible for our experts to conclude that this unit had existed for several years, probably since the mid-1970's, and possibly even longer.

This unit appears to be a brigade of two or three thousand men. It is armed with about 40 tanks and other modern military equipment. It's been organized as a combat unit. Its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat

to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the United States is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and the Central American region. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. They've added to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

During the last few years, the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region. These military forces are used to intrude into other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

There's a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get their weapons free; other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies.

The Communist regime in Cuba is an economic failure that cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about \$8 million in economic aid every day.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for Soviet arms; the Cuban people pay a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, the Cuban regime automatically follows the Soviet line.

The Soviet brigade is a manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance, and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for escalating Cuban military actions abroad.

What We Are Doing

Now, I want to report further on what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

Over the past 3 weeks, we've discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. We've made it clear that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. However, the Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to our concern: that the unit in question is a

training center; that it does nothing more than training and can do nothing more; that they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities.

They have said that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation; that they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed-upon confirmation in 1970 and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding.

These assurances have been given to me from the highest level of the Soviet Government.

Although we have persuasive evidence that the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future noncombat status of the unit are significant. However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone.

First, we will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba.

Second, we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere. Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio treaty. It's a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in an offensive action against any neighboring countries.

Third, I'm establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign to this headquarters forces from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and for conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability to monitor and to respond rapidly to any attempted military encroachment in this region.

Fourth, we will expand military maneuvers in the region. We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on. In accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

Fifth, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet eco-

nomic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to insure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination.

The United States has a worldwide interest in peace and stability. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea, and air units to distant areas, rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities—both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and our methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I've consulted not only with my own advisers but with congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander in Chief.

I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the cold war. A confrontation might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or weeks for some people, but it would be destructive to the national interest and to the security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for 20 years, under six Administrations of both parties, a policy that recognizes that we are in competition with the Soviet Union in some fields and that we seek cooperation in others—notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

The Need for Ratifying SALT II

My fellow Americans, the greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world—including the United States and the Soviet Union—is the breakdown of a common effort to preserve the peace and the ultimate threat of a nuclear war.

I renew my call to the Senate of the

United States to ratify the SALT I treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Insuring compliance with its terms will not be a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated, national technical means carefully focused on the Soviet Union to insure that the treaty is verifiable.

This treaty is the most important step ever taken to control strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and to preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and lower cost. During the past few years, we have made real increases in our defense expenditures to fulfill the goals of our 5-year defense plan. With SALT II, we can concentrate these increases in areas where our interests are most threatened and where direct military challenges are most likely.

The rejection of SALT II would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have these disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, these disagreements and conflicts could take on a new and ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute would carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western alliance. Obviously, a secure Europe is vital to our own security. The leaders of our European allies support SALT II unanimously. We've talked to a number of those leaders in the last few days. I must tell you tonight that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT II treaty, these leaders and their countries would be confused and deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, then our effort to build a stronger and more united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress this is a troubling and a difficult issue, in a troubling and difficult time. But the Senate has a tradition of being the greatest deliberative body in the world, and the whole world is watching the Senate today. I'm confident that the Senators will perform their high responsibilities as the national interest requires.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix. We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much to

Background on the Question of Soviet Troops in Cuba

Following is background information on the question of Soviet troops in Cuba, with questions and answers on some of the specific points raised during briefings held prior to the President's broadcast to the nation, October 1, 1979.

The surveillance of Cuba which was being conducted at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis noted the existence of Soviet ground combat units deployed at four major locations and at several sublocations. One of the major locations was the same as one at which major elements of the combat unit now in question have been located.

In the course of the negotiations that took place in 1963, the United States called to the attention of the Soviets the fact that these ground combat units were present. Out of those discussions came a commitment on the part of Chairman Khrushchev, made to President Kennedy, that he would ship out of Cuba the ground combat units which had anything to do with guarding the Soviet missile installations and bomber bases.

In 1963 the U.S. Government conducted extensive surveillance and checked, among other things, whether or not the ground combat units were being removed.

By 1964 the U.S. intelligence community had concluded that the Soviet ground combat units had been essentially withdrawn from Cuba.

At the same time, there can be no question that there was a substantial

Soviet military presence in Cuba in 1962 and that there has been a continuous military presence since then.

There is also no question that the Soviet military presence changed its mission in 1963-64 from being there to maintain missiles to something else.

It is clear today that in the postmissile crisis period, the Soviet forces in Cuba did not have enough equipment or enough facilities and did not conduct enough training activity to be the kind of a combat unit that we see there today. In short, the mission and the structure of this brigade has changed at least once more since the change after the postmissile crisis in 1962.

When precisely it reached its present form is unclear to us today, but there is a high degree of confidence that it is not a unit with a primary purpose of training Cubans. The observed pattern of activity of this unit over the past several years does not include any substantial involvement with the training of Cubans or Cuban ground forces. It does not show any pattern of interplay between Soviet forces and personnel and Cuban forces and people. The pattern of activity that can be seen is definitely similar to the patterns of activity of ground combat units inside the Soviet Union, carrying out their normal combat training.

The organization of this unit, its facilities, and its equipment are not those which would logically be there if it were going to perform a function of training other people. The organization, the facilities, the equipment are

those which can be seen in Soviet units of this type inside the Soviet Union.

Soviets in military advisory capacities elsewhere in the world have not performed in this kind of a pattern with this kind of an organization, with these kinds of facilities and these amounts of equipment.

The conclusion can be drawn—after looking at its organization, at its facilities, at its equipment, at its personnel, and at its training activities—that it is not a brigade for training Cubans but that it is a brigade with a combat capability. This can be done through thorough intelligence research involving not simply detecting whether a Soviet military unit exists in Cuba but assessing the purpose of a known Soviet military presence in Cuba, its intentions, and its plans.

It can be said with confidence that the composition of the Soviet units is known. It is a brigade. Its organization is known: its rank structure, that it has three infantry and one tank battalions, and that it is commanded by a Soviet Army Colonel. Its location is known: that it is garrisoned in two sites. Its size is known: that it has about 2,600 people. Its equipment is known: that it has 40 tanks, 60 armored personnel carriers, and various other pieces of hardware. Its training pattern is known: that that is similar to combat units in the Soviet Union. And it is known that it has no observable connections with the Cuban military.

Over a period of about 3 weeks negotiations have been conducted with the Soviets. The Secretary of State has had six negotiating sessions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, two with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and in addition to that there has been an exchange between the two heads of government. The negotiating sessions with Dobrynin have lasted for considerable periods of time. In addition to these, there have been numerous telephone conversations. The two sessions with the Foreign Minister in New York were reasonably lengthy and exhaustive.

The serious concern of the United States about the presence of this unit was made very clear to the Soviets in all these discussions. At the end of the negotiations the Soviets made certain statements, or assurances, which they have given to the United States:

Number one: That the unit in question is a training center; that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more.

Second: That they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities.

unity, American will, and American strength. That is what I am determined to do.

The struggle for peace—the long, hard struggle to make weapons of mass destruction under control of human reason and human law—is a central drama of our age.

At another time of challenge in our nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people: "We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth."

We acted wisely then and preserved the nation. Let us act wisely now and preserve the world. □

¹Broadcast live on radio and television from the Oval Office at the White House; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 8, 1979.

Cuba (Cont'd)

important for that—too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

The purpose of the SALT II treaty and the purpose of my actions in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationship are exactly the same—to keep our nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.

As a powerful nation, as a superpower, we have special responsibilities to maintain stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations.

We've had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about these differences. The best way to deal with them successfully is to maintain American

Third: That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation.

Fourth: That they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed confirmation of that understanding in 1970—and that they will abide by it in the future.

The United States, for its part, reconfirmed this understanding.

The assurances have been given to the President by the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

As indicated by the President, although there is persuasive evidence that the unit is a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future non-combatant status of the unit are significant.

Again as the President points out, however, the United States will not rest on the Soviet statements alone but will take a number of steps.

First, the United States will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increasing surveillance of Cuba.

Second, the United States will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in the hemisphere.

Third, the President is establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean task force headquarters in Key West.

Fourth, the United States will expand military maneuvers in the region and conduct them regularly from now on. The President also underscores that in accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States will, of course, keep its forces in Guantanamo.

Fifth, the United States will increase its economic assistance to alleviate the economic and human needs in the region. A supplemental appropriation bill will be submitted to the Congress in the very near future.

Next, the President has pointed out that the United States has a worldwide interest in peace and stability and that, accordingly, he has directed further enhancement of the capacity of the rapid deployment force to protect the interests of the United States and of its friends and allies.

The President further noted that the United States has already reinforced its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and is enhancing its intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities both in Cuba and throughout the world. These steps reflect, as the President said, the determination of the United States to preserve peace, to strengthen the alliance, and to defend the interests of the United States.

The President's speech also stressed:

First, the very clear conclusion that the main issue is no reason to return to the cold war.

Secondly, that the basic policy of the United States for 20 years under six Administrations will be continued. This policy recognizes that while the United States is in competition with the Soviet Union, it also seeks to cooperate in other areas—notably in maintaining peace and in controlling nuclear arms.

The President very clearly called upon the Congress to complete the work which is necessary for ratification of the SALT treaty and to proceed with the debate on that treaty. The President said it is of critical importance to us and to world peace—and to the security and well-being of our allies—that this must go forward.

Q. Was the Soviet Union asked to remove the forces?

A. A number of suggestions and proposals for resolving this matter were sent forward by the United States. Suggestions were made by the other side as well. At the end of those discussions, the assurances, statements, clarifications laid out very clearly in the President's statement were advanced.

Q. Reference was made to the evidence based on the facilities, the equipment, the organization, and the training pattern. The President said "... the Soviet statements about the future noncombat status of the unit are significant." Does that suggest that the Soviets have given any indication whatsoever that they will change either the facilities, the equipment, the organization, or the training?

A. Looking at the language itself, it says for example: "... the unit in question is a training center ... and can do nothing more." It further says that "... they will not change its function or status as a training center ... " and by that they mean not to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities. One of the additional capabilities which, obviously, the unit does not have now but would be significant is any airlift or sealift. They have said that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities.

Q. Combat status can be both offensive and defensive. Does it appear that the mission of these troops is perhaps to guard an installation that is important to the Soviets, perhaps a monitoring installation or an installation attempting to plug into our undersea grid?

A. The Soviets have a large moni-

toring facility in Cuba, and it certainly can't be ruled out that one of the functions of this unit would be to protect it.

Q. Is there a difference in the way we view a brigade that has tanks and APC's [armored personnel carriers] that are there in sort of a "defensive" posture to guard a facility—and one that we would think is there in an offensive posture?

A. First, the size of the brigade and its equipment is inordinate to a function of protecting the intelligence-collection facility that the Soviets maintain in Cuba.

Secondly, the key question is whether or not it has a combat capability which can be projected in a way which constitutes a threat to the United States or others in the region.

Q. How has the status quo, which was earlier said to be unacceptable, been changed?

A. It has been changed in two ways.

First, very clearly, the President has outlined a number of steps that are going to be taken because it is felt they are necessary to protect U.S. national interests and those of our friends and allies.

Secondly, the Soviets have made certain statements. Those statements are believed to be significant insofar as they relate to the future. So from taking a look at those two sets of factors, it can be seen that the status quo has been altered.

Q. Why should we take assurances about the future seriously when assurances about the past role of this brigade are not taken seriously?

A. By observing and monitoring, by increasing collection activities, by what is being done; at the same time by taking additional steps to strengthen our capabilities and to assure that we have the capability to protect ourselves and our neighbors in the hemisphere from any threat to them or to their security.

Q. Is it really possible, politically, in the real world, to separate this sequence of events from what is going on in the Senate with the SALT treaty?

A. The Senators obviously will be reading very carefully what the President has to say tonight. We believe very deeply that SALT should be judged on its own merits. A great many of the Senators who are concerned about this issue, however, are also very concerned about SALT—and feel that it should go forward on its own merits.

And indeed, even in situations of tension like this, such as we have had,

it is all the more important to have agreement on such fundamental matters as strategic balance, or factors that affect our two nations.

Q. Does this training facility, or combat headquarters, or whatever it is called, constitute a base in the sense that the President used that word?

A. We have not come to the conclusion that this constitutes a "base." We will continue to review the matter, but we have not come to that conclusion.

Q. How has this "incident" affected our overall relationship with the Soviets?

A. Both the Soviets and the United States have recognized very clearly that this matter, if not satisfactorily resolved, can have a serious effect on the relationship between our two countries and, therefore, it has been a matter of serious concern to both of our nations.

That is why so much time has been given to this, at the highest level, starting with those at the head of the government, the Foreign Ministers, and others. Obviously, this is a matter which both countries feel to be of great importance to our basic relationship.

Q. Would you say that its resolution has moved us forward, or set us back, or are we on an even plane?

A. It remains to be seen.

Q. The President referred to assurances from the Soviets' "highest levels." Are we to assume, then, that this is the text of a message that Brezhnev sent to Mr. Carter?

A. You should make the assumption that what has been said precisely reflects statements that were made to us at the highest levels.

Q. Is this the language the Soviets used, or is this our summary, or interpretation of the language they used?

A. This is language which they used.

Q. Give us your perspective on this issue: How long has this brigade been there?

Is it a question of earlier Administrations—earlier watches not picking up on this brigade down there? Deliberately ignoring it? Putting our resources elsewhere? Or did we just put it together here as of August 17th for a variety of reasons?

A. We cannot tell when it took this form and assumed this mission. It was at least 3 years ago—maybe somewhat longer.

This is not a condemnation of any previous Administration.

In Cuba there are lots of tanks and APC's exactly like those in the Soviet unit. What we are trying to find out is, what has been the purpose for having this particular set of soldiers and equipment there. That is not easy, and we are pleased that we were able, eventually, to put all these pieces together.

Q. Was it our assumption or expectation that in due course that unit would have been given sealift and airlift capability?

A. We have no evidence of any intent to do that.

Q. If we don't know what their mission is and how long they have been equipped and what they are doing, how can one say they are no threat to us?

A. We do know what they're doing. We know the kind of training they are doing; we know the kind of organization it is there. We don't know why the Soviet Union has decided that this is an appropriate unit for it to have in Cuba.

A brigade of Soviet forces is not a threat to the United States. We have available for use to defend ourselves, forces which to this are as a giant to an ant. We can deploy forces in the region that could swamp any such force. It is, therefore, not a threat in those terms to the United States. Nevertheless, as the President makes plain in his speech, the Soviet brigade is, and should be, a matter of some concern to the surrounding nations and, therefore, is to us too because it might be used. The Cuban forces, which in Cuba amount to a much larger force than this Soviet brigade, could also be a threat if they were used to intervene in surrounding areas.

The actions that we are taking are not designed to greatly increase U.S. strength. U.S. strength and capability in this area already are very large. Our actions do serve to remind people that the problem is not of a magnitude that could threaten us. We have and will train and exercise forces which are very much larger than this and could, should the contingency arise, take care of any such situation.

Q. Are you saying this "beefing up" is essentially political rather than military?

A. No. There are two pieces, you will recall. One is the establishment of a joint task force headquarters at Key West whose purpose will be to concentrate on planning and on training and on exercises and, as needed, on tactical surveillance, and should the need arise, conducting contingency operations.

Q. Will you reactivate the Key West Naval Station at Boca Chica?

A. The Key West Naval Station continues to exist. This is only a headquarters organization. It will be perhaps 60-100 people. We will, as necessary, assign to it forces for the functions that have been mentioned; that serves a very useful purpose in reminding us of our strength. Should it be necessary, it would conduct whatever operations are necessary.

Q. Are you going to go back and do the aerial reconnaissance of Cuba which was suspended in 1977?

A. The President's statement includes the statement that we will augment our surveillance as necessary; to the degree that it is necessary to use such assets, we will.

Q. If there is no real threat, then why must any additional action be taken? And what could they be setting out to prevent?

A. There is not a threat to the immediate security of the United States. This force and the overall Soviet-Cuban military relationship, however, raise real questions and concerns in the minds of other countries in the region.

Q. Senator Church said several weeks ago that as long as the brigade as a combat brigade remained in Cuba, he saw no likelihood that the Senate would ratify SALT. Well, the brigade is going to remain apparently, so what assurance do you have now that SALT can be saved?

A. In talking to a number of Senators who have been briefed about the speech, in almost every case, the response that we have received is: "We believe that the SALT treaty hearings should go forward; we believe that it should be taken up on its own merits, and we are prepared to do that." It is our best judgment that that will be the case.

Q. Could you describe the size of this task force that is going to be down there?

A. What we are establishing is a task force headquarters which will have perhaps 60 people, to begin with; it might expand to 100. It will be established beginning this week. It will have assigned to the headquarters personnel from Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. And it will, depending upon the particular things that it happens to be supervising at a particular time, have assigned to it operational forces from each of these services. And that might go anywhere from a battalion of Marines for some functions to a substantial Naval task force plus some air squadrons in others. □

News Conference of October 9 (Excerpts)

Q. Do you think that you have diffused the problem or issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and satisfied those who seek a bigger defense budget enough now to win SALT ratification this year, and if so, how?

A. I believe SALT will be ratified this year basically on its own merits. It's obvious to me that the SALT treaty is in the best interest of our country. It enhances the security of the United States, it contributes to world peace, it will strengthen our own alliances, it will preserve our place as a leader of the Western world, it will let it be more easy for us to control the spread of nuclear explosives all over the world.

In my opinion we have answered the question of the Soviet combat unit in Cuba adequately. I think we've isolated any threat from that unit. We'll increase our surveillance there and I believe that this obviously has been an important issue for us to address. I believe it's been addressed adequately.

As far as the defense budget is concerned, that still must be resolved. I'm committed to a 3% real growth in our defense. I have maintained that position for the last 3 years. It's important to us, to our allies, to American strength. If I see a need for increased defense programs, I would not hesitate to recommend them to the Congress.

Q. What is your reaction to Dr. Kissinger's statement that the Soviet troops in Cuba are the first organized hostile force in this hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine that we've accepted, and also do you feel that the Soviet troops in Cuba symbolize the growing expansionism of the Russians, the Soviet Union?

A. The troops in Cuba have been there for a long time. I've not read Secretary Kissinger's speech. I've read news reports of it. Its basic premises are compatible with my own, that the presence of a Soviet combat unit there is a serious matter, which I think we have addressed as best we could.

Secondly, that this is not the most important matter of all, that above and beyond that, it's important to recognize and to do what we can to contain Cuban interventionism or adventurism around the world. As you know, this began primarily with the entrance of more than a 10,000 body of troops

from Cuba into Angola in 1975 before I was President.

We do look upon this as a major threat. I have not seen any reports that Secretary Kissinger recommended different moves from the ones that I outlined to the nation on the evening of October 1. So we do share a common concern. I think that our response was measured and appropriate. I do not favor the Soviets extending their arm of influence to the Cubans or anyone else around the world.

This has been part of the history of the Soviet Union. We attempt to meet them and compete with them adequately in my opinion on a peaceful basis. And in my judgment, if we can control the military expenditures and have equality, have arms control, in my judgment, we can compete with the Soviets on a peaceful basis with an excellent prospect for victory.

The Soviets represent a totalitarian nation. We are committed to peace and freedom and democracy. The Soviets subjugate the rights of an individual human being to the rights of the state. We do just the opposite. The Soviets are an atheistic nation. We have deep and fundamental religious beliefs. The Soviets have a primary emphasis on the military aspect of their economy. Ours is much more broadly based to give the benefits of economic growth to individual human beings. So I believe that in addition to that, our raising a standard of human rights and the honoring of national aspirations, not trying to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, gives us an additional advantage in a peaceful competition with the Soviets. So I don't have any fear of or any trepidation about that intense competition with the Soviets on a peaceful basis.

I obviously want the same thing that President Brezhnev wants; that is, the avoidance of a nuclear war. So we have some things in common, the avoidance of war. We have other things in common, a willingness to compete. We've got advantages over them that I hope to utilize in the future as we have in the past.

Q. . . . will you plan on talking to Reverend Jesse Jackson in response to his meetings with Yasir Arafat?

A. I have no plans to talk to Reverend Jackson. I presume you mean

about his recent trips to the Middle East. He has or will make a report to Ambassador Strauss, who is our Mid-east negotiator.

Q. In your speech on Cuba the other night, you spoke about wanting to increase the capabilities of our rapid deployment force.

A. Forces.

Q. Forces. I wondered if you could say under what circumstances you would be willing to intervene militarily in the Middle East.

A. I see no prospect at this point for our intervention militarily in anyplace in the world. That would be a judgment that I would only make if I thought the security of our country was directly threatened.

Q. Further on the Fed tight money policy, figures such as from the West German Deutsche Bundesbank President Emminger and Democratic Party presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche [sic], have charged that this is leading us rapidly toward the crash of 1979. Will you move to stabilize the dollar in the economy by collaborating with Europe on their moves to demonetize gold as La Rouché and others have suggested?

A. I doubt that that is in prospect, certainly not for this year. We do cooperate with our allies and friends and trade partners in order to stabilize the worldwide monetary system, including at times the interrelationship between currencies from one country and another and sometimes the basic metals. I don't see any threat to the well-being of any American because of a rapidly increasing price of gold, except those who have sold early or bought late. But as far as the average citizen is concerned, the price of gold, whether it is \$200 an ounce or \$400, has very little impact.

Recently, the Federal Reserve Board has decided to raise interest rates and take other steps concerning the reserve supply of money to be kept on hand by banks. This has resulted in a strengthening of the dollar, which had already begun to strengthen, and I believe that it's well within the bounds of management, it is stable. I noticed an analysis that showed that in the last year the price of the dollar, the value of the dollar, as compared to currencies of all our trade partners, has increased substantially. Among the OPEC nations [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and their trade partners, the

THE SECRETARY: *Currents of Change* in Latin America

Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on September 27, 1979.¹

I want to talk this noon about a region in which the surface waves have received more attention than the deeper currents shaping them. I refer to Latin America. Beneath the conflict and controversy, quieter but profound changes are taking place in the hemisphere. They are leading toward economic growth, toward democracy, and

toward greater international engagement.

These trends are neither uniform nor immutable. Distinct crosscurrents are also present. The interplay of these and other forces may at times produce turmoil. But the broad directions are unmistakable. Economies are expanding, democratic values are taking firmer hold, and the international role of Latin American nations is widening and deepening.

Let me discuss these basic trends in

the region. What do they mean for the countries there and for the United States? And, mindful of these changes, how are we approaching our relations with the other nations of the hemisphere?

Latin America Today

Economic Growth. Over the past generation, dramatic economic growth has occurred throughout the region.

value of the dollar, even before we made this recent move, had increased 8% over the last year.

So I believe the dollar is stable, I believe the world economy is stable, and I see no prospect of shifting to a rigid price of gold and a gold standard.

Q. By all accounts, it appears that in the coming months, a million or more people could die in Kampuchea of starvation. I know that you talked about this with the Pope the other day. What if anything can this government do in combination with other groups?

A. We have been encouraging the humanitarian granting of aid, particularly food aid to the people of Kampuchea, hundreds of thousands of whom, maybe millions of whom are starving. We are trying to work out with the uncertain leaders of that country—uncertain because it's contested through war—a mechanism by which the United Nations primarily, the Red Cross, and UNICEF, could get food in to those people who are within Kampuchea.

There's also a legal problem in refugee funds because it hasn't yet been determined legally if a person who hasn't left the country is still identifiable as a refugee. The fact that the country is divided by war creates a complication. But we are ready and eager to join in with other countries to provide humanitarian aid to all the people of Kampuchea who are starving, and we will move on that without any further delay as soon as it's possible to join other countries in this effort.

Q. Going back to your comments about competition with the Soviet

Union with regard to arms, would you support NATO deployment of the Pershing missile to counter the SS-20? And if I could add another question there, do you have any reaction to President Brezhnev's conditional offer, too, on arms reduction in central Europe?

A. Our allies and we are carefully assessing the significance of President Brezhnev's statement. However, I'd like to point out that what he's offering in effect is to continue their own rate of modernization as it has been provided, we don't modernize at all.

They have had an actual reduction in launchers the last few years. They've been replacing the old SS-4's and SS-5's with the SS-20, not on a one-for-one basis, but the SS-20 has three warheads, the old missiles only had one warhead. The SS-20 has a much greater range. It can reach our Western allies' countries as a target even if it's located in the central part of Russia.

It's three to six times as accurate as the old missiles which it replaced, and in addition to that, it's mobile; that is, it can't be located specifically and destroyed with a preemptive strike if that should become a desire on the part of allies.

They also have replaced older airplanes with the Backfire bomber. So it's not quite as constructive a proposal as at first blush it seems to be. I think it's an effort designed to disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves.

In my judgment, the decision ought to be made to modernize the Western allies' military strength and then negotiate with full commitment and determination mutually to lower armaments on both sides, the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries, so that we can retain equivalency of military

strength, equity of military strength and have a lower overall level of armaments. This is what we hope to achieve.

I might point out that Chancellor Schmidt said, I believe yesterday or the day before, that a prerequisite to a decision by our NATO allies to take these steps which he considers to be vital for the security of NATO is the passage of SALT II.

So if we can be successful in controlling existing strategic Soviet and U.S. atomic weapons through SALT II, then we'll move in the next step to reducing the nuclear weapons which don't have intercontinental range. And along with that, we'll continue with our mutual and balanced force reduction effort to reduce conventional arms.

It's an interesting proposal; it's one that might show promise. We're assessing it carefully, but it's not as great a step as would ordinarily be judged at first.

Q. A question on the Middle East—do you agree with those such as former Ambassador Andrew Young and George Ball and others who say that it is now time to do away with the restrictions put on our foreign policy by Henry Kissinger and open up a dialogue with the Palestinians and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. No, I do not. We will not negotiate with the PLO. We will not recognize the PLO until after the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist and endorses U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for Middle East peace. □

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 15, p. 1836.

• Since 1960 Latin America's economies have expanded rapidly. As a result, Latin America's share of world trade has grown by more than a third.

• The region produces and exports a growing variety of manufactured goods as well as raw materials and oil.

• A number of the countries of Latin America are now among the most industrialized and urban in the world. Several are emerging as global economic powers.

This vitality is closely linked to our own well-being. To a greater extent than ever before, the daily lives of citizens in New York and Caracas, in Mexico City and Los Angeles are intertwined. Social and economic conditions elsewhere in the hemisphere have a direct impact on us in every phase of our lives.

The flow of people and goods, technology, and capital—in both directions—is at unprecedented levels. Three nations—Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela—are among our top dozen, and fastest growing, trading partners.

With Latin America's rapid development has come a shift toward more pragmatic economic policies. The hemisphere's planners generally have discarded dogmatic strategies in favor of mixed economies. Governments are performing certain essential functions, but the private sector also has a vital role. The ideological tensions surrounding private investment have diminished, as both host nations and foreign investors have learned to negotiate to mutual advantage. These are welcome developments for they enable U.S. business to add its dynamism to that of Latin America.

Certainly, many serious economic problems remain in the region. Its societies feel the consequences of inflation, high energy prices, and the economic slowdown around the world. Some Caribbean nations are just beginning the awesome task of translating national independence into measurable progress for their people. Regional fragmentation still hampers development both in the Caribbean and in Central America.

Sharp economic inequities plague the region. The fruits of rapid growth, in many cases, have not reached the poor majority, and the gap widens. For too many, each dawn still brings the hard reality of want and frustration.

But despite persistent problems, the fact remains that the enormous potential of the region is beginning to be realized. The challenge for Latin America in the 1980's will be to combine sustained growth with increased equity.

As trade, technology transfers, cap-

ital flows, migration, fishing rights, and other economic issues move to the top of the hemispheric agenda, there are new opportunities for us—and new sources of friction as well. National interests will be asserted vigorously on all sides. Those interests will sometimes clash. As competition in trade expands, for example, we must continue to assure that it takes place in ways that are fair to all trading partners, and to all Americans.

But if we all proceed with a realistic appreciation of the interest we have in each other's well-being, we can find common ground.

The Democratic Resurgence. A second dimension of the changes now taking place in the region is the gradual, uneven but nonetheless distinct movement toward greater democracy and respect for human rights.

• A year ago, the Dominican Republic transferred power peacefully to an elected opposition candidate for the first time in this century.

• Ecuador and Bolivia recently inaugurated constitutional governments after 10 years of military rule.

• Peru has adopted a new constitution and is preparing for national elections next year.

• In Central America Nicaragua is attempting to overcome the legacy of 40 years of dictatorship. Honduras will elect a constituent assembly next spring.

• In Latin America as a whole, the last 2 years have witnessed many tangible improvements in respect for the rights of the person. We have welcomed and supported this resurgence.

But the competition between democracy and authoritarianism is far from over. Injustice, frustration, and fear can breed cycles of violent extremes, producing polarization within countries and in the region. Repression, terrorism, or their scars persist, even in nations with once proud democratic traditions.

Thus, the prospects for democracy and human rights are far from uniform. But the currents are moving in favorable directions. The transition to more stable and open systems is underway and gaining momentum.

These moves toward more democratic and open societies in Latin America are distinctly in our interest. The great strength of democracy is its flexibility and resilience. It opens opportunities for broadly based political and economic participation. By encouraging compromise and accommodation, it fosters evolutionary change.

In short, the evolution toward democracy serves our interests in a

dynamic community of nations in this hemisphere.

Greater International Engagement. A third dimension of change in Latin America is the growing role of the nations of the hemisphere in shaping regional and international responses to shared problems.

In the region, Latin American initiatives have led to the Tlatelolco nuclear-free zone and the newly created court for human rights. Last month the countries of the Andean pact, drawn closer together by their convergence toward more democratic systems, issued the declaration of Quito pledging their support for democratization and human rights throughout the hemisphere. The leadership of these South American states—together with Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, and like-minded countries in the Caribbean—enabled the Organization of American States (OAS) to play an important role in support of political change in Nicaragua. The OAS has been enhanced as a result.

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are also playing an increasingly critical role in global negotiations between North and South. From the Law of the Sea negotiations to the creation of UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development], the Latin Americans are asserting their leadership energetically.

At times we will differ—even strongly—as we do with some of the statements made at the recent meeting of the nonaligned movement in Havana. But Latin American initiatives are an increasingly important part of the global framework within which we must work to achieve greater prosperity and security for our own people. The realization of basic U.S. objectives in the world—from structuring a better functioning international economy to halting the ominous spread of nuclear weapons—will depend, more than ever before, on our ability to work with our friends in the hemisphere.

Future Relations With Latin America

What does all this mean for future relations with our neighbors?

If we are properly attentive to the region, the changes that are taking place can lead to more sturdy and durable ties. Relations between the United States and the nations of Latin America continue to be affected by the disparities of power between us. This produces differing perceptions and conflicting approaches on many issues. But Latin America's growth is bringing new balance. Inter-American relation-

ships are becoming more open and forward looking.

From the beginning of this Administration, we have made a concerted effort to fashion a course that recognizes the new realities of the hemisphere and the distinctive differences among Latin American nations and people. As President Carter said last year in his address before the Organization of American States:

Slogans [will] no longer suffice to describe the diversity of the Americas nor [will] a single formula be helpful when our individual and our common interests are so clearly global in scope. The problems . . . require that we in the Western Hemisphere think and act more broadly.

From his first days in office, President Carter made clear his intention to conclude a new Panama Canal treaty to strengthen the basis on which the canal is operated and defended and take account of the rights and aspirations of the Panamanian people. The new treaties go into effect on Monday.

Just as Americans have been rightfully proud of our success in building that technological marvel when others had failed, so too we should be proud of our achievement in building a new partnership with Panama. For it points to a new direction in our dealings with the hemisphere—based on shared responsibility, not domination or dependence; on justice and accommodation, not confrontation.

U.S. Approach Toward Latin America

In a speech a few months ago to the National Urban League, I outlined the elements of that new approach to the developing world in general. Today, let me describe this approach as it affects our relations with the closest and most industrialized part of the developing world.

First, in our economic relations we are seeking to increase both the participation—and the responsibilities—of developing countries in the international economic system.

We have made some genuine progress in recent years. The International Monetary Fund is stronger, better capitalized, and becoming more responsive to the developing world. The new trade rules agreed to earlier this year open new opportunities for countries entering the world trading system. A number of individual agreements have been reached to limit damaging swings in the price of particular commodities. And we have agreed on the elements of a common fund to help stabilize the prices of raw materials.

We are committed to achieving further concrete progress. One issue that is of particular concern to the Caribbean and Central America is the International Sugar Agreement that has been negotiated. We have not yet been able to secure congressional ratification for the agreement. It is important, and we will continue to work until it is approved.

Continued transformations in the world economy will demand continued creativity in balancing the interests of all countries. Our relations with Mexico are a prime example. The range and diversity of issues in our relations are probably greater than with any other country in the world. Because we share a 2000-mile border, because we share democratic perspectives, because our economies are both strong and interdependent, Mexico is one of the most important countries in the world for us.

When President Carter and President Lopez Portillo meet tomorrow, they will do so with a mutual recognition of our common need to continue to strengthen the cooperation between us. The successful completion last week of negotiations on natural gas demonstrates the benefits we both can derive.

Second, we are focusing our attention and resources on practical solutions to concrete development problems.

We are targeting our bilateral aid on the pressing daily needs of people in the poorer countries. And we are providing emergency help for countries like the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, struggling to rebuild after natural and human disasters.

We are working through the Inter-American Development Bank and other international financial institutions to increase food and energy production and to move toward greater social equity throughout the hemisphere.

At the same time, we are intensifying our support for subregional integration, through the Andean pact and the Central American Common Market. As a step toward greater cooperation among the Caribbean nations, we and other donors have joined with them to form the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development.

Most of the continent's poor live in countries which, because national per capita incomes have risen, no longer receive our bilateral assistance. This dilemma, although not unique to Latin America, affects this region more than any other. National decisions will primarily determine how the fruits of growth are distributed. But the international community must also do a better job of reaching all those who are in need.

These varied cooperative endeavors not only contribute to Latin America's progress, they are fundamental to the political and economic cooperation we ourselves seek from the countries of the region.

Third, through consistent support for human rights, we are seeking to help other governments respond to rising demands for justice and for full participation in the political and economic life of their nations.

How each society manages change is a matter for it to decide. But divergent views cannot be permanently excluded nor repression maintained in any society without sowing the seeds of violent convulsion.

We have seen the consequences of authoritarian rule in Nicaragua. Our challenge today is to join with others in the region to help the Nicaraguan people and government succeed in building a stable, healthy, democratic society out of the debris of dictatorship and revolution. The relative absence of reprisals against members of the Somoza government is a promising beginning to what we hope will be a humane process of social change, in close association with the hemisphere's democracies.

By extending our friendship and economic assistance, we enhance the prospects for democracy in Nicaragua. We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold there. But if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can almost guarantee that democracy will fail.

It may take time for us to overcome the legacy of the past and to develop a relationship of mutual trust with the new government. We must be patient, steady, and prepared for inevitable disagreements. But so long as pluralism flourishes in Nicaragua—and we respect it—I am confident that relations will prosper.

Elsewhere in the region, we will encourage and support constructive change before the ties between government and people irreversibly erode and radicalism or repression drive out moderate solutions.

Fourth, we must keep alive in our minds the important distinction between the social and political changes that result from internal factors and those that result from outside pressures and forces. We must recognize that disruption within nations does not necessarily mean there is an outside hand. But at the same time, we must be alert to the reality that internal tensions present opportunities for outside interference.

It is in this context that we have in the past expressed concern over Cuba's

efforts to exploit for its own advantage social and political change within its neighbors.

Our concerns are shared by other countries in the hemisphere. The nations of Latin America are firmly committed to the proposition that outside interference in their internal affairs must be resisted. We fully respect and will support that determination on their part.

Cuba's ability to exploit these internal tensions is reinforced by its close military ties with the Soviet Union. The recent confirmation of the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba has further heightened this concern. We are seeking to resolve, by diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, questions raised by the presence of these forces. We have significant interests at stake in our total relationship with the Soviet Union. We wish to keep each part in proper perspective. However, we will assure that our interests are fully protected.

The fifth element in our strategy is to support regional efforts to resolve regional conflicts. Latin America is the scene of a number of simmering and potentially explosive territorial disputes. But over the past year, reasonable progress has been made on a number of them.

- Fears of conflict in the Andes have eased substantially.
- The Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, while not resolved, is under mediation.
- El Salvador and Honduras are moving closer to resolving their border conflict.

In these and other territorial disputes in the region, the underlying issues remain. We will continue to support collective efforts to preserve the hemisphere's long tradition of resolving its international disputes in peace.

Sixth and finally, as we pursue this strategy, we will work with any nation willing to work with us toward practical common goals. Latin America is a continent of great—and growing—diversity. Our interest is not in resisting diversity but in building upon it for our common good.

Conclusion

Change and growth—in the United States, in Latin America, and in the world—create both new opportunities and new tensions. They have transformed inter-American affairs. Today, those relationships are more directly relevant to our domestic lives than ever before. The perplexing dilemmas, the

Question-and-Answer Session Following New York Address

Q. With the advantage that the audience has had in being able to listen to your remarks, particularly toward the close, I would like to ask a question of my own, if I may, at the outset. You have spoken of the problem of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and you have said that the nations of Latin America join with us in rejecting external interference in their affairs, and specifically any interference in which Cuba might have a quarrel.

Can you comment on the Latin American reaction to the revelation of the precise nature—perhaps is the way to put it—of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and comment on whether there are possibilities for associating Latin America with the diplomacy that might produce an adjustment of this matter?

A. I do not think it would be wise to answer the second half of your question. I will answer the first half of the question. Let me say that the reaction has been one of caution, one of seeking for further information on the part of the various nations. Some have expressed their views to us in very clear terms; others have said that they want to further watch and examine the situation before they express their views. That is the general picture that the discussions to date have brought.

Q. Do private trips, by private individuals, to the Middle East endanger official efforts to bring about peace there? [Laughter]

A. Private trips to the Middle East I do not believe jeopardize the peace process. The peace process is under way with the negotiations that are going forward with respect to the West Bank and Gaza. Insofar as actual par-

ticipation, that obviously lies in the hands of the parties. They are the ones who are going to have to make the decisions on what the future will bring in terms of the outcome of the negotiations. I, for one, am one of those people who believe that in any set of negotiations, you can do the most effective work when you are working together quietly discussing the issues rather than in the spotlight of the press and the television cameras.

On the other hand, we believe very deeply in the right of free speech and of people to speak their minds, and, therefore, I, for one, would not say that people should not be free to speak their minds, whether I disagree with them or not, or whether they have different views from some of the rest of us.

Q. There are signs of some division between some blacks in the United States and some Jews in the United States. Does this complicate the task of the Administration in the Middle East?

A. One of the great tragedies would be if the problems of the Middle East should cause divisions between blacks of the United States and people of the Jewish faith. This would be indeed a great tragedy, and there should be no reason for this, and I want to make very clear the situation.

Because of some stories which have been written about Andy Young's resignation from the government, it has been suggested that Andy's decision was brought about by pressure from either the Jewish community in the United States or Israel. Both of these are untrue, and I want to make it very clear that both are untrue. I have felt that from the beginning, and I believe this very, very deeply. I know that to be the fact, and I think that we must all have this very clearly in our minds.

fresh problems, and the expanding opportunities all require new leadership, new initiatives, and new ways to relate to each other.

We are embarked on a course that takes account of these new dimensions.

- We will work to improve the climate for equitable growth.
- We will respect and encourage economic and political diversity.
- We will welcome Latin America's growing influence, and we will work

with its nations in the international arena.

With patience, with the attention that the region properly deserves, and with a decent respect for the aspirations of our fellow citizens of the hemisphere, I believe we can see in the coming years an increasingly creative and fruitful era of cooperation between the United States and the nations of Latin America. □

¹ Press release 238.

Q. Over the last 6 weeks, the Administration and some of its supporters in the Senate, as well as some of its opponents, have laid down a major challenge to the Soviets over the alleged role of Soviet troops in Cuba. Yet, because of its hesitation in releasing to the public the evidence on which it based these allegations, it has allowed the impression to come forward that its case has been less than overwhelming.

It now appoints a panel of wise men—one of them whose name it releases, the other six of whom it insists on keeping private—to analyze the evidence and to advise it on what steps it might take in the future.

Does this not strengthen an impression not only in this country but also in the camps of our allies and our potential adversaries that the Administration is vacillating and divided and indeed weak?

A. The answer I think should be a clear no. We put out the information which we believed was essential and which we had at the time that the situation arose, and we had the definite evidence on which the conclusions of the intelligence community were based that there was this combat unit in Cuba. We laid out the facts in as simple form as we could.

Since then, we have obviously been reviewing all the facts, going back through the entire period from 1962 of checking and rechecking. We will, at the appropriate time, release a full report. I think that as long as negotiations are going on between ourselves and the Soviet Union, the best thing that can be done is to keep those negotiations private, to pursue them through private diplomacy because only through private diplomacy can one explore ways of reaching a satisfactory resolution to this problem.

If we were to put out all the information at this time, some of it before it is completely hard, I think we would be doing a disservice to our people and to the world, and, therefore, I think that our responsibility was to lay the essential facts before the people, to then engage in private discussions—private diplomacy—with the Soviet Union, and to pursue those to the end to reach, if possible, a satisfactory resolution of the problem.

Q. This question is from the audience. It concerns the most prominent non-Mexican now resident in Mexico, and therefore, at least, has a Latin-American angle. But it is a very serious question. Why is it that the United States does not let the Shah come to our country? Hasn't

this man been our friend for nearly four decades?

A. I think, as many of you know, immediately after the Shah left Iran, we invited him to come to the United States. He chose not to do so at that time and spent several months in Africa before he decided that he wished to come live in this hemisphere. By that time, circumstances had changed in terms of the internal situation within that country, and we have had to take into account the possible dangers to American people at this time in that country, should we take this action at this particular time.

We will continue to keep the matter under review, but I do not think it would be to our national interest to do so. We have explained this very clearly to the Shah, and I think he understands clearly what our position is.

Q. There have been a number of questions from the audience having to do with the Soviet military units in Cuba. I would like to combine two of them, if I may. The first one suggests that we ourselves have bases and troops stationed in various parts of the world—how can we, therefore, object to the Soviet presence in Cuba?

And the second part of the question: Please respond to Mr. Gromyko's statement before the General Assembly, which was that this was an issue artificially created.

A. I really would prefer to stay away from these Cuban issues at this point. I am meeting this afternoon at 3:00 with Mr. Gromyko, and as I said before, I don't think it helps for us to be making public statements—neither we nor them.

Q. Is there any sort of deadline in your mind and the President's mind for the negotiations with the Russians on some resolution of this matter?

A. As long as we are making progress, as long as the discussions continue, we will continue.

Q. Why is Israel allowed to use U.S. aircraft and military equipment in Lebanon? That's the first question. And, second, what can the United States do about the prospect of a further extension of settlements on the West Bank which will endanger our hope of expanding the Middle East accords into a general one?

A. Let me take the Lebanon question first. I think, as all of you know, the United States furnishes a wide variety of equipment through sales to Israel.

These include aircraft of various types. Under the law which permits these sales, it provides that the aircraft cannot be used for offensive purposes but can be used for defensive purposes. This then brings you to the question of what happens when there is a terrorist attack into Israel? What then is the situation with respect to defense, because there is nothing that precludes the Israelis from defending against such attack? This gets one then into very complicated situations as to whether the response is a disproportionate response or an actual response in self-defense.

These present very, very difficult situations with which we wrestle almost on a daily basis. We have made it very clear to the Israelis that we do not agree with many of the actions which they have taken recently in south Lebanon in terms of some of the responses to these raids. But it is a very, very difficult situation, as you can see.

The second question was what?

Q. —on the settlements on the West Bank as endangering the process of expanding the peace into a general accord in the Middle East.

A. The American position has been, I think, very clear in this for a long time. We believe that the establishment of settlements in the West Bank is contrary to international law. We believe that the establishment of settlements, particularly as the negotiations are going forward, is an obstacle to peace. We have stated this publicly; we have stated it privately; and we continue to urge that this not be done. Despite that fact, some settlements continue to be established, but I think that our view on this has been and remains crystal clear. □

Text from press release 238A.

Interview on NBC's "Today" Show

Secretary Vance was interviewed on the NBC "Today" Show in New York on October 4, 1979, by Tom Brokaw and Richard Valeriani.¹

Q. President Carter has been saying he thinks the Soviets will eventually change the nature of that unit in Cuba. Now is that something that's based on wishful thinking or does he have some positive indications of that?

A. As the President indicated during his speech, certain statements or reassurances or assurances were made to the United States during the course of the discussions between myself and Minister Gromyko and the communications between the President and President Brezhnev. Those dealt with future actions with respect to the Soviet brigade in question. They indicated as I believe most people know and heard that insofar as the future is concerned, the Soviets say that the status and condition of the unit will not be changed. In other words, the unit will not be increased in size nor it be given additional capabilities. He further indicated that the unit and units that exist in that area would not be given any capability which would constitute a threat to the United States or any other nation in the hemisphere.

Q. They have not indicated they will change anything that's on the ground right now.

A. Insofar as what's on the ground right now, they have stated what I have said. I think those words speak for themselves.

Q. If they don't change anything that's there now, would that affect the chances of getting SALT ratified? Some Senators seem to think they have to do something a little more down the road.

A. Let me come back to this question of change of the status quo which has been discussed quite a bit. Some people have said that there has been no change in the status quo. There clearly has been a change in the status quo. Change in the status quo has come about in two ways: one, steps which the United States has taken. The President outlined eight different steps that the United States is taking; and in addition to that, we have assurances which the Soviet Union has given to

the United States. They reflect the future condition, what the future of the brigade will be, and the limitations that will exist on its capabilities. Namely, that it will not constitute a combat threat.

Q. For many Senators and for many Americans, the fact of the matter is that the combat unit that is there now is unacceptable in its present form. When you said and the President said that you would not accept the status quo, it signaled to a lot of people that it could not stay in its present form—that it would have to be a noncombat force—if it were to be acceptable. I gather that you're saying that the Russians are going to keep it as it is—not take away its combat ability.

A. When I used the words "status quo is not acceptable," I chose my words very carefully because I realize that one can change the status quo in several different ways—by actions we take, as well as by actions they take. In my judgment, as I indicated a moment ago, both kinds of actions have been taken; therefore, there has been a change in the status quo.

Q. We had Senator Frank Church on the other day—chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—a key figure in all of this. His clear indication was, based on what he said on this program, that there would be a reduction in the combat nature of that brigade, and he was tying, really, his future attitude toward SALT in public appearance here to that change. Do you think that he has been misinformed or that he is misreading what you were telling him?

A. No, I don't think that he has been misinformed. In terms of what Senator Church may offer in terms of a resolution or understanding, I don't think this has been worked out yet; and we'll have to see what Senator Church suggests in this regard.

Q. Would the Administration accept a demand from the Senate that the President certify in writing that this unit in Cuba is, in effect, "harmless," in order to get SALT passed?

A. One of the suggestions that has been made that some form of certifica-

tion will be asked of the President, it would depend upon the precise wording of such a certification; and I do not rule out some form of certification.

Q. Is there now an understanding with the Soviet Union that the Soviets will not put a combat unit, as they understand it, into Cuba—combat forces as they understand it?

A. They say that this is a training unit—that its only function is training, and it can do no more. That is the position that they assert. As you know, it is our conclusion—based upon the intelligence that we have—that it does have combat capability. Insofar as the future is concerned, they indicated, however, that they do not intend and will not give it any additional capabilities. It has, as you know, no airlift, no sealift, and, therefore, it is not a threat to the United States or to the other nations as—

Q. No, what I'm asking: Is this a new understanding to go along with the 1962 understanding, 1970 understanding that the Soviets will not put, say, another unit in—

A. I would not call it an understanding. When I say this is a statement—a statement from the highest levels of the Soviet government.

Q. But, do you think you have rid yourself of the political problems in this country that the combat brigade represented?

A. I think they have been put in proper perspective now. I'm sure that this will be a subject that will continue to be discussed; but I hope at a more rational and less heated level than it has in the past. I think we are now clearly going to go forward with the completion of SALT ratification; and that this issue may come and probably will come up and be discussed during that. I believe that we can now see this in proper perspective since the President has made his speech, that we will be able to go forward and complete the SALT ratification process.

Q. How can you be encouraged by the initial reaction from people like Senator Church, for example, who had been for SALT before the disclosure or the presence of the Russian troops in Cuba, and now are saying he wants to add resolutions and he's still awaiting the change in the character of that brigade?

A. I think it remains to be seen exactly what it is Senator Church intends to suggest. Senator Church believes very strongly that SALT is important, as all of us do. It's of funda-

mental importance to our security, and it will enhance our security and that of our allies. I am confident that Senator Church shares our views that this is of importance to us and to our allies and would like to see the treaty ratified.

Q. May I ask you about the Middle East? Do you think the effect of the trip of Jesse Jackson is having any affect on the prospects for peace there?

A. I think that the real negotiations have to be conducted by the parties; and they will be conducted by the parties. However, on the other hand, we believe very strongly in free speech. All individual citizens should be free to go and meet with people in the Middle East should they choose to do so. But the ultimate negotiations have to be conducted among the governments and parties involved.

Q. But does he delay the prospects for peace?

A. I don't think so.

Q. To get back to the Cuba episode, how is this going to affect overall relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? For example, there's a story this morning that the Defense Department has turned down a request for computer technology from the Russians. Is this punishment for what they've done in Cuba?

A. As you know in selling advance technology equipment, we always review these very carefully, and if there is technology which would be of military use, those are usually denied to the Soviet Union and to the Chinese.

I'd like to take the occasion to comment on another story that appeared this morning which indicated that there was a study in the Defense Department which recommended the selling of arms to the Chinese. Let me state flatly and categorically that it's nothing more than a story. We have no intention of changing our policy. We are not going to sell arms to the Chinese.

Q. If we can just wrap up in the final moment what we have here, the status of the combat brigade in Cuba. It will get no larger in your judgment but neither will it get any smaller, or will it have less combat capability?

A. It will get no larger. It will, in my judgment, perhaps shrink in size; but I cannot at this point say that I am certain that that will happen. □

Interview on CBS-TV Morning News

Secretary Vance was interviewed on CBS-TV morning news in New York on October 5, 1979, by Bob Schieffer and Richard Hottelet.¹

Q. In summary, the [Senate Select] Intelligence Committee had concluded that the United States did have the means to detect Soviet cheating on the SALT II treaty. Today the committee is reported unable to decide whether it is possible to detect some Soviet violations of the proposed arms control arrangement. A report to that effect is expected to go from the committee to the full Senate today. Secretary of State Vance, of course, is the point man for the Administration's effort to get Senate approval of the treaty; and he's in New York this morning for the fall session of the United Nations. If I could ask you first if, indeed, this report by the Senate intelligence committee concludes that we're unable to say for certain whether this treaty can be verified, doesn't that just about end it for the SALT II treaty?

A. No. First of all, I have not seen the report, and I wish to see the report and examine it with care before coming to any conclusion. I will be testifying next week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also before the Armed Services Committee in closed session with respect to the question of verification. I am confident that we can adequately verify the SALT treaty. Admiral Turner [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency] and I will be testifying together when the time comes, and I can say that I believe we will be able to convince both committees of the Congress to which I have referred that we do indeed have the means to adequately verify the treaty.

Q. It took American intelligence rather a long time it seems, at least to an outsider, to locate the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. Doesn't that entitle one to ask whether the intelligence system could really put its finger on violations of SALT so much farther away?

A. No. I think they're entirely different kinds of problems in terms of verification. When you're talking about verification of the SALT treaty, you're talking about verifying the location and the development of missiles—large

items—that are easy to pick up with photography. The question of telemetry is important. We have the capability to monitor with telemetry and many kinds of devices which interact with each other.

On the kind of problem that one was dealing with in monitoring whether there are certain troops—a small number—what kind of equipment they have and that type of thing, that is much more difficult. Therefore, I think that the difficulties that one has in monitoring whether a specific ground unit has or does not have certain types of equipment, particularly when the Cuban equipment and the Soviet equipment is the same kind of equipment is a totally different kind of a problem from that of monitoring the kinds of matters that are necessary for adequate SALT verification.

Q. Now one thing about the Soviet brigade issue with Cuba is that it was a crisis of confidence, in a way. It was suggested sort of a purpose of evasion by the Soviet Union. What effect is this going to have on Soviet-American relations, not only in SALT, but in general dealings with the Russians if you're entitled to suspect that they will always seek a little advantage somewhere on the fringe or somewhere underneath despite their given word or despite an understanding that exists between us?

A. Insofar as verification of the SALT agreement is concerned, we are not depending upon trust. We are depending upon our own national technical means of verification, so the question of trust does not arise in connection with that verification.

Q. Let me just sneak in with another question here because that raises a point that Senator Glenn raised yesterday in an interview with Phil Jones on Capitol Hill. He suggested that much of this verification will depend on systems—intelligence systems—still in the development stages. Can you elaborate at all on that?

A. No. We get into highly classified matters when we talk about systems which are under development. I think the point that I should make is to state very clearly that our intelligence which is used in verification of a SALT agreement is made up of many different

¹ Press release 250.

pieces of intelligence gathered from different sources. These sources and these bits of intelligence overlap to form a mosaic and they are redundant, and, therefore, back up each other in arriving at the ultimate conclusions which are necessary for verification.

Q. You say that your arrangements on SALT are not going to depend on good faith, but good faith has entered into this Cuban business. The President says he has assurances that this unit there will not be expanded, will not be exported to any part of Latin America, do these assurances take the form of something that you can put on the table, in case of a future misunderstanding of this type?

A. The assurances were clearly stated in the President's speech. They are clear by their terms and I think there can be no question as to what those assurances are.

Q. Do you have a piece of paper? Do you have a note from Brezhnev or from Moscow?

A. The assurances are derived from two sources—conversations which I had with Foreign Minister Gromyko and from exchange between our two heads of government.

Q. Do you consider the incident closed now?

A. We obviously are going to follow the situation as the President said. We are going to monitor the situation. And in addition to that, we are taking the other seven steps which the President indicated very clearly in his speech to the people.

Q. In retrospect, was too much made of this incident? Was Senator Byrd right when he said it was a pseudocrisis?

A. As we indicated, we considered it a serious matter, but it'd have to be kept in perspective; and I think the President's speech has put it in a proper perspective. We see that it's a serious matter—a matter where certain steps had to be taken to make sure that it would be in a condition which we

could accept. Those steps are being taken. We have received the assurances and, therefore, I think we can now—doing the necessary monitoring, taking the steps we're taking—move forward and get going on ratification of SALT which as the President said is of paramount importance and a really serious issue that has to be finished up.

Q. Very briefly, what about American relations with Cuba? Do you see a prospect of improvement there, especially if Fidel Castro comes to the United Nations next week? Will there be contacts?

A. At this point, I cannot predict that there will be an improvement in relations. I think as you know at the outset of this Administration, we took steps to try and normalize relations. We made some progress. We entered into a maritime treaty. We entered into agreements which led to the establishment of a diplomatic mission on our part in Havana and one by them in the United States. We started talking about the reunification of families and the release of prisoners, and we made progress. However, the adventurism of Cuba which took place during the period of 1966, '67, '78, etc., led to the placing of obstacles in the road of moving toward normalization.

Q. Those obstacles are still there?

A. They are still there.

Q. And not likely to be quickly removed?

A. I do not think they will be quickly removed. □

¹ Press release 254.

AFRICA: President Carter Meets With Zairean and Liberian Presidents

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 11, 1979¹**

The President met this afternoon for 25 minutes in the Cabinet Room with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, who is in Washington on a private visit connected with meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The two Presidents discussed the situation in Zaire. President Mobutu informed President Carter of the progress that Zaire is making in dealing with its economic and security problems. President Carter restated our strong support for Zaire and the importance that we attach to the ongoing process of reforms in Zaire. He welcomed President Mobutu's description of progress that is being made in these regards.

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
OCT. 2, 1979²**

President Carter met this morning for an hour in the Cabinet Room with President William R. Tolbert, Jr. of Liberia. They had a warm and com-

prehensive exchange of views on bilateral and regional issues.

President Carter expressed the importance of the U.S. special relationship with Liberia and our desire to enhance and promote it. The two Presidents agreed to consider the visit of a group of distinguished Americans to Liberia in the near future. The group will work toward strengthening U.S. ties with Liberia and focus on economic and development cooperation in the public and private sectors.

The two Presidents had an extensive discussion of President Tolbert's role as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the OAU meeting last July. President Carter complimented President Tolbert on his leadership as head of the OAU and praised President Tolbert's efforts to resolve outstanding problems in the region. □

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17, 1979 (list of participants omitted).

² Text from Weekly Compilation of Oct. 8, 1979 (list of participants omitted).

ANTARCTICA: 10th Meeting of Treaty Consultative Parties

The 10th meeting of the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties was held in the Department of State September 17-October 5, 1979. Following are the texts of a State Department press release issued prior to the meeting; opening remarks by Lucy Wilson Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, on September 17; and the press communique issued by the chairman of the meeting on October 10.

PRESS RELEASE 224, SEPT. 14, 1979

The United States will host the 10th meeting of Antarctic Treaty consultative parties from September 17 to October 5 in Washington, D.C., at the Department of State. The 10th consultative meeting will include delegations from the treaty's 12 original signatories—Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States—as well as Poland, whose consultative status was recognized in 1977.

The meeting takes place pursuant to provisions of the treaty which provides for regular meetings of the consultative parties to discuss matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica and to develop and recommend to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty. Meetings of the consultative parties have been held at approximately 2-year intervals since the treaty entered into force.

The 10th consultative meeting will mark the 20th anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1959. The treaty, including the consultative system it establishes, has been an unusually successful example of international cooperation among states with differing political systems as well as different legal and political perspectives. Seven of the consultative parties claim sovereignty over portions of Antarctica; six, including the United States, neither assert nor recognize such claims.

Largely through imaginative provisions under which the parties agree to disagree over the issue of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, the treaty

provides for freedom of scientific research in Antarctica and establishes a basis for international cooperation there. The treaty sets aside Antarctica and the waters below 60° south latitude for peaceful purposes only. It prohibits nuclear explosions or the disposal of nuclear waste there. It also prohibits any measures of a military nature such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of military weapons. Employment of military personnel or equipment is permitted only in support of scientific research in Antarctica. In order to promote these objectives and insure the observance of the treaty provisions, each consultative party has the right to designate observers to carry out inspection activities throughout the treaty area.

The Antarctic Treaty defines specific objectives and establishes an imaginative legal and political framework to achieve those objectives. However, the treaty does not apply to activities in Antarctica other than those enumerated in it.

Among those with which the treaty does not deal are questions relating to Antarctic resources. In the two decades since the treaty was concluded, a variety of factors—including perceptions of possible resource shortages and accelerated technological developments—have directed attention toward the possibility of resource activity in Antarctica, a possibility which seemed quite remote in 1959. Therefore, questions relating to Antarctic resources, both the living resources of the waters surrounding Antarctica and Antarctic mineral resources, have become major items of consideration at recent meetings of the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties.

These issues will be important subjects of discussion at the 10th consultative meeting, along with those matters relating to cooperation in scientific research and logistic activities in Antarctica and to controlling the impact of human activities in Antarctica which have been dealt with at consultative meetings since their outset.

U.S. policy toward Antarctica rests upon commitment to the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty. The pattern of international cooperation and collective scientific investigation in Antarctica which the treaty and the

treaty system has sustained is a truly remarkable achievement. In the U.S. view, the treaty and treaty system continue to play a dynamic and constructive role in international relations. The purposes and objectives of the treaty remain as valid today as when elaborated in 1959.

At the same time, new issues—largely relating to Antarctic resources—face the consultative parties. Effective and imaginative responses to these new issues will make important contributions to the future strength and viability of the treaty system.

The United States seeks to work with its treaty partners in meeting the challenge posed by resource-related issues in Antarctica.

With regard to Antarctic marine living resources, the waters surrounding Antarctica appear to be both highly productive and vulnerable to unregulated harvesting. Antarctic krill, which occupies a central place in the ecosystem of these waters, has become the object of considerable interest for possible commercial fishing.

For these reasons, the United States has taken the lead in seeking an international treaty to provide for effective conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. We recognize that fishing will likely take place for these resources, but we are committed to seeing that such activity is properly regulated, to insure the health not only of harvested populations but also of dependent and related species, including whales, and of the ecosystem as a whole.

It is our objective to insure that an effective system for applying necessary conservation measures is in place before large-scale fishing for krill and other Antarctic marine living resources comes a possibility. Major progress has been made toward developing such a system in the ongoing negotiations on the convention on the conservation of antarctic marine living resources. Though the draft convention will not be a formal item on the agenda of the 10th consultative meeting, the meeting offers the opportunity to resolve the few remaining obstacles to convening the diplomatic conference necessary to conclude the convention.

With regard to mineral resources, there are insufficient data to determine the potential of such resources in Antarctica, and it is not known if or when development of mineral resources in Antarctica would become economically feasible or environmentally sound. In light of interest generated in the possibility of mineral resource activities, the United States believes it is important to begin work toward an agreed interna-

tional system or regime to determine whether development of Antarctic mineral resources may be acceptable in the future and how to govern mineral resource activities if they were to prove acceptable.

The U.S. approach to this issue reflects several basic principles.

- It is of basic importance to maintain the Antarctic Treaty system, which for nearly two decades has reserved Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes and fostered international cooperation, freedom of scientific research, and protection of the environment.

- Conclusion of the convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources is the most important objective presently before the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and consideration of the mineral resource regime should not detract from this goal.

- Full understanding of the environmental consequences of any mineral resource development is essential, and Antarctic mineral resources, if ever developed, must be used wisely and developed only under effective environmental safeguards.

- The United States should have the opportunity to share in nondiscriminatory fashion in the benefits if such activities were to prove acceptable.

At the 10th consultative meeting, the United States will work toward building an effective foundation for dealing with the mineral resource issue in a timely fashion.

MRS. BENSON'S REMARKS, SEPT. 17, 1979

It is a pleasure for me on behalf of my government to welcome you to Washington for the 10th meeting of the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties.

This consultative meeting marks a significant milestone. It is the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. Twenty years ago in this city, delegates representing countries on six continents completed work on a treaty concerning the seventh continent—the southernmost, and least known, part of our planet. Those delegates pledged to reserve this area for peaceful purposes only and to cooperate in investigation of this unique scientific frontier.

The world of 1959—not unlike today—was one in which the divisions among nations too often seemed to predominate. In such circumstances, it was no small task for a diverse group of nations to recognize that they shared a common concern for Antarctica. Yet

the authors of the treaty were able to set aside the problems which divided them in order to affirm the interests which bound them.

It was during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957–58 that scientists from the Antarctic Treaty nations first worked together across the vast southern continent to begin unlocking its secrets. The realization that their efforts during the IGY had just begun to bear fruit stimulated the development of a more enduring agreement among interested parties.

Those who gathered here 20 years ago to work on that international agreement realized that to reach that common objective, Antarctica must be treated in a special fashion. As the words of the treaty attest, they recognized "... that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. . . ."

This was an impressive commitment, indeed. It was not simply an expression of common purpose but the basis of the operative provisions of the treaty.

- It underlies the provisions for freedom of scientific research in Antarctica.

- It underlies the imaginative juridical formulation insuring international cooperation among the parties on Antarctica.

- It underlies provisions for the nonmilitarization and nonnuclearization of Antarctica and for inspection of stations.

The basic principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty remain as valid and cogent today as in 1959. The framers of the treaty understood that to give concrete effect to these principles and purposes required a mechanism through which the treaty could evolve to meet new circumstances and developments. That mechanism is the regular consultative meetings which have contributed importantly to the continued dynamism and responsiveness of the Antarctic Treaty system.

The accomplishments of the treaty and the consultative mechanism established pursuant to it are impressive. Antarctica remains an area reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. International cooperation in scientific research in Antarctica has made major contributions to the understanding of our planet, its oceans, and its atmosphere. An impressive collection of recommendations have been developed to insure the protection of the Antarctic environment from harmful impacts of human activity. Consultative parties

created a responsive system for controlling the effects of man's presence in Antarctica through the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctica Fauna and Flora. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, which entered into force 2 years ago, resulted from other initiatives undertaken within the consultative system.

From the perspective of this meeting, it is clear to me that the treaty parties can look back over the past 20 years with a sense of accomplishment and pride. The Antarctic Treaty has served as a model for important international initiatives in other areas of the globe. The nuclear free zone and inspection of facilities and activities by observers designated by the consultative parties are provisions that have contributed to the field of arms control. The pattern of scientific cooperation established under the treaty has served as a model for other regional and multidisciplinary programs of scientific investigation.

The Antarctic Treaty has proven vital and dynamic in a time of rapid global change. For these reasons, I believe it appropriate that we pay tribute to those farsighted scientists and diplomats who met here 20 years ago and whose work and spirit continue to infuse international cooperation in Antarctica. We are honored that some of these distinguished individuals are with us today.

In commemorating these accomplishments, we must not lose sight of the future. We stand at an important point in the history of the Antarctic Treaty system. New issues and new challenges have emerged to engage the attention of the consultative parties. In large part these new issues stem from the potential of new forms of human activity in Antarctica, particularly, resource development activities.

At the ninth consultative meeting in London [1977], major attention was devoted to the subjects of marine living resources and mineral resources. This is the proper forum for such considerations, because satisfactory resolution of these issues is key to the continued vitality of the Antarctic Treaty system.

Our priority interest is in the development of a regime for Antarctic marine living resources. Over the past 2 years the consultative parties have devoted intense effort to the development of a draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. Indeed, this gathering offers the opportunity to reach understandings necessary to convene the final diplomatic conference to conclude that convention. I can think of no more effective

action to reconfirm our commitment to the Antarctic Treaty system and its principles and purposes than the conclusion of the Antarctic marine living resource convention.

In the marine living resource negotiations we have sought to provide the basis for wise decisions on resource activities before events force ill-considered decisions upon us. The same objective should be sought in our negotiations relating to mineral resources. The nature of mineral resource issues—their complexity and sensitivity—will require measured and thorough examination. However, if we are to meet the commitments we have collectively made to insure the health of the Antarctic environment—in the ecological and the political sense—it is imperative that we achieve continued and timely progress toward an agreed regime concerning Antarctic mineral resources.

While matters relating to Antarctic resources are prominent on our consultative meeting agenda, we should not lose sight of other important matters traditionally on the agenda of consultative meetings. Telecommunications, exchange of meteorological data, the impact of man's activity on the Antarctic environment, tourism, and other subjects have continuing importance and merit our concerted attention.

The modern world offers many examples in which our scientific and technological creativity has outpaced our political and institutional responsiveness. The international cooperation symbolized in the Antarctic Treaty stands as a welcome exception.

We have the chance, I believe, to preserve and enrich this example. This is a challenge and the opportunity is inherent in today's issues regarding the Antarctic environment. We have taken major steps toward dealing with these issues. We must continue to do so without shortchanging those areas of cooperation in Antarctica traditionally dealt with at all consultative meetings. If we persevere in the pragmatic and imaginative spirit of the authors of the treaty, we will have many more occasions to commemorate our cooperation in Antarctica.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE, OCT. 10, 1979¹

The Tenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting completed its work on October 5. Attending were delegations from the thirteen Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the

U.K., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.). During the three-week meeting held in Washington, D.C., there was detailed discussion of a wide range of issues relating to Antarctica.

The Tenth Consultative Meeting marked the twentieth anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty which was signed in Washington, D.C., in 1959. The Treaty, including the system of Consultative Meetings it establishes, has been a unique example in international cooperation.

One of the most important results of the Treaty system is that it has established Antarctica as a zone of peace. The Treaty provides that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Military activities, including establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of military weapons, are prohibited in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty, therefore, represents a landmark development in the field of arms control. The Treaty also prohibits nuclear explosions or the disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica.

In addition, the Antarctic Treaty establishes a basis for international collaboration in scientific activities. The record of cooperative scientific activities and the importance of the results in expanding knowledge not only of Antarctica but of our planet as a whole over the past 20 years have more than justified the efforts of those who designed the Treaty. In the political sphere as well, the Antarctic Treaty represents a dynamic form of cooperation among states with differing legal and political perspectives.

For all of these reasons, the representatives participating in the Tenth Consultative Meeting believed it both appropriate and important to commemorate the success of the first two decades in the operation of the Antarctic Treaty system, and to rededicate themselves to the maintenance of that system and to the continuing fulfillment of the Treaty's ideals. This recommitment to the Antarctic Treaty system was considered particularly relevant at a time when new issues relating to resources in Antarctica have come to the forefront.

The Consultative Parties start from a common position in approaching these difficult and complex questions. That is the basic importance they attach to the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty with emphasis upon the protection of the Antarctic environment, an emphasis of the Consultative Parties since their first meeting.

During the Tenth Consultative Meeting informal discussion led to important progress toward fulfillment of the objective, articulated in 1977, of creating an effective regime for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. The Consultative Parties remain committed to the prompt establishment of such a system.

The Tenth Consultative Meeting also witnessed extensive consideration on the subject of Antarctic mineral resources. Again the shared environmental concern of the Consultative Parties formed a major basis of their deliberations. The recommendation adopted on this

subject represents substantial progress.

The representatives also recalled that their responsibilities for ensuring effective treatment of these resource issues are balanced with the need to ensure that the interests of all mankind in Antarctica are not prejudiced.

The representatives of the Consultative Parties also agreed on recommendations dealing with operational aspects of their activities in Antarctica, including recommendations dealing with cooperation in Antarctic telecommunications, development of agreed practices and guidelines for tourists who may visit there and recommendations designed to prevent harmful impacts from human activities in the Antarctic Treaty area.

The representatives believed that the nature and results of their three weeks of deliberations justified continued confidence in the strength and responsiveness of the Antarctic Treaty system. They reaffirmed their commitment to finding imaginative and equitable solutions to the evolving issues in Antarctica. To this end, they welcomed the invitation extended by the Government of Argentina to host the Eleventh Consultative Meeting in 1981. □

¹ Press release 258.

ARMS CONTROL: SALT II— A Summation

by Secretary Vance

*Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 10, 1979.*¹

I welcome this opportunity—as you conclude what has been a thorough and intensive set of hearings on the SALT II treaty—to offer a brief summation. Before turning to your questions, I want to address the importance of the treaty in the context of four specific issues:

- Whether our national security will be better served by the pursuit of both defense modernization and arms control or by relying on defense programs alone;
- The impact of SALT on our overall position in the world;
- The risks associated with now making changes in the treaty that will force renegotiation with the Soviets; and
- Whether approval of the treaty should be linked to other issues between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have stressed from the beginning that we must simultaneously pursue two mutually reinforcing elements of national security: the modernization of our defenses and the negotiation of agreements to limit arms.

On the military side of the equation, we have developed a comprehensive and reasoned program to improve our defenses in all areas—strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional. Over the course of these hearings, we have described those programs in detail. Secretary [of Defense] Brown will discuss them further today. Let me just observe that we are manifestly not involved in a dispute between those who see dangers to our security and those who want to let down our guard. Clearly, over the course of these hearings, we have built a broad consensus that our defense needs are real and will be met.

The question is, how will the SALT II treaty affect our defenses? Will our security be greater with the treaty or without it? That is the central question before us—not whether the treaty solves all our security problems, because it doesn't; not whether it will lull us into a false sense of security, because it certainly won't; not whether it

achieves everything we want in the way of arms control, because no single agreement can.

I believe these hearings have clearly demonstrated that the treaty will enhance our security and that of our allies.

Without the treaty:

- We would almost certainly be faced with several thousand more Soviet nuclear warheads and bombs than the treaty allows and several hundred more systems to deliver those weapons;
- Our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces—and thus assess Soviet capabilities—could be impaired, since there would be no constraints on deliberate concealment of such forces;
- Without the boundaries set by the treaty through 1985, our ability to predict the level and nature of Soviet forces into the future would be lessened—Our defense planning would be more complicated and more costly; and
- We would jeopardize the opportunity to achieve further limits on nuclear forces, and thus a greater measure of safety, in the next round of talks.

These are concrete and important security benefits to the United States. We should secure these gains now by ratifying the treaty, as we move on with our defense modernization efforts and proceed to SALT III.

U.S. Capacity for Leadership

Beyond the immediate impact on our security, the treaty bears directly on America's capacity for leadership—on our ability to sustain a sense of common purpose with our friends.

As you know, in conjunction with the U.N. General Assembly session in New York over the past few weeks, I met individually with over 60 foreign ministers. Almost without exception, they expressed to me their concern with the consequences of defeat or inordinate delay of the treaty. Our friends and allies want this treaty approved. They see it as affecting their own security as well as ours.

This is particularly true for NATO. As the President said in his television address last week: "If our allies lose confidence in our ability to negotiate

successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, then our effort to build a strong and more united NATO could fail."

It is essential that the alliance move forward to improve its conventional and theater nuclear forces. The United States will do its part; we want the allies to do theirs. There is no question in my mind that failure to place the SALT treaty in force in the near future would seriously jeopardize the prospect of building the necessary consensus on these issues within the alliance.

For the future of the alliance—and for our overall international posture—SALT II is a benchmark issue. It will have a profound impact—for our allies see it as directly touching them, and nearly all countries sense its effect on global stability and peace.

Question of Changes to the Treaty

Let me briefly turn to the question of amendments, reservations, and conditions. It is indisputable that the Senate has the constitutional power to condition its advice and consent on changes in the treaty regime. But any action which requires Soviet acceptance necessarily becomes a proposal that the negotiations be reopened.

If negotiations should start again—and there is no certainty that they could—we would have to expect countervailing Soviet demands to reopen issues resolved to our benefit. Seven years of delicate negotiations could quickly come unraveled, with a spiral of demands and counterdemands.

If the SALT II negotiations are prolonged, the calendar must also be considered. SALT I expired just over 2 years ago. We must contemplate how long new systems can be restrained if an agreement is not in force.

We must recognize the reality that steps which require renegotiation place the entire treaty at risk. And thus I believe we must ask ourselves, first, whether on balance the treaty as negotiated serves our interests and, second, whether any particular amendment warrants risking what we have gained in SALT II.

Linkage to Other Soviet Activities

Finally, let me turn to the question of whether support for SALT should be made dependent upon Soviet conduct in other realms.

In July, I argued strongly against such linkage. Developments since then have not changed the logic of that ar-

MX Missile System

PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKS, SEPT. 7, 1979¹

I have a statement to make about the new strategic deterrence system which I consider to be quite significant. Some analysts would equate it with two other major decisions made by Presidents in this century: the first, to establish the Strategic Air Command itself under President Truman and the subsequent decision by President Kennedy to establish the silo-based Minuteman missile system.

For nearly 30 years now our nation has deterred attack and has kept the peace through a complementary system of land, sea, and airborne nuclear forces, commonly known as the strategic triad. By maintaining the special strengths and the advantages offered by each of the three separate forces, we make it impossible for any enemy to

gument. We signed this treaty because it contributes to our national security and serves our national interests. It is on that basis that it should be judged. We should not give up the benefits of this treaty because of our differences with the Soviets on other matters.

Indeed, it is precisely because our interests and those of the Soviet Union differ in many areas that the need to bring the most dangerous aspects of our relationship—the competition in strategic arms—is so compelling.

Let me say a word about the situation in Cuba. As the President said, we consider the assurances that we have received from the Soviet Union to be significant. But we do not intend to rest on these statements alone.

We are moving ahead swiftly to implement the steps announced by the President. These steps are appropriate. They are proportionate to the problem. They make unmistakably clear that we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in the hemisphere.

We must not let this issue obscure the vital stake that we—and our allies and friends—have in the treaty that is before you. Our concern about a stable East-West balance—military and political—should compel us to place the treaty, not in limbo but in force.

counter all of them.

My Administration is now embarked on a program to modernize and to improve the ability of our entire strategic triad, all three systems, to survive any attack. Our bomber force is being strengthened with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Our strategic submarine force is being upgraded by Trident submarines and Trident missiles. However, as a result of increasing accuracy of strategic systems, fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBM's, located in silos such as our Minuteman, are becoming vulnerable to attack. A mobile ICBM system will greatly reduce this vulnerability. Therefore, I decided earlier this year to proceed with full-scale development and deployment of a new, large, mobile ICBM, known as the MX. I made this decision to assure our country a secure strategic deterrent now and in the future.

Consensus on National Security

Over the course of these hearings, I believe we have begun to rebuild a national consensus on the overall direction of this nation's security policies. We have not had such a consensus in this country for a number of years, and we have suffered as a result. That emerging consensus rests on two pillars—each of which is necessary.

- First, that we are now prepared as a nation to move ahead with a comprehensive and reasoned modernization of our military defense and
- Second, that we must continue the process of bringing nuclear weapons under more sensible control.

If we knock out one or the other of those pillars, I believe we face a future of fractious debate. But if we now firmly establish our commitment to both, we can move ahead as a nation united. Thus, whether your principal concern is the future of our defense posture, or of arms control, of America's capacity for effective leadership in the alliance and in the world, the SALT II treaty serves that end and deserves your support. □

¹Press release 257. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The MX will enable us to continue with a modernized, unsurpassed, survivable strategic deterrent ICBM, submarine-launched, and heavy bomber triad—ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the heavy bomber triad, armed with cruise missiles. Clearly, the way we base the MX to enhance its own security from attack is vital to the ability it has to defend our country.

At the time that I made the decision to build the MX, I established five essential criteria which the basing system would have to meet.

- First, it must contribute to the ability of the strategic forces to survive an attack.
- Second, it must be verifiable so as to set a standard which can serve as a precedent for the verifiability of mobile ICBM systems on both sides.
- Third, it must minimize the adverse impact on our own environment.
- Fourth, its deployment must be at a reasonable cost to the American taxpayer.
- Fifth, it must be consistent with existing SALT agreements and with our SALT III goal of negotiating for significant mutual reductions in strategic forces.

In light of these criteria and after full consultation with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and my other principal advisers, I've decided upon the following configuration for basing the MX missile system. The MX will be based in a sheltered, road-mobile system to be constructed in our western deserts, the total exclusive area of which will not exceed 25 square miles.

This system will consist of 200 missile transporters or launchers, each capable of rapid movement on a special roadway connecting approximately 23 horizontal shelters.

Let me point out how this meets the criteria that I've established.

First, it increases the survivability of our missiles by multiplying the number of targets which would have to be attacked, because not knowing in which of the 23 shelters the missile was located, all 23 shelters would have to be targeted in order to be sure to attack the missile.

The capacity of the missiles to move rapidly insures that no attacker will be able to find out ahead of time where the missiles might be located and attack just those locations only. In fact, the missiles would be able to change shelters during the flight time of an enemy ICBM. Moreover, the system is flexible enough so that we can adjust the

scale of deployment either up or down in response to a future enemy threat or to progress on future SALT negotiations.

Secondly, the system is adequately verifiable. The special roadways will be confined to designated areas, and the associated missile transporters will be incapable of moving other than on those designated roadways.

The shelters will be designed so they may be opened in order to demonstrate that no extra missiles are hidden within them. These and other features will make this system adequately verifiable.

Third, the system minimizes the impact on the environment. The shelters are flush with the ground. The public will retain access to the area. Only the shelters themselves will be fenced off. The entire system, as I said earlier, will take only about 25 square miles of land out of public use.

Fourth, the system is affordable. The projected cost over the full 10-year period, total cost, to develop, to produce, and to deploy is \$33 billion in 1980 dollars. While this acquisition cost may vary somewhat as the program proceeds, it's important to recognize that the cost of this system, in constant dollar terms, will be no greater than the cost of any one of the original three legs of our strategic triad, either the B-52 force or the Polaris-Poseidon force or the Minuteman ICBM system.

Finally, this system is compatible with existing SALT agreements and with our objectives for SALT III. Deploying this system will make it clear to the Soviet Union that they will gain no strategic advantage out of continuing the nuclear arms race. This is a fundamental precondition to more effective arms control agreements. Equally important, this system points in the direction of reductions of strategic arms because we are giving better protection with a force of fewer missiles. Without such a mobile shelter system, the only way we could maintain our deterrent would be to increase greatly the number of our strategic systems or nuclear missiles.

In the course of making the series of decisions that led to this announcement, I carefully studied the potential threat to our Minuteman force. That threat is real. The system I've outlined this morning does the best job of meeting that threat, while also fulfilling the conditions that I specified at the outset. The system is survivable, it's verifiable, it has a minimum impact on the environment, it's affordable in cost, and it's consistent with our SALT

CANADA: Transboundary Air Quality Talks

On July 26, 1979, the United States and Canada released the following joint statement in Ottawa.¹

Transboundary air quality has become a matter of increasing concern to people in both the United States and Canada. This issue has many dimensions, including the long range transport of air pollutants and the phenomenon of "acid rain". Both Governments have recognized the need for close and continuing cooperation to protect and enhance transboundary air quality.

Discussions on transboundary air quality were initiated through an Exchange of Notes of November 16 and 17, 1978, in which the United States Department of State proposed that "representatives of the two Governments meet at an early date to discuss informally (a) the negotiation of a cooperative agreement on preserving and enhancing air quality, and (b) other steps which might be taken to reduce or eliminate the undesirable impacts on the two countries resulting from air pollution."

In reply, the Canadian Government indicated that it shared United States concern about the growing problem of transboundary air pollution. In particular, it noted the potential environmental impact, and the transboundary significance, of the long range transport of air pollutants. It therefore welcomed the opening of "informal discussions . . . with a view to developing agreement on principles which recognize our shared responsibility not to cause transboundary environmental damage, and which might lead to co-

operative measures to reduce or eliminate environmental damage caused by transboundary air pollution."

Bilateral discussions of an informal nature took place on December 15, 1978, and June 20, 1979, and both Governments have exchanged discussion papers on principles which they believe have relevance to transboundary air pollution. As a result of these discussions it has become clear that Canada and the United States share a growing concern about the actual and potential effects of transboundary air pollution and are prepared to initiate cooperative efforts to address transboundary air pollution problems.

There is already a substantial basis of obligation, commitment and cooperative practice in existing environmental relations between Canada and the United States on which to address problems in this area. Both Governments are mutually obligated through the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to ensure that ". . . boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property. . . ." (Article IV)

Both Governments have also supported Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which proclaims that ". . . States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause

goal of deep reductions in strategic arms.

In sum, this system will enhance our nation's security, both by strengthening our strategic deterrent and by offering the prospect of more effective arms control. This system is not a bargaining chip. It's a system that America needs and will have for its security. I'm confident that the American people will support its deployment.

Unhappily, we do not yet live in the kind of world that permits us to devote all our resources to the works of peace. And as President, I have no higher duty than to insure that the security of the United States will be protected beyond doubt. As long as the threat of war per-

sists, we will do what we must to deter that threat to our nation's security. If SALT II is ratified and SALT III is successful, then the time may come when no President will have to make this kind of decision again and the MX system will be the last weapon system of such enormous destructive power that we will ever have to build. I fervently pray for that time, but until it comes, we will build what we must, even as we continue to work for mutual restraint in strategic armaments. □

¹Remarks to reporters at the Old Executive Office Building; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 10, 1979.

damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. . . .

A number of cooperative steps have been taken to deal with transboundary air pollution. In the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, both Governments committed themselves to develop and implement "programs to identify pollutant sources and relative source contributions . . . for those substances which may have significant adverse effects on environmental quality including indirect effects of impairment of tributary water quality through atmospheric deposition in drainage basins. In cases where significant contributions to Great Lakes pollution from atmospheric sources are identified, the Parties agree to consult on remedial measures."

Both Governments have sought to implement the principles of notification and consultation on activities and projects with potential transboundary impact, and to promote exchanges of scientific and technical information. In 1978 the two Governments established a Bilateral Research Consultation Group on the Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants to coordinate research efforts in both countries. Both Governments have also engaged the International Joint Commission in some aspects of transboundary air pollution. This has been done through References under the Boundary Waters Treaty establishing the Michigan/Ontario Air Pollution Board and the International Air Pollution Advisory Board, and through the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978.

Having regard to these and other relevant principles and practices recognized by them, both Canada and the United States share a common determination to reduce or prevent transboundary air pollution which injures health and property on the other side of the boundary. Recognizing the importance and urgency of the problem, and believing that a basis exists for the development of a cooperative bilateral agreement on air quality, the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada therefore intend to move their discussions beyond the informal stage to develop such an agreement. Both sides agree that the following further principles and practices should be addressed in the development of a bilateral agreement on transboundary air quality:

1. Prevention and reduction of transboundary air pollution which results in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and impair or

ENVIRONMENT: *The Quiet Crisis*

by Anthony Lake

Based on an address before the Council on Religion and International Affairs in New York City on April 25, 1979. Mr. Lake is Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

Each day, the press of events abroad, reflected in newspaper headlines here at home, focuses the attention of public officials and private citizens alike on the crises of the moment—the Middle East, Iran, Southeast Asia, southern Africa.

Each of these problems deserves, and commands, our immediate attention. But today I want to talk with you about another crisis—a quiet crisis—one that usually escapes daily notice but nonetheless will profoundly affect the kind of lives we will lead, indeed the prospect of life itself, in the decades ahead.

I am referring to the relationship between mankind and the planet we inhabit: whether we can strike a decent balance between the burgeoning demands of more people for a better life and the immutable reality of limited resources; whether we can manage successfully a steady and more equitable rise in standards of living without destroying our planet—and ourselves—in the process.

A bomb set off by a terrorist in London or Israel makes a shattering noise heard around the world. But a precious rain forest lost over time in Central America, or a slight but ominous rise in the temperature of the Earth from the

introduction of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or 25,000 more mouths to feed in the world each day, these gathering signals of tomorrow's crisis can go unnoticed.

In part, that is why this is an extraordinarily difficult set of issues. They are diffuse, deceptively incremental. They are also technically complex, sometimes socially sensitive, and often politically painful.

I will not attempt, today, to cover all of the aspects of this quiet crisis. But I would like to share with you some general thoughts on the kinds of challenges and choices we face. Nor will I pretend to hold out solutions that are being found or even designed. But I will try to indicate some of the actions we are now taking in key areas.

Let me begin with a few stark statistics. Numbers are a shorthand for reality. We can sometimes give short shrift, therefore, to their implications. But each of these indicators of what is happening now predict, imprecisely but certainly, future difficulties for us all.

- Each year a way must be found to feed 70 million more people. Already, one out of every five human beings is sick or weak from malnutrition.
- The rate of increase in grain yields has slowed.
- In the last decade, nearly a million acres of agricultural land were taken for urban use. Additional farmland is turning into desert—250,000 acres a year in northern Africa alone.
- Nearly two-thirds of the ecologically vital tropical rain forests in Cen-

interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment.

2. Control strategies aimed at preventing and reducing transboundary air pollution including the limitation of emissions by the use of control technologies for new, substantially modified and, as appropriate, existing facilities.

3. Expanded notification and consultation on matters involving a risk or potential risk of transboundary air pollution.

4. Expanded exchanges of scientific information and increased cooperation in research and development concerning transboundary air pollution processes, effects and emission control technologies.

5. Expanded monitoring and evaluation efforts aimed at understanding of the full scope of the transboundary air pollution phenomenon.

6. Cooperative assessment of long-term environmental trends and of the implications of these trends for transboundary air pollution problems.

7. Consideration of such matters as institutional arrangements, equal access, non-discrimination and liability and compensation, as relevant to an agreement.

8. Consideration of measures to implement an agreement. □

¹ Press release 117.

tral America have been destroyed. Worldwide tropical rain forests are disappearing at the rate of more than 50 acres a minute.

- While increased amounts of toxic substances are introduced into the world's water (as well as into our food chains), human demand for clean water is expected to grow three times by the early 21st century.

- A million tons of oil a year enter the oceans from tankers, freighters, and offshore drilling. Several million more tons of oil and its products find their way into the oceans from the land.

- There are now more than a dozen nations that could develop a nuclear weapon within a few years of a decision to do so.

I could, of course, spend the remainder of our time together ringing such statistical alarms.

But the implication of even these few is obvious. If our children are to lead decent lives and have the hope of a friendly Earth for their children, people around the globe must work together not only to live in harmony with each other but with their environment.

The political, social, and cultural barriers to this kind of cooperation are evident and huge. Less evident, I believe, is an intellectual hurdle to be crossed. It is the tendency toward "either/or."

Most of the problems I have cited are the consequences of growth. The scientific and technological advances which propel this economic growth bring with them new risks and problems. Progress can seem perverse.

The natural reaction of many of us can sometimes be a kind of Luddite rejection of growth itself. This response may seem sensible to those whose own economic welfare is assured by the benefits they have gained from previous economic progress. But for the vast numbers of the poor the idea of denying or severely limiting future growth—for the sake of humanity—is a cruel concept. Nor, indeed, could growth and scientific advance be limited, even if we wished it.

What is needed, in our academic community, our government, and our political processes, is a better synthesis of the imperatives of progress and of conservation, a discipline of environmental economics. Certainly, such thinkers and planners now exist. We need more of them. And all of us who are neither economists nor environmentalists need to think more about how our national and global societies can shape progress in safe ways rather than concentrating solely either on con-

servation of the environment or on material growth.

Let me illustrate this point by discussing two sets of interconnected global issues and some of the dilemmas they create: first, energy development, associated environmental risks, and nuclear proliferation; and second, the balance among population growth, food, and natural resources.

The Search for Safe Energy

I need not belabor the critical importance of addressing, firmly and urgently, the prospect of growing energy shortages. The consequences can be severe: inflation and economic dislocation here and abroad, damage to the development of poorer nations, and increased tensions in the international system.

It is of fundamental importance, then, that we increase our own production of energy, including petroleum, and significantly reduce our costly reliance on foreign oil. One part of the President's energy program is designed to do this.

Inevitably, here and abroad, increased emphasis on nonpetroleum energy resources will mean more reliance on coal (a priority in our own plans) and on nuclear energy (which is particularly attractive to a number of foreign nations). Each raises obvious concerns, however.

The most realistic short-term alternative to our current dependence on oil is to increase our coal production. We intend to achieve a two-third increase in this production by 1985. But there are possible longer term penalties which we all must also recognize.

Burning coal and other hydrocarbons, for example, produces carbon dioxide. Increased levels of CO₂ in the atmosphere could produce a "green house effect" in which the global climate is gradually warmed with unpredictable effects on climate patterns and food production. In fact, a strong body of scientific opinion believes the Earth's atmosphere is already getting warmer. In the past 100 years, CO₂ in the atmosphere has increased by 12%; in the next 50 years it could increase by 100%.

In addition, the burning of hydrocarbons, particularly coal, releases sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere. The sulfur dioxide is in turn washed out of the atmosphere by rain and snow which becomes acidic in the process. This so-called acid rain is already an important environmental issue in Europe and in the eastern U.S.-Canadian border areas. Noticeable effects have been de-

creases in fish populations and a reduction of the productivity of forests and agricultural lands.

We are working on technologies which might decrease the CO₂ problem, and various scrubbing systems exist to remove much of the sulfur dioxide from hydrocarbon burning. But these technologies are expensive, and some will take time to develop.

Nuclear power is much cleaner for our atmosphere, and it does not add to carbon dioxide buildup. But the potential for nuclear accidents, we now know, is real. Furthermore, aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle raise the specter of nuclear-weapons proliferation. And we have not yet demonstrated that we have a fully acceptable means for the disposal of radioactive waste.

Yet, while we seek to slow the pace of new nuclear technologies such as the fast-breeder reactor, nuclear energy is already a key part of our own energy network; up to 13% of our electrical power comes from nuclear plants. And its continuing development is clearly irreversible abroad.

Energy Conservation. Thus, we come back to my central question: How do we strike the right balance between needed increases in energy production and concern for our environment?

The first and most important answer to our dilemma is, of course, energy conservation, to slow the growth in energy demand. Our energy program places great stress on this. As a short-run measure, we have agreed with the other 19 industrialized members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) to reduce collective demand on world oil markets by 2 million barrels per day. For the United States this will mean a cut in demand for oil imports of up to 1 million barrels a day by the end of 1979.

On April 5, President Carter set forth specific measures which would meet the IEA commitment, as well as address the longer term energy problems of the United States. These measures focus on reducing consumption of oil and gasoline, switching to fuels which are more abundant in the United States, decontrolling crude oil prices, and providing incentives for conservation and improving efficiency in energy use.

Progress can be made. The mileage of the U.S. new car fleet has improved by 5 miles per gallon since 1974. Through careful conservation and greater efficiency, we can reduce the amount of energy needed to fuel our economic growth. In the past, each 1% growth in U.S. gross national product has generated an equivalent 1% growth

in our demand for energy. From 1973 to 1978, this proportional increase in energy growth fell to about one half of 1% for each 1% of growth. By continuing to improve the efficiency of energy use, we hope to keep at least below 0.8% through 1985, while maintaining a growing economy.

International Cooperation. A second response is to help focus greater international attention on what are truly international problems. Action by the United States alone will not resolve our dilemmas. For example, even if we were to reduce by half the amount of CO₂ the United States puts in the atmosphere, the best models available indicate that such unilateral action would extend by only 5 years the time it would take for atmospheric CO₂ levels to double. Thus, if real improvement is to take place to address environmental problems created by energy production, it will require the cooperation of other industrialized countries and, very importantly, the developing world.

With strong congressional support, the Agency for International Development (AID) is rapidly expanding its programs to assist developing countries cope with their energy and environmental problems. Such assistance ranges from energy assessments of national policies to demonstration projects of specific technologies, from improved management of forests used for firewood to application of satellite photography for understanding the overall environmental impact of development programs. And at the current meeting of the U.N. Environment Program Governing Council, we are suggesting that consideration be given to new mechanisms for dealing with the international impact of major national projects that could degrade the environment.

We must also devise international means for dealing with the question of nuclear power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over a dozen countries now produce and export nuclear technology. Many nations with little domestic energy capacity are almost completely dependent on the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries for their energy resources. This creates an increased demand for nuclear technology, with its potential nonproliferation problems.

To help deal with the proliferation risks in nuclear energy development, we have organized the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation to search for ways—both technical and institutional—to enable nations to pur-

World Forests

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY VANCE, AUG. 2, 1979¹

In my Environmental Message of August 2, 1979, I expressed concern about the rapid disappearance of the earth's forests, especially in the tropics and subtropics. I believe there is much that the United States can do in cooperation with other nations to contribute to environmentally sound care and management of the earth's forests and to the well-being of people affected by them.

I am directing you to give high priority to the following matters in your budget and program planning:

- improved monitoring of world forest trends, particularly tropical forests, including use of satellite observations;
- research on necessary preservation of natural forest ecosystems and their rich complex of plant and animal life;
- research on multiple uses of highly diverse tropical forests, including management of natural stands, development of ecologically sound forest plantations, and combined agriculture and forestry;
- studies on increasing yields in family-scale tropical agriculture, to relieve pressures on forest lands that are not suitable for cultivation;
- demonstration of integrated projects for reforestation, more efficient fuel-wood use, and alternative energy sources;
- examination of how U.S. citizens and U.S.-based corporations may be encouraged to support sound forest management practices.

sue peaceful nuclear energy without bringing closer the specter of nuclear-weapons proliferation. In addition, the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 places very strict conditions on nuclear cooperation with other nations.

Developing Renewable Energy Sources. A third—and ultimately the most promising—response to the energy/environment dilemma is the longer term development of the renewable energy sources that can provide us with greater energy security and in greater safety.

We are increasing our financial commitment to research on renewable energy sources. In addition to private financing, the Department of Energy has budgeted over \$600 million this year to study, develop, and demonstrate renewable energy technology. We have asked Congress for more than

I am asking you to ensure that the inter-agency task force on tropical forests, chaired by the Department of State, submit to me by November 1979 its report and recommendations on U.S. goals, strategies, and programs to help protect and conserve world forests.

I am asking you to work with the Department of Agriculture, the Council on Environmental Quality and other relevant federal agencies, and with other nations and international organizations, to give full support and assistance to the international program of activities for conservation and wise utilization of tropical forests to be developed under the sponsorship of the United Nations Environment Programme.

I am also asking you to encourage and support high-level international conferences on forest problems in regions where forest losses are severe, to raise awareness and understanding both of the complex problems and possible solutions.

Finally, I am asking you and the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality to report to me within six months on the best ways to designate "ecological and natural resources of global importance" under Executive Order 12114, so that proposals for major federal actions significantly affecting these resources will be reviewed before a decision is made.

Please give these assignments your immediate attention.

JIMMY CARTER □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1979.

\$700 million for these efforts next year.

President Carter and other heads of state at the Bonn economic summit last July pledged to increase assistance to developing countries for harnessing the vast energy potential of the sun, the wind, the oceans, and other renewable resources. These efforts will be reviewed and, we hope, intensified at the Tokyo summit in June.

AID has requested \$42 million in FY 1980 for the actual application of renewable energy technologies in developing countries. The energy security fund, proposed by the President to be funded by the windfall profits tax would, in part, finance a further commitment to the development of alternative energy sources and technologies.

We have proposed a new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, which would become an important

element of our foreign assistance program with new energy development as a major focus of its work.

With strong U.S. backing, the United Nations will hold a World Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy in 1981. We intend to play an active role in that effort. In this connection we will also work with other nations to determine whether it would be useful to support regional energy research institutes. These would focus particularly on LDC [less developed country] energy needs, with emphasis on appropriate renewable and nonconventional energy sources. And we are asking the World Bank to undertake a thorough review of how best to assure adequate financing for developing countries to acquire renewable energy technologies.

Population and Natural Resources

At the root of the inexorable pressures on our natural resources lies perhaps the single most important phenomenon in the world today—the population explosion. Its importance lies not only in the fact of more and more mouths to feed and other human needs to be satisfied. It also derives from the demographic shape of the population changes taking place.

- By the year 2000, the world's population will have increased by about 50% from 1975 levels—an increase in the final quarter of this century equal to the entire growth of world population from the birth of Christ to the year 1950.

- While the rate of increase is declining in some poorer countries, the birth rate there will still be twice as high as in industrialized countries. By the year 2000, these countries will have 78% of the world's population.

- Also by the year 2000 roughly 17% of the population in industrial countries will be over 60 years of age (vs. only 7% in the LDC's); in the LDC's, 44% of the people will be under 19.

These trends have a number of important implications.

- As time goes on, the industrial countries will have an increasingly older population profile, with a heavy burden of support for the very old.

- The younger population in the developing world will require greatly increased social services and job opportunities, which when combined with migration to urban areas, could create tremendous social, economic, and political stresses.

- An expanding population is both a drag on per capita growth and a steadily increasing burden on the environment. It is a truly vicious circle. With expanding numbers of people, we see greater deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification. These developments further erode the ability of the rural poor to survive.

But in the short run, what choice does the poor farmer have who needs to use what little land he has to grow his crops, or whatever firewood he can find, to cook today's meal? And without the hope of a better economic future, what incentive is there for parents to limit the number of their children, when children are often seen as a hedge against an uncertain future?

As with the dilemmas we face on energy, the simple but extraordinarily difficult answer is that we have to work on a number of fronts at once. Let me mention just two of these fronts: limiting population growth and increasing food production.

Limiting Population Growth. First, we must, and will, continue to intensify our efforts to assist nations in dealing with excessive population growth. Indeed, in many developing countries, there has been a rapidly increasing level of interest in implementing family planning programs. This year we are providing, under the foreign assistance programs of AID, some \$185 million for such programs, focused on helping developing countries strengthen and extend the delivery of family planning information and services. Currently, 26 countries are being assisted directly by AID, while numerous other countries are receiving assistance through private, nongovernmental organizations which AID supports. In addition, the population programs of multilateral organizations of the United Nations and the World Bank are playing a role of growing importance in the worldwide population assistance effort.

Increasing Food Production. Second, we must focus increasing attention on the need to increase the local food production capabilities of the developing nations. Adequate food is not just the basic requirement for survival. Proper nutrition, like adequate health care, is also needed to sustain the productivity which can lead to a better quality of life. Food and nutrition programs are thus more than a humanitarian concern.

Yet, despite some recent years of good harvests, the prospects are that we will have greater food deficits in

developing countries in the future. World food stocks have declined compared to the 1960's or very early 1970's. We are now more vulnerable to serious crop failures in the rich food growing lands of North America and elsewhere.

We already devote roughly half of our bilateral economic development assistance—approximately \$600 million this year—to agriculture and rural development. The \$1.4 billion in concessionary food assistance we will provide this year will represent about two-thirds of such assistance provided by all countries. We have contributed \$200 million to the International Fund for Agricultural Development. And we provide over \$25 million a year to help support the international agricultural research centers which make major contributions to increasing agricultural productivity in the developing world.

This summer we expect a report from the President's Commission on World Hunger, which was launched last fall, to suggest further measures that might be taken to alleviate world hunger. In the meantime, we have identified certain areas in which we will increase our efforts. They were enumerated by Secretary Vance in a recent speech outlining our approach to development issues of the 1980's.

- We will seek to further food security by doubling our minimum commitment to food aid in the Food Aid Convention and proposing domestic legislation for an emergency food reserve to be used to meet such a commitment.

- We will support research and development programs geared to increasing the production of crops traditionally grown by poor farmers on marginal lands, as well as nontraditional crops which hold out potential for new sources of food and income.

- We will be seeking ways to cut postharvest food losses, which now rob the LDC's of some 20% of their food production.

- And, most important of all, we will encourage greater world attention to the domestic policies developing countries take to encourage food production. We will do so through our active participation in the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development and by concentrating our food and development assistance on countries which pursue such policies.

Conclusion

There is, I believe, reason both for hope and for deep concern as we look

at the question of whether mankind can learn to live in harmony with our environment.

We have reason for hope when we recognize how much our attitudes have changed just in the past decade. While there have always been lonely voices of warning, it has only been in the last few years that our collective consciousness has been awakened to the reality of a limited planet and to the real costs of wasteful consumption. This has been true for the public, as we saw in Earth Day some 10 years ago. It is true for the Congress, which has given far more attention to the environment in the past decade than ever before. And it is true for the executive branch. In the State Department, for example, we now have a bureau which has as one of its primary duties work on the international environment. This is a recognition of the fact that the environment is now not one of those "other," peripheral issues, but a central concern as we think about the future security of our nation.

But if this rise in consciousness gives some cause to be hopeful, it gives no cause to be sanguine. For if we are doing more, we are by no means doing enough. If we are more aware, then we move into the future with our eyes open. We cannot claim ignorance if we fail to address a gathering global crisis.

The basic question, therefore, is whether the United States—itsself and working with others—can undertake the kind of sustained, long-term efforts it will require: whether a democracy like ours—and a pluralistic international system—can decide now, freely, to make the short-term sacrifices necessary to secure our future interests, whether we can act today to deal with tomorrow.

I have suggested some of the ways in which our physical environment can shift against us. I suspect that, unless we alter the trends, we will face as well a harsher political environment. The choices we fail to make freely today could, under more dire circumstances, produce a trend toward more authoritarian regimes that would impose such choices.

What is at stake in the long-term, then, is both the quality of our lives and the quality of our freedom. The character of our democracy's response to these challenges will not come all at once but in a series of discrete decisions in the years ahead—in our environmental legislation, in the levels and priorities of our foreign aid, in the strength of our support for international environmental programs, in the posi-

Negotiations To Protect Migratory Wild Animals

At the invitation of the Federal Republic of Germany, 63 nations convened in its capital city Bonn, June 11–23, 1979, in an attempt to negotiate a new international treaty to protect wild birds and animals which migrate across national boundaries. The negotiations ended Saturday, June 23, with 22 nations, principally those in Europe and Africa, officially signing the Convention [on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals]. The United States did not sign.

Though it appears that the convention will not be the global convention originally envisaged by its sponsors, it should prove a particularly valuable instrument in establishing protection for birds migrating across the Mediterranean, and for zebras, wildebeests, impalas, and other animals which migrate in Africa. It should also help stimulate protective action elsewhere.

Some countries—among them the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, New Zealand, Japan, and the U.S.S.R.—while supporting the treaty's objective, believed that the treaty as adopted presented serious problems. These countries did not vote for its adoption and did not sign the convention. Most of the above countries did not wish the convention to apply to all marine species. Others were concerned with the possible adverse effects the treaty might have on the effective management of wildlife under present federal-state division of authority. A few had problems with the relation between the treaty and the current law of the sea negotiations.

The countries with federal systems (United States, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Austria, Germany) made considerable progress toward getting the conference as a whole to accept the idea that there should be a federal-state clause in the convention. Despite intensive negotiations, it proved impossible to find treaty language suitable to each nation's particular situation. In the end it was agreed that it would be

better to have no clause on this point rather than have imprecise language.

The African and Asian countries, with tacit support from the European countries, insisted that the treaty apply to all migratory species of animals and resisted the attempts of various countries to exclude certain marine species from the treaty. The United States supported the inclusion of sea turtles, sea birds, and marine mammals. The Japanese, who were the lone holdouts on sea turtles, modified their position during the conference and agreed to reconsider their position. The U.S. authorities involved with the protection of marine mammals, concerned with the possible weakening and certainly the complicating aspects of the proposed treaty on existing agreements and agreements being negotiated to protect mammals, set down a stiff set of requirements to be met before the delegation could agree not to have marine mammals excluded.

When a week's hard negotiations resulted in the apparent successful resolution of these points, the U.S. delegation modified its original position and supported the inclusion of marine mammals. Treaty coverage of fish and shellfish was most contentious, and the vote was 49 to 9 in favor of having the treaty cover all marine species. The reasoning behind the U.S. opposition, which was presumably shared by the other countries voting with the United States, was that the convention could have a disruptive and complicating effect on the negotiation of a number of fisheries agreements which already contain conservation aspects.

The principal outstanding law of the sea issue involved adequately describing the term "national jurisdictional boundaries." The United States believed that this term was too ambiguous and tried unsuccessfully to modify it with a reference to "international law."

The United States and several other countries would have preferred a longer

tions we take at the Law of the Sea Conference and other global forums where the environment is at issue, and, most immediately, in the energy policies and programs our nation now adopts.

Each of us has a responsibility—those of us in government and those outside—to poke, prod, and push for action. Not to stop progress. But to shape it in ways that offer the promise of a decent future. □

EUROPE: NATO's Fourth Decade— Defense and Detente

Following are remarks by Vice President Mondale and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before the 25th assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association on October 10, 1979, in the Department of State.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

I am delighted to have this opportunity and this honor to address this Association, whose function is so crucial and has been so effective since the creation of this Association those many years ago.

I wish to commend you for the superb role that the Atlantic Treaty Association plays in the support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Today I wish to review the strength and constancy of U.S. leadership within that treaty organization and emphasize how SALT II now pending before the U.S. Senate contributes to the safeguarding of the alliance.

As you know, when I speak on behalf of the American commitment to NATO, I speak not only on behalf of the President of the United States, Mr. Carter, but I think the history of our country has shown that consistently from the beginning and including today, the commitment to NATO by our nation is a bipartisan American

commitment that is permanent and lasting and complete in terms of total public support.

In fact, the first mission of the new Administration involved my visit within hours of our inaugural—the first visit on my international journey—to the NATO headquarters in Brussels to underscore immediately the commitment of the new Administration to the continuation of the strongest possible relationship with NATO and the strongest possible relationship within NATO among its treaty members. In 1977 the President sent me to Brussels in that first overseas mission to underscore that message.

In the more than 30 years that have passed since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, we have shared with our allies three unprecedented decades of strength, of peace, and of success.

The 12 nations which signed the NATO treaty in 1949 reaffirmed their

ened obsolescence and the traumas of modernization.

That the alliance has survived and flourished through so much challenge offers proof that its charter, like our own Constitution, is, in fact, a living document, broad enough, universal enough, and tested enough to serve as a basis for the future. But today, as allies, we are not and cannot be complacent.

If the challenge faced by the alliance over the years has changed, it has by no means lessened. If the threat to the alliance has in some ways become more subtle, it is nonetheless formidable. And if the Soviet Union has become more open to cooperation with the West than it was in 1949, nevertheless, serious differences and strong competition continue to exist between East and West.

I need not describe for this audience the long history of the Soviet military

The President, working with our allies, has increased defense spending by 3% a year in real terms . . . We will continue that growth and will request even more if our defense needs require it.

faith in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. They stressed their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They have pledged to safeguard the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. And above all, they agreed to develop their capacity to resist armed attack. An attack against one, they agreed, would be considered an attack against all.

It is difficult to realize in our more settled and prosperous times, what an ambitious, even visionary, act that treaty was; how ambitious to speak optimistically of peace when the debris of World War II had not yet been fully cleared away, and how farsighted to join in a collective effort to resist aggression when so many of the signatories were individually vulnerable.

The NATO alliance has shown remarkable resilience and flexibility. It has surmounted recurring problems within and challenges without. It has undergone strategic and doctrinal changes, from an era of massive retaliation to an era of flexible response. It has endured both the pangs of threat-

buildup of Warsaw Pact forces. That history, for many of you, has been a daily professional challenge. It is a challenge that President Carter has met from the beginning of his Administration with the shaping of U.S. defense forces and with his decision to increase real defense spending by 3% annually. This is not an effort that we bear alone. Each of our allies must participate, if together we are to benefit.

The President has submitted to the Congress a request, as you know, for \$2.7 billion amending the FY 1980 budget so that despite the increased inflation which vexes us all, we will meet that commitment that we have made in all seriousness to NATO.

Visible strength is a deterrent to war. Together with our allies, we have begun the process of modernizing our defenses for the coming decades to meet the massive arms buildup of the Soviet Union and the East.

As you know, just this past week, in East Berlin, President Brezhnev announced unilateral reduction of certain Soviet troops, tanks, and other military hardware in Eastern Europe. We would

Migratory Animals (Cont'd)

period of negotiation that would have permitted taking home a negotiated and preliminary agreed text for study and consultation with interested domestic groups. It was clear, however, that the Federal Republic and the majority of the countries present were much in favor of concluding and signing a convention at this time. Though the U.S. delegation was able to have included in the convention a wide range of points, the several unresolved issues described above, plus the lack of opportunity to consult at home, led the U.S. delegation not to sign the convention. At the same time, the U.S. delegation recognized the benefits the convention should bring to areas of the world which have less well developed conservation programs than has North America. □

welcome such a reduction, but it is absolutely essential that it be seen in context, and that context includes the following factors.

First, Soviet forces in Europe today vastly outnumber those of the NATO alliance, and so, as I said, on behalf of the President to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament on the eve of the 1978 NATO summit in Washington, we in NATO increased our defense budgets, not out of preference but out of necessity—a necessity imposed upon us, for example, by the Warsaw Pact's three to one advantage in tanks in Europe.

Second, the Soviet theater nuclear forces have been built up. The Backfire bomber and now their new SS-20, an intermediate range mobile ballistic missile, significantly increases Soviet military capability against targets not only in Europe but also in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

And **third**, it is obviously in the Soviet interest to lure NATO away from crucial conventional and theater nuclear force modernization.

While we must examine President Brezhnev's announcement carefully and affirmatively, we must bear in mind that the self-restraint in theater nuclear forces shown by the NATO alliance over the past two decades has not been met by corresponding restraint on the part of the Soviets. It is for this reason that the work of NATO's groups on the theater nuclear forces modernization and theater nuclear forces arms control is so crucially important, as is the decision we will take as an alliance leader this year on modernized theater nuclear forces capable of countering real and existing Soviet theater nuclear forces opposed against our alliance.

While deterrence at the theater level is of keen concern to each of us, the competition between East and West at the strategic nuclear level is central to our defense and survival. How we manage that competition—literally and directly—affects the lives of every man, woman, and child through the alliance and, indeed, throughout the world.

This week in Washington, as you well know, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has moved into the final phase of its hearings on SALT II. As the Senate approaches this historic decision, let us look at the record of the debate and of the hearings before the committees.

Every single provision of SALT II has been scrutinized in detail for days of hearings. The agreement has stood up to every single criticism leveled

against it. The treaty is verifiable without any doubt. It is in the alliance's interest without any doubt. It strengthens our security, and it is a meaningful step toward arms reduction.

SALT II has withstood partisan attack. The fact is that when the President took charge of the strategic arms talks, he inherited many provisions of a draft agreement negotiated by his predecessor. We have not only built on that draft, we have improved it—broadening the scope of the agreement, greatly improving the quantitative and qualitative limits, and laying the groundwork for the negotiation of further limits in our national interests in SALT III.

SALT II has successfully withstood determined efforts to link it, to hold it hostage to other issues—issues ranging from the level of the defense budget to the Soviet presence in Cuba, issues important in their own right but which must not be linked to the pending SALT treaty.

I need not detail for the defense experts in this assembly the positive trend in the U.S. defense budget since 1977. No linkage to SALT is required for that trend to continue. The fact is that the President, working with our allies, has increased defense spending by 3% a year in real terms, reversing several

States to pursue strategic programs to strengthen our security while also constraining the arms race. In the same way, SALT provides both a foundation for the alliance to build a consensus to proceed with essential NATO theater nuclear force modernization, and it also furthers arms control initiatives to control the Soviet threat to Europe.

Thus, when the Senate votes for SALT II—and I have confidence the Senate will ratify that treaty—it will be voting not only for a strong and more stable strategic relationship toward the Soviet Union, it will also be giving crucial impetus to a stronger NATO and to efforts to reduce the nuclear threat facing our allies in the future. That is why the members of the North Atlantic alliance have, without exception and with great strength, endorsed SALT II. That is why SALT II is so central to continued American leadership of this great alliance.

Earlier this year, soon after the signing of the SALT II agreements, I visited seven states of our great country to discuss SALT with a good cross section of the American people.

Their response was overwhelmingly positive. The American people recognize that strategic arms limitation is an issue of vital importance for our nation and for mankind. They want any

The U.S. commitment to the security of Europe is unshakable. It is organic. It is complete. We view the security of Western Europe as an extension of our own security.

years of previous decline. We will continue that growth and will request even more if our defense needs require it.

To deal with the Soviet presence in Cuba, we have taken a number of steps to neutralize the Soviet role, including stepping up U.S. surveillance and military presence in the Caribbean. We will assure that the Soviets in Cuba pose no threat to the United States or other nations in this region.

When the President announced these measures a week ago, he emphasized and I quote, that, "... the greatest danger to American security... is certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest danger to all the nations in the world... is the breakdown of a common effort to preserve peace and the ultimate threat of a nuclear war."

Finally, SALT II is the central element in the alliance's policy of pursuing both defense and detente. SALT II provides a framework for the United

agreement we enter in to be fair, and they believe this treaty is fair. They want a treaty to protect our security, and they understand that this treaty enhances America's security. They want it ratified, and they want us to continue our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

They understand that SALT does not undermine our security. They recognize that SALT is not based on trust but on suspicion and that it can be adequately verified. They believe we must have SALT II if we're to move to SALT III.

If I have received a single message, it is that the American people genuinely believe, as do the President and I, that the SALT II agreement is in our interest and that it's vastly superior to no agreement at all.

Every day brings more support for the treaty. Just last week I received a letter from the President of the National Farmers Union representing a broad cross section of rural Americans.

In it he stated, and I quote: "The full board of directors of the Farmers Union concurred unanimously that the Nation must make headway towards arms control. It would be tragic," they continued, "if the whole process were to be set back by rejection of the present treaty. Approval of SALT II at this session, therefore, is vitally important so that the next steps can begin soon and hopefully lead to another advance for humanity."

"An advance for humanity." That is what the SALT process is all about.

As you all know, last week America welcomed an extraordinary visitor. To joyful crowds in cities and farmlands, to millions everywhere who saw him on television, the Holy Father brought a luminous message to mankind and to all Americans, a message of love and faith and optimism and confidence and grace.

That message struck deep chords within us. It unleashed our best and most generous sentiments. It opened, truly, a window on our soul. It reminded us again what our civilization is all about—and what this Association was established to protect and has served so well throughout the history of this Association—what it is about is the protection and love of our democracy, our drive for social justice, our hopes for our children.

In the end, those are the dreams that bond our NATO alliance together. That's its basic reason. Nuclear holocaust renders those dreams absurd. Today, with the decision on SALT II, we have a decisive chance to take a further step away from that final madness, to take a further step toward reason, and I'm confident we'll make the right choice.

DR. BRZEZINKSI

I welcome this opportunity to meet with your 25th annual assembly and to share with you some informal remarks on the subject of Western security on the relationship between defense and detente. At this time of unprecedented global change, our collective security requires that the United States successfully maintain a global power equilibrium while helping to shape a framework for global change.

These two imperatives—a power equilibrium and a framework for change—are not slogans. Each represents a difficult and vital process, critical to our security. The maintenance of a power equilibrium by itself would be insufficient for it would be unresponsive to the imperative need to recognize that an awakened global population in-

sists on basic changes in the human condition. Shaping a framework for global change while disregarding the realities of power would contribute to a fundamental instability in world affairs; it would transform global change from a potentially positive process into a condition of increasing fragmentation and eventual anarchy.

Since 1945 the United States has been the pivotal element in the maintenance of global stability. Initially our primary focus was on the defense of Western Europe. Today, Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East represent three interrelated strategic zones of central importance to the survival of the West as a whole and to global economic stability. This is an important strategic reality, and it has political, as well as military, implications. The United States must work with the countries in all three zones to protect the independence of these regions.

Development of more cooperative relationships with a power such as China is another important new factor in the geopolitical equation, contributing to greater global stability.

Insofar as the strategic nuclear equilibrium is concerned, the last 30 years have seen a shift from a U.S. monopoly and supremacy to a much more complex situation of mutually assured destruction. Moreover, the momentum of the Soviet nuclear buildup does pose the possibility that the Soviet Union may be seeking genuine nuclear war fighting capability. Accordingly, in thinking of the 1980's, we must be sensitive to the nuanced psychological-political relationship between the effective deterrence and war fighting capabilities. Therefore, to maintain effective deterrence, we must upgrade our own capacity to manage a conflict stably and to control nuclear escalation effectively.

Our responsiveness to the increasing complexity of deterrence is but one element in the global power balance. Arms control—a new factor in global security—is also significant. Such steps as SALT I and SALT II, based on the recognition that security cannot be obtained by arms alone, thus contribute to greater stability and predictability in the strategic equation.

The political awakening of mankind and resulting redistribution of power worldwide is the overriding reality of our time. By the end of this century, approximately four-fifths of mankind will be living in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. As a consequence, the West can no longer dominate world affairs. The only alternative to that domination is wider global cooperation

based on the acceptance of basic changes. Nothing less than that can insure that global change is not violent, chaotic, and increasingly exploited by our adversaries.

It is, therefore, important that the inevitable tensions associated with basic sociopolitical change not be exploited by major powers either directly or indirectly. The export of revolution through proxies or by direct military power has to be resisted, for otherwise global change will become global anarchy. These considerations make it imperative that self-restraint be the guiding principle for the conduct of the major powers in relationship to the local conflicts in the more unstable parts of the world.

The key elements of our efforts to promote genuine global cooperation, designed to create a more equitable sharing in global political and economic power, accordingly involve:

- Close cooperation between the United States, Western Europe and Japan;

- The development of more friendly relationships with some of the emerging regionally and internationally influential third world countries, including the moderate Arab countries whose influence is essential in shaping an economically and politically moderate Middle East; and

- More emphasis has to be placed on multilateral and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Association of South East Asian Nations. They represent the emerging new realities of a more genuinely pluralistic world.

As we fashion together the framework within which many of these changes will be assimilated, NATO's role retains vital relevance. The alliance, a guarantor of basic Western security, has special meaning for us in the context of global strategic equilibrium. Let me say a few words about one particularly important aspect of that equilibrium.

Entering its fourth decade, NATO now confronts a challenge and a choice as critical as any in its past. The challenge comes from a resolute, increasingly powerful Soviet Union. The choice, however—whether to acquiesce to Soviet ascendancy or effectively to preclude it—lies with us. Let me speak about both.

First the challenge. It is a fact that the Soviet Union has been steadily increasing its military expenditures over the past 15 or even 20 years. The projection of Soviet power has gained a global capacity; and along with that

capacity the Soviet Union continues to devote major resources to a regional military buildup. In no area is this buildup more pronounced than in the Soviet forces opposite Western Europe. This buildup encompasses all facets of Soviet military power—conventional forces, long-range and shorter range theater nuclear forces, and intercontinental forces.

One part of that buildup—the long-range theater nuclear forces—is of particular concern. The SS-20 missile represents an enormous advance over two previous generations of Soviet missile weaponry in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Compared to the older SS-4 and SS-5, the SS-20 is three times more accurate than the one and six times more accurate than the other. And where an earlier generation of missiles targeted against NATO Europe carried a single warhead, the SS-20 carries three. Moreover, the mobility of the SS-20, its increased range, and the fact that its launcher can be quickly reloaded following an initial salvo significantly enhance both the weapon's destructive force and its ability to survive attack.

In addition to the SS-20 missile, the Soviet Union has developed a medium-range bomber—the Backfire—whose range, greatly exceeding that of earlier Soviet aircraft, enables it to strike directly at Western Europe.

It is clear to us that the Soviets have underway a substantial and sustained program to modernize, expand, and deploy their theater nuclear forces. What this means in practical terms can be simply yet soberly expressed: At current Soviet deployment rates there is one new SS-20 warhead deployed roughly every second day.

Such a sustained effort goes well beyond what could be explained as meeting a reasonable defensive need. Yet in the same period of time, NATO has done virtually nothing to upgrade its own long-range theater nuclear forces.

The challenge we now confront is not only a military one; I believe that we have far more to fear from the possibility of political intimidation. Should NATO be viewed as unwilling or unable to respond to threats of nuclear warfare confined to the European area—as the lack of any effective theater forces would almost certainly make it appear to be—the opportunity for Soviet political pressures would be correspondingly enlarged.

That is the challenge. The choice is squarely up to us. We can, as an alliance, decide to do nothing to offset the substantial modernization in Soviet

theater nuclear forces; we can sit by, hoping we can cope with the consequence of inequality; we can allow ourselves to be lulled into passivity, leaving the alliance in a situation of inequality and growing vulnerability; or we can take effective action now. This means, in turn, the deployment of strong, theater-based systems capable of reaching Soviet territory.

U.S. Commitment to Western Europe

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 10, 1979¹

The security of Western Europe and the security of the United States are indivisible. This central fact has been the basis of our strategic doctrine and our defense planning for four decades or more. Our allies believe, as do we, that our mutual security requires collective effort and that our defense is inseparable. There should be no question about America's commitment to help defend Europe with all the means necessary—nuclear and conventional. The substantial forces we have deployed to Europe are not concrete evidence of that commitment.

As President Carter said in his proclamation on the 30th anniversary of the alliance, "... the firm support of Congress and the American people for NATO reflects their deep conviction that NATO is the cornerstone of United States foreign policy."

NATO's basic strategy is one of flexible response. President Carter has, on several occasions, expressed U.S. support for this strategy. There has been no change, and we contemplate no change.

The defense efforts now underway within NATO demonstrate the collective determination of the allies to meet new challenges. To improve NATO's conventional forces and to make more efficient use of combined resources, the alliance is proceeding with a Long-Term Defense Program. We are cooperating in plans to modernize our theater nuclear forces. And we are developing an agreed alliance position regarding future arms control negotiations.

At the same time, the United States is engaged in a thorough and vigorous program to modernize each leg of our strategic forces. Our determination to maintain the strategic balance is re-

Such a decision to deploy NATO systems would not only keep the credibility of our deterrent intact but would help promote the conditions under which meaningful arms control negotiations between East and West can proceed. In line with our twin goals of deterrence and detente, alliance deliberations over the past year have, in fact, actively explored meaningful

flected most recently in the President's announcement last week that we will proceed with full development of the new MX missile in a mobile basing mode that, while fully verifiable under SALT, will assure the long-term survivability of our land-based strategic forces.

Our strategic modernization programs reflect our determination not only to maintain the strategic balance but also to hold a capacity for flexible response—in terms of size and targets of the response—to any attack at any level of intensity, against us or our allies. That has been U.S. policy for many years. It continues to be U.S. policy. And we will maintain the forces necessary to fulfill it.

This modernization of nuclear and conventional forces is being undertaken precisely because the allies seek to deter aggression by maintaining the integrity and credibility of the whole spectrum of our response options. To deter aggression, NATO must both have—and be perceived to have—the capability, flexibility, and determination to respond as appropriate. Only in this way can we demonstrate to the Warsaw Pact the costs of embarking upon or continuing a conflict and the risk that a conventional European regional conflict would escalate to a general nuclear war.

The security of the alliance depends not only on collective military forces and resolve—although these are indispensable—it depends as well on common ties among allied peoples and their creativity and vitality in meeting the challenges we confront together. We are confident of the alliance's continued ability to do so. □

¹ Made available to the press by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

Review of U.S. Policy in Europe

by George S. Vest

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 12, 1979.¹

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the state of U.S. relations in Europe. I know that your overriding concern is U.S. policy. What are our main objectives? What have we achieved? What remains to be done?

It is with an eye to those central issues that this annual review is addressed. The succinct answer to your questions is that U.S.-European relations are in good shape.

- We have reaffirmed and reinforced our commitment to the traditional principles of U.S. policy and to our transatlantic partners.

- We continue to stress items of highest priority for the U.S. national interest—Western solidarity, the military defense of the West, economic well-being, the preservation and de-

velopment of democratic institutions in Western Europe, and the promotion of constructive relations with the diverse countries of Eastern Europe.

- We are working together with the governments of Western Europe and Canada on major issues of mutual concern. They have, for example, expressed strong support for SALT II, and they recognize the continuing need to cooperate on the economic challenges before us all.

To elaborate on these larger themes that pervade recent and current U.S. policy toward Europe, I will start with a discussion of our role vis-a-vis the major institutions of Europe. I will then move to discussion of our bilateral ties with the Western European and nonaligned nations and Canada. I will conclude with a summary of the evolution of our relations in Eastern Europe.

Western Military Security

Concern for the security of our citizens remains fundamental to U.S. foreign policy. In that regard, the

Defense and Detente (Cont'd)

arms control policy along with the need to modernize nuclear-capable systems. It is no secret that we view both paths—effective arms control and modernization—as complementary and that we look for credible movement along both by the end of this year. The true test of NATO's purpose lies with our allied parliaments and publics. Are they willing to pay the political price required to avoid the infinitely more costly alternative of intimidation at best, and even war at worst?

Let there be no question about our commitment nor of our determination to help defend Europe by all means necessary—nuclear and conventional. The U.S. commitment to the security of Europe is unshakable. It is organic. It is complete. We view the security of Western Europe as an extension of our own security. We recognize that any threat to the security of Western Europe is a direct threat to the security of the United States. The American commitment—nuclear and conventional—to the defense of Europe is an integral part of our own defense posture. There are no conceivable circumstances in which we would not react to a security threat directed at our allies in Europe.

The danger we could face in the 1980's will not be American decoupling from Western Europe; rather, the danger will derive from Soviet miscalculation—that is, from the belief that the alliance, through failure to keep pace with a changing strategic environment, has decoupled from its traditional purpose.

We must remove any possible grounds for that miscalculation. It is my belief that the decision which President Carter made a few weeks ago on the MX missile and the decisions which NATO must soon make on theater nuclear forces are as important as any the Western allies will ever face. Historically, those decisions rank with President Truman's creation of a strategic bomber command and President Kennedy's deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Positive action now will give us survivable systems on both sides of the Atlantic. These, in turn, will greatly enhance the West's crisis-bargaining capability and thus contribute to global stability.

We are approaching a watershed in our alliance. The issue confronting us is fundamentally a simple one: We do not have to choose between detente and defense; we must have both, and—with political will—we can. □

American role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is central. This year we celebrated the 30th anniversary of an alliance which, according to President Carter, has "... successfully deterred war and maintained stability in Western Europe and North America, thus securing the well-being and prosperity of its fifteen member states ..."

NATO's main purpose is, in the words of the North Atlantic Treaty, "... To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law," and "... to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." NATO's basic means to achieve these goals are to deter war in the North Atlantic community and to defend its member states, if deterrence fails, by sustaining the credibility of NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response based on a triad of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces.

U.S. policies to carry out this strategy center, in the first instance, on the modernization of theater nuclear and conventional forces. These improvements are required in order to maintain the credibility of NATO strategy in the face of Soviet theater nuclear and conventional force improvements over the past decade.

U.S. policies toward NATO, in the second instance, aim at restraining arms competition in strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional armaments. We carried out continuous consultations with our NATO partners on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), and we coordinate closely with them on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and other arms control initiatives.

Thus, U.S. policy toward NATO offers the Soviet Union and its allies an alternative to an unrelenting force buildup, while NATO force improvements offer them an incentive to move forward on this option.

Equally important, the United States pursues these policies in NATO in a way that preserves political cohesion among members of the alliance. It is in the interest of NATO solidarity that we consult continuously with our allies not only on the issues of arms control but also on global issues where the national interests of the United States and its allies intersect.

The impact of U.S. policy on this institutional cornerstone of Western security is impressive. We held a ministerial meeting recently at which there was a most useful exchange of views. We are confident that our effort

to help shore up NATO's defenses, renewed after long concentration on Southeast Asia, is making headway.

- On conventional forces, the NATO summit a year ago approved the Long-Term Defense Program. It provides programmatic remedies for such deficiencies in conventional forces as antiarmor, reenforcement, reserve mobilization, maritime, air defense, and logistics. Complementing the program was the NATO summit's commitment to the goal of 3% real annual increases in members' defense spending. Needed improvements could not have been made on the basis of existing levels of defense expenditure. The summit also approved alliance cooperation in the development and production of armaments in order to bring about greater standardization and interoperability of NATO arms and greater efficiency in the employment of economic resources.

- On theater nuclear forces the Long-Term Defense Program gives impetus to consultations with allies on the need to modernize. The question has taken on particular importance in view of the continuing deployment of Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems targeted on Western Europe, such as the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber. These consultations, carried on in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group's high level group (which we chair), are moving toward recommendations for theater nuclear force modernization. In parallel with this process, we are consulting with our allies on theater nuclear arms control measures in the special group, which the United States also chairs.

- On strategic arms limitations, we have consulted closely with our European allies and Canada over the course of the recent years to insure that the SALT II treaty protects and enhances their security. The consultations have focused on treaty issues of particular interest to the allies, such as the protocol cruise missile restrictions and the noncircumvention provision. European leaders made clear their support for SALT II at the Guadeloupe summit last January, in individual governmental statements in the intervening months and, most recently, at the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers' meetings in May and after the NATO Council reviewed the treaty on June 29.

I could not give a comprehensive review of our NATO policies without touching on the question of enhanced radiation warheads, the so-called neutron bomb. This defensive tactical nuclear weapon was designed to counter an enemy tank assault with a

nuclear warhead which would cause less collateral damage than existing nuclear weapons. The President decided in April 1978 to defer production of the weapon but to modernize tactical nuclear forces in such a way as to leave open the option of adding it at some future time, depending on Soviet restraint.

In addition to the defense side of our policy toward NATO, we have, on the political side, sustained the vital consultative process on issues of mutual concern. East-West relations, the Mideast, China, Southeast Asia, and Africa have been prominent among the questions of foreign policy we have addressed in the NATO Council, often with special experts sent from Washington for the meetings.

The need to preserve political cohesion in NATO, while a truism, can never be taken for granted, precisely because we are an alliance of 15 sovereign equals. And, the greatest single burden in this respect falls on the United States. It is, in part, for that reason that President Carter has met three times with the North Atlantic Council. Our leadership is an imperative. Further, the manner in which we lead influences NATO's cohesiveness as well as its effectiveness.

The fact that NATO's basic fabric is strong and resilient in 1979 is a signal achievement. It may be a greater accomplishment now than it was in 1959 or 1969 when we were in the midst of, or were just emerging from, the cold war. To have preserved the commitment of NATO's 15 members to the alliance has been a difficult challenge in an increasingly multipolar world where defense and detente have been our declared policy since 1967. And, it has been all the more difficult for NATO to confront collectively the unprecedented, broad range of divisive issues that face the West today.

Finally, the very success of our efforts to preserve Western security begets new challenges. On the defense side, our success in achieving alliance agreement on how to respond to the Warsaw Pact conventional and theater nuclear challenge leaves the need to follow through with implementation of agreed decisions.

- On the Long-Range Defense Program, the United States must lead the effort for vigorous followthrough on the 123 conventional force improvement measures approved at the NATO summit a year ago.

- On improved cooperation in NATO armaments, U.S. leadership will require imagination and face hard choices, given the economic as well as

military implications of this issue. The executive branch intends to work closely with the Congress and with U.S. business and industry.

- Similarly, carrying out the goal of a 3% increase in defense expenditures will necessitate equally tough choices. If we fail to fulfill our commitments, our allies are likely to find it impossible to convince their own publics and parliaments of this need.

- On theater nuclear force modernization, we will continue to consult closely with allies, looking to NATO decisions near the end of the year.

- Close consultations will be the order of the day for SALT III.

- On the political side, the current effectiveness of our intensive consultations in NATO does not relieve us of the task of maintaining that process. It is a primary necessity for NATO, as well as for our own foreign and security policies. And, needless to say, we in the executive branch attach comparable importance to the need to continue to consult with the Congress as we move ahead on issues vital to U.S. security.

Western Economic Well-Being

There can be no enduring military security without a sound basis in economic strength. Recession can imperil the defensive underpinnings of the alliance and the political stability of its member states. Concern about economic issues in general and energy in particular ranks uppermost in the minds of Europeans, as much as with most Americans.

How to deal with shared economic problems is thus a major consideration in U.S.-European relations. Because the problems are so great and because the need for cooperation is so clear, we have put primary emphasis on working together. Recognition of the necessity for close consultation on shared challenges to our economic well-being is the basis for holding economic summits and it accounts for the special emphasis we place on working with two major multilateral institutions—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Community (EC).

We have made a concerted and continuing effort to underscore the role of the OECD as a major forum for cooperation among the industrialized nations. At the June 13-14 OECD ministerial meeting, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal, and Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Charles Schultze headed the U.S. delegation. They focused on the

need to grapple collectively with such problems as sustained noninflationary economic growth, payments imbalances and the international monetary situation, energy, the North-South dialogue, and structural change brought about by changes in technology and relative prices, as well as shifting patterns of world production and trade.

Using the OECD as the principal forum, we have engaged in extensive consultations with the EC nine and other European countries on North-South issues. We have been successful in building support for U.S. views and in achieving a common position among the OECD member countries in meetings such as the recently concluded UNCTAD V [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] session in Manila. This time, the industrialized countries had a cohesive approach, and we avoided acrimonious disputes with our allies.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), an independent agency within the OECD framework, is the principal forum for consumer country cooperation on energy matters. As recent price and supply developments illustrate, there is a need to maintain a united consumer country position and for careful management of the situation. The IEA ministerial meeting, May 21-22, reconfirmed the decision for members to adopt measures to reduce their collective demand for oil by 2 million barrels per day, or by about 5% of anticipated 1979 IEA demand. The ministers decided to continue such efforts in 1980 and agreed on a set of policies and principles for enhancing coal utilization, production, and trade. France, although not an IEA member, has adopted parallel conservation measures. The EC is an IEA participant and the EC energy program has reflected IEA recommendations. The Tokyo summit commitments to limit oil imports are based upon the IEA program.

A substantial package of economic assistance for Turkey has been developed within the OECD framework, with the Federal Republic of Germany and OECD Secretary General Van Lennep playing key lead roles. A pledging session in Paris, May 30, resulted in commitments in excess of \$900 million over the next year in the form of concessional credits, export credits, and grants. The U.S. share is approximately \$250 million, subject to congressional authorization and appropriation. The pledging of these funds has facilitated the completion of an agreement between the Turkish Government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on appropriate economic

policies. We expect to receive formal IMF approval later this month.

U.S. support for the process of European integration, exemplified by the evolution of the European Community, remains strong. We consider progress toward European unity of primary importance for Europe, for the West, and for the world. At the same time, we believe that European unity must be achieved by the Europeans themselves. It is in that spirit that we follow with interest such milestones in the move toward European unity as the establishment of the European monetary system, the enlargement of the Community to include nations of southern Europe, and the holding of direct elections to the European Parliament. We view these developments and others as reflections of the growing habit of Europeans to think and act in the European context.

- We welcome the European monetary system, launched on March 13, 1979, by all EC members except the United Kingdom. It is an effort to stabilize intra-EC exchange rates and to provide additional resources to counter exchange speculation. It is a major Franco-German political initiative, designed to stabilize European currencies and, incidentally, to foster European economic integration. Its long-term success will depend on the member states' ability to harmonize their economic policies.

- We applaud the signing of a treaty of accession for Greece on May 28, 1979. After ratification by all the national parliaments, Greece is expected to become the 10th EC member on January 1, 1981. Portugal and Spain have also applied for membership and substantive negotiations are expected to begin this fall, with entry into the EC as early as 1982-83. The primary motivation for EC enlargement is political: to bind the newly democratic applicants to the more advanced European democracies and thereby enhance their political and economic stability.

- We consider the first elections to the European Parliament, June 7-10, a significant step forward for Europe. The shift to direct elections will not increase the limited advisory and oversight powers of the Parliament, but the new legislators will adopt a higher profile than their appointed predecessors and will gradually seek to expand their influence. We hope that, in due course, the present ties between the Congress and the European Parliament can be strengthened to reflect the significance of the June elections.

In addition to expanding U.S. activity in the OECD and increasing cooperation with the EC, there are other de-

velopments in the economic realm that merit mention. We continue to participate in economic summits as one of several means to buttress joint action for economic well-being. The economic summit in Tokyo was a crucial opportunity to focus on such priority issues as energy.

In the area of energy, the most important decisions revolved around the commitment to set national ceilings for oil imports for 1980 and 1985 and to insure adequate resources for the development and commercial application of technologies for alternative sources of energy. Both the OECD, including the IEA, and the European Community will play a significant role in the followup to the commitments made by the summit participants.

Although energy was the key issue discussed at the Tokyo summit, the participants also made commitments to do more to improve the long-term productive efficiency and flexibility of their economies, to implement the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), to achieve durable external equilibrium, and to pursue constructive North-South relations.

After years of arduous bargaining, we have achieved the successful conclusion of the MTN. U.S.-EC negotiations lay at the heart of the MTN because of the Community's weight in world trade. We have, in consultation with the Congress, prepared the necessary U.S. implementing legislation. We will be consulting closely with the EC and other European countries to insure that their implementing regulations and legislative procedures are a comprehensive and accurate reflection of the agreements reached at Geneva. With ratification, we will have to put the new rules into practice through revised GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] procedures and thus be able to deal with trade disputes over the coming decades.

Over the past year, we have been working closely with our European allies to arrive at reasonable solutions which balance proliferation concerns with energy needs. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is part of this process. In addition, as required by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, we are negotiating a new nuclear cooperation agreement with the EC and hope to conclude a new agreement sometime next year after the end of INFCE. We are also working with the EC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna to accelerate the conclusion of facility inspection arrangements between the EC and the IAEA.

Bilateral Relations

Although the United States places significant emphasis on using multilateral institutions to help foster Western military security and economic well-being, we must, at the same time, deal with our European counterparts and nonaligned nations effectively on a bilateral basis. Here—as with NATO, the OECD, and the EC—we are searching together for solutions to problems that affect both Europeans and Americans.

We have deepened mutual understanding on bilateral policy issues with the **Federal Republic of Germany** through intensified consultations. Of particular note during the last year were the President's highly successful state visit to the F.R.G. in July 1978 and Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Washington last month. The Chancellor has countered reports of a deterioration in U.S.-F.R.G. relations in major speeches in Germany and during his June 1979 visit in the United States. In a speech at the University of South Carolina, for example, he emphasized that firm U.S.-German ties are a reliable feature in today's international affairs and that "the focus of our relations is no longer on a purely bilateral relationship but on the wider tasks and responsibilities which we share."

He has expressed strong support for the President's efforts to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East and for the prompt conclusion and ratification of SALT II. Areas of U.S.-West German relations requiring continued special attention include military-security policy, East-West relations, the coordination of economic measures, and policies on nuclear energy and export.

We continue to have a positive relationship with **France** based on mutual respect and exemplified by the recent Washington visit by French Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet and effective consultations with the French during their term in the EC presidency this year. We recognize that, in its role as a major power, France has its own views on such questions as peace in the Middle East, organizing assistance for Africa, conventional disarmament in Europe, oil price ceilings, and export credit competition. All of these questions are under extensive discussion, as are such questions as nuclear non-proliferation where there is now a greater identity of view. The important underlying factor in all these questions is that French and U.S. basic objectives in the world are similar, while we sometimes seek their achievement along different but parallel paths.

Since I talked with your committee last year, the Conservative Party in

Great Britain has returned to power. Prime Minister Thatcher's victory, May 3, has given her party a solid working majority in Parliament and a strong mandate to try a Tory approach to dominant domestic economic issues. We expect our close ties with Britain to continue, as we work together on problems of mutual interest, especially those regarding Western security and southern Africa. If differences of view on some specific issues should emerge between us and the new British Government, we are confident that they will be resolved through the close and continuing cooperation that has long existed between our two countries. The Administration's dealings with the new British Government got off to an excellent start when Secretary Vance visited London, May 20-24. The President and Mrs. Thatcher met in Tokyo for the economic summit last month.

We remain distressed by the continuing violence in **Northern Ireland** which, although below the level of several years ago, still claims lives with tragic regularity and disrupts social peace and economic progress. As President Carter has said, our policy on Northern Ireland is one of impartiality,

and we recognize that the only permanent solution must come from the people who live there. Given a settlement acceptable to both parts of the community, we would be prepared to join with others to see how job-creating investment could be encouraged for the benefit of all in Northern Ireland.

We, of course, continue to enjoy close ties with the **Republic of Ireland** and are pleased to witness its continuing economic growth. We welcome Ireland's increased activity on the world scene, as evidenced by its contribution of troops to U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and its assumption of the presidency of the European Economic Community for the second half of this year. We look forward to the visit of Prime Minister Lynch this November. That occasion will give us the opportunity to consult with him in his dual capacity as head of government and president of the Council of Ministers of the European Community.

We have continued our traditionally close ties with the nations of the Nordic area, an area of growing strategic significance in the light of the steady build-up of Soviet forces on the nearby Kola Peninsula. Vice President Mon-

Fourth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, AUG. 1, 1979¹

On this day in 1975, the leaders of 35 states met in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They pledged to build a future of peace and stability in Europe on the strong foundation of mutual understanding and respect for fundamental human rights.

In the years since Helsinki, we have witnessed conscientious efforts on the part of many signatory states to fulfill, fully and completely, their obligations under the Final Act. We have made progress in insuring the freer flow of people and ideas. Flagrant abuses of human rights no longer go unnoticed and unchallenged.

The Final Act provision which calls for notification of large military maneuvers has worked well. The spirit of Helsinki is alive. But there have also been important setbacks. For example, in the German Democratic Republic, harsh new laws designed to restrict

contact with foreigners will take effect today, on the anniversary of Helsinki. In Czechoslovakia, members of the Charter '77 movement remain in prison, facing trial for their dedication to basic human freedoms. In the Soviet Union, organizations established to monitor compliance with the Helsinki agreement have been harassed and their members jailed. Acts like these are totally inconsistent with pledges made at Helsinki.

On the anniversary of the Helsinki accords, I rededicate this Administration and this nation to strive tirelessly for full implementation of the Final Act. We will continue to review our own record in preparation for the meeting of CSCE states at Madrid in 1980. And we call upon other signatory states to work with us so that we may mutually fulfill the obligations undertaken at Helsinki to peace, security, and human rights. □

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1979.

dale's trip to northern Europe in April 1979 demonstrated the solidarity of our NATO links to **Iceland, Norway, and Denmark**. On the same journey, he visited **Sweden and Finland** as visible evidence of our respect for these nations and their policy of neutrality, which also contributes to the stability of the northern region. The Vice President's trip to northern Europe was the first undertaken of that scope and at that level since Lyndon Johnson visited the area as Vice President in 1963.

Although the Nordic countries have differing security policies, they share common concerns with each other and with the United States on such global issues as human rights, East-West relations, arms control, U.N. peace-keeping, the Middle East, and economic development of the Third World. Vice President Mondale's trip provided an opportunity for high-level consultation on these world issues where the Nordic countries play a leading role and where their advice and support are important to us. The visit last month to Washington of Norwegian Prime Minister Nordli was a welcome reaffirmation of this process. Both in our talks and in public statements, Nordli stressed Norway's "close commitment" to NATO and emphasized that "SALT is an important element in the evolution of the East-West detente."

Our relations with the **Benelux** countries continue to be excellent and largely free of bilateral problems. We welcome their contributions to NATO defense and to peaceful solutions to common problems, both political and economic. Examples of these include the Belgian contribution to stability in Zaire and the Dutch contribution of troops for the U.N. forces in Lebanon. The Vice President's visit to the Netherlands in April underlined the importance we attach to that country and the rest of the Benelux.

U.S. policy goals in **Spain** remain to support Spanish democracy and Spanish integration with the rest of Western Europe and to maintain our mutually beneficial security relationship. Our cooperation under the 1976 treaty of friendship and cooperation contributes to the security of both nations and makes an important contribution to the defense of Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

Spain has made tremendous progress in its transition to democracy in the face of serious political and economic difficulties. Having adopted a new democratic constitution and carried out both national and local elections since December, the country is about to enter a challenging post-transition phase of

political life in which fundamental issues—such as economic policy, basic implementing legislation, and regional autonomy—must be addressed. Of particular seriousness is the problem of the continued, brutal terrorist campaign to destabilize Spanish democracy.

Our support for Spain, as manifested by the Administration and the Congress, and by our close relationship, assists the Spanish people in their efforts to realize the democratic ideals we share. Secretary [of Defense] Brown visited Madrid in mid-May. On June 1, Secretary Vance cochaired a meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council in Madrid and met with the King and the Prime Minister.

U.S. relations with **Portugal** continue to be excellent. Our governments' shared goals of democratic consolidation and professionalization of the military were recently highlighted and reinforced during visits to Portugal by Secretary Brown and Senator Edmund Muskie and a meeting between Secretary Vance and the Portuguese Foreign Minister at The Hague. Secretary Vance stopped in Lisbon, June 18-19 to sign the extension of the Azores base agreement.

With the May 30 passage of the budget, Portugal can also look forward to resuming negotiations with the IMF on a third credit tranche standby. The fourth constitutional government headed by Prime Minister Mota Pinto submitted its resignation on June 6 but will remain in caretaker status until a government is formed or elections are held. The debate over the formation of any future government is, however, distinguished by the continued firm commitment to the democratic process and by a common willingness to seek a reasonable compromise to solve present problems.

Our important interests in **Italy** remain what they have been since the war. Italy's strategic position in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, its willingness to host American military bases dedicated to NATO, its nearly total support for American foreign policy positions, and its status as a major U.S. trading partner underscore the value of good U.S.-Italian relations.

Over the past year and a half, we have tried to reinforce our close relationship with Italy by pursuing a "strategy of cooperation" comprising concrete, mutually beneficial projects in such diverse fields as energy, health, and the environment. The program stresses medium- to long-range efforts to assist the Italians to solve their serious problems, to solidify our relations for the future, and to take advantage of

Italian expertise in areas where they are advanced, like solar energy. We have also encouraged high-level visits between our two countries, the latest being that of Secretary Vance less than 6 weeks ago.

Elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean, the United States continues to work for stability in the area, including good relations with Greece and Turkey, progress toward a Cyprus solution, and the general strengthening of democracy among the countries of the region. During the past year, there have been significant developments in all of these areas.

With regard to **Cyprus**, the Administration has been actively engaged over the past year in seeking to promote an early and effective resumption of intercommunal negotiations. The centerpiece of this effort was the series of substantive suggestions that we submitted to the two Cypriot parties last November 10, in conjunction with the British and Canadian Governments. We are gratified that our efforts and the initiative undertaken by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim resulted in an agreement to resume intercommunal negotiations June 15. Unfortunately, these talks have run into temporary difficulties over the agenda and have now been recessed.

We hope, however, that these difficulties will be overcome soon and that we will see sustained and productive negotiations leading to concrete progress toward a mutually acceptable settlement. As in past months, we will work closely with the United Nations, the Cypriot parties, and our allies to help insure the success of these talks.

Turkey continues to be plagued by serious economic problems. We have worked to help solve them by proposing a substantial U.S. assistance program, as well as by working with other countries in a multilateral effort led by the Federal Republic of Germany to provide Turkey with needed foreign exchange so that necessary steps can be taken by the Turkish Government to start on the road to economic recovery. As I noted earlier, the multilateral effort is proceeding well.

Our security relationship with Turkey has also improved. In response to the lifting of the arms embargo, the Turkish Government, on October 9, 1978, authorized the resumption of U.S. military activities in Turkey. The authorization was for a 1-year period during which a permanent arrangement for the operations of the activities is to be negotiated. Formal negotiations began on January 18, 1979, and are continuing. They involve several complex issues and much work remains to

be done, but we are confident that we will work out a mutually satisfactory agreement.

Discussions are continuing within NATO to develop arrangements for the reintegration of Greek forces into the alliance's integrated military structure. As you know, **Greece** withdrew its forces in 1974 at the time of the Cyprus events. In the interim, there have been command changes on the southern flank which make necessary new command and control arrangements in the sensitive Aegean area. The issue has been handled in NATO military channels with Gen. [Alexander] Haig playing a key role in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The retirement of Gen. Haig will not halt the process. As we have stated repeatedly, we believe it is important to secure the return of Greek forces at the earliest possible time.

Greece, in the meantime, is enjoying a continuing period of economic vitality and democratic strength, as demonstrated by it signing a treaty of accession to the European Communities. That development contributes to one of our major policy goals—stability in the vital eastern Mediterranean area.

U.S. relations with **Canada** are excellent. We enjoyed close working relations with the Trudeau government and look forward to continuing close cooperation with Prime Minister Joe Clark. We particularly value the cooperative approaches to the energy challenge which we have effected with the Canadians, as well as cooperation on such global concerns as the Cyprus dispute, southern Africa, the Mideast peace effort, and assistance for Indochinese refugees.

We are gratified by Prime Minister Clark's reaffirmation of Canada's commitment to NATO and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and his indication that Canada should increase defense spending. Finally, we hope that longstanding differences on fisheries and boundary issues in the Gulf of Maine will be resolved by two treaties signed last March, agreements that we hope will be considered and approved promptly by the Senate.

Our good relations with **Switzerland** have been bolstered in recent months by visits from the Swiss Minister of Defense, Gnaegi, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aubert. Both visits went smoothly. While reaffirming their own stance of armed neutrality, the Swiss have shown support for most aspects of U.S. foreign policy. We have a modest but important defense relationship with them, including co-

14th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 25, 1979¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past sixty days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

In my last report to the Congress on Cyprus, dated June 4, I took note of the decision reached by President Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash during their May 18-19 meetings to resume intercommunal negotiations on June 15. These negotiations resumed as scheduled under the chairmanship of United Nations Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. A number of procedural issues were settled in the course of the first session. Unfortunately, however, differences soon arose over the interpretation of the ten-point communique agreed upon in Nicosia on May 18-19, which serves as a broad agenda for the talks. The Greek Cypriots took the position that the Varosha issue should be discussed first in accordance with point five of the communique which states that "priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha." The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, maintained that point two of the communique, dealing with the overall basis for the talks, should be discussed first.

When it became clear that these differences of approach could not easily be overcome, Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar decided to recess the negotiations on June 22 and to pursue a compromise resolution through informal consultations with the parties. These consultations have now been in progress in Nicosia for some four weeks. As of this writ-

ing, no firm date has been set for reconvening the talks, although there have been indications of greater flexibility and the elements of a solution are beginning to emerge. Our assessment is that given sufficient determination on the part of all concerned a practical way can be found out of these current difficulties that will permit the negotiators to return to the table within a short time. I assure you that this Administration will continue to work closely with the United Nations, the Cypriot parties and our allies both to overcome the present, hopefully temporary, difficulties and to help ensure ultimate success in the negotiations.

The Turkish Cypriot side has not yet given final endorsement to the procedures worked out in Nicosia on May 18-19 concerning the formation of a joint committee to trace and account for missing persons in Cyprus. With the assistance of expert organizations such as the International Red Cross, the proposed joint committee should be in a position to resolve this long-standing humanitarian problem.

I enclose with this report a copy of Secretary-General Waldheim's comprehensive report on May 31 to the United Nations Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER □

¹ Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 30, 1979).

production arrangements for some U.S. weaponry.

U.S. relations with **Austria** are essentially troublefree. We respect Austria's neutrality under the 1955 state treaty; at the same time, we admire its democratic development and prosperity. We support the Austrian desire to make of Vienna a third U.N. city, and we are grateful for Austrian hospitality in connection with the summit conference held there in June.

U.S. relations with nonaligned **Yugoslavia** have continued to improve across the board, as both sides have demonstrated a conscious effort to resolve differences and to build a climate of trust for the present and the future. President Tito's state visit to Washington in March 1978 provided the opportunity for in-depth discussions. This

dialogue has continued through a dozen or so letters between the two Presidents and through frequent consultations. Other Yugoslav visitors have included Assembly President Markovic and Defense Secretary Ljubicic. From our side, several Cabinet-level officials have visited Yugoslavia or are planning to this year.

In the economic area, we have made significant efforts to increase trade and to improve further the climate for U.S. business in Yugoslavia. The United States is Yugoslavia's fourth largest trade partner and is first in the value of joint ventures, but we are convinced that both trade and investment can be increased further.

In scientific affairs, the two sides recently reviewed the achievements of the joint science and technology pro-

gram over the past 5 years, but the future of this highly successful program is clouded by the prospect that the United States may be forced to cut its contribution to about one-third of the level of the past 5 years.

On the cultural side, Joan Mondale recently opened a major exhibit of American arts in Belgrade. Mrs. Mondale also visited the earthquake-stricken Republic of Montenegro. Following the severe earthquake, April 15, the United States mobilized a major disaster relief effort which resulted in the prompt delivery of nearly \$1.3 million worth of relief supplies. We are currently in the process of working out a program of longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

All of this activity is in support of a policy which has remained consistent through every Administration since 1948: We support Yugoslavia's independence, territorial integrity, and unity. But, in addition, we are trying to move our relations toward broader interchange, mutual understanding, and confidence.

Evolution of East-West Relations

Much that the United States pursues with the nations of Western Europe, Canada, and Yugoslavia reflects our shared interest in fostering improved East-West relations. The Carter Administration has devoted substantial high-level attention to this area of concern. Since I understand that you will be holding separate hearings on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and SALT, I will focus on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

We are grateful to this subcommittee for your initiative in convening hearings last year on recent developments and trends in Eastern Europe. The statement which then Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers presented to you, September 7, remains valid as a comprehensive account of U.S. policy and objectives toward the region. As Mr. Luers indicated then, we are mindful of the increased diversity in Eastern Europe and, at the same time, of the importance of contributing to the security of all of Europe in pursuing our policies. Thus, we intend neither to leave our relations with Eastern Europe hostage to relations with the Soviet Union nor to conduct a policy that is reckless and destabilizing.

In Eastern Europe, we have continued to make progress toward more normal relations with individual countries. We have expanded and intensified human contacts, trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, and discussions of political and security issues.

Our approach is designed to recognize and support the sovereignty and individuality of each Eastern European nation in its domestic and foreign affairs.

During the past 18 months, our relations with **Romania, Poland, and Hungary** have been particularly active and fruitful. For example, with Romania, which pursues an independent foreign policy in many respects, we have conducted a useful dialogue on a broad range of international political and economic issues. These discussions were given special impetus during President Ceausescu's visit here in April 1978 and by subsequent visits to Romania by Secretaries Blumenthal [Treasury] and Kreps [Commerce].

With Poland, official and nongovernmental exchanges continue to develop, and the level of our two-way trade rose to over \$1 billion last year. Earlier this week, Polish Foreign Minister Emil Wojtaszek visited Washington for an extensive review of bilateral and international issues. And, U.S.-Hungarian relations continued to improve, as demonstrated by successful conclusion last year of a bilateral trade agreement extending most favored nation tariff treatment to the exports of both countries.

With **Czechoslovakia** our first priority continues to be a satisfactory resolution of the nationalization claims of U.S. citizens. Following consultations with the Congress, we hope to be able to initiate new talks on this longstanding problem in the coming months.

Our relations with **Bulgaria** have continued to show gradual improvement, although progress in family reunification has been slower than we had hoped.

The United States is continuing to try to develop improved relations with the **German Democratic Republic**. We recently completed negotiation of a consular convention with the G.D.R. in which, to our satisfaction and that of the F.R.G., we successfully defended the position that there is a single German nationality. When the convention has been signed, the way will be open for some modest development of our relations with the G.D.R. For example, the G.D.R. will then be allowed to open two trade offices in New York. We will continue to stress claims, our desire for more action on divided family cases, and the need for a general improvement in their emigration record.

Of course, we continue to have certain fundamental differences with the governments of the Eastern European countries. We are concerned about the lack of democratic institutions, about

uneven observance of human rights, and issues such as divided families and denial of freedom of movement which directly affect many American citizens. But, it is also clear that the expansion of U.S. relations with these countries has enhanced our ability to talk candidly with their governments about these and other issues.

During the past months, for example, we have had constructive consultations with Eastern European governments concerning further progress in implementing all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, and we expect to continue to use these bilateral exchanges as we approach the Madrid Review Conference for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Indeed, continuing attention to the CSCE process has been an integral part of U.S. policy in the area of East-West relations. Our objective in the CSCE is to achieve full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and thereby reduce international tensions, improve observance of human rights, and solve some of the human problems caused by the political differences among European states. Progress has been slow, and there have been many setbacks. Yet, we have seen some effort by all signatories to implement the Final Act and thus believe that sustained attention to carrying out the commitments undertaken in Helsinki will have a positive effect.

The first meeting for review of implementation, held in Belgrade, ended in March 1978. That meeting achieved our major aim of providing a full and complete review of the follow-through of the Helsinki accords. The time since the Belgrade meeting has been devoted to a series of experts meetings; to prepare a scientific forum; to discuss peaceful settlement of disputes; and to consider economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation in the Mediterranean.

In addition the United States, its allies, and the other participating states in the CSCE have now turned their attention fully to the review meeting to be held in Madrid in 1980. The United States has held bilateral consultations, using the Final Act as a framework, with Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland. Consultations were recently held with Yugoslavia and Sweden. We have also had the first of a long series of discussions on the Madrid meeting in NATO. We anticipate that these consultations will continue throughout the period leading to Madrid.

At that meeting, the United States favors seeking a review of implementation of the Final Act and consideration of a limited number of new proposals. Any new proposals should be balanced to reflect the major concerns of the Final Act. We should not favor, for example, adopting new proposals in the military area without including new humanitarian measures.

Conclusion

Concern with security and the importance of the individual brings me full circle in this tour d'horizon of U.S.-European relations. Several points of particular import emerge from this summary of Western military security, Western economic well-being, bilateral relations with individual nations, and the evolution of East-West relations.

First, U.S. objectives in Europe are clear. We have a firm sense of overall direction and priority. We consider U.S. relations with Europe the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Through pursuit of shared aspirations with the nations of Western Europe and Canada, we seek to assure strong defense and fullest possible economic and political opportunity for our citizens. Through promotion of detente with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we try to curtail dangerous competition and expand constructive cooperation.

Second, active and sustained pursuit of these goals has helped serve important U.S. interests. Relations with the nations of Western Europe and Canada are sound. Although much of the rest of the world is torn by turmoil, there is institutional stability and a sense of communal progress in the west. Since I last met with you for a review of U.S.-European relations, there have been elections in 10 European countries. Transitions have been orderly, both in terms of the changing of guard from one government to the next and in terms of continuing American cooperation with the new heads of government. For the first time in its history, all members of NATO are democracies. We have resisted retrenchment into national reaction to challenges that transcend borders. We have, instead, reached out to work together on mutual problems for mutual benefit. It is for that reason that NATO is strong and growing stronger and that we have resisted the worst protectionist pressures in a generation in order to try together to shape a healthier world economy. At the same time, we have achieved continuing success in building more normal relations with Eastern Europe—

relations that reflect the diversity of the area, our interest in security, and our concerns with fundamental human rights.

Third, we recognize that, despite some achievements to date, much remains to be done. The problems before us—most notably those in the area of economics and energy and those in the sphere of East-West relations—are complex. Bilateral frictions persist. Uncertainties exist within some European nations, especially those in the Mediterranean area. We are, however, determined to persist in the pursuit of vital U.S. objectives. And, we feel confident that we can succeed. As Secretary Vance stated in his address before the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on December 9, 1978:

We have passed through a particularly difficult period during the 1970's. But we have navigated these turbulent waters. Although the course ahead remains demanding, the progress we have made should give us great confidence in our future. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Fisheries Agreement With Denmark, Faroe Islands

On September 5, 1979, representatives of the Government of the United States of America on the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands on the other part, signed a new agreement relating to fishing activities of the Faroe Islands off the coasts of the United States.

The agreement sets out the arrangements between the countries which will govern fishing by Faroese vessels within the fishery conservation zone of the United States. The agreement will come into force after the completion of internal procedures by the governments. □

Press release 215 of Sept. 5, 1979.

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MIDDLE EAST: *Vision of Peace*

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Address before the World Jewish Congress in New York City on September 17, 1979. Mr. Brzezinski is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.¹

We meet at an historic moment. One year ago tonight, President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat signed the Camp David accords. The electrifying meeting in the White House East Room culminated 13 days of the most intensive diplomatic negotiation in history. It marked the first moment, in 30 years of efforts, when people could truly say: Yes, peace is possible in the Middle East.

President Carter spoke that night for all Americans:

We are privileged to witness tonight a significant achievement in the cause of peace, an achievement none thought possible a year ago, or even a month ago, an achievement that reflects the courage and wisdom of these two leaders.

And I may say, as one privileged to have participated at Camp David, that none of this would have been possible without the courage and wisdom of that

begun. Last March 26, for the first time in its history, Israel at last found itself at peace—a real peace—with one of its neighbors. I can only tell you that nothing I have ever experienced can compare with that moment at the airport in Cairo, when President Carter lifted the phone to tell Prime Minister Begin that peace was finally within grasp. It was an extraordinary triumph of statesmanship, of personal courage, of vision—a triumph shared by President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat.

I felt deep pride in all three men for what they alone, in a long line of leaders of these three nations, had accomplished for the people of Israel, for the people of Egypt, and—I believe—ultimately for all the peoples of the Middle East. “No more war, no more bloodshed, no more bereavement.”—the words of Prime Minister Begin at the treaty signing—“Peace unto you—*shalom, salaam* forever.”

Negotiations on Palestinian Autonomy

Yet even as we rejoiced, all of us, at the new state of peace between Israel and Egypt, we knew that the task was

is fast approaching when the Palestinians should enter the autonomy negotiations to help determine their own future—though their unwillingness to enter must not be permitted to delay the Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. talks.

And we all must seek to avoid any impediments to peace that lie in the way: whether by continued building of settlements on the West Bank, which plays so directly into the hands of those who argue that Israel does not genuinely desire an agreement; or by the use of Lebanon for terrorist attacks on Israel; or by the retaliatory devastation of that helpless country.

Israel, meanwhile, has a right to arrangements that will guarantee its security. Yet, in securing this right, in demanding full recognition as a Middle East state, Israel also bears a responsibility to reach out to the Palestinians in new and creative ways. The Israeli nation, which has suffered so much and worked so hard to gain acceptance in the region, must also be prepared to accept legitimate Palestinian rights and to interpret the Camp David accords on the West Bank and Gaza both generously and with wise attention to the needs of an enduring peace with the Palestinian people; all, of course, with due regard for Israel's genuine security needs.

Representatives of the three Camp David countries—Minister Burg, Prime Minister Khalil, and Ambassador Strauss—are striving to make the negotiations on autonomy succeed. Each carries the mandate of his government to make them succeed, and each carries with him the hopes and prayers of his people.

Bob Strauss has just returned from the Middle East to report that those talks are progressing on track and ahead of schedule. They are full of promise, and full of the basic good will and mutual trust that are vital to carrying on the great work of peace. At the same time, the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt is no longer just words. It is turning into facts—facts that should prove to all the joint commitment of these countries to both the letter and spirit of the Camp David accords, in their entirety.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat are building upon their own unique friendship: leaders of once bitter enemies who know that to build peace is to build for the future of

The time has come, too, for all Palestinians to accept fully, and in good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist; the time is fast approaching when the Palestinians should enter the autonomy negotiations. . . .

third great leader—the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter.

We are also here tonight because we share a common commitment to the future of Israel, to its security, and a common commitment to peace. The United States and Israel share something that today is particularly important—a belief that human society must be able to devise ways for the peaceful resolution of disputes, whether within each country, or between them and their neighbors. The peoples of both countries are passionately committed to peace—and there is no higher calling in either country than that of peacemaker.

The United States today is at peace; Israel has enjoyed but few moments of peace. Yet tangible progress has

not done; that it was important to move ahead with the other half of the Camp David agreements—a peaceful solution for the West Bank and Gaza.

This task is more difficult than the first: the questions it raises are, at first glance, more opaque; the stakes for Israel, its neighbors, and for a lasting peace throughout the region clearly are far higher.

In this process, all the parties are challenged to exercise the same wisdom and foresight that brought the dramatic visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem and led to the Camp David accords, with all their hopes for the future. The time has come, too, for all Palestinians to accept fully, and in good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist; the time

their peoples, that "to the counsellors of peace is joy." [Proverbs 12:20]

I have no doubt that success will crown their efforts as they work alongside the United States. And I have no doubt that these first steps toward resolution of the Palestinian problem will be followed by a continuing process of peacemaking between Israel and all of its other neighbors—with Jordan, with Syria, with Lebanon. I can reaffirm to you tonight: President Carter is totally committed to the attainment of peace in the Middle East. There will be peace for all; there will be security for all.

This will take time, it will take vision, it will take courage. And it will take an understanding of the consequences if we do not all join together to seek a broad, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

No one needs to remind an Israeli mother, wife, or child of the legacy of conflict: four wars in 30 years; casualties in a mere 2 weeks of 1973 which in proportion nearly equaled U.S. losses in all of World War II; and the knowledge that modern warfare is increasingly costly, in lives and in living standards, whoever the ultimate victor.

There has been no more touching moment than that last May when Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and Secretary Vance stood at El Arish before battle-scarred veterans of Middle East wars—from both Israel and Egypt. This meeting was the surest reminder that it must not happen again. And I will always remember the moment at my table at the White House, at the dinner following the peace-signing ceremony, when President Sadat's daughter embraced the wounded son of General Weizman, and the tears that I saw in the General's eyes.

No one needs to remind the people of Israel—or of Egypt or of other Middle East states—of the economic and human costs of continually having to pile arms upon arms, instead of devoting a greater proportion of precious resources to the benefit of people. No one needs to be reminded of the risks of instability in the Middle East that are posed by the absence or breakdown of an effort to build peace; or of the continual risks that outsiders will exploit instability for their own ends; or of the moral and social consequences of a failure by each party to recognize the full legitimate rights of the others.

The path of peace is not just a way chosen from a host of options. It is the *only* way if we—all of us—are to fulfill our grave responsibilities both to our own people and to others. True, lasting security for Israel and for its neighbors cannot come from a constant state of

tension, however well protected by strength of arms. True security can come only through efforts that set in train real and positive changes in the hearts of people; changes built not on war but on the patient work of politics and diplomacy and human wisdom.

The Objective of Peace

Today we are all preoccupied with the details of building on the Camp David agreements, with individual steps in diplomacy, or with continuing conflict taking place in Lebanon or violence which originates from Lebanon. The stakes are too high for it to be otherwise. But at the same time, we must also cast our minds forward, beyond momentary issues, to the possibilities that lie ahead. These are the possibilities of peace itself.

I believe that to understand the historic moment that is before us, in patiently and progressively building a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, we should be guided by a vision of what that peace can bring. And in developing such a vision, we can better understand what we are striving for and the need to press onward.

I was enormously impressed by what Prime Minister Begin told me once about his great teacher, Vladimir Jabotinski. He said that Jabotinski insisted that one should always focus on the ultimate great objective, define it clearly, and never lose sight of it in one's actions. Otherwise, one runs the risk of becoming absorbed by details, preoccupied with the passions of the moment, and ultimately diverted from one's own great objective. Our objective, everyone's objective in the Middle East, must be a final and comprehensive peace—perhaps not this year, or the next, but surely a peace and nothing less. What is our vision of it? What will it mean?

For the people of Israel a final, comprehensive peace will mean not just acceptance but friendship from its neighbors in the Middle East—a goal of many decades to rend the walls of this modern ghetto, which isolates those without as well as those within.

Peace will mean a chance to turn a far higher proportion of Israeli talents and energies away from the tasks of security to the task of continuing to build one of the most creative societies of all times—in the words of Isaiah, to "make a way in the wilderness, and rivers in the desert." [Isaiah 43:19] And it will mean an end to anxiety, the anxiety that has produced great courage, but ultimately debilitates a society and detracts from the full enjoyment of simple human pleasures and the full

**Saudi Arabian
Oil Production**

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 26, 1979¹**

We have received official confirmation of today's reports that the Government of Saudi Arabia intends to continue production of 9.5 million barrels of oil per day—1 million barrels above its established limit—for 3 more months.

President Carter welcomes this decision as "a constructive complement to the efforts of the oil-importing nations to curb consumption and switch to other fuels."

"I hope no one will take this news as a signal to relax the effort that each citizen must make to ease our demand on a limited world supply of oil," the President said.

Continued high production by Saudi Arabia and several other countries will relieve concern about the adequacy of oil supplies this winter. It will permit full restoration of oil inventories drawn down after Iranian oil exports were halted last winter and subsequently reduced to about half their usual volume. It should help to stabilize prices in the world oil market. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1979.

unleashing of creative human endeavors.

For the United States in its relations with Israel, a final peace will enable us to build even further upon the close ties that bind us together. Our relations will not be punctuated in public discussion by the disagreements and doubts that from time to time arise. It will be possible for us both to concentrate on and enhance that genuine relationship which is based upon trust, common understanding, and shared commitment to promote the best that mankind has ever had to offer. These two great democratic peoples will be able to see each other always for that fact itself; instead of too often forgetting what we agree upon in momentary concern about our differences.

At the same time, the United States will continue to broaden its relations and deepen its friendship with Arab states, to the benefit of all. It is both in the fundamental U.S. national interest

—and also Israel's—that the Arab nations in the Middle East be moderate, friendly to the West, and also secure.

For Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza—all a land of prophecy and of the Bible—the vision of peace means nothing less than the sharing of a hopeful future by two peoples that are, in fact, united more by a common past than by past hostility; two peoples that have suffered so much, that have a right to a secure existence that dignifies the individual and enshrines their distinctive religious and historical traditions. It means peace for a land on ground undivided by barbed wire, by frontier posts, even if colored somewhat differently on the map; a land in which all people can move freely, pray wherever they wish, and work without prejudice because of their national or religious identity.

As Shimon Peres said in the Knesset, while President Carter was there:

For over 10 years, we and over a million Palestinians have lived here side by side. We know they do not want us to rule them. They should also know that we do not want to rule them either. We have learned to appreciate their national uniqueness and I hope they have learned to appreciate our democracy. We want to discuss with them a new future—good neighborhood and security for both them and us.

A final peace can also make possible the fruition of the shared interests of the peoples of the Middle East. Except for what is beginning to happen between Israel and Egypt, cooperation between Israel and its neighbors in the development of the region today is impossible. It will not come easily tomorrow unless and until there is also a fundamental awareness of the basic equality and mutual respect that is contained in the concept of peace it-

self. But this cooperation can come with patience, and effort, and a healing of the memories of conflict and past grievances. It can unlock the human and material wealth of this productive region, and provide shared benefits to enrich the lives of all its people.

Peace in the region will then make possible genuinely cooperative ventures designed to enhance regional economic development. The Israelis and the Palestinians are among the most advanced, best trained peoples of that region, and they have much to contribute to regional development. The Israelis and the Palestinians—whatever respective arrangements between them develop from the peace process—can transform their ancient lands into a thriving community of economic and social interest in the Middle East; into a model for others; into nothing less, in fact, than the catalyst for creative development, for intellectual and technological innovation for a region that is bursting with opportunity and that is crying for peace.

And such peace in turn will make genuine regional security possible. Such security is the rightful requirement of every people living in that region. Security for Israel, and also for its neighbors, will mean security from internal terrorism, security from external terrorism, security from radical subversion, and security from foreign intervention. With peace, and the friendship that it will generate between the peoples who live in the Middle East and the West, the United States will be in an even better position to help provide security assurance and effective protection from external intervention and thereby help all concerned to gain both the spiritual and economic benefits of genuine peace.

You and I know that there are some who fear peace; there are some who prefer violence and hatred; there are some who see benefits for themselves ideologically, and in terms of power politics, from continued hostility between the Arabs and Israelis. Yet progress toward peace can be a source of powerful magnetic attraction; and peace is clearly an attainable vision, however difficult the way there, however challenging the problems that will inevitably have to be overcome.

U.S. Ambassadors to Middle East Countries, October 1979

Algeria—Ulric St. Clair Haynes, Jr.

Bahrain—Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.

Egypt—Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Iran—Vacant

Israel—Samuel W. Lewis

Jordan—Nicholas A. Veliotis

Kuwait—Francois M. Dickman

Lebanon—John Gunther Dean

Libya—Vacant

Morocco—Richard B. Parker

Oman—Marshall W. Wiley

Qatar—Andrew I. Killgore

Saudi Arabia—John C. West

Syria—Talcott W. Seelye

Tunisia—Stephen W. Bosworth

United Arab Emirates—William D. Wolle

Yemen Arab Republic—George M. Lane □

What I have just sketched is a personal vision of what a final peace can mean to the region and, indeed, for a world removed from the threat of Middle East conflicts that can spread to other parts of the globe. It should give us heart to carry on with the work of the moment; with the Camp David accords, with the patient and often unrewarding work of diplomacy; with planning for the future beyond.

This is a challenge to each of us—to those of us who serve in government and to members of organizations like the World Jewish Congress, with your special insights and concerns. None of us should have any illusions about the work that is ahead of us, the real risks for peace that each party to the conflict must take; but none of us should ever be without hope. Hope that can lead us to our common goal. In the words of the Psalm, "peace shall be upon Israel," and we can add, "and upon its neighbors, as well." □

Letter of Credence

On July 24, 1979, Faisal Alhegelan presented his credentials to President Carter as the newly appointed Ambassador from Saudi Arabia. □

¹ Text from White House press release of Sept. 17, 1979.

Anniversary of the Camp David Agreements

PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 17, 1979¹

One year ago today, on September 17, 1978, Prime Minister Begin of Israel, President Sadat of Egypt, and I returned from Camp David with an agreement establishing the Framework for Peace in the Middle East. We believed then that we had reached an historic turning point in the bitter history of that long-suffering region. One short year later, that belief has become a firm reality.

After 30 years of hostility and war, Israel is truly at peace with its largest Arab neighbor. The relations between them are improving daily. The provisions of the Treaty of Peace are being carried out precisely and on schedule.

This peace is no longer words on paper. It is now facts on the ground and faith in the hearts of millions of people. This remarkable change—from war to peace, from hostility to friendship—was clearly visible in the recent visit by President Sadat to Haifa, where he was received with genuine warmth and enthusiasm by the people and the leaders of Israel. Such events, which would have seemed amazing—even unthinkable—until the very recent past, are now accepted almost as routine. That is itself a measure of how far we have traveled along the road to peace.

So it is worth remembering on this occasion what an extraordinary change in attitudes has taken place. The successes of Egypt and Israel so far in overcoming three decades of animosity give us renewed confidence in facing the difficult tasks which remain.

Our goal has always been the establishment of a comprehensive peace in which Israel could at last live in security and tranquillity with all its neighbors. The Camp David accords are a long step on that path. We do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead, but we knew from the outset that the road would be hard and rocky. And looking back today at the solid achievements of the past year, we are justified in keeping our eyes firmly on the goal of peace rather than in heeding the inevitable cries that say peace cannot be achieved.

The peace process outlined at Camp David 1 year ago is alive and well. The talks on full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza are proceeding on

schedule, in an atmosphere of good will and serious cooperation. I am confident those talks will succeed. Their progress is a tribute to the vision and courage of President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and the people of their two great nations.

Over the coming months it will be our common task to continue demonstrating that peace does work and, by the evidence of our deeds, to convince other nations and leaders to join with us in this quest for lasting peace, security, and the opportunity for productive lives for all the people of the Middle East.

SECRETARY VANCE'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 17, 1979

One year ago today the historic agreements between Egypt and Israel

reached at Camp David were signed in the White House by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and was witnessed by President Carter. All of us who were privileged to participate in those negotiations continue to feel a deep sense of gratification and admiration for the three leaders whose vision led to that achievement.

It is important today to reflect on how much farther we have come in the year since the Camp David accords were signed. The commitments made 1 year ago are being carried out scrupulously.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty has been signed and is being implemented as agreed with dedication and in a spirit of cooperation by both sides. The world can see the practical results that have been achieved. Israeli military forces are being withdrawn—zone by zone—and the foundations are being laid for normalization of relations.

The relationship between Egypt and Israel is beginning to broaden and deepen. As this relationship matures, it will demonstrate that agreements will be kept. It will show not only that

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN²

On this the first anniversary of the Camp David agreement signed in Washington on September 17th I vividly recall the wonderful hospitality which you and your gracious lady accorded to my wife, my colleagues and myself during those 13 days of the momentous conference. I remember well the sessions, the strong debates, the mutual convincing, the difficulties we all had to overcome, the weighing of every sentence and word and ultimately the joy of achieving the understanding which became the basis of an historic agreement. Out of it the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel, certainly a turning point in the annals of the Middle East emerged and the positive concept of full autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza District was brought forth.

You, Mr. President, did your utmost by your own hard work to make these agreements possible, allow me, therefore, on this memorable anniversary to thank you from the heart for the great assistance rendered to both Egypt and Israel in achieving a rapprochement between two countries which for thirty one years, were in a state of war, and which have now concluded peace, the first step towards a general and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

There are people who do not yet appreciate the value of this moral international achievement, but many millions of women and men of goodwill will rejoice together with us in this accomplishment. Their blessings are our joy and the source of satisfaction.

Accept, Mr. President, my deepest gratitude for all you have done with such great devotion in the service of peace.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

MENAHEM BEGIN

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SADAT²

This afternoon I have issued a presidential statement expressing my views on the first anniversary of the signature of the Camp David agreements. On this occasion I wish to express my deep feelings and thanks for your personal contribution to this historical event. I am confident that these agreements, which have been the first steps toward a comprehensive peace, will help bring a solution to the Palestinian question in all its aspects. The role of the U.S. as a full partner in the peace process will remain a key element in our mutual efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

ANWAR AL-SADAT

MILITARY AFFAIRS: *Defense Budgets for FY 1980 and 1981*

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, SEPT. 11, 1979¹

I am sure you agree with me that we cannot effectively safeguard U.S. legitimate interests abroad nor pursue safely peace, justice and order at home unless our national security is protected by adequate defenses. The fundamental responsibility of the President—a responsibility shared with Congress—is to maintain defenses adequate to provide for the national security of the United States. In meeting that responsibility, this Administration moved promptly and vigorously to reverse the downward trend in U.S. defense efforts. This is demonstrated by an examination of the trends in real defense expenditures since the mid 1960s. At NATO Summits in May 1977 and 1978 we persuaded our allies to join with us in endorsing a goal three percent real annual growth in defense outlays and an ambitious Long Term Defense Program for the Alliance. Together these represented a turning point, not only for the United States, but the whole Alliance.

For our part, we moved promptly to act on this resolve. We authorized production of XM-1 tanks; we greatly increased the number of anti-tank guided missiles; we deployed F-15s and additional F-111s to Europe, along with equipment for additional ground forces. We reduced the backlog of ships in overhaul and settled contractual disputes that threatened to halt shipbuilding progress. In strategic sys-

tems, we accelerated development and began procurement of long range air-launched cruise missiles, began the deployment of Trident I missiles, and have begun the modernization of our ICBM force with the commitment to deploy the MX missile in a survivable basing mode for it.

These and other initiatives were the building blocks for a determined program to assure that the United States remains militarily strong. The FY 1980 budget submission of last January was designed to continue that program. In subsequent months, however, inflation has run at higher levels than those assumed in the cost calculations associated with that defense program. Accordingly, I plan to send promptly to the Congress a defense budget amendment to restore enough funds to continue in FY 1980 to carry out the Administration's defense program based on our current best estimate of the inflation that will be experienced during the fiscal year. Although the detailed calculations needed to prepare an amendment are still in progress, I expect that the amount of the amendment will be about \$2.7 billion in Budget Authority above the Administration's January 1979 budget request.

Correcting for inflation is not enough in itself to assure that we continue an adequate defense program through FY 1980. We must also have the program and the funds authorized and appropriated, substantially as they were submitted. Therefore, in the course of Congressional consideration of the second budget resolution, I will support ceilings for the National

committing ourselves to a redoubled effort to build further on the solid foundation laid at Camp David. We call on all who seek and cherish peace to join with us. □

Camp David (Cont'd)

peace can be achieved but that it can last.

The new round of negotiations foreseen at Camp David also began on schedule. Today, for the first time in the more than 30-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict, a mechanism exists for beginning to resolve issues of concern to the Palestinians. These current negotiations on an agreement to provide full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are gaining momentum.

On this anniversary, all of my colleagues and I join President Carter in

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 24, 1979, which also carried the text of remarks by President Carter, Egyptian Vice President Mubarak, and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan on the subject of the Camp David agreements.

² On Sept. 17 the White House announced that the President received messages from Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat (text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 24).

Defense Function for FY 1980 of \$141.2 billion in Budget Authority and \$130.6 billion in outlays. I will also request that the Congress support the Administration's FY 1980 defense program and, in particular, that the Appropriation Committees actually appropriate the funds needed to carry it out.

Furthermore, in FY 1981 I plan a further real increase in defense spending. The Defense Department is working on the details of that budget. It would, therefore, be premature to describe the features of that budget beyond noting that it will continue the broad thrust of our defense program, and that I intend to continue to support our mutual commitment with our NATO Allies.

While this defense program is adequate, it is clear that we could spend even more and thereby gain more military capability. But national security involves more than sheer military capability; there are other legitimate demands on our budget resources. These competing priorities will always be with us within the vast array of budget decisions both the Congress and the President are called upon to make. Defense outlays are actually lower in constant dollars than they were in 1963, and a much lower percentage of the gross national product (5% compared with 9%). There are those that think this has caused a decline in American military might and that the military balance has now tipped against us. I do not believe this to be so, but I am concerned about the trends. I believe that it is necessary for us to act now to reverse these trends.

The Secretary of Defense will be presenting to the Congress over the coming months the highlights of our defense program in terms of the goals we think we should achieve and the Five-Year Defense Program we plan to achieve them. In this context he will point out, among many other items, how MX and our other strategic programs will contribute to the maintenance of essential equivalence between the central strategic forces of the United States and Soviet Union, how we plan to modernize theater nuclear forces in cooperation with our NATO allies, how our general purpose forces programs contribute both to our military capability to support our NATO allies and rapidly to deploy forces to defend our vital interests elsewhere. That presentation can serve as the basis for future discussions (including open testimony) that will allow us to build the national consensus that is the fundamental prerequisite of a strong and secure America.

JIMMY CARTER □

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17, 1979.

NUCLEAR POLICY: *Bangladesh* *Joins Nonproliferation Treaty*

Following are the texts of a Department of State press release announcing that, at a ceremony at the Department of State on September 27, 1979, Bangladesh had deposited its instrument of accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty and Acting Secretary Warren Christopher's remarks at that ceremony.

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE¹

Bangladesh is now the 111th party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Bangladesh's Ambassador to the United States, Tabarak Husain, deposited his government's instrument of accession at a Department of State ceremony on September 27, 1979. Participating in the ceremony for the U.S. Government was Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State. In his remarks, Mr. Christopher stated that: "The specter of nuclear competition in South Asia is a major concern to the United States" He also welcomed Bangladesh's accession and hoped that its initiative will spur others in the region to follow Bangladesh's lead. Mr. Christopher then announced that negotiations would begin soon on a U.S.-Bangladesh nuclear cooperation agreement.

The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970, when the United States and the Soviet Union became parties. Among its provisions, it bans the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices by parties which are non-nuclear-weapon states and requires these nations to accept international safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. The treaty also seeks to insure that all parties facilitate the fullest possible exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and requires all parties to pursue negotiations on disarmament measures.

The United States considers the SALT II agreement and the current negotiations on banning the testing of nuclear weapons to be major examples of fulfillment of its obligations under the treaty.

In April 1977 President Carter declared universal adherence to the NPT as a U.S. foreign policy objective. A major international conference will be

held in August 1980 in Geneva to review the operation of the treaty. Recent parties to the NPT include Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

ACTING SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S REMARKS

Since the advent of the nuclear age, the nations of the world have wrestled with the complex problem of harnessing the enormous power of the atom for the good of mankind, rather than for its destruction. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the principal means by which the international community has sought to protect itself from the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons. In this

context, the United States welcomes the accession of Bangladesh to this important treaty.

The United States takes seriously its obligations under the NPT. Article VI of the treaty obligates the United States and other parties to negotiate in good faith on measures to end the nuclear arms race.

Through the SALT negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted, over the past 10 years, to limit and ultimately reduce our nuclear arsenals. We are pressing, and we will continue to press, for prompt Senate ratification of the SALT II agreement in the belief that it will promote a stable strategic balance and that it will set the stage for more significant arms control measures in the future.

Similarly, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are negotiating to end the testing of nuclear weapons in order to constrain the development of new types of nuclear arms.

Article IV of the NPT obligates the

U.S.-Australia Agreement on Nuclear Energy

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS JULY 27, 1979¹

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123 d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)), the text of the proposed Agreement Between the United States and Australia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and accompanying annex and agreed minute; my written approval, authorization and determination concerning the agreement; and the Memorandum of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning the agreement. The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy, which includes a summary analysis of the provisions of the agreement, and the views of the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are also enclosed.

The proposed agreement with Australia is the first such agreement submitted to the Congress since enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which I signed into law on March 10, 1978 and which, among other things, calls upon me to renegotiate existing peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements to obtain the new provisions set forth in that Act. In my judgment, the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States

and Australia, together with its agreed minute, meets all statutory requirements.

I am particularly pleased that this first agreement is with Australia, a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of international non-proliferation efforts generally. The proposed agreement reflects the desire of the Government of the United States and the Government of Australia to update the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries in a manner which recognizes both the shared non-proliferation objectives and the close relationship between the United States and Australia in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The proposed agreement will, in my view, further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the agreement and authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

JIMMY CARTER □

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 30, 1979.

OCEANS: *Law of the Sea* Negotiations

by Elliot L. Richardson

Statement to the press in New York City on August 24, 1979. Ambassador at Large Richardson is Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference.

The successful completion of the third U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea is now in sight. The conference should be able to produce a treaty in the next year.

When we assembled here in New York 6 weeks ago, the number of unresolved issues had been reduced to something close to 20. There has been steady forward movement on most of these. The conference cannot now fail:

It has come too close to a successful conclusion to stop or turn back.

Solid gains have been made in negotiations on the seabeds, particularly in the financial arrangements on both sides of the parallel system; the powers, functions, and voting procedures of the [Executive] Council [of the International Seabed Resource Authority]; production limitations; and dispute settlement. Similar encouraging progress has marked negotiations on protection of the seabed mining environment and the preservation of whales.

Although the conference did not issue a second revision to the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, the advances made in New York are included in reports which should provide the

basis for the continuation of negotiations when the ninth session convenes early in 1980. Conference experience has been that everything contained in reports of this type invariably holds.

With respect to the seabeds, perhaps the most significant improvement has been to bring both sides of the parallel system into closer balance. Taxes on miners have been scaled down, thus making mining ventures more attractive to investors. As a counterbalance, agreements on financing the Enterprise will allow it to compete and mine on an equal footing.

Decisionmaking and voting procedures of the Council remain vexing issues for in microcosm they reflect the core of the North-South conflict. But even here, opposing viewpoints are moving closer together. The powers and functions of the Council have been agreed upon. What is left in essence is determination of the number of votes that will be accorded producers and consumers of seabed minerals so that their unique and predominant interests cannot be overridden arbitrarily.

Differences have narrowed greatly on the thorny question of production controls. I believe we are on the verge of a final compromise on this question, and I believe this compromise will emerge in the early weeks of the next session. The same prediction applies to the negotiations on settlement of disputes arising from seabed mining.

Negotiations on the conduct of marine scientific research showed significant gains, including a compromise on the right to conduct research on the Continental Shelf beyond 200 miles without coastal state consent unless the research area is undergoing exploitation by the coastal state.

Although I am optimistic as to the outcome, I do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead. Serious differences still exist on the handful of issues which have resisted broadly accepted solutions. Yet my sense of the situation is that the nations represented in the conference have marshaled the political will to overcome whatever obstacles block the road to a treaty. All of us have come too far to be deterred. We will go the rest of the way. □

Bangladesh (Cont'd)

United States to share the benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom with parties to the treaty. Since we inaugurated the Atoms for Peace program in 1953, the United States has been in the forefront of those nations that have provided nuclear technology to others under conditions assuring peaceful uses. The United States has agreements for cooperation with more than 20 parties to the NPT and has provided technical assistance to these and many other countries through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

I am pleased to announce that the United States and the Government of Bangladesh will soon enter into negotiations to conclude an agreement for cooperation in nuclear research. I am also pleased to announce that the United States will be in a position to assist Bangladesh nuclear projects through the IAEA.

Despite the efforts of many states, the struggle to control the spread of nu-

clear weapons is far from won. The specter of nuclear competition in South Asia is a major concern to the United States, as it must also be to nations of the region such as Bangladesh.

Closer to home, we in the United States have been troubled by the recent public disclosure of sensitive nuclear weapons technology which makes available information that would have been very difficult to obtain otherwise. From these two examples it is clear that the struggle to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons must be universal and unceasing. If we are complacent, we shall not be safe.

Bangladesh's action today marks a significant contribution to the historic international effort to eliminate forever the threat of nuclear warfare. We warmly welcome your accession and hope that your initiative will spur others in your region and elsewhere to follow your lead. □

¹ Press release 237.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:

U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development

The U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) was held in Vienna August 20-31, 1979. Following are remarks made at the opening and closing sessions by Ambassador Theodore M. Hesburgh, chairman of the U.S. delegation, and the text of President Carter's message to the conference.

AUG. 20, 1979

It is only proper that this beautiful city by the Danube, a witness of so many great historical events, should be the site to compose the new contours of our future. For centuries Vienna has been a center of culture and of far-reaching diplomatic decisions. In remembrance of things past—the sieges and the symphonies, the genius of Sigmund Freud, of Ignaz Semmelweis, of Conrad Lorenz, of Ernst Mach, of Lise Meitner—Vienna recalls the vicissitudes of time and the versatility of man.

Today, this city is one of the capitals of the U.N. system, host for the headquarters of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization and of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both are symbols of the potentialities of progress, yet both remind us of the perils of modernity. The growth of industrialization accompanied by unwanted pollution, the search for atomic energy for peace haunted by nuclear hazards, reveal not only the possibility of technology but also its ambivalent qualities—hence the uncertainty of result, the ambiguity of promise, and the necessity of high moral purpose.

Again, here in Vienna, only 2 months ago, with the signing of SALT II, new evidence emerged that the spirit of cooperation for peace may ultimately prevail over the awesome spectre of nuclear disaster. The treaty is an inspirational witness to a central thesis of our times, that defines man first by his responsibility toward his brothers and toward history. This is the human imperative of the modern age.

This imperative is the only commanding criterion with which we may rein the rapid, exponential advances of technology, but it is also the human imperative that makes these advances possible. Science and technology are

knowledge and power that must find their true meaning and direction in the total life of mankind.

Technological progress is more than a chronology of inventions. It must be an enactment of human rationality in history, a portrayal of some vision of the good life and the choice of preferred means for moving toward it.

Modern science is changing man's view of himself. We no longer see ourselves as merely a cog in a Newtonian world of determinism with man's role reduced to that of an observer—at best a beneficiary, often a victim. We view this modern world not as static but as constantly changing with man and woman as free and responsible agents affecting that change. Science and technology have become a distinctly human experience, an adventure and a challenge to create a better world.

We went to the Moon a decade ago. The true reward of that endeavor was not what we found on the Moon's surface but rather the view it afforded us of our own planet. From that distant perspective we were able to recognize, for the first time, the delicate fragility and beauty of this gemlike spaceship that we call home. In fact, we now know Earth as more beautiful from afar than up close.

Science and technology are not the guarantors of civilization; they only guarantee the possibility of civilization. Fast cars or fast breeders, synthetics or cybernetics do not a civilization make. Unless our existence reaches beyond the frivolities of materialism and becomes a life enriched with meaning, science and technology will not be hallmarks of progress; they will only be the trappings of modernity. The pursuit of scientific excellence must be based upon the pursuit of human goals.

But can we really call ours a civilization:

- When one-fourth of this Earth's population lives in abject poverty, starving, idle, and numbed by ignorance?
- When in this century alone over 100 million people have fallen victim to wars?
- When millions today are denied their basic human rights because of their political convictions, religious

beliefs, ethnic origin, or economic status?

• When advances through technology often mean in many societies new forms of discrimination against women?

Today the world is facing critical shortages on many fronts. We live under the recurring threat of global energy crisis, the depletion of our nonrenewable resources, and the despoilment of our environment. Our ecosystem is strained by a dramatic population growth, our security threatened by the continuing arms race, and our well-being jeopardized by inflation and monetary chaos.

Does this mean that we have reached the limits of our growth? Have we, indeed, exhausted the possibilities of science and technology for the benefit of mankind or have we exhausted only our spirit? I hope this conference will be a living testimony that we have exhausted neither our knowledge nor our spirit and that we can turn our collective vulnerabilities into a world of interdependence—a world of interdependence among nations as well as between man and his ecosystem.

Indeed, ours is an imperfect world. The global economy is not working as well as it should for either the poor or the rich countries.

The patterns of worldwide technology generation, diffusion, and utilization lack the cohesion that would incorporate and benefit the majority of people.

We have not yet found the right mix between scientific excellence and needed technologies. Given the vast potential of the developing world, it is an anomaly that around 95% of all research and development is conducted in the industrialized world.

It is even more tragic that only 1% of the world's research and development on health, agriculture, housing, and industrial technology is spent on the needs of the poorest half of this Earth's population. Nations spend six times as much on military research as on energy research. Even most developing countries spend more on armaments than on health and education.

It is an imperfect world in which scientists and technicians from the developing countries do not partake of the latest and the best or the most economical and most appropriate technologies. It is a terrible waste that millions of illiterates and uneducated cannot participate in our technological progress either as beneficiaries or creators of new implements to make their lives better.

It is an imperfect global economic order that does not fully benefit from

the robust and dynamic role of international business and industry and has not yet found the right balance between the interests of private enterprise and of the developing countries.

Just as modern science is changing man's view of man, so are the new relationships among nations—between North and South—changing our perceptions of global and national interests. This change is healthy, this change is good, and we need not fear it. As our Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, said: "We cannot let ourselves be diverted by the myth that if we encourage change, or deal with the forces of change, we only encourage radicalism." We intend to encourage this change, to quote the Secretary again, with "... a positive, long-term strategy toward the Third World." So let us continue this dialogue for change at this conference.

First, we must work to make the industrialized countries more responsive to the aspirations of the developing countries so that the advances in science and technology in the North will be of greater benefit to the South.

Second, we must increase the participation and the stake of the developing countries in the world economic order, including global technology circulation.

Third, we must create a more equitable relationship between the developing countries and international private enterprise, so that in the global transfer of technology the interest of both is enhanced.

The task of this conference is not one of restating the errors of the past but of weaving science and technology into the fabric of the future, the fabric of development. We need collaboration, not confrontation.

The question is not whether we should do something, but how will we accomplish it?

- How can we best mobilize the imagination and energies of the scientific community to launch new major efforts to eradicate the worst aspects of poverty by the year 2000?

- How can we cooperate in building indigenous science and technology capacities in the developing countries—without which there is neither self-reliant growth nor self-sustaining economic progress?

- How can we correct current imbalances in the global market of technology, so that the developing countries may select what they need—and reject what they do not—from the international supermarket of products and processes?

- How can we best strengthen scientific and technological cooperation so as to ease global pressures on food and water supplies, energy sources, and raw materials and deal effectively with the problems of population growth and the deteriorating environment?

None of these challenges can be met by any nation alone. But what we have done, individually and collectively, for the development of science and technology and with science and technology for development is a good beginning.

Over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has contributed more than \$100 billion in development assistance. This year our assistance has risen to nearly \$7 billion. No element of our foreign assistance fails to involve in some form our sharing of scientific knowledge, technical skills, or technological hardware.

- The core of U.S. cooperation continues to be the application of technological know-how to increase food production in the developing countries.

- We intend to make substantial and real increases, over the next 5 years to our contribution to the consultative group for international agricultural research. And we invite other nations to join us in this effort.

- Eighty percent of our development aid goes to countries where per capita income is below \$300 a year to give the masses of people greater access to production technologies, preventive health care, family planning, and basic education.

- To strengthen the science and technology infrastructure in the developing countries, we have assisted well over 100 universities and more than 300 vocational schools. Each year we help tens of thousands from the developing countries to study in U.S. and third-country institutions of higher learning.

We have and will continue to share with the developing countries the advances we make in our most sophisticated technologies.

- The United States foresees investing \$24 million in a new 6-year program to test the effectiveness of satellites as a medium of educational broadcasting and improved communication in remote rural areas.

- The United States will take the initiative to bring together the operators of remote sensing satellites, as well as the users, to develop an international system. We believe that satellites should be operated so that all can have easy access to the data and so that in-

formation can be collected without unnecessary duplication and for maximum mutual benefit. The objective is to insure developing countries improve their access to information for the use and management of forests, rangelands, water supplies, soil preservation, and the identification of new mineral and water resources.

- The United States is significantly expanding its renewable energy assistance and is working on cooperative methods of applying advanced technologies, including solar technology, to the energy needs of the developing countries.

In the application of science and technology for development, foreign assistance cannot be a substitute for self-reliance. People who are illfed and in ill health, without shelter and without jobs, do not need paternalistic redemption. They need tools and trades, capital and opportunities, help to help themselves to meet their own basic needs.

The building of the developing countries' capabilities and their infrastructure in science and technology must be the first critical step to eliminate the worst aspects of poverty and to elevate the developing countries to full partnership in the global scientific and technological enterprise. Education at all levels is at the core of human development, the key to a higher quality of life.

We have and will, therefore, assist in strengthening local scientific and technological infrastructures, managerial, technical and general education programs, research institutes, standardization activities, extension and information services, laboratory supply and equipment centers, and training activities.

Technical assistance and the export of expertise must rely on local capacity to define problems and establish priorities.

In order to respond to the challenge of building such indigenous capacity, we are establishing, at the personal initiative of President Carter, a new institute for scientific and technological cooperation. The institute's principal functions will include:

- Enlisting developing countries' assistance in establishing research and development priorities;

- Long-term research and development on critical development problems;

- Building international cooperative linkages within the scientific and technological community;

- Marshaling research and development activities of various U.S. public and private agencies;

- Facilitating greater attention by

U.S. scientific and technical institutions to joint research, training, and other cooperative activities; and

- Involving the private sector in the United States in efforts to improve science and technology for development.

We cannot seriously contemplate more just and equitable patterns of scientific and technological cooperation without the developing countries possessing the leverage of scientific knowledge and information. Substantial amounts of information residing in the public sector have already been made available to developing nations. In addition, much of the technology in the private sector is available through public information systems describing these technologies or the sources from which such technologies can be obtained.

But we should not pretend that all is well in the international market of technology. Technology is often sold as a product that can be least afforded by those who most need it. Transferred technology is often inappropriate to local needs, as well as wasteful and insensitive to environmental impact. Such transfers are bad business. But at the same time we cannot ignore that private enterprise has always been a major source of innovation, a major actor in the diffusion of technology, and an indispensable factor in the economic growth of the developing countries. We must, therefore, continue our dialogue about a wide range of measures that enhances the negotiating capability of the developing countries in their acquisition of foreign technologies and strengthens their participation in the market of technology, not only as consumers but also as producers.

Through new initiatives and through continuing programs, we must find at this conference and in the years ahead new grounds and new mechanisms for cooperation. President Carter, in his message to this conference, spoke of science and technology for development as a "joint venture." The awesome challenges that we all face, developed and developing countries alike, make this joint venture a global imperative. The United States notes, therefore, with pleasure the declaration of Bucharest in which the developing countries reaffirmed their willingness to work with a sense of urgency to assure the success of this conference.

We inhabit a planet with finite resources, one ecosystem, and one common destiny. In this interdependent world, we are all developing countries. The differences between the North and the South, between the East and the West, are minimal in contrast to the

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO UNCSTD

This conference is a new journey toward progress. Your endeavor rekindles the spirit of adventure in all of us. It dares mankind to invent a better future. After many centuries of progress we may now explore not only the frontiers of knowledge but also the frontiers of justice.

We must not fail this time to respond beyond words to the pressing needs of the developing countries. In turn we can all benefit from their participation in a new and stronger world economic system.

In the robust spirit of imagination, inventiveness, and ingenuity, let us dare to reshape the world and eliminate the worst aspects of poverty by the year 2000. Let us use our knowledge to create the means to provide for the basic needs of all people. Together let us invent a more dynamic partnership among governments and private institutions to serve the common interest of all nations.

We have awesome challenges to confront. Their solution will require a joint venture of all nations.

This venture will inevitably extend freedom, because success will require a free flow of information, free access to the marketplace of ideas, and the broadest scope for scientific imagination and initiative.

Broad participation should characterize our venture, because knowledge unpropagated is knowledge wasted. The worldwide diffusion of technical knowledge must be a liberating venture in which all participate and all will profit.

Our primary task must be to assist in the building of scientific and technological capabilities in the developing countries.

enormity of the common tasks facing mankind.

We are, therefore, prepared to join reasonable ventures that strengthen worldwide scientific and technological cooperation. We strongly believe that this will be a shared effort—where universal values are the organizing principles for research and development, where the value of knowledge and technological hardware is measured by their contribution to the larger concerns of human welfare.

Science and technology should open new frontiers and new opportunities to enjoy all of the beauty and boundless elements of this planet Earth. Our generation must be the guarantors of this new tomorrow. It is our task to usher in this new age, to tend the soil and plant the seed which will bring forth bountiful fruit. And our harvest will be threefold: a new realm of reason, a new realm of reality, a new realm of rights.

Let us invent this realm of reason.

Their indigenous capacities to invent and innovate, to choose knowledgeably the right technologies, and to bargain on the basis of facts and not of fads is the only assured way that the global diffusion of technology will not become a new system of dependency.

The United States, for its part, hopes to contribute to this common endeavor with an institute of scientific and technological cooperation, which we plan to establish this fall. The institute is one of our most important innovations to help developing countries who so desire create and adapt the technologies best suited to their needs. Its work will receive my strong personal support. I will insure that it cooperates closely with similar programs and institutions elsewhere in the world.

I am confident that our scientific community, our government agencies, and our private institutions will heighten their involvement in research and development programs so as to address the endemic problems of food scarcity, the energy crisis, population explosion, and the lack of adequate health care that are common concerns of all.

I pledge our willingness to support all practical endeavors that can help us to overcome these problems, to create a world in which education is within everybody's reach, the hungry can feed themselves, millions are freed from tropical diseases, economies are expanded to provide jobs, and worldwide trade assures every nation's progress.

This conference will test our commitment to share worldwide the fruits of scientific progress and to master the forces of technology for the benefit of all mankind. To you, Madame President, and to all delegates who represent this hope and this goal, I extend my sincerest wishes for a successful endeavor.

For the efforts we make are not a zero-sum game in which the gains of those who seek equality and parity would automatically register as a loss for those who now possess more. In this realm we can prove the mutual benefits thesis—that advances in any part of the world are for the benefit of all.

Let us accept the realm of reality. This reality dictates that we become aware of the coming crises of the global commons. While our material resources may dwindle, our traditional energy sources may run dry, there is one inexhaustible and always renewable resource: our ingenuity, our imagination, our knowledge and technology, and especially our common human aspirations that can convert all these into a new world.

And let us, with the aid of science and technology, construct a new realm of human rights. A new realm:

- Where the international spirit of

cooperation places basic rights at the centerpiece of our agenda for the 21st century;

- Where freedom is the hallmark, equality of men and women will be the cornerstone, and justice the watchword; and

- Where the benefits derived from the world's resources know no special beneficiary nor will they be confined by any national border as long as there are people in need.

So let us make our tomorrow a world full of sharing, where the freedom to explore, the freedom to create, and the opportunity to share in the fruits of our labor will be the true hallmarks of civilization.

AUG. 31, 1979

The U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development opened 11 days ago amidst dire warnings that it would fail and that it would contribute little to establishing new and effective ways for science and technology to address the great global imbalances of our times.

Nonetheless, to the satisfaction of all of us, UNCSTD has just concluded with the clear promise of a new beginning. There is significant agreement among us both of the principal goals of science and technology for development and on major new measures for achieving them.

Much remains to be done, but the conference has good reason to feel encouraged. Agreement was reached on the following important measures.

- An intergovernmental committee was created—in effect a new world forum. Henceforth, all nations will have a voice in formulating policies and plans for the use of new resources in the area of science and technology for development.

- An interim fund was created, pending the arrangements for the financial system, which will be managed by the U.N. Development Program, with a target for voluntary contributions, over a 2-year period of not less than \$250 million.

Moreover, the conference has reached agreement on a program of action to enhance scientific and technological capacity in the developing countries and to improve international information flows and the commercial transfer of science and technology.

Differences of view still remain, but the mutual understanding of these issues has been expanded, and this should facilitate further discussion of the unresolved issues in the months ahead.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: Panama Acquires Jurisdiction Over the Canal Zone

Vice President Mondale visited Panama September 30-October 2, 1979, to represent the United States at ceremonies when Panama acquired jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone on October 1 under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty. Following are his remarks made October 1 at Albrook Air Force Base where the ceremonies took place.

This is, indeed, a proud day for the people of Panama, and it is a proud day for the people of the United States. Together on this moving occasion, our two nations rejoice as we write a new chapter in the history of our hemisphere.

We meet at the magnificent canal of Panama. For 65 years it has stood as a triumphant symbol of civilization of the engineering, medical, and entrepreneurial genius of the 20th century. But from this moment forward the Panama Canal takes on a second symbolic meaning. It becomes two success

stories: both of technology and of political ideals; both of engineering wizardry and of diplomatic vision; both of the conquest of nature and the cooperation of cultures. We now seal a relationship between two independent nations to guarantee the operation and defense of one of the world's key waterways, working together in mutual interest and for mutual benefit. The United States and Panama can be confident in our ability to achieve our shared objectives.

I am here today to say that we will honor in full the terms of the treaty. We will keep the canal operating smoothly just as it has been since its opening in 1914. It will remain a safe and sure route of transit for the commerce of the entire world.

Today the United States and Panama settle more than the future of the canal, for as President Carter has said, these treaties mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness and not force should lie at the heart of

Of equal importance is the agreement reached on the three priority goals which our newfound cooperation should advance:

- Overcoming the worst aspects of poverty;

- Solution of global problems affecting most, if not all, nations—food, energy, health, overharvesting of seas and forests, and the general impairment of our human environment; and

- The progress of developing countries toward self-reliant growth.

The conference dared to raise difficult questions and contentious issues. It did not shirk its responsibilities. The conference faced the issues placed before it, discussed them for long hours, and now should take some satisfaction in the results of its work.

The Chinese have a proverb: every journey of a thousand miles requires a first step. We have taken that first step—to overcome the worst aspects of poverty and to create a better world for human kind by the year 2000. The 2 years of preparatory work by governments and the scientific and educational communities provided the essen-

tial roadmap for our journey.

Working together we have achieved a momentum which must be sustained through the 1980's and beyond, for the problems we have addressed are not susceptible to quick technological fixes but require sustained planning and continuing effort.

President Carter pledged at the beginning of this conference the willingness of the United States to support all practical endeavors to overcome the endemic problems of food scarcity, the energy crisis, the population explosion, and the lack of adequate health care. The United States will work with others to fulfill that pledge.

Let us never forget that it is a pledge we make to each other, as brothers and sisters on a small planet we share. Let us not give way to either discouragement or cynicism. Let us, rather, rejoice at what we have begun, take courage at what there is yet to do, and looking back some future day at what we have launched here in Vienna tonight—this last day of August—may we say in heartfelt fellowship together: We were present at the new creation, and we watched and worked for the emergence of a better world. □

our dealings with the nations of the world. Our partnership is the outcome not of the politics of confrontation but of a common search for justice—a politics not of domination or dependence but of mutual interest and aspiration. And other countries of the world near and far can draw a meaning of what Panama and the United States have accomplished, for both our countries have acted with restraint and responsibility. Both achieved longstanding goals, and both have strengthened their capacity for independent action and influence on the global scene.

Panama has long been a crossroads of world commerce. Today Panama also stands at the midpoint of a new heartland of emerging democracy. In Quito, in La Paz, we have just witnessed free elections and a successful transition to civilian rule. In Lima a new constitution has been adopted. In Santo Domingo elections brought an orderly transfer of power for the first time in our century. In Managua winds of democratic progress are stirring where they have long been stifled. In Honduras the return to constitutional rule and elections is underway. From the Dominican Republic to the north, from the Andean states to the south, we celebrate today a remarkable advance toward effective democratic institutions.

This move toward more open and democratic societies is an indigenous process, not a formula imposed from elsewhere without regard to the diversities of the people concerned. It is a dynamic and evolving order reflecting national diversities alive to aspirations for human rights and responsive to the drive to participate in the political process.

The progress of the past 2 years refutes the claim that only authoritarian methods can provide the social discipline for well-being and growth. Instead, as the Quito declaration states, the best way to guarantee the prosperity of people is to provide a climate of freedom and enforcement of human rights under new forms of social democracy. These are the ideals we enshrine in our Panama Canal treaties.

As 15 years of negotiations reach their moment of fulfillment today, let us pay tribute to the countless thousands who have made and still make the canal great. To the French pioneers who launched its history, to the Americans and Barbadians and Jamaicans and people literally from every nation in the world who built the canal against such overwhelming odds. To the Panamanians and Americans whose hard work day after day has maintained its efficient operation and to those who

Panama Canal Act of 1979

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 27, 1979¹

I am pleased to sign into law the Panama Canal Act of 1979, which implements the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.

The Panama Canal Treaty and the neutrality treaty were the result of 13 years of careful negotiations. They have been hailed throughout this hemisphere as a model for equitable negotiations between ourselves and our smaller neighbors. As I said when I signed the treaties, they express the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness, and not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with nations of the world.

The treaties also protect our economic and security interests. We will continue to operate the canal until the end of the century through the Panama Canal Commission, an agency of the United States in which Panama will have a minority voice. We will maintain military forces in Panama until that date. After the year 1999, Panama will assume responsibility for operating the canal. A regime of permanent neutrality is established under which both nations have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the canal. The Panama Canal Act provides a framework in which the United States can exercise its rights to operate and defend the canal in a manner consistent with our responsibilities and obligations under the treaties.

I particularly want to thank Senators Stennis and Levin and Congressmen Murphy, Bowen, and Derwinski for their outstanding leadership in resolving the many difficult issues embodied in this act.

In signing this act, I want to assure

Members of Congress and the Government of Panama that this legislation will be interpreted and applied by the executive branch in strict conformity with the terms and the intent of the treaties. In this respect, I believe that certain technicalities in several sections of the act require comment.

Section 1503 requires congressional approval for transfers of property to Panama. Section 1504 grants such approval subject to a 180-day notice requirement and a prohibition against transfer of the canal itself before termination of the treaty. It remains the position of the Administration that the treaty is self-executing with respect to the transfer of property, and thus no additional legislative authorization is required. With regard to the condition contained in section 1504(c) concerning transfer of the canal, I note that this does not preclude other discretionary transfers during the lifetime of the treaty, as provided for in article XIII, paragraph 2(b) and 2(c) of the treaty.

Section 1341(e) lists certain costs which must be paid prior to any contingent payment to Panama under paragraph 4(c) of article XIII of the treaty. It is my understanding that costs listed in this section are identical to those which will be included in the tolls base under section 1602 of the act. These costs are related to the operation and maintenance of the canal and are thus properly considered as "expenditures" under paragraph 4(c) of article XIII, to be paid before any surplus is due to Panama under that provision. □

¹Made on signing H.R. 111 into law (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1979). As enacted, H.R. 111 is Public Law 96-70, approved Sept. 27, 1979.

will continue that crucial work by staying on with the Panama Canal Commission. The creation of the canal, as its superb historian has written, "... was one of the supreme human achievements of all time, the culmination of a heroic dream of four hundred years and of more than twenty years of phenomenal effort and sacrifice. The fifty miles between the oceans were among the hardest ever won by human effort and ingenuity and no statistics on tonnage or tolls can begin to convey

the grandeur of what was accomplished ... the canal is an expression of that old and noble desire to bridge the divide, to bring people together."¹

So today let us celebrate a new bridging of the divide. A new drawing together. For 65 years the Panama Canal has joined the oceans. Now and forevermore it will join our ideals. □

¹*The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914* by David McCullough.

Nicaragua

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on September 11, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.¹

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to appear before you and this subcommittee to support the proposal to reprogram \$8.5 million of foreign assistance from FY 1979 funds for relief and rehabilitation efforts related to the recent Nicaraguan civil strife. In my statement today, I would like to describe briefly the current situation in Nicaragua, outline the circumstances that prompted the reprogramming proposal now before you, and provide some additional details on the proposed uses of these funds.

Current Situation

For both Latin America and the United States, the current situation in Nicaragua presents a critical challenge and a major opportunity. The course of events there will influence developments in Central America and throughout the hemisphere and will have an important impact on U.S.-Latin American relations.

When the new Government of Nicaragua assumed power July 20, the country's political, economic, and security institutions had all ceased to function. Almost half of Nicaragua's population was displaced, hungry, or unemployed.

The new government, which was initially formed in exile, is a coalition of former guerrilla and civic leaders. It consists of a five-member junta as the executive authority, a 19-member Council of Ministers, and a 33-member National Council, still in the process of formation. While the Sandinista National Directorate, made up of guerrilla leaders, wields significant influence, so, too, does the Cabinet, which includes many moderate leaders. Lines of authority within the government are still unclear, and there is considerable administrative confusion.

The government's orientation, as revealed in its initial policies, has been generally moderate and pluralistic and not Marxist or Cuban. The government has restrained reprisals—indeed, I believe it has been more successful in

doing so than any other recent government which has come to power in the wake of a violent revolution. The government has also promulgated a decree guaranteeing individual rights and has permitted an independent press and radio.

The leadership of the government is very diverse. While there are influential figures who espouse positions with which we strongly disagree—as at the recent nonaligned conference in Havana—the government as a whole has expressed a desire for close and friendly relations with us. Over time, we hope that Nicaragua will find a balanced foreign policy. We are encouraged by indications that the Nicaraguans are making a genuine effort to establish friendly relations with their neighbors in Central America.

The situation in Nicaragua today is in a process of evolution. With the support of the democratic countries in the hemisphere, Nicaragua will have an opportunity to revitalize its shattered economy and to continue on a moderate and pluralistic path. Without adequate support for reconstruction, the Nicaraguan Government might resort to authoritarian measures to expedite economic recovery. Our relationship would doubtless become more strained as a result. We believe that the best approach to the situation in Nicaragua is for us to adopt an attitude of friendly cooperation, including the provision of effective and timely assistance.

U.S. interests will be best served by the development in Nicaragua of a truly democratic government, within a flourishing, pluralistic society. We recognize that some elements of the present government might prefer a closed, Marxist society. We recognize as well that Cuba is already providing substantial advice and assistance to Nicaragua. But the situation in Nicaragua remains fluid.

Reprogramming Proposal

The moderate outcome we seek will not come about if we walk away now. Precisely because others are assisting Nicaragua and may seek to exploit the situation there, we must not turn our backs.

We want to help alleviate human suffering in Nicaragua, speed reconstruction, foster respect for human rights and democracy, and promote re-

gional development and security. These goals can best be achieved by working with the new government and with other nations and international institutions which share our basic objectives.

The basic tenets of our policy are therefore:

- To develop a positive relationship with the new government in Nicaragua based on the principles of nonintervention, equality, and mutual respect;
- To support the development of a democratic, pluralistic government in Nicaragua, by maintaining contact with all elements of Nicaraguan society, including the church, the media, and the private sector, as well as public officials;
- To cooperate with other nations and public and private institutions in assisting Nicaragua's economic recovery; and
- To help directly with the reconstruction effort by interim aid such as we are proposing today and by assessing and seeking to assist in the longer term effort.

Proposed Uses of Funds

I now turn to the assistance package we are proposing today. We first informed this committee of our intention to reprogram \$8.5 million of FY 1979 foreign assistance funds by letter of August 1, 1979. The committee has expressed concern that the letter arrived just as the August recess was beginning and thus did not afford the opportunity for study that the proposal required before the members departed. The timing was the result of the situation in Nicaragua. It was only on July 20—only 10 days earlier—that the new government was sworn in. The Agency for International Development (AID) officials and Department officers could not prepare a reprogramming proposal without some assessment of Nicaragua's immediate needs, and the security situation in Managua and throughout the country made any such assessment impossible for several days. The 10 days between July 20 and August 1 does not seem an unreasonable amount of time for this effort.

The upheaval in Nicaragua has left the people of that country in dire circumstances, with both severe short-term humanitarian needs and serious long-term economic recovery requirements. The widespread civil war left some 1 million people in need of food, 40,000 in need of medical services, and 250,000 in need of shelter. At the height of the conflict, some 150,000 Nicaraguans took refuge in nearby

Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo

President Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico made an official visit to Washington, D.C., September 28-29, 1979. Following is the text of the joint press statement issued on September 29.¹

President Carter and President Lopez Portillo met at the White House September 28-29 for the third in a series of reviews on the status of bilateral relations and consideration of regional and global issues of mutual interest.

At their second meeting the Presidents had agreed to a restructuring of the consultative mechanism and had requested their Secretaries of State and Foreign Relations to report on the

matter. The first order of business at this meeting, accordingly, was to review that report. The Presidents expressed satisfaction with the intensive effort made by the working groups of the consultative mechanism and the substantive progress achieved in those groups. They concluded that the mechanism has proven to be an effective vehicle for coordinating and further defining bilateral relations. They, therefore, instructed their Administrations to continue working through the mechanism in the areas of mutual interest already identified.

President Carter and President Lopez Portillo reviewed the status of bilateral consultations in the energy field and

Common Market countries have made available \$10 million in loans. Spain has pledged up to \$7 million for relief and recovery. West Germany is providing \$1.75 million for relief.

Looking to the future, we understand that three Central American countries are arranging a revolving export credit fund of up to \$75 million to assist Nicaragua within the Central American Common Market. We also understand that the European Economic Community is providing special credit for \$9 million for grain exports to Nicaragua and that Germany is arranging an assistance program totaling some \$19 million.

We now need to begin to shift our efforts from relief to recovery—to assist the Nicaraguan people to meet their own basic needs of food, shelter, and medical attention. After reviewing the status of our assistance accounts and analyzing all possibilities, the Administration has concluded that the only immediate way to assist is to reprogram: (1) \$8 million of Economic Support Fund (ESF) funds which had been planned for the Maqarin Dam but which were not required this fiscal year, and (2) \$500,000 from AID development assistance. These reprogrammed funds will enable us to put together an interim repair and rehabilitation program to help meet Nicaragua's needs. We are now completing an assessment of Nicaragua's longer term needs, and we will shortly be consulting with Congress on the feasibility of a longer term recovery program for the country.

The interim program we are proposing for the balance of FY 1979 consists of the following elements:

- \$6 million to provide the grain stabilization institute with the capacity to assure purchase of food crop production and stable and reasonable consumer prices through the next planting and harvest cycle;
- \$2 million to assist the Ministry of Housing in the repair and rehabilitation of low-cost housing; and
- \$500,000 reprogrammed from development assistance to assist a major Nicaraguan private voluntary agency to restore small businesses and industries.

In addition to these reprogrammed funds, our proposed interim program also includes PL 480, Title I sales of 15,000 tons of wheat, amounting to approximately \$2.6 million. These sales will help the country to feed itself and to save precious foreign exchange.

The interim relief and rehabilitation activities I have described are needed to meet urgent requirements. Although the proposed reprogramming is not large, it will be an important symbol of the traditional and continuing friendship between Nicaragua and the United States. I assure you that the focus of the proposed activities will be on the people of Nicaragua, who so badly need our assistance. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

expressed their pleasure at the successful conclusion of governmental negotiations for the sale of Mexican surplus associated natural gas to the United States. They considered this agreement advantageous to both countries.

Regarding another energy source, the Presidents expressed their hope that ongoing negotiations for electric energy interchanges along their common border may also be satisfactorily concluded in the near future.

Both Presidents noted that the common border offers unique opportunities for close collaboration in many areas. They expressed their interest in enhancing the environment along the border and preserving the quality of life in the region. Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo agreed on the need for both countries to prevent events or actions on one side of the land or maritime boundary from degrading the environment on the other side. They also instructed their Administrations to give a high priority to such questions. They also agreed to work within the consultative mechanism to determine if it is possible or appropriate to conclude agreements for measures by both countries to lessen or eliminate environmental damage in the future.

The Presidents recalled that last February they had instructed the International Boundary and Water Commission to recommend measures that might be adopted within the context of existing agreements to achieve further progress toward a permanent solution to border sanitation problems. The Presidents reviewed the recommendations submitted by the commission and found them satisfactory as a basic agreement for solution of border sanitation problems. The Presidents asked the commission to proceed as soon as possible to conclude the supplementary recommendations for completion of the works required to provide the good quality water which they had recognized in February to be so important for the health and well-being of the citizens of both countries living and traveling in the border area.

The Presidents paid special attention to the phenomenon of the migratory flow between Mexico and the United States, including specific issues that arise therefrom on both sides of the border. They recognized that, as they had agreed last February, it is essential to know with greater precision and detail all aspects of the matter.

The President of Mexico accordingly outlined the purposes and first partial results of the national survey of emigration to the northern border and the

Agreement With Mexico on Natural Gas

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, SEPT. 21, 1979¹

I'm pleased to announce that we have just reached an agreement with the Government of Mexico which will permit the purchase of Mexican natural gas by U.S. buyers.

This is a significant step toward providing a new source of energy supplies for our country. Just as important, the agreement is a breakthrough in building the relationship of equity and mutual respect which we seek with the government and the people of our great southern neighbor.

Under the terms of this agreement, the U.S. purchasers will be able to buy 300 million cubic feet of natural gas each day. This gas will be in excess of Mexico's national demand and will meet our own needs, which are not covered by our present supplies. The price is a fair one for both countries.

This natural gas agreement represents an important first step toward a

deeper and broader relationship, and it will be of great benefit both to the people of Mexico and to the people of our own country.

I've expressed to President Lopez Portillo today my pleasure that we've reached an understanding with respect to natural gas sales and that we will have a chance to discuss more important issues—other important issues—when we meet in Washington next week.

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, SEPT. 21, 1979²

The Governments of Mexico and the United States of America have reached an understanding on a framework for the sale of 300 million cubic feet per day of natural gas by Petroleos Mexicanos, the Mexican State Oil Company, to U.S. purchasers.

Pursuant to the understanding reached, the Governments of the

United States, undertaken by the Department of Labor and Social Welfare. This large-scale study, which is in an advanced stage, will provide more precise information on the size and nature of emigration, including data on the number of emigrants who annually enter the United States, how many return to Mexico, their contribution to the U.S. and Mexican economies, and the degree to which they draw upon and contribute to social services in the United States. President Carter agreed on the importance of statistical consistency in approaching questions of migration and was pleased to learn of the progress of the survey.

President Carter described the steps he has taken to insure that all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government give priority to the protection of the human rights of all persons in the United States, whether or not they are American citizens.

Both Presidents repeated their commitment to combat the smuggling of undocumented persons, which constitutes a serious threat to human rights.

Following their review of bilateral matters, President Lopez Portillo and President Carter discussed recent developments in Central America and agreed that progress toward a demo-

cratic government in Nicaragua had improved the prospects of peace in the region and a greater respect for human rights. They committed their governments to continue supporting the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction with a view toward assisting it in the task of economic and social recovery. Both Presidents exchanged points of view on the Caribbean.

President Carter congratulated President Lopez Portillo on his proposal to the United Nations on rationalized production and consumption of energy, both in the industrialized countries and the developing countries, saying that it was a balanced presentation, positive in tone. President Carter also referred to the energy plan proposed to the U.S. Congress and agreed on the need to devote increased efforts to alternative sources.

Finally, there was a review of the latest developments on the Middle East and SALT II treaty. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 8, 1979, which also carries the exchange of toasts at a state dinner on Sept. 28 and the departure remarks on Sept. 29.

United States of America and the Mexican States have agreed to authorize and support as a matter of policy commercial transactions which are within the following framework:

- The initial volume of natural gas deliveries will be 300 million cubic feet per day, commencing as soon as contracts are signed, regulatory approvals obtained, and gas is available for delivery.

- The initial price will be \$3.625/million btu as of January 1, 1980. This initial price is subject to reconsideration prior to January 1, 1980, if the price for natural gas from comparable sources exceeds that amount prior to said date.

- The arrangement shall continue without limitation subject to the understanding that the gas to be supplied is surplus associated gas in excess of Mexican national demand, that the gas being purchased is to meet U.S. needs not covered from other sources, and that therefore the contractual provisions will provide that either nation, on the basis of its own determination of its national interest, taking into account its domestic supply and demand for natural gas, may cause the termination of the arrangement upon 180 days notice to the other nation.

- The initial price will be adjusted quarterly by the same percentage as the change in world crude oil prices pursuant to a specific formula to be agreed upon by the contracting parties.

The way is now clear for the negotiation of commercial contracts between Petroleos Mexicanos and U.S. purchasers on terms which both governments regard as mutually beneficial. Such contracts will be subject to appropriate governmental approvals in each country.

The two governments will review from time to time the terms of this arrangement as well as other energy issues of mutual interest. □

¹ Made to news correspondents assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 24, 1979).

² Text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 24, 1979.

U.S. Ambassadors to Western Hemisphere Countries, October 1979

Argentina—Raul H. Castro
Bahamas—William B. Schwartz, Jr.
Barbados—Sally Angela Shelton
Bolivia—Paul H. Boeker
Brazil—Robert Marion Sayre
Chile—George W. Landau
Colombia—Diego C. Asencio
Costa Rica—Marvin Weissman
Dominica—Sally Angela Shelton
Dominican Republic—Robert L. Yost
Ecuador—Raymond E. Gonzalez
El Salvador—Frank J. Devine
Grenada—Sally Angela Shelton
Guatemala—Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.
Guyana—George B. Roberts, Jr.
Haiti—William Bowdoin Jones
Honduras—Mari-Luci Jaramillo
Jamaica—Loren E. Lawrence
Mexico—Vacant
Nicaragua—Lawrence A. Pezzullo
Panama—Ambler Holmes Moss, Jr.
Paraguay—Robert E. White
Peru—Harry W. Shlaudeman
Saint Lucia—(Minister) Sally Angela Shelton
Suriname—Nancy Ostrander
Trinidad and Tobago—Irving G. Cheslaw
Uruguay—Lyle Franklin Lane
Venezuela—William H. Luers

TREATIES: Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited: Colombia, Sept. 25, 1979.

Antarctic

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977, at the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.¹
Notification of approval: Chile, Sept. 27, 1979.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accessions deposited: El Salvador, Sept. 25, 1979; Sierra Leone, Sept. 20, 1979.

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (Chicago, 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.¹
Signature: Spain, Oct. 4, 1979.²
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Sept. 27, 1979.
Acceptances deposited: Peru, Sept. 26, 1979; Yugoslavia, Oct. 9, 1979.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, July 6, 1979.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, June 20, 1979.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978.³
Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Oct. 3, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, Oct. 5, 1979.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S. June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Sept. 11, 1979.

Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.³
Adherence deposited: Bolivia, July 19, 1979.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.¹
Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, Oct. 8, 1979; Iraq, Sept. 5, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, Oct. 8, 1979; Iraq, Sept. 5, 1979.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964.³
Accession deposited: Barbados, Oct. 1, 1979.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Aug. 31, 1979.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972.

Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Sept. 12, 1979; Switzerland, July 31, 1979.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.³

Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 3, 1979.

Reciprocal Assistance

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance (Rio pact). Done at San Jose July 26, 1975.¹

Ratification deposited: U.S. (with reservation), Sept. 20, 1979.

Telecommunications

Final acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.³

Approval deposited: India, Mar. 31, 1979.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised (TIAS 4893, 8599), relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.³

Approval deposited: Canada, June 20, 1979.

Transportation

Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.³

Accessions deposited: Belgium, Oct. 1, 1979; U.K. Oct. 5, 1979.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to Membership: Saint Lucia, Sept. 19, 1979.

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Adopted at New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. (TIAS 6900).

Accession deposited: People's Republic of China, Sept. 11, 1979.

Weights and Measures

Convention establishing an International Organization of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris Oct. 12, 1955, and amended January 1968. Entered into force May 28, 1958; for the U.S. Oct. 22, 1972.

Accession deposited: Algeria, June 26, 1979.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Peru, Sept. 26, 1979.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Extradition treaty, with annex. Signed at Washington Sept. 14, 1979. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

France

Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes on income and property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the protocol of Oct. 12, 1970, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Sept. 27, 1979.

Entry into force: Oct. 27, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1979.

Federal Republic of Germany

Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperation in the development of national air traffic control systems, with annex. Signed at Washington and Bonn Aug. 8 and 20, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 20, 1979.

German Democratic Republic

Consular convention, with exchange of notes. Signed at Berlin Sept. 4, 1979. Enters into force 30 days following the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Hungary

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979.

Entry into force: Sept. 18, 1979.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 31 and Oct. 4, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1979.

Japan

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles, with related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 17, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1979.

Record of discussion relating to trade in textile products. Signed at Washington Aug. 22, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1979.

Jordan

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Aug. 27, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1979.

Republic of Korea

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Dec. 19, 1975, and Jan. 15, 1976, as extended (TIAS 8609, 9161), relating to the development of the Korea Standards Research Institute. Effected by exchange of letters at Seoul and Washington June 14, July 13 and Aug. 21, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1979; effective July 31, 1979.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and the encouragement of international trade and investment, with related notes. Signed at Seoul June 4, 1976.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Sept. 20, 1979.

Entry into force: Oct. 20, 1979.

Malaysia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Sept. 10 and 14, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 14, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Sept. 14 and 28, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1979.

Mexico

Minute 261 of the International Boundary and Water Commission: Recommendations for the solution to the border sanitation problems. Signed at El Paso Sept. 24, 1979. Enters into force after approval of the two governments.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to cooperation between the United States and the Netherlands Antilles regarding a hurricane monitoring and forecasting program for the Caribbean, with memorandum of arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague July 26, 1979. Enters into force on the date on which the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands notifies the Government of the United States that the necessary constitutional procedures required in the Kingdom of the Netherlands have been complied with.

Nicaragua

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Managua Aug. 31, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1979.

Panama

Convention for the construction of a ship canal. Signed at Washington Nov. 18, 1903. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1904. 33 Stat. 2234.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement delimiting the Canal Zone referred to in Article II of the convention of Nov. 18, 1903. Signed at Panama June 15, 1904. Entered into force June 15, 1904. 10 Bevans 678.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Boundary convention. Signed at Panama Sept. 2, 1914. Entered into force Feb. 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1893.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Protocol of an agreement relating to neutrality. Signed at Washington Oct. 10, 1914. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1914. 38 Stat. 2042.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Convention modifying the liquor smuggling convention of 1924 (43 Stat. 1875). Signed at Panama Mar. 14, 1932. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1933. 48 Stat. 1488.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Convention with regard to the construction of a trans-isthmian highway between the cities of Panama and Colon. Signed at Washington Mar. 2, 1936. Entered into force July 27, 1939. 53 Stat. 1869.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

General treaty of friendship and cooperation accompanied by sixteen exchanges of notes em-

bodily interpretations of the new treaty or agreements pursuant thereto. Signed at Washington Mar. 2, 1936. Entered into force July 27, 1939. 53 Stat. 1807.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement confirming that the protocol signed at Washington on Oct. 10, 1914 (38 Stat. 2042), is at present in effect. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Aug. 25, 1939. 54 Stat. 1811.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Arrangement providing for a Trans-Isthmian Joint Highway Board. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 19 and 23 and Dec. 20, 1939, and Jan. 4, 1940. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1940. 54 Stat. 2278.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement supplementing the convention of Mar. 2, 1936 (53 Stat. 1869), relating to the trans-isthmian highway. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 31 and Sept. 6, 1940. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1940. 58 Stat. 1593.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

General relations agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 18, 1942. Entered into force May 18, 1942. 59 Stat. 1289.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Convention regarding the Colon corridor and certain other corridors through the Canal Zone. Signed at Panama May 24, 1950. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1955. TIAS 3180.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Treaty of mutual understanding and cooperation and memorandum of understandings reached. Signed at Panama Jan. 25, 1955. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1955. TIAS 3297.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement providing for reciprocal recognition of drivers' licenses issued in Panama and the Canal Zone. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 31, 1960. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1960. TIAS 4716.

Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979.

Philippines

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Aug. 23 and 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979.

Agreement continuing the operations of the U.S. Veterans Administration in the Philippines. Signed at Manila Sept. 5, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1979; effective Oct. 27, 1978.

Poland

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw May 10 and Sept. 3, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1979.

Portugal

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon Aug. 14 and 27, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 27, 1979.

Romania

Agreement amending the agreement of June 17, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8833, 9211), relating to trade in wool and manmade fiber tex-

tiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York July 23 and Sept. 14, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 14, 1979.

Sierra Leone

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of negotiations. Signed at Freetown Aug. 23, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1979.

Singapore

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Mar. 31, 1978 (TIAS 9001). Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore Sept. 14, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 14, 1979.

Spain

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates of deceased persons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 1978. *Instruments of ratification exchanged:* Oct. 11, 1979.

Entry into force: Nov. 11, 1979.

Western Samoa

General agreement for special development assistance. Signed at Apia Sept. 20, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 20, 1979. □

¹ Not in force.

² Without reservation as to acceptance.

³ Not in force for the U.S.

CHRONOLOGY: September 1979

Sept. 3 Conference of nonaligned countries meets in Havana, Sept. 3-9.

Sept. 4 Fifth conference of the U.N. World Food Council held in Ottawa, Canada, Sept. 4-7.

Egypt and Israel hold talks on Palestinian autonomy in Haifa, Israel, Sept. 4-6.

Sept. 5 U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Young visits Africa Sept. 5-20.

Sept. 10 Constitutional conference on Southern Rhodesia begins in London. Angolan President Neto dies following surgery in a Moscow hospital.

Egyptian Vice President Mubarak visits U.S. Sept. 10-17.

President Mobutu of Zaire visits Washington, D.C., Sept. 10-13.

Sept. 12 18th Congress of the Universal Postal Union held in Rio de Janeiro Sept. 12-30.

Sept. 16 Sweden holds parliamentary elections. The Moderate, Center, and Liberal

Parties retain their parliamentary majority by a narrow one-seat margin.

President Taraki of Afghanistan is reported by Kabul radio to have resigned the presidency. Prime Minister Amin is named to succeed him.

Sept. 17 10th Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting held in the Department of State Sept. 17-Oct. 5.

Sept. 18 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly opens in New York.

Sept. 20 The Angolan Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party elects Jose Eduardo dos Santos as President.

Ola Ullsten resigns as Sweden's Prime Minister.

Sept. 21 U.S., Mexico announce agreement on Mexico's sale of natural gas (300 million cubic feet a day) to the U.S. UNGA allows ousted Kampuchean regime of Pol Pot to retain the country's seat in the U.N. by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 35 with 34 abstentions (12 nations were absent).

David Dacko leads a coup which overthrows Emperor Bokassa I of the Central African Empire. The country is renamed the Central African Republic.

Sept. 23 Donald F. McHenry sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.

Sept. 24 Hilla Limann sworn in as President of Ghana.

Sept. 25 U.S. Senate passes the Panama Canal Act of 1979 to implement terms of the Panama Canal Treaty by a vote of 63 to 32.

Israel returns another section of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in ceremonies at Abu Darba.

Sept. 26 U.S. House passes the Panama Canal Act of 1979 by a vote of 232 to 188.

Egypt and Israel hold Palestinian autonomy talks in Alexandria, Egypt, Sept. 26-27.

Sept. 27 President Carter signs into law the Panama Canal Act.

Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen resigns.

World Administrative Radio Conference convenes in Geneva.

Sept. 28 Mexican President Lopez Portillo visits Washington, D.C., Sept. 28-29.

Sept. 29 Pope John Paul II visits Ireland and the U.S. Sept. 29-Oct. 8.

Sept. 30 Vice President Mondale visits Panama Sept. 30-Oct. 2 to represent the U.S. when Panama acquires jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone on Oct. 1 under terms of the Panama Canal Treaty. □

PRESS RELEASES: Department of State

September 19–October 12

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*226	9/19	U.S., Philippines amend textile agreement, Aug. 3 and 16.
*227	9/19	U.S., Japan confirm record of understanding dealing with trade in textile issues, Aug. 17.
*228	9/19	U.S., Korea amend textile agreement, Aug. 24.
*229	9/19	U.S., Haiti sign textile agreement, Aug. 17.
*230	9/20	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 6, Nov. 8.
*231	9/20	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Oct. 4.
*232	9/20	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Oct. 10.
*233	9/21	U.S., Hong Kong amend textile agreement, May 23.
234	9/24	Vance: address before U.N. General Assembly.
*235	9/25	Program for official visit to Washington, D.C. of Mexican President Lopez Portillo, Sept. 28–29.
*236	9/26	Ambassador Paul C. Warnke to address conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Portland, Me., Oct. 3.
237	9/27	Bangladesh joins nonproliferation treaty.
238	9/27	Vance: address before Foreign Policy Association, New York.
238A	9/27	Vance: question-and-answer session following address before Foreign Policy Association.
*239	9/27	SCC, Oct. 30.
*240	9/27	SCC, National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Nov. 20.
*241	9/27	Hispanic-American Foreign Policy Conference, Oct. 29.
*242	9/28	Ambassador Warnke to address conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Portland, Ore., Oct. 11.

KAMPUCHEA DONATIONS

The authorities in Kampuchea have reached agreement with the two international agencies which enter Kampuchea with food and medical supplies—UNICEF and the International Red Cross. If you or members of your organization wish to help the people of Kampuchea, please send your donations, marked specifically for that purpose, to:

American National Red Cross—Kampuchea Relief
2025 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

or

U.S. Committee of UNICEF
331 East 38th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016

Or you may call the U.S. Committee of UNICEF for more information: 800-221-2870
212-686-5522 (New York State only)

The U.S. Committee of UNICEF serves as a clearinghouse for the International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Service, American Friends Service Committee, CARE Inc., Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, and Oxfam-America Inc.

*243	9/29	Kenneth M. Curtis sworn in as Ambassador to Canada (biographic data).	*253	10/4	SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, Oct. 24.
*244	10/1	Stephen Low sworn in as Ambassador to Nigeria (biographic data).	254	10/5	Vance: interview on CBS-TV morning news, New York.
*245	10/3	CCIR, study group 7, Oct. 22.	*255	10/5	Jack Richard Perry sworn in as Ambassador to Bulgaria (biographic data).
*246	10/3	Advisory Committee to the U.S. National Section of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 30.	*256	10/9	Thomas W. M. Smith sworn in as Ambassador to Ghana (biographic data).
*247	10/3	Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, Nov. 8.	257	10/10	Vance: statement before the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*248	10/3	Richard Noyes Viets sworn in as Ambassador to Tanzania (biographic data).	258	10/10	Press communique issued by the chairman of the 10th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.
*249	10/4	Ambassador Marshall Shulman to address conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Portland, Ore., Oct. 11.	*259	10/10	John R. Clingerman sworn in as Ambassador to Lesotho (biographic data).
250	10/4	Vance: interview on "Today" Show, New York.	*260	10/10	Irving G. Cheslaw sworn in as Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago (biographic data).
*251	10/4	International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group 1, Oct. 31.	*261	10/11	CCIR, study group 5, Nov. 5.
*252	10/4	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radio communication, Oct. 18.	*262	10/12	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Dec. 13.
			*263	10/12	Advisory Committee to U.S. Section on the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Oct. 28. □

* Not printed in the BULLETIN.

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
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CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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DEPOSITORY



(Photos by United Press International)

Clockwise from left:

A pair of undernourished Kampuchean girls at the Sa Keo refugee center in Thailand wait their turn for a bath at a pond in the camp.

A Kampuchean refugee eats rice gruel at the Klong Kai Tueng temporary camp in Kampuchea near the Thai-Kampuchea border.

Kampuchean refugees seek some rest in a crude shelter at the Klong Kai Tueng temporary camp.



KAMPUCHEAN REFUGEES: URGENT NEED FOR WORLDWIDE RELIEF

by Matthew Nimetz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 8, 1979.¹

We meet today at a time of extraordinary urgency. Famine, dislocation, and warfare in Kampuchea threaten the lives of the Khmer people. Of a population that numbered between 7 and 8 million in 1975, perhaps a third have died in the last 4 years. Many more will die in the coming months unless action is taken now to end this senseless inhumanity. An effective worldwide relief effort can save hundreds of thousands who would otherwise die. Worldwide indignation at the death and suffering in Kampuchea has contributed to a climate in which such a program can be pursued.

Successful relief activities require the active support of all the political authorities in Kampuchea, as well as action by the world community in coordinating contributions and distribution of relief supplies. And clearly the U.S. role in this essential humanitarian cause will depend on close cooperation among the Administration, the Congress, and private voluntary agencies.

The Administration is committed to this urgent humanitarian task. The presence of the First Lady, Rosalynn Carter, in Thailand today, to view the situation firsthand, is a manifestation of the President and Mrs. Carter's personal concern for the Kampuchean tragedy. On Tuesday, Mrs. Carter will be meeting with representatives of voluntary agencies to discuss her trip and plans for future relief efforts.

Mr. Chairman [Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island], we also welcome your personal efforts on behalf of this effort, including your participation in the delegation to the U.N. pledging conference on Kampuchean refugees earlier this week. I am honored to be a part of this group of concerned organizations and individuals, and I welcome your ideas on ways we can improve U.S. and international contributions to the survival of the Khmer people.

U.S. Policy

Before I outline relief efforts to date and options for assuring that assistance

gets to those in need, let me just say that the Administration's policy is simple: We will do everything possible to support international organization and voluntary agency efforts in providing humanitarian assistance to the beleaguered and starving Khmer people. Our purpose is to save lives.

Since the moment we began to receive indications of impending famine, we have sought to alert the international community to the dimensions of the potential tragedy. We have unceasingly supported relief agencies most likely to work out arrangements with the Kampuchean authorities for the necessary delivery and distribution of food and medical supplies to all Khmer, regardless of political affiliation. We will work closely with the Congress to insure that the United States contributes a generous share of the required funds, food commodities, supplies, and logistical support. In this respect, we are gratified that the Congress is moving expeditiously to authorize and appropriate funds for Khmer relief. We are also encouraged by the response of other governments at the U.N. pledging conference in New York on Monday, at which an aggregate of \$210 million was pledged.

It is all the more important to accelerate our joint efforts now that we have a clearer idea of both the needs of the Khmer people and the political and logistical problems of providing humanitarian assistance in a country with contested authorities and a war-ravaged infrastructure. The worst predictions have been realized.

The picture of a new holocaust is all too graphic and horrifying from media coverage and reports of delegations of Members of Congress, governors, Administration officials, and representatives of private groups. The vulnerable younger and older generations of Khmer are already decimated, and there appear to be few resources within Kampuchea to sustain those who have so far escaped starvation and disease. At the same time, however, a concerted international relief program is underway. I should like to review briefly what has been done to date and then look at the challenge ahead.

Situation to Date

The U.S. Government has been concerned about the possibility of mass starvation among the Khmer people since Vietnam's invasion and occupa-

COUNSELOR AND ACTING U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS

Matthew Nimetz was born June 17, 1939, in New York and received degrees from Williams College and the Harvard Law School. At Williams he was President of Phi Beta Kappa and valedictorian of his class. At Harvard he was President of the *Harvard Law Review*. He also has an MA from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.

Mr. Nimetz was a partner in the New York law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett. He was also a commissioner of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and a member of the Health Advisory Council of the State of New York. He served as the Executive Director of Governor-elect Hugh L. Carey's transition council (1974).

Mr. Nimetz was a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice John M. Harlan (1965-67) and was a staff assistant to President Johnson (July 1967-January 1969).

He was sworn in as Counselor of the De-



partment of State on April 8, 1977, and in this capacity serves as a senior adviser to the Secretary of State on a wide range of foreign policy matters. He has been actively involved in issues concerning the eastern Mediterranean, European, and East-West relations, SALT, and Mexican affairs.

Secretary Vance named Mr. Nimetz Acting U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs on November 1, 1979.

tion of Kampuchea began in December of last year. The invasion followed almost 4 years of despotic and brutal rule by the Pol Pot regime. As a result of the regime's savagery against its own people, 2-3 million Khmer may have perished—out of the country's estimated 1975 population of 7 to 8 million.

The timing of the Vietnamese invasion at the height of the rice harvest aggravated the situation. Most of the rice crop was lost because both the Vietnamese and the forces under Pol Pot tried to limit each other's effectiveness through food-denial and crop-destruction tactics.

In addition, to avoid fighting or harassment in the countryside, the population clustered along lines of communication and around troop concentrations which had the effect of reducing the numbers of people available to cultivate the land. Competing military forces sought to restrict movements of the people into areas where they would be subject to the other side's control, thus restricting normal agricultural activity. As a result, we estimate that only a minimal percentage of the spring crop was planted, and persistent warfare is now impairing the principal December harvest once again. Moreover, hungry and desperate people have eaten most of the seed intended for the next crop.

The tragic consequence is that widespread famine is already evident. Its victims have little resistance against disease, and many of them may not even have the energy to seek food or medical care. We hear reports that many people are too weak even to lift food cartons off relief trucks. A whole generation of Khmer children faces death, and Khmer women are so malnourished that few children survive the first days of life. The fortunate few with the strength to make the journey through ravaged and often hostile territory to Thailand in search of food and safety are so weakened that they are close to starvation by the end of their journey.

As the Khmer are moved away from the border area to camps like Sa Keo, where they can receive medical treatment and food on a regular basis, the death rate has dropped from 40 per day to about 25 per day. We hope that these numbers will continue to fall, but the resistance of these people to disease has been severely weakened by the absence of an adequate diet.

The political consequences of this tragedy are equally troubling. Currently 35,000 Khmer are located in a new Thai holding center at Sa Keo, and another 200,000 are poised along the

border. New groups are fleeing the interior of Kampuchea in search of food and safety from the warring factions. They will probably move into Thailand at the first sign of increased Vietnamese pressure. The Thai and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are preparing for another influx—which may occur very soon—of those on the border plus others from the interior that could lead to a total of 300,000-400,000 refugees. We are grateful that the Thai Government has established a policy of accepting the Khmer refugees, making contingency plans for the difficult days ahead and cooperating with concerned governments and international relief organizations.

But the new surge of Khmer refugees will certainly add to Thailand's existing burden of sheltering 150,000 refugees from Laos and Vietnam and from earlier waves of migration from Kampuchea. The prospects of continued Vietnamese military operations and a burgeoning refugee population constitute a threat to Thailand and remain a seriously destabilizing factor in the region and a source of great concern for the United States and the Association of South East Asian Nations.

Relief Efforts

Let me review briefly the relief effort that is underway. Negotiations began in June between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF and the Phnom Penh authorities. We initiated diplomatic demarches in over 30 countries in late August to urge them to reinforce our efforts with the Soviets, Vietnamese, and Chinese to permit an international relief effort in Kampuchea. Finally, on September 26, ICRC/UNICEF received permission to send a joint operating team into Kampuchea. On October 13, ICRC and UNICEF established their mission in Phnom Penh and initiated a daily airlift to Phnom Penh of about 14 metric tons of foodstuffs and other supplies.

On October 19, the ICRC and UNICEF announced that the estimated needs for their relief program would be \$111 million for the first 6 months, assuming cooperation with the Kampuchean authorities on delivery and monitoring of distribution. This estimate was calculated on the basis of providing some 165,000 tons of rice, 15,000 tons of sugar, and 8,000 tons of edible oils over that 6-month period. The Phnom Penh authorities calculated that these quantities were necessary to provide food for some 2¼ million people whom they stated were facing serious food shortages.

In addition, by October 31, the ICRC and UNICEF (working with the World Food Program) as well as private agencies, principally Oxfam, had also been able to land about 9,400 metric tons of foodstuffs at the port of Kampong Som. These agencies expect to double that tonnage into the port in November, and in December they hope to meet the estimated need of 30,000 tons per month using all means of delivery—sea, air, and land. However, when the level of 30,000 tons per month is realized in December, the international agencies must still make up for the long period prior to that date when they were delivering far less than the needed 1,000 tons per day.

To meet the urgent need, and to follow up the work of the Geneva conference [on refugees July 20-21, 1979] Secretary General Waldheim convened a pledging conference for humanitarian relief to Kampuchea on November 5. Seventy-five countries and observer delegations participated. ICRC/UNICEF sought \$250 million for a year's program for 2½ million people in Kampuchea, and UNHCR sought \$60 million for 8 months of operations to care for 300,000 Khmer fleeing to Thailand. At the conclusion of the conference, Secretary General Waldheim announced that approximately \$210 million in cash and commodities had been pledged. The U.S. pledge, a reiteration of President Carter's October 24 announcement, was an aggregate of \$69 million, including \$30 million in cash and commodities for Kampuchean relief, the Administration's support of congressional efforts to provide an additional \$30 million for Kampuchean relief, and \$9 million for the care of Khmer refugees in Thailand.

Adequate funding for the initial phase of the ICRC/UNICEF relief effort thus appears to be available, although the ICRC/UNICEF operation has an immediate need for more cash. The major difficulty facing us now is to assure the delivery and distribution of essential food and other supplies within Kampuchea. Supplies reportedly are already arriving in the port of Kampong Som and Phnom Penh faster than they can be unloaded and distributed. Political restrictions on relief operations have limited efforts to a 100-kilometer radius around Phnom Penh. Food and medical relief have, therefore, not been getting to large areas of the country, particularly to western Kampuchea where they are most desperately needed.

We were gratified to learn on Tuesday that there are signs that some of these obstacles are being overcome. The Phnom Penh authorities are apparently becoming more receptive to

cooperating with the international relief agencies. In particular, we are informed that they have approved multiple flights a day into Phnom Penh and that they are setting up their own relief committee to serve as a liaison with ICRC and UNICEF officials and to coordinate distribution. They have also apparently agreed to allow two truck convoys beyond the original 100-kilometer radius around Phnom Penh to which they have so far been restricted. Just prior to the U.N. pledging conference, the Vietnamese also announced that the Mekong River would be opened to shipments of relief supplies. We sincerely hope that the political authorities in Phnom Penh will follow these steps with further moves to increase and facilitate relief activities.

Proposals

Several proposals have been made to break what has appeared until this week to be a stalemate between those who wish to speed aid to all needy Khmer and the competing Kampuchean authorities who want to prevent diversion to forces under each other's control. As you know, Senators Sasser, Danforth, and Baucus, during their recent trip to Kampuchea, urged authorities in Phnom Penh to permit a "land bridge" to bring supplies to population centers in Kampuchea by truck convoy from Thailand.

We are disappointed that the Phnom Penh authorities have so far not accepted this idea. The limited capacity of the unloading facilities and railway service from the port of Kampong Som, as well as the logistical and financial burden of air shipments into Phnom Penh, preclude delivery of more than half of the estimated 30,000 metric tons needed each month. Even with the addition of the Mekong route, experts believe that there will only be an additional 8,000 tons per month available by this means. Thus, without using the land route, we can at best realize only 21,000-23,000 tons per month of the 30,000 ton goal.

The truck-route concept also has the advantage of permitting supplies coming in from Thailand to be distributed to cities and population centers along the way to Phnom Penh. These supplies would still remain under the supervision of the ICRC and UNICEF and would be distributed with the agreement of the Phnom Penh authorities. On their return trip to Thailand for additional supplies, the trucks could again be used to redistribute commodities delivered to Phnom Penh via the other air, sea, and river routes.

We hope the Phnom Penh authorities will reconsider their initial reaction to

the "land bridge" proposal. I would like to point out, however, that our continued support for ICRC/UNICEF operations on behalf of Khmer is not contingent on acceptance of the "land bridge" proposal. We support all avenues of relief—sea, river, air, and land.

We are also well aware of your own proposal that the United States, unilaterally or in concert with other nations, launch a massive airdrop of relief supplies into Kampuchea. We share your concern for expediting aid to the Khmer, and we certainly have not eliminated any possible means of responding to this challenge. Your recommendation is receiving serious consideration. However, we should recognize that neither the U.S. Government nor the international relief agencies control the Kampuchean airspace, and there is at present no guarantee that planes or helicopters carrying such supplies would not encounter hostile fire.

In the coming days and weeks, we will be working with ICRC and UNICEF and other groups involved in Kampuchean relief to explore all means of assuring that relief reaches those who need it. Starvation, disease, and dislocation will obviously be of such magnitude that a successful program will require delivery and distribution by a wide range of means. Among the possible measures to be taken are the following:

- Maximizing use of the Mekong River route;
- Encouraging the French proposal to repair the railway system in Kampuchea;
- Seeking an increase in the number of ICRC/UNICEF and voluntary agency personnel in Kampuchea;
- Increasing the number of planes resupplying Phnom Penh;
- Seeking permission to use airports in addition to the one at Phnom Penh for delivery of supplies so as to establish new centers for distribution;
- Expediting delivery of sorely needed trucks to Kampuchea;
- Urging the Soviets and the Vietnamese to work with us to obtain permission for increased access by all routes—land, sea, river, and air;
- Increasing support to the UNHCR and other relief organizations for assistance to the hundreds of thousands of Khmer presently in or likely to seek refuge in Thailand;
- Seeking methods for delivering humanitarian supplies to those in need who cannot be reached by truck from Phnom Penh, including those living in areas controlled by Pol Pot and other forces;

• Consulting with other concerned governments in an effort to form a consortium of countries to respond to ICRC/UNICEF requests for support; and

• Encouraging and supporting American voluntary agencies in bringing personnel and supplies to camps along the border in Thailand.

We will also be working with the Congress to make sure that we are able to fulfill our pledges. The ICRC and UNICEF are currently hampered by the lack of ready cash since most contributions have not yet been handed over to them. We are planning to provide them with an advance of cash so that rice can be purchased in Thailand for immediate shipment to Kampuchea.

We are pleased that the House and Senate have moved quickly to pass authorizing legislation for this program and have also quickly reconciled the differences between the two versions of the bill. We are looking forward to passage of this legislation in the next few days. The Administration is also impressed with the speed with which House and Senate conferees have moved to include \$30 million in new funding for relief to victims of the famine in Kampuchea in the conference committee report on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. We hope that the Congress will keep in mind the urgent need for contributions in cash. We also hope the Congress will provide the Administration sufficient authority to respond immediately to emergency requests.

The American response will obviously not be purely a governmental one. Voluntary agencies are taking a major role in organizing contributions and programs for Kampuchea relief. The President, in his October 24th announcement, called upon all Americans to match the government effort by supporting the work of these agencies.

The Congress has worked effectively with the Administration in dramatizing the Kampuchean tragedy to American and world opinion and in providing a generous share of the resources necessary for an effective relief operation. We are gratified that so many Members of Congress share our belief that this unfolding human calamity compels us to show our compassion by taking whatever action is required to avert the destruction of the Khmer people. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Senators' Report on Refugees

At the direction of President Carter and the leadership of the Senate, Senators James R. Sasser (Tennessee), John C. Danforth (Missouri), and Max Baucus (Montana) went on a humanitarian mission to Southeast Asia October 19-26, 1979. Following are remarks by President Carter, a press briefing the three Senators held in the White House, and the text of their report, "The Refugee Situation in Thailand and Cambodia," released on October 26.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, OCT. 26, 1979¹

My first comment to the press and to the American people is one of thanks and appreciation on behalf of all of our country to Senators Sasser, Baucus, and Danforth, who have just returned from a visit to Thailand and Kampuchea to represent our nation in the analysis of what can be done to alleviate the tragedy that is taking place in that country.

It's been estimated that almost half the people of Kampuchea have lost their lives in the last few years. And at the present time, hundreds of thousands of people in that unfortunate country, and some refugees that have crossed the Thai border, are now at the point of death because of starvation.

Our country has been encouraging—through the United Nations and also through the International Red Cross—a means by which we could get food to those people, over the obstacles created by the Vietnamese and the Kampuchean authorities of all kinds. We have discussed this matter in the last few minutes. Senators Sasser and Baucus and Danforth have given me a report of what they observed there. They will answer questions for you in a few minutes.

We are prepared as a nation—my own Administration and the Congress—to proceed expeditiously in every possible way to alleviate the extant suffering. I will ask Dick Clark, former Senator now in charge of our refugee program, to represent me directly. The State Department and I will give him full authority and support throughout all the agencies of government to make his administration of relief to those people effective. As the Senators have just described to me, it's mandatory for effectiveness to deal with the starving

people and deliver aid through the United Nations and also through the Red Cross, not on a unilateral basis.

We have had some discouraging word from the officials in Phnom Penh. We hope that this is a temporary circumstance and that because of world concern, that they would modify their positions and permit a land bridge to be formed so that food can be brought in through Thailand, over the border, to the people who are suffering so greatly, primarily by truck.

I might add one other thing: that I have agreed with the Senators that it would be important for them to talk directly to Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations, to give him a first-hand report and also to seek his continuing support for the effort that all of us are joining in helping.

I want to say that the Thai Government has performed nobly in preparing and permitting a haven for the starving Kampuchean and are cooperating in every possible way to get food to the refugees who now are living on the borderline of death in their own country.

I'd like to turn the podium over to Senator Sasser, who was the leader of this group, and let him make a report to you, and then he and Senators Baucus and Danforth will answer questions that you might have.

PRESS BRIEFING, OCT. 26, 1979²

Senator Sasser: As many of you know, Senator Danforth and Senator Baucus and I, at the request of the majority and minority leadership of the U.S. Senate and also at the request of President Carter, journeyed to Southeast Asia some 6 days ago. Ours was a humanitarian mission, an effort to find some way to bring relief to the suffering people of Indochina and Southeast Asia.

We saw on our arrival in Thailand three refugee concentration areas. Here we saw people in make-shift hospitals lying on the ground covered only by a plastic sheeting held up by poles, with the living and the dying and the dead all together.

We were told that malaria was in epidemic proportions. The only noise you heard in the refugee concentration areas was the cough of children with tuberculosis. There was no laughter;

there was no crying among the children. There were emaciated people in final stages of malnutrition.

We journeyed to Phnom Penh and there discussed with the authorities the possibility of opening up an overland route from Thailand into Cambodia. We have been told by the representatives of the International Red Cross and also by UNICEF and by others that this is the only practicable means to deliver the total amount of foodstuffs and medicines which have been calculated to, I think, 30,000 tons a month. This is the only practicable way to deliver this amount of food and this amount of medicine.

We made our proposal in Phnom Penh. We were told the proposal would be seriously considered and seriously studied. The authorities there in Phnom Penh admitted that they did not have the capacity to feed 2,250,000 of their population of slightly over 4 million. They admitted to us that malaria was raging at epidemic proportions. They admitted to us that they needed some help.

We and the other countries of the world are offering this help, and the only way to deliver it is by land route from Thailand into Cambodia. We're agreeable to it. The Vietnamese say they will protect the trucks and the convoys and the drivers. So it's only the regime in Phnom Penh which stands in the way, and they are the ones who must say "yes," and if they don't, tens of thousands of people, we believe, will die and perish over the next 30-60-90 days.

Q. Haven't they already said "no" today?

Senator Sasser: At first blush, this would appear to be a "no," but we're going to persevere in our efforts to get a "yes." Senator Danforth and Senator Baucus and I are going to meet with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and we're going to maintain the pressure. We're advised by those experienced in these matters that on occasion a "no" has come to mean a "yes" in a short period of time.

Q. What kind of time are you talking about? How long can you wait?

Senator Sasser: I'll let Senator Danforth answer that.

Senator Danforth: Thank you. Let me just say this. The situation that we saw on the border between Thailand and Cambodia was absolutely dreadful. It defies the ability of a person with words to describe it, and, therefore, we took some slides and showed them to the President.

When people see in a news magazine a picture of a starving child, they think that's one starving child. But when you spend hour after hour looking at people who are dying, when you see little babies who are wizened up like little old men, when you see people who are so weak that they can't even travel a hundred yards to get a little medical attention, you realize what a desperate situation it is. And we understand that the situation within Cambodia, particularly in the rural areas, is even worse than what we saw, because at least the people who got out were able to walk out. There are those who are even weaker within Cambodia.

Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of people face death in a country where, as the President said, almost half of the population has already died. There is absolutely no reason on earth why this dreadful situation has to continue. There is a way to solve it, and that is by a land route from Thailand to Cambodia.

Every expert with whom we spoke—the International Red Cross, UNICEF, the United States, logistics experts—all agreed that the land route was the way and that within 3–5 days after receiving notice, truck convoys could begin to travel across the highways—highway 5 and highway 6—set up distribution centers, and start feeding people.

We presented that concept to the Vietnamese. We presented it, again, to the regime in Phnom Penh. We asked them to agree to it. We're waiting for a favorable response. Now the word we got today, it's doubtful that it was a favorable response. It seems very negative. But our view is this: We cannot accept the possibility that a government or an alleged government is going to willfully consign hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to a needless death.

Q. At the risk of asking a naive question, Cambodia is a small country lightly defended, without air cover. Why don't you just fly C-130's down route 5 and drop the stuff out the back?

Senator Baucus: The problem is that there are so many people—this is from information given to us by international organizations which are on the spot, International Red Cross, UNICEF, Oxfam, World Vision, all the organizations there which are basically there to help people, but they have no vested interest in one form of government or another—the problem is there are just so many people within the country who just haven't the strength to get up to get the food or to get the medical attention. You have to have trucks within the country, too, to dis-

tribute the food and the medical supplies once it's within the countries. An air drop has all the glamor and the glory, and it's visual and it sounds good. The fact of the matter is, according to the people we talked to on the spot, by far the most practical way to get the attention to the people is with a truck system, to get the trucks, foods, and supplies out to distribution points, and also personnel on the ground to pick up the people who are almost dead, bring them to makeshift hospitals, which really only amount to rows of people on the ground, and to get some medical attention and some food.

Q. Can you explain to us in your words why the Phnom Penh government is not accepting this offer now?

Senator Baucus: I frankly don't know why. When we flew over to Thailand and into Phnom Penh, we tried to stay out of political entanglements and political considerations. For one thing, we're not experts on Southeast Asia. But more important than that, there is one overriding humanitarian goal, that's just to get food and aid to people.

I can't tell you, I can't read the minds of Heng Samrin authorities or the Vietnamese associates as to why they made the statement. But one thing, I will say this: It's premised on an incorrect assumption. One of their assumptions is we made the proposal and said that American aid is conditioned upon opening up a land bridge. That is absolutely incorrect. We did not make any condition at all. We just said we suggest the best thing to do is to open up the land bridge.

Q. You said a minute ago the Vietnamese are prepared to protect the convoys, but the regime in Phnom Penh will not accept this procedure. Are you trying to say there is a distinction here between what the Vietnamese are willing to do and what the Heng Samrin government is prepared to do?

Senator Sasser: No, I am not saying that. What I am relating to you is what the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs for Vietnam told us. He indicated that guaranteeing the security of trucks, the drivers, the cargo was no problem. We assumed that this security will be guaranteed by forces of the Vietnamese army, since they are operating, we are told, up and down routes 5 and 6. This was repeated to us—that security would not be a problem—by the authorities in Phnom Penh.

If I might respond to an earlier question. There is air cover in Cambodia. We saw MiGs in the Phnom Penh airport. They put on a little show for our

pilots, and they are pretty good with them. We saw about, I would guess, 20, either MiG-19's, or 21's. I can't tell the difference.

Senator Danforth: Can I just also add to that? I think it's important to focus attention on what can practically be done. I think that it's very important not to divert attention to something which has superficial appeal and to chase some will-o'-the-wisp idea which sounds sensational.

The fact of the matter is, there is only one practical matter to solve this problem, only one, and that is by truck. That is the only practical way to deliver the tonnage. Air transportation cannot deliver the kind of tonnage that's needed. It can't put it in the right place. It doesn't provide the kind of trucks to move it to the countryside. It doesn't provide the kind of infrastructure to move food and to dispense medical supplies and to tell people what to do with the medical supplies once they get them. The trucks are the only available method of doing that.

Q. I understand that, but still how long do you wait for the Phnom Penh government to give you permission to drive the trucks in there?

Senator Danforth: I'm saying the position is that the ball is in their court and that they have the life and death decision. Nobody else has that, and they have to assume the responsibility. They have to face up to the fact that by saying no or by making no answer at all, they are consigning their people to death.

Q. Do you suspect that in saying no, they are making that decision, that they have chosen this path to allow this mass starvation to take place, as a matter of policy?

Senator Danforth: It is so insane that I just can't accept that, and I don't think any of the three of us can. It is our understanding that sometimes they will take one position one day and one the next.

Just before we left Bangkok, we received a message from the Foreign Minister, at least a transcript of his comments, which looked as though he was really opening the door to the possibility of the land route. That's the way we construed that message. So I just don't read one particular statement as being all that definitive.

Q. But do you think sanity prevails in that land today?

Senator Baucus: In some sense, every country is sensitive to world opinion—I don't care what the country is—to some degree. And it is our hope

that more people in the world begin to understand what is happening in Cambodia.

Therefore, the Heng Samrin authorities and Vietnam will begin to be more receptive to the kinds of proposals we are making. I don't know. I can't predict with absolute certainty, and none of us here can, as to what they are or are not going to do. But certainly, the more and more people realize what is happening in the world and, therefore, begin to focus on Cambodia, their chances are better.

Q. You made it sound like there are only two possibilities—one air and the other trucks from the Thai border. Can you discuss the third possibility, Kompong Som or bringing stuff up the Mekong River?

Senator Baucus: That is a third possibility now in the sense both—Hercules, through the British, are being flown in, one aircraft, roughly, a day into Phnom Penh, combined with the seaport and barge traffic up the Mekong River. But that's not enough.

It takes a long period of time. And not only that, once you get the supplies into Phnom Penh—and virtually that's where it all ends up—you have to go out of Phnom Penh out in the country, and that's where you need the trucks.

Q. Can't you bring trucks into Kompong Som or up the river? The Americans did it between 1970 and 1975. I don't understand why you are just not discussing that possibility also.

Senator Danforth: Can I say, on the day that we were in Phnom Penh, a logistics expert from a U.N. organization was also in Phnom Penh studying the logistics of delivering the food. It was his judgment, as an expert in the field, that under optimum conditions, the present modes of delivery—to wit, by plane into Phnom Penh and by ship into Kompong Som—were capable of delivering about 13 to 15,000 tons a month, when the real needs were about 27 to 30,000 tons a month.

So the fact of the matter is that those two methods, which are now in use, even operating under optimum conditions, are capable of only handling half of the tonnage. Further, the distribution, once you get north, is weakened by the fact that there are very few trucks within the country.

The situation can be improved by shipping into Phnom Penh up the Mekong. But even when that is going full force ahead, there will still be a very substantial shortfall to the tune of about 10,000 tons a month.

Therefore, the only solution is the truck solution. Furthermore, all of

these arrangements for ships—putting it on the ships, taking it off, getting the equipment to take it off—take a lot of time.

The trucks are ready to go between 3 and 5 days. They can go between 3 and 5 days. That is why it's so important to focus world attention on the truck route—on the land bridge—and to call attention to the fact that the decision is Phnom Penh's to make and that decision will not be made in the dark; it will be made under the full spotlight of public attention.

Q. So what do you do next? What do you do to get them to turn around the "no"? Do you hold news conferences, try to build up the world opinion? Do you do something diplomatic?

Senator Baucus: We are going to meet with Secretary General Kurt Waldheim Monday or Tuesday of next week. That is one avenue. In addition to that, we will speak out as imaginatively as we can, talk to as many people as we can.

Q. Where does the money for this come from, what fund?

Senator Sasser: This is an international effort. It's been calculated that \$110 million will be needed over the next 6 months. The United States will contribute, I'm told, slightly over one-third of that. There are specific appropriations bills which are moving through the Congress now, and there's emergency relief available.

Q. This is all for this specific operation, or is it for resettlement?

Senator Sasser: It's for the whole operation. That includes helping supply the refugee camps on the Thai border, for some resettlement, and for some of the foodstuffs and medicines going in now by ship and by air through the International Red Cross and UNICEF.

Q. My understanding is the bulk of this money may be for resettlement, as opposed to maybe a tenth of the money the United States is supplying going specifically to feed these people immediately. Can you clarify that?

Senator Sasser: No, I really can't. I haven't had the opportunity to—we just got back in the country last night late, and I have not had an opportunity to study how the funds are being allocated.

Let me make one point here. Laying aside humanitarian reasons for a moment, one reason it's so important that these people be fed and given medical attention inside their own country is to stop this massive hemorrhage of refu-

gees across the border into Thailand. Once they get into Thailand, something has to be done, something has to be done with them. And if we can get the food and the medicine into their own country, then we have reason to believe, and rational people would think, they would stay there rather than moving into Thailand and then having to be dealt with there.

Q. What do you think would happen if you just started a convoy into that country flying Red Cross and UNICEF flags without waiting for the people in Phnom Penh to come down on one side of this thing or another?

Senator Sasser: That's speculation. You'd have to speculate as to what would happen with that. Quite frankly, I would approach that prospect with some trepidation. In other words, you're moving into an area with hardened Vietnamese combat troops there. You are also moving through an area which, in some places, the Pol Pot guerrillas are operating. They are very short on supplies, and we're told that the Vietnamese are not oversupplied. I think it would be very risky business.

Q. What role, if any, does the Soviet Union have in this process?

Senator Danforth: What the United States is doing is to appeal to the officials of Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese to allow the trucks to come in, and I would hope the Soviet Union would take the same position. The regime in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese are certainly within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, and, therefore, the Soviet Union has a very definite role to play. I would hope it would take the same humanitarian position that we would take and that it would use all of its authority to intercede with the appropriate officials.

Senator Baucus: I think the Soviet Union would be very agreeable to all this. I'll tell you one simple reason. Look at all the wheat that they are buying now from the United States, and when we were in Phnom Penh, we saw a lot of, at least a significant amount of, rice from Russia. It seemed to me the more that other organizations, other countries are supplying foodstuffs to Cambodia, it would take some of the pressure off the Soviet Union. I'd think they'd like it.

Q. Why haven't they done anything yet?

Senator Baucus: I can't answer that.

Senator Danforth: Ask them. I think you should ask them.

Q. Why don't you ask them?

Senator Danforth: We might.

Q. From what you three saw over there, is what this government is doing and is committed to do sufficient, is it adequate, or is there more that we could be doing even under present circumstances?

Senator Danforth: I think, first of all, the \$70 million is really a step in the right direction and that that's a very substantial commitment. It may be that during the next 6 months—and all the projections that have been made are for 6 months—that we might want to consider some other things that we could use specifically with respect to logistics, trucks, and the like. I think that deserves further analysis.

It's not realistic to think that the situation in Cambodia is going to be turned around on the dime in a 6-month period of time. The country is really in bad shape. In Phnom Penh, no traffic, very few cars on the streets, some army trucks, derelict buildings. I mean it is really a devastating sight in Cambodia. Therefore, I think there's going to be a very long-term problem in turning that country around.

So I don't think that it's realistic to think that a \$110 million multinational program over a 6-month period of time is going to bring them to—

Q. We should be prepared to do much more beyond the 6-month period.

Senator Baucus: Yes, I think we could certainly help probably a little bit more, but the bigger problem now is Cambodia. It's not so much the question of dollars in aid and medical supplies now as it is Cambodia opening up its borders. That's what we have to do so we can get that land bridge across.

SENATORS' REPORT

We went on this humanitarian mission at the direction of the leadership of the Senate and the President of the United States. We went to see firsthand the nature of the refugee problem, to learn what more should be done, and to report our findings.

Over the past few days, we have witnessed a human tragedy of enormous and unfathomable proportions. Without a massive and prompt international relief effort, the situation will continue to deteriorate. Inside Cambodia today, and in refugee camps located in Thailand near the Cambodian border, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians face death by starvation and

**U.S. Relief Efforts
for Kampuchea**

**PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT,
OCT. 24, 1979¹**

Thirty-seven years ago, a holocaust began which was to take the lives of more than 6 million human beings. The world stood by silently, in a moral lapse whose enormity still numbs the human mind.

We now face, once again, the threat of avoidable death and avoidable suffering for literally millions of people, and this time we must act swiftly to save the men, women, and children who are our brothers and sisters in God's family.

Five days ago, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Children's Fund appealed jointly for \$111 million in aid to help the millions of Kampucheans—formerly known as Cambodians—who are facing death from starvation during the next 6 months. We must respond to this appeal, and we must also help the related need for food and medicine and shelter for refugees who are fleeing from Kampuchea to Thailand.

I'm urgently asking the Congress to enact a supplemental Food for Peace appropriation that will make available \$20 million in commodities for use in Kampuchea, subject only to assurances that it will reach its destination; that is, the human beings who are suffering. This is in addition to the \$5 million in food that I pledged for this purpose last week.

Today, I'm also directing that \$9 million in U.S. refugee assistance funds go to meet about one-third of the total cost of Thailand's program to help starving refugees who are entering Thailand from Kampuchea. I commend the Thai Government on its decision to admit more refugees. They have already received tens of thousands of them.

Third, I've told Chairman Zablocki [Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs] in the House, and cosponsors, that the Administration supports their proposal to authorize \$30 million for the next phase of relief in Kampuchea. This would enable us, as a total, to raise our contributions to the continuing program for the alleviation of suffering in Kampuchea as high as \$70 million.

The dimensions of the Kampuchean tragedy are immense, and more aid will

almost certainly be needed. And I'm also asking my Commission on World Hunger, headed by Sol Linowitz, to recommend to me the next steps that we must take to meet worldwide hunger needs.

I'm certain that the American people, in addition to their government, will want to be part of this urgent humanitarian effort. It's absolutely too important to be left to government alone.

Standing behind me on the platform are representatives of religious and other groups who have already pledged to help in this effort, who've called on me to do what I'm announcing now, and who, I believe, sincerely said that they would match the government effort. Several voluntary agencies have been working all along to meet the needs of increasing numbers of refugees, and I call upon all Americans to support this work. I ask specifically that every Saturday and Sunday in the month of November, up until Thanksgiving, be set aside as days for Americans in their synagogues and churches, and otherwise, to give generously to help alleviate this suffering.

I'm confident that Americans' responses will be matched abroad. Many governments and international voluntary agencies are already coming forward with their pledges. The human family, those of us who have been blessed so highly with food and a relative absence of suffering, must not be found wanting in our response to alleviate this almost unprecedented mass human suffering.

If a tragedy of genocidal proportions is to be avoided in Kampuchea, we must all help, both nations and governments and individuals alike. □

¹ Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979). Prior to the President's announcement, he met with religious leaders and representatives of various humanitarian organizations to discuss the situation in Kampuchea. Following the President's announcement, Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, Chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and chairman of the board of the Overseas Development Corporation, and Ambassador Henry D. Owens, Special Representative of the President for International Economic Summits, answered reporters' questions. Their question-and-answer session was issued as a White House press release on Oct. 24.

disease. The survival of the Khmer race is in jeopardy.

At three refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border, we saw human suffering of a kind so deep and pervasive as to defy our ability to describe it adequately.

We walked through encampments of thousands of Khmer who stared at us in silence. No one smiled, and no one laughed. Indeed, they seldom spoke to each other. We saw the swollen bellies and stick-like legs of children suffering from acute malnutrition. Even at the hospital, areas where physical suffering was greatest, they didn't cry. We saw people protected from the elements by only a plastic sheet strung up on sticks.

In makeshift hospitals, we walked among hundreds of comatose patients, crawling with flies. The people were suffering from prolonged malnutrition and malaria. We were told by those to whom we talked that conditions were even worse on the Cambodian side of the border. Only the strongest survive the trip across the border.

Yet amidst this appalling scene of human suffering, we had reason to feel a degree of encouragement. The Government of Thailand has magnanimously promised to permit entry to all refugees who arrive at the border. The relief efforts by international organizations are beginning to provide food, medical supplies, and personnel. The international relief agencies are making a valiant effort to bring aid to those in need of assistance, but their efforts are still inadequate. The voluntary agencies stand ready to increase their assistance as soon as it is possible.

We are absolutely convinced that a practical means exists to provide the food and medical supplies needed to save hundreds of thousands of lives; that means is the immediate establishment of an overland route—a "land bridge" linking Cambodia to relief supplies in Thailand. The international relief agencies estimate that as many as 2.25 million Cambodians face serious food shortages. They estimate that nearly 30,000 tons of food and medical supplies are required to meet this need each month. Currently only 12,000 tons can be brought in by sea, and 300 by air per month. This is less than half the estimated need. The establishment of an overland route could, within 3-5 days, more than double the current capacity.

During our visit, we devoted much of our energies seeking to establish this land bridge. We discussed it with Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak, with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Thach, and with representatives of the international relief agencies. We traveled to Phnom Penh to discuss the land

bridge with the authorities there. We were encouraged by what we heard. The challenge now is to open the overland route. The decision currently rests with the Phnom Penh authorities. We are committed to prepare to pursue this goal anywhere and on an urgent basis. To delay is to prolong the suffering and loss of life we have seen.

A more detailed description of our experiences, our findings, and our recommendations follows.

Conditions in the Refugee Camps

We visited three refugee areas located at Khlong Gai Thuen, Tap Phrik, and Nong Samet. More than 150,000 people were in those areas and estimates are that another 100,000-200,000 are concentrated just inside the Cambodian border. Persons of all descriptions, including some former combatants, wander across the border into the areas. Intensified fighting or continued lack of food may force additional Cambodians across the border in the days and weeks ahead.

In the areas visited, we saw children near death from acute malnutrition and disease. We saw men and women lying on the ground in makeshift "hospitals." We saw people too weak to walk the last 100 yards to food distribution points. The eerie quiet strikes a visitor. Emaciated and sick people lay on the ground in a silence interrupted only by the coughs of those with tuberculosis.

These areas are not "camps." They are places where people stopped running from war and deprivation inside Cambodia. They have no sanitary facilities, little water, and little shelter. "Hospitals" are placed where the very ill and the dying lie on the ground. We were told that 5-10% of the people in the hospital die every day. A large portion are beyond help, and some of those we saw last Monday are not alive today.

Food distribution points, operated by a variety of relief agencies, are scattered through the areas. Those strong enough to walk to the distribution points are fed. Those who cannot, go hungry, unless relatives or friends help. The social order among these people has so deteriorated that they are not helping those outside their immediate family group.

The principal constraint in the effort to aid the refugees in the areas we visited is insufficient staff. We were told by physicians in the camps that they had adequate medical supplies and food but they did not have enough people to distribute either. Without adequate staff, there is no organized system for allocating and distributing supplies of food or medicine.

Conditions in Cambodia

Our 9-hour visit to Cambodia enabled us to observe the rice planting situation around the capital, to see the condition of the city, and to test the reaction of both government cadre and ordinary people to discussions with a delegation of Americans. In addition we met with the Heng Samrin regime's Foreign Minister to make a specific proposal that Phnom Penh permit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) to truck emergency food and medical supplies from Thailand to Cambodia.

Phnom Penh authorities received us courteously and hospitably. Our guide for the day was a middle-level Foreign Ministry official. On the streets we were met with curiosity, friendliness, and a few suspicious looks.

The shambles that was Phnom Penh can hardly be called a city. The run-down condition of this once-graceful city betrays both the neglect of the past 4 years and deliberate destruction by the previous regime; both the national bank and the Roman Catholic cathedral were destroyed, presumably for political reasons. Phnom Penh residents estimate that its population is between 30,000 and 70,000. A few vehicles travel the deserted streets. Whole sections of the town are still barricaded shut. We saw few foreigners.

Rice is scarce. In the capital, in the absence of currency, a small can of rice acts as the medium of exchange for the few street hawkers we saw. No organized central market exists. Food is distributed through local street markets. The former central market area has been planted in coconuts. Our brief aerial view of agricultural areas around Phnom Penh showed small plots of vegetables and many fields of rice. A large number of paddies remain fallow. This, combined with the comments of more knowledgeable international officials and short interviews with passers-by during our tour of the city, leads us to conclude that the government's claim that 2 million acres of rice have been planted is too optimistic.

ICRC/UNICEF officials in Phnom Penh confirmed the desperate food situation of the country. To date their programs have dealt successfully with hospital and supplementary feeding. Only very recently have the two agencies been faced with the logistical problems created by bulk arrivals of rice.

There was general agreement that approximately 30,000 tons of rice per month are needed inside Cambodia. The best estimate we heard was that

under current circumstances only 13,000-15,000 tons of foodstuffs could be moved inside Cambodia. Transportation within Cambodia is the major problem. Less than 5,000 tons of food per month can now be moved from the port of Kompong Som. The port of Phnom Penh has the potential to handle an additional 8,000 tons if inland transportation is available. The present airlift to Phnom Penh adds only fractionally to available supplies.

Conclusions

Our principal conclusion is that thousands of Cambodians will die unless a massive expansion of relief efforts proceeds on an emergency basis.

This finding is based on our personal observation of refugees, our discussions with the international relief agencies, and our discussions with the Phnom Penh authorities.

Our interviews indicated that as many as two-thirds of those who try to reach Thailand from Cambodia may not make it. They die along the way from starvation and disease. Given the conditions in Cambodia, we expect the flow of refugees to continue into Thailand. The need to provide assistance will accelerate in the months to come.

The refugee problem is compounded by the arrival of large numbers of Lao who further flood the refugee camps. Reports of an extensive shortfall of food in Laos will undoubtedly increase the refugee flow from there unless relief is available at the source.

The most serious problem inside Cambodia and along the border with Thailand is the lack of sufficient food and medical supplies. Under the best circumstances, the shortfall in total supplies is about 15,000 tons per month. The current situation is even worse and not likely to improve much in the near future.

We have concluded that this condition need not exist. There is a practical solution which can be implemented immediately. An all-land route can be opened between the Thai border and Phnom Penh along highways 5 and 6.

This plan could increase transport capacity by as much as 1,000 tons per day within 3-5 days of the opening of the route into Cambodia.

The essential considerations for opening such a route were, first, security of the shipments and, second, authorization and cooperation from the authorities involved (i.e., the international agencies, the Thai Government, the authorities in Phnom Penh, and the Vietnamese).

In an effort to open up the land route to Cambodia, we met with the head of government of the Thai Kingdom, a

representative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, representatives of the Phnom Penh authorities, and representatives of the international agencies.

Meetings with the Voluntary Agencies

We met with representatives of UNICEF, the ICRC, and World Food Program (WFP). They agreed unanimously that the key to solving the situation inside Cambodia and on the Thai border was to establish a land bridge. They stand ready in every way to implement the planning and shipment of the needed supplies. Other aspects of those meetings appear throughout the report as appropriate.

Meeting With Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak

At the time of our meeting, we were just beginning to explore the possibilities of a land bridge to Cambodia via the road from Aranyaprathet near the Thai-Cambodian border. The Prime Minister was totally supportive of the idea.

He felt that adequate quantities of most of the needed supplies were available in Thailand. He also expressed the view that there were enough trucks in Thailand to send convoys in immediately.

The dominant subject of our meeting was the desperate situation of the Cambodian refugees. The day before our meeting with the Prime Minister, he had taken a trip to the border and had witnessed first-hand the suffering. He said he had been touched by this experience and had decided to open the border to admit all refugees from Cambodia. This was an unpopular decision, he said, because it would result in the displacement of 60,000 Thais.

The Prime Minister told us that he was planning to move the refugees from the border to a nearby holding area. In fact, the movement of the refugees began before we left Thailand. It should be noted that the Prime Minister made it clear to us that the fleeing Cambodians would be granted only temporary status.

He expressed hope that it would be possible for the Khmer to return home when conditions improve. He was not optimistic that this would occur soon. He told us that he welcomed the growing involvement and support of the international relief agencies. He stressed the importance of close coordination of that effort.

We expressed our appreciation and gratitude for the Prime Minister's humanitarian policy toward the refugees,

notably his decision to allow unlimited entry to the Khmer.

Meeting With Nguyen Co Thach of Vietnam

At the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok we met with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach. We explained that we did not want to raise political questions. We expressed our appreciation for his help in obtaining a favorable reply to our request to visit Phnom Penh. We noted that our purpose for wanting to visit Phnom Penh was to meet with representatives of the international relief agencies and get a more complete view of the problems of refugees. We emphasized in our discussions that U.S. assistance to needy Cambodians would be provided through the international organizations.

We asked Mr. Thach if his government would cooperate in providing security for truck convoys on an overland route between Thailand and Cambodia. He replied first by saying that he could not speak for the Cambodian people. But, he added: "If the Cambodian people or the Cambodian Government asked us for help we will agree. There is no problem on this. You can be sure any humanitarian actions without ulterior motives we will welcome."

Mr. Thach emphasized that the truck convoy proposal was no problem for his government but was a question that had to be addressed by Phnom Penh. He said that Vietnamese troops would not fire on trucks that were on humanitarian missions.

Meeting With Officials in Phnom Penh

We presented the proposal for a land route to Phnom Penh's Foreign Minister, emphasizing the humanitarian need and our desire to make political considerations secondary to the fundamental problems of life and death. With regard to the security of food convoys, he agreed that Phnom Penh could insure security for the shipments and drivers. He said that he would take the proposal to the Central Committee for decision. In the meantime, relief supply by sea and air should continue. We urged him to recommend the speedy and favorable decision. We pointed out that to delay is to prolong the human suffering.

Subsequently Hun Sen issued the following statement to the press: "In case of a substantial increase in the aid, we are ready to study with the two organizations the improvement of our means of reception and transportation and to think about other access routes in case of need." We view his statement as a

U.N. Pledging Conference for Khmer Refugees

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim called for the U.N. General Assembly to hold a pledging conference to encourage member nations to commit funds for humanitarian relief for Khmer refugees. That conference was held in New York November 5, 1979. Following is a statement Secretary Vance made at that session.¹

Mr. Secretary General, let me thank you for your initiative in calling this conference and your leadership in addressing this crisis. I will be brief, for we are here, today, to act. We are here to make, through our individual contributions, an international commitment to deal with a human tragedy of almost unfathomable proportions.

We need no other call to action than the grim facts in Kampuchea.

- A nation of 7 million has been ravaged by famine and disease, brutality and war. Some 2 million have perished.

- Death has struck hardest at the children. An entire generation of Kampucheans may have been lost.

- The meager food available has become a booty of war.

- Malaria is rampant. Anthrax has appeared. Minimal health care is virtually nonexistent.

Even these are only fragments of the tragedy. Statistics are only a shadow of the reality. The reality of Kampuchea, of a people on the verge of extinction, is most powerfully conveyed by the images of suffering carried in our daily newspapers. The silent grief of a young Khmer mother cradling her dead baby in her arms, a victim of starvation, or the vacant gaze of an infant beyond help and hope in a makeshift orphanage in Phnom Penh.

We are here as diplomats, as representatives of our governments, to address this reality. But first of all, we are here as human beings. Our presence reflects the concern of millions of human beings in all our nations who care about this suffering. Some issues transcend politics. This is one of them.

Clearly, there are differences among governments on the political situation in Kampuchea. But all of us must put

those differences aside as we ask all the authorities involved in Kampuchea to turn away from calculations of political and military advantage and turn to the overwhelming human issue before us.

In this connection, I want to single out the Government of Thailand for its courageous and correct decision to allow into its country large numbers of people fleeing famine and disease. The burden this places on the Thai Government is immense, and we in the international community owe Thailand not only our admiration but also our full support.

So let us get to the business at hand. I am here today on behalf of the President of the United States to place substantial material resources behind a major humanitarian effort.

- President Carter has committed the United States to a contribution during the next 6 months of \$30 million for international relief efforts in Kampuchea and \$9 million for Khmer who have recently fled to Thailand.

- Our Congress is approving \$30 million of additional funds for the next phase of relief efforts. This is in addition to our already substantial contributions to the refugee program in the same area.

- And we will give our full support, in any way that will be helpful, to the efforts of the United Nations.

Senators (Cont'd)

positive reference to the land bridge because the only way practical of substantially increasing aid is by a truck route along highways 5 and 6.

Our Ambassador in Bangkok has been in contact with officials of ICRC/UNICEF requesting that they follow through on this directly with the officials in Phnom Penh.

Recommendations

1. The United States should provide strong support for the creation of a "land bridge" operated by the ICRC and UNICEF to bring food and medicine into Cambodia. We should strive to do the following:

- Achieve agreement to permit up to 1,000 tons of food and medical supplies to be carried daily by truck into Cambodia from Thailand;

- Acquire by lease or purchase a sufficient number of trucks to establish the necessary distribution network (one international relief official believes a total of 500 trucks is needed);

- Assure the security of the truck convoys; and

- Establish storage centers at re-

gional distribution points on the main highways between the border and Phnom Penh.

2. In order to develop an international program of food relief for Indochinese refugees, the United States should:

- Expedite implementation of the full \$69 million 6-month aid package announced by President Carter on October 24;

- Assess funding requirements for a longer range program of food and medical relief;

- Name a senior-level White House coordinator with specific responsibilities for implementation of the food and medical relief program in Cambodia; and

- Utilize emergency relief funds to provide sufficient logistic support to the ICRC and UNICEF to get food and medicine to where it is needed.

3. The President should call on other nations and American citizens to support the efforts of international organizations and voluntary agencies. Both money and volunteers are needed.

4. The U.S. Government should make diplomatic efforts and mobilize

world opinion in support of the opening of the land bridge to Cambodia. The role of the Secretary General of the United Nations is critical to the success of this effort.

5. The United States should assist the international relief agencies as appropriate to:

- Increase and regulate distribution of food and medicine on the border areas;

- Increase immediately the staff in the border areas;

- Increase capacity of the ports to handle shipments by sea;

- Provide air transportation for critically needed items;

- Establish a system for equitable distribution from central storage facilities to local areas inside Cambodia; and

- Secure agreement that the international agencies have staff and access to insure that food is used effectively. □

¹Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979).

²Text from White House press release of Oct. 26.

Refugees – An International Obligation

by **Harry F. Young**

This article on the world refugee situation since World War II was written especially for the BULLETIN. Dr. Young is the senior writer in the Editorial Division, Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs.

It is often said, and justly, that the 20th century is the age of the refugee. Of course, it is many other things as well, and refugees are not only a 20th-century phenomenon. The word "refugee" has been part of the English vocabulary since the end of the 17th century when it was first used for the Huguenots who had found refuge in England after their expulsion from France. It was available for use on other occasions in the 18th and 19th centuries. But it was not until comparatively recent times that "refugee" became a common word conveying an image of many people in flight or driven from their homes because of their race, religion, or political opinion.

The White Russians

Refugee history in our time begins with the Russian revolution of 1917. In that great upheaval, 1½ million "White" Russians fled their homeland and sought refuge abroad. These were a new type of migrants, unlike the Europeans who crossed the oceans in the previous century to North America and Australia. Most of the latter had left home of their own accord for a new

UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and private voluntary groups as they continue the enormous task they have now begun.

We must pursue every avenue and use every means to bring relief supplies to people desperately in need. Whether through Thailand, through Vietnam, or by sea, whether by truck—as we have recently urged—by airlift, or by river transport, food and medicine, in sufficient measure, must be delivered. The international relief agencies must be allowed to do their jobs, to see that help gets to the people so desperately in need.

This is a compelling moment. Our common humanity calls us to action. □

country of their own choosing and with the intention of starting life anew. The White Russians, on the other hand, had fled their homeland, and where they landed (at first, in any case) made very little difference. They did not arrive as laborers needed in an expanding economy but as unexpected political fugitives who, for the most part, became a public burden.

League Efforts

The White Russians were the first refugees assisted by an official international agency. Private relief organizations, finding their resources overstrained, asked the League of Nations to take the matter in hand as "an obligation of international justice." In 1921 the League set up a High Commission for refugees headed by a noted humanitarian, the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen. The main task was to secure civil status to the Russians who were scattered throughout Europe without legal protection and representation. The High Commissioner introduced an identity document known as the Nansen Passport which gained wide acceptance and was later extended to Armenian and other refugees. But beyond this progress was minimal.

Refugees, as the League discovered, were an issue that had none of the simplicity of world health or the suppression of slavery. Legal questions and political concerns clouded what might seem to be a purely humanitarian issue. Shortly after Hitler came to power and Nazi persecution began, the League created a High Commissioner for Refugees Coming From Germany. But this agency had little positive effect, for there was no European government that was prepared to let a possibly temporary issue complicate its relations with powerful Germany. The 32 governments that met on the German refugee question at Evian-les-Bains, in France, in 1938, at President Roosevelt's suggestion, also could provide no effective relief. In an attempt to bring order to the German refugee outflow, they created the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, which survived the war and was active until 1947. In the fall of 1938 the League also amalgamated the Nansen commission and the commission for German refugees, bringing all League refugee work under one head. But within less than a year Europe was at

war, and the refugee question was transformed beyond all recognition.

World War II

World War II set in motion far-reaching political forces. At the time, however, no one could foresee how difficult the refugee problem would become. What was clear was that the German war machine had uprooted tens of millions of people from across the whole continent and that those who were still alive at war's end would be left stranded far from their homes. And so the Allied powers in 1943 charged the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) "to prepare and undertake measures for the return of prisoners and exiles to their country of origin." All agreed that the solution was to transport the displaced persons (DP's) home as rapidly as possible. The German armies surrendered in May 1945. By October Allied authorities had repatriated some 7 million persons.

Soon, however, it was clear that the DP problem was not to be solved so easily. Many Eastern Europeans did not want to go back to their country of origin. Jews aspired to a new homeland in Palestine, and others were afraid to go back to lands that had fallen under Soviet control or influence. Thus, at the end of 1945, the DP camps were still sheltering a million persons, who were joined by early 1946 by another million so-called new refugees, also from Eastern Europe.

U.N. Efforts

The DP and refugee problems came before the United Nations. In 1946 the General Assembly created the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as a temporary specialized agency with wide authority to deal with European DP's and refugees. A distinction was made between these two types of homeless persons. A DP was someone who had been deported as forced labor or for racial or political reasons, while the refugee was someone outside his or her homeland because of prewar fascist persecution or—and this made it possible to extend the protection to anti-Communists—due to later events and was unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of their home government. The statute was a compromise between the Soviet bloc and Western countries. Although the IRO was to promote repatriation by all possible means (as desired by the Soviet bloc), each eligible person was free to decide against repatriation and for resettlement somewhere else. It was the

U.N.'s hope that the IRO would provide a permanent solution within a few years.

But the IRO proved to be a beginning rather than an end. In Europe the problem defied a permanent solution. In 4½ years of operation, the IRO moved 1 million persons (including 73,000 repatriates). But there remained a hard core of the aged and infirm and others who were not "emigrable." And in the meantime new refugees continued to arrive. In IRO's last year, 1951, between 1,000 and 1,500 Eastern Europeans crossed the borders into non-Communist countries each month (not including Germans leaving the Soviet Zone who were the responsibility of the West German Government).

At the same time, urgent refugee problems had arisen in the Middle and Far East. In the turmoil surrounding Israel's birth in 1948, over 770,000 Palestinians fled into neighboring countries. And in China the Communist victory over the Kuomintang started a flow of refugees pouring into Hong Kong. The Korean war also created a serious DP and refugee problem on that peninsula.

The United Nations took up each of these problems separately. They did not come within the mandate of the IRO which was confined to existing groups of Europeans. In 1950 the General Assembly, building on an emergency organization created earlier, established the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinians in the Near East. But it found no way to set up a fund to assist the Chinese in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's long established policy was to treat all Chinese who found haven there not as refugees but as immigrants, and as immigrants they could not qualify for assistance from regular U.N. refugee programs. What help they received came from British authorities, private donations through voluntary agencies, and the U.S. Far Eastern Refugee Program (FERP), begun in 1954. The United Nations also designed a separate program for Korea, the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).

The year 1951 saw several decisive steps to improve the status of refugees. It was now clear that refugees were going to be a chronic problem of this age and would need continuing protection. First the General Assembly created a refugee agency of almost global responsibility, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR did not succeed to all of IRO's duties, for it was not intended to be an operating agency. It was not to run camps or arrange for transportation or resettlement or care for the refugee's

physical needs. Its main purpose, unchanged over the years, was to provide legal protection. As the advocate of refugee rights it was to use its good offices to induce governments to meet their obligations toward refugees. Within a few years, however, it gained the authority to dispense the material assistance that at first was to be provided by other agencies.

UNHCR's main support has been the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Founded at U.S. suggestion in 1951, it absorbed some of the IRO facilities and staff, although it is not a U.N. agency. Its original purpose was to relieve the pressure of overpopulation in Europe by supplying low-cost transportation to emigrants, including refugees. Later it took on responsibilities in other continents, and now it is working closely with the UNHCR in assisting refugees in Southeast Asia.

Refugee Magna Carta

Also completed in 1951 (though not put into effect until 1954) was the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, known as the refugee Magna Carta. The purpose of the convention was to secure to stateless refugees a body of rights in international law. No real progress had been made on this issue, despite the League's concern, in the period between the wars. A refugee's legal standing still depended entirely upon the obligations toward him or her that the country of asylum had voluntarily assumed. The convention established the rule that a refugee was not to be penalized for illegal entry (if coming directly from the country he or she had fled) and was not to be expelled to the frontiers of the country where his or her life was threatened. The convention guaranteed continuing personal status to refugees, particularly in regard to the rights attached to marriage, in accordance with the law of the country of asylum. Refugees were entitled to administrative or consular services, such as issuance of a travel document. In public education, social security, public welfare, and other matters they were to be no less privileged than the nationals of the host country, and in employment, acquiring property, and admittance to studies and professions they were to enjoy treatment no less favorable than that accorded to other aliens generally.

U.N. Definition of Refugees

The first article of the 1951 convention contained a definition of the refugee. Who was eligible for international

protection and assistance as a refugee was a question of vital importance, and one for which there had been, up to now, no general answer. Of course, all refugee agencies, since the Nansen Commission, had been concerned with the political fugitive, that is, the victim of government policy, and not persons fleeing from a natural catastrophe. But each agency had been designed to serve a particular body of persons—Russians, Germans, DP's, or Palestinians—and the first international agency with a mandate broad enough to permit a definition of the refugee in the abstract was the UNHCR.

The convention took over and slightly expanded the UNHCR definition. A refugee was a person who was outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence because of well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, who was unwilling, because of such fear, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin or to return to the country of habitual residence. Such, in essence, were the qualities of the political refugee.

But there was more to the definition: It was hedged in by limitations on place and time not contained in the UNHCR statute. For, as always when refugee rights were debated, many countries were not prepared to accept an open-ended responsibility and preferred to handle emergencies as they arose and as needs could best be judged. And so the terms of the convention were to apply to existing groups of refugees, namely those who owed their status to events occurring before January 1, 1951. What was more, signatories could, by declaration, limit their responsibility to refugees from events that had taken place in Europe.

The cutoff date was removed by a U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, completed in 1967. By this time most states had concluded that the time limitation gave them little protection. In the modern world, refugee problems were, by nature, international and could not be ignored, even if they occurred in faraway places, if only for humanitarian reasons. This was apparent in the fall of 1956 when 200,000 Hungarians, within a period of a month, fled into Austria and Yugoslavia. In spite of the time limitation, the U.N. agencies and Western governments came to the rescue without any hesitation.

What made the cutoff date in a universal convention even more unrealistic was the situation in Africa. In this

continent of new and struggling states and of residual colonialism, refugees became a permanent feature in numbers unknown in Europe or Asia since the uprooting that took place during World War II. It was difficult (though not impossible) to derive African situations from events prior to 1951.

U.S. Aid to Refugees

No country has played such a decisive role in world refugee affairs as the United States. Assuming a large share of the costs of most international refugee programs since the UNRRA, it has also maintained extensive programs of its own supported wholly by U.S. funds. These include the U.S. Refugee Program (USRP) for Eastern European refugees (started as the U.S. Escapee Program in 1952), the FERP for Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao, educational aid for young refugees from southern Africa, assistance to refugees in South Vietnam and Laos, food allotments under PL 480 (Food for Peace program), and special programs of domestic assistance for those who have fled directly to the United States, namely, Cubans after 1959 and Indochinese since 1975. Like the U.N. programs, each had its own mandate and separate organization. Initially there was no unified administration or central policy guidance for refugees as a whole. Refugee programs were considered to be part of the foreign aid program.

In the 1960's, however, Congress provided a coherent financial authority. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 authorized appropriations to cover U.S. contributions to the UNHCR and to the ICEM, the costs of the USRP and the FERP and to meet new refugee needs. It also provided authority to assist Cuban refugees in the United States, and Congress used its authorities to provide assistance to Indochinese refugees after the fall of Saigon in 1975.

The United States has also been the leading country of resettlement. Since 1945 close to 2 million refugees have found a new home in the United States. While Canada and Australia have a better per-capita record, these vast underpopulated countries at first selected refugees primarily for their economic value. Australia insisted on a 2-year work contract and gave strong preference to single males from Baltic countries, while Canada asked for those willing to do heavy manual labor. (Interesting for comparison are the two special cases of Israel and West Germany where immigration has been a dominant fact of national life. The

Jewish population of Israel of about 3 million has more than quadrupled since 1948, with two-thirds of the increase due to immigration. The West German population of about 60 million includes about 12 million refugees and expellees, all of German extraction.)

U.S. Immigration Law

Until 1965 U.S. permanent immigration law made no explicit provision for the refugee. All immigration is regulated by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (most recently in 1978). The predecessor to the 1952 act set a ceiling on immigration and established a system of distributing visas by nationality (defined in most cases by the country of birth). The number, or quota, of visas allotted to each nationality corresponded to the share it had already contributed to the U.S. ethnic make-up. This resulted in a large quota for the United Kingdom and small quotas for southern and Eastern Europe. While the large German quota enabled many refugees from the Hitler regime to enter the United States as regular immigrants, postwar DP's and refugees from Eastern Europe who wished to come to the United States had no choice but to wait or accept the terms offered by other countries of immigration.

At first the United States, responding to this need, tried to speed up DP admissions without changing the quota system. About 80,000 Poles, Balts, and southern Europeans (about half of them refugees) were admitted under a December 1945 directive by President Truman to use the quota numbers accumulated during the war. And the 215,000 DP's admitted under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 were to be charged against the quotas of future years. It was only with the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 that the United States went outside the quota system by authorizing distribution of 215,000 special nonquota immigrant visas to a number of eligible groups of Europeans and Chinese. The McCarran-Walter act of 1952, amending the immigration and nationality law, had eliminated the clause excluding Asians as immigrants but had retained the quota system.

Refugees were first mentioned explicitly in the general immigration law in the amendments passed in 1965. The law abolished the national origins quota system and set up in its place a hierarchy of preferences for visa distribution based on personal qualities; that is, relationship with U.S. citizens, accomplishments, labor skills, and so forth. First preference went to the sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; the

ASYLUM AND RESETTLEMENT

The right of political asylum is well-established in international law, but contrary to common belief it is a right not of the person seeking haven but of the state that is granting it. The theory is that every state, by virtue of its sovereignty, has an absolute right to determine who shall be admitted to its territory. Nevertheless, states that are party to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees accept the obligation not to expel refugees "to the frontiers of territories where [their] life or freedom would be threatened."

Refugee doctrine distinguishes between a state of first asylum and a state of second asylum (or resettlement state). A country that has received, but cannot assimilate, large numbers of refugees coming directly from their homelands is a state of first asylum, whereas a country that accepts for permanent resettlement a refugee already granted asylum in another country is a state of second asylum. The main states of second asylum for Indochinese refugees have been the United States, France, Canada, and Australia

seventh (and last) to refugees. Hemispheric immigration ceilings established by this law were put together in 1978 to form a worldwide ceiling of 290,000 immigrants per year. Refugees received 6% of this ceiling, or 17,400. Refugees, however, do not enter the country on the same terms as others. They are conditional entrants and must wait 2 years before they can apply for status as immigrants.

There was a definition of the refugee given in the 1965 law; it was narrower than that of the 1951 U.N. convention. Refugee programs dependent upon American initiative and funds spanned the globe. And yet the U.S. immigration law of 1965, following the practice of the 1950's, continued to tie refugee status to communism and turmoil in the Middle East. Thus, under the 1965 law, refugees are persons who "because of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion . . . have fled from any communist or communist-dominated country or area, or from any country in the general area of the Middle East, and are unable or unwilling to return to such country on account of race, religion, or political opinion."

The United States was not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (which gave rise to certain legal doubts). But it did sign the 1967 U.N. protocol abolishing the cutoff date in the 1951 convention, and this meant accepting a definition of the

refugee at variance with the one given in U.S. domestic law for immigration purposes. The term as used in the 1962 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act was not defined, however, and in application is broader than the immigration definition.

The Parole

Thus limited by its immigration laws, the United States could not have admitted as many refugees as it has in the past 14 years if the executive branch had not had use of a special authority known as the parole. Instituted by the McCarran-Walter act of 1952, the parole clause authorized the Attorney General to admit to the United States temporarily, for "emergent reasons" or for reasons deemed in the national interest, *any* alien applying for admission. Referring to the use of the parole to admit over 30,000 Hungarian refugees between 1956 and 1958, Congressman Walter said: "We never anticipated anything of this magnitude, but we did know this sort of situation would arise. That is why the provision was put in the law." The parole enabled the United States to admit refugees from non-Communist countries, such as Chile, after 1973. And in the absence of other authority, the executive branch has had to resort to the parole to admit large numbers of refugees in emergency situations.

The parole was used extensively to admit anti-Castro Cubans in the 1960's. Of the some 800,000 Cubans who have gone into exile in the 20 years that Castro has ruled their island, some 650,000 have found refuge in the United States. The Federal Government opened a reception center for Cuban refugees in 1960 and created a special assistance program in 1961. The largest number of refugee Cubans processed into the United States in a single year, 1962, was 78,000. By comparison, in the 8 months of 1975 following the fall of Saigon, the United States took in and found homes for 135,000 refugees from Indochina.

The 1975 Indochinese Exodus

The flow of Indochinese refugees started with the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Preparations began when the outcome of the fighting was no longer in doubt. Alerting the UNHCR and ICEM to an impending refugee crisis, the United States invoked the parole authority to admit into the country persons whose lives were believed to be in danger. Within a few days at the end of April, some 130,000 Vietnamese, with a smaller number of Laotians and

Cambodians, had quit their country and were on their way to the United States. Many had been evacuated by air from staging sites in Saigon while others left by sea either in U.S. vessels or under U.S. naval escort for transit centers in Guam and the Philippines.

An interagency task force, supported by private voluntary organizations, set about the work of resettlement. Reception centers were quickly opened at military bases in California, Florida, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania. The job that lay before them was without any real precedent in American history. The Federal Government had only the experience of the Cuban resettlement to guide it, and these new refugees were Orientals who had been whisked almost overnight into an Occidental country of which many had only superficial knowledge.

The operation relied heavily upon the work of the voluntary agencies. These organizations, most of them church based, had long experience settling and caring for immigrants and refugees. It was they who found the sponsors who would give individual assistance to refugees, arranged for transportation, and watched over the refugees until they were self-supporting. Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, the largest of the reception centers, was open until December 1975. In less than 8 months, 130,000 Vietnamese and 5,000 Cambodians had been started on new lives. Considering the difficulties this must be regarded as a rare success.

The Flow From Indochina

The exodus from Cambodia and Vietnam of April 1975 was followed later that year by a flow of refugees from Laos. Now, 4 years later, the flow from Indochina shows no sign of abating. The refugees come from all three Indochinese countries and belong to all social classes. Some, like the Hmong hill tribesmen of Laos, are under pressure because of their race as well as their political past. Some, like this year's Khmer are fleeing chaos and famine. And others—the ethnic Chinese of Vietnam—have been virtually expelled. But whatever the motive in the individual case, the root cause of all flight from Indochina is the strain of life under despotic regimes.

The refugees come by land and by sea. The "land people" come from Kampuchea (Cambodia) and from Laos (mostly hill people, or Hmong, but also lowland Lao) and cross the border on foot into Thailand. The number of those who have taken this route since 1975 is over 450,000 (not counting 300,000 Khmer who crossed into

Thailand in the fall of 1979), and 180,000 of these are still in Thailand awaiting resettlement elsewhere. Some have been in the camps for more than 4 years. Another 260,000 people, mostly ethnic Chinese, have gone by land into the People's Republic of China, where almost all are in the process of resettling.

"Boat people" first made their appearance in the summer of 1975, although it was not until the following year that the world became aware of their plight. Nearly all of the boat people come from Vietnam, although at first there were some Kampucheans who took this route. The method of flight is determined by geography. As Vietnam borders Kampuchea and Laos on the west and China on the north, those who leave the country clandestinely for a non-Communist haven have no choice but to set out to sea and hope for the best.

Once at sea boat people face enormous dangers. Their craft are usually small fishing vessels, often not more than 30 feet long, that were never intended for use on the high seas. Many boat people have hoped to reach the shipping lanes there to be rescued by some larger vessel. By international law captains are obliged to assist other ships that are in distress and to disembark crewmen and passengers at the first port of call. But as the number of refugees increased and port authorities became reluctant to accept them, captains began to ignore their obligation. Indeed, refugees who were afloat in a leaky boat reported that 21 vessels passed them before one picked them up and carried them to safety. It is unknown how many perish at sea (some think 30%) or are caught by Vietnamese patrols. In July 1979 eight refugees who had arrived in the Philippines reported that their boat had gone aground on the Spratly Islands where Vietnamese troops opened fire, killing 20 men, 20 women, and 45 children.

Until mid-1978 the boat people from Vietnam left their homes by stealth. To escape detection and punishment, they had to lay plans well in advance. They were mostly ethnic Vietnamese. But in the fall of 1978 boats began to make their appearance with passengers consisting almost exclusively of ethnic Chinese. Some were large vessels capable of carrying several thousand passengers, and they had left Vietnam under government supervision.

Hanoi's Policy

What had happened was that the government had seen the chance to

exploit the flight for its own purposes. Hanoi had intensified its drive to do away with private enterprise and reduce the urban population. Many Chinese were both businessmen and city dwellers. But also influencing the treatment they received was the belief that the Chinese are a fifth column inside the country. In any case, the authorities, since mid-1978, have been giving Chinese farmers and fishermen as well as business people the choice of moving into new economic zones in the remote countryside or leaving the country.

Those who choose to leave by sea pay dearly for the privilege. Voyages are arranged strictly as a business venture. A middleman, as a rule a Chinese who will later leave himself, charts a ship and collects passage money while officials certify the passenger list, collect an exit fee, and set a day for departure. While the government has not extended this favor to citizens of Vietnamese extraction, some Vietnamese have reportedly succeeded in bribing officials to certify them as Chinese for the voyage. Both fare and "tax" are payable in gold (a common means of storing wealth in Vietnam). In this way the government is not only rid of a socially undesirable class but acquires specie to pay for badly needed imports. Reliable estimates are that the exit money collected from emigrants in the past year amounts to 3% or more of the GNP.

Refugee Reception

For many the voyage itself, like the overland trek, has been just one phase of a continuing ordeal. The land people have no place to go but Thailand, while the "small boat" people often set ashore on the Malaysian or Indonesian coast. Freighters carrying "large boat" people have appeared off those coasts or slipped into Hong Kong and Manila Bay. Up to now both Thailand and Malaysia have refused to assimilate any fugitives (with the exception of Khmer Moslems in Malaysia) but have otherwise wavered in their treatment of refugees. Although neither government is a party to the 1951 convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, both have accepted the principle of granting asylum. But both peoples feel hostility toward the Chinese and Vietnamese, and the continuing and increasing flow has raised the prospect of heavy costs and political, even military, complications.

Refugees have sometimes been forced back across the border. Boat people, not allowed on land, have had

to make camp in their overcrowded vessels. And some boats, after being reprovisioned, have been towed back out to sea. In July 1979, 1,000 Sino-Vietnamese, upon reaching Malaysian coastal waters, smashed their boats and swam ashore.

The flow of Indochinese refugees affects other Southeast Asian countries as well. Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Indonesia are no more able to absorb a large influx of helpless foreigners than were many European countries that gave asylum to Russians fleeing their revolution.

Singapore is the nearest port for many ships that have rescued Vietnamese from sinking vessels. Being an overpopulated city-state, Singapore feels that it cannot accept any refugees for permanent settlement. Its present policy is to give temporary asylum only to persons who have a promise of permanent settlement elsewhere. The UNHCR camp in Singapore is now housing over 2,000 refugees.

Hong Kong, always a place of open settlement for Chinese and currently housing 63,000 Vietnamese refugees in UNHCR-sponsored camps, also has limited space and is overpopulated. As it also receives illegal immigrants from the P.R.C., its resources are badly strained. The Hong Kong Government has imposed severe penalties on masters and owners who have let out vessels for the Vietnamese refugee trade.

Some Vietnamese boats arrive in Indonesian waters. Although Indonesia has given asylum to refugees who succeed in landing, it will not accept any for resettlement. Its naval patrols have often intercepted vessels, made them seaworthy, and sent them on to other destinations. Some have gone on to Australia, over 2,000 miles from their home.

The Philippine Government has accepted for permanent resettlement a small number of Vietnamese—less than a thousand—who have Philippine family ties. It has also freely given temporary asylum to small boat people. But like all other Southeast Asian countries it was upset by the appearance in 1979 of large boats with thousands of refugees aboard.

World Response, 1978-79

At the end of 1978 there was a dramatic increase in the flow of refugees. The monthly arrivals grew from fewer than 1,500 in January to over 20,000 by the end of the year, and the growth continued into the new year. In May 1979 the number of Indochinese seeking asylum was 64,000, the record

for a single month until the outflow of several hundred thousand Khmer into Thailand this fall. This high level of flight in 1978 and 1979 reflects Hanoi's policy of forced emigration and the chaos that has reigned in Kampuchea after the Vietnamese invasion.

The situation at the end of 1978 generated new efforts of assistance. At a UNHCR consultative meeting attended by 38 nations in December 1978, there were new pledges of money and refugee admissions. The paramount need was to speed up resettlement. It was also vital, however, to reduce the flow and to work for free emigration under humane conditions.

In January 1979, Hanoi, faced with growing world disapproval of its policies, announced that it would make

WORLD REFUGEE YEAR

In June 1959, the United Nations launched a campaign to secure increased assistance for refugees, to which it gave the name World Refugee Year. At that time the number of refugees dependent upon international assistance was 2,500,000. (In 1979, after two decades of upheaval in Africa and Asia, the number is close to 10 million.) Chinese, Palestinians, and Algerians accounted for most of these. Of special concern were European refugees who had no hope of returning home but because of physical handicaps had been turned down for immigration.

The U.N. drive was supported by 97 nations, and in many of these special committees were formed to solicit contributions and campaign for more liberal refugee policies. Much publicity was achieved through World Refugee Year postage stamps issued simultaneously by 77 countries.

In the United States this event was marked by a ceremony attended by ambassadors and representatives of 40 of the participating countries. These activities added millions of dollars to refugee aid funds, led many countries to accept the handicapped as immigrants, and focused public attention for a whole year on a serious humanitarian problem.



arrangements for orderly emigration in the future. In May Hanoi signed an agreement with the UNHCR permitting free departure of all citizens who wished to leave (except criminals). In July the United States and Hanoi began discussions on admitting U.S. consular officers to Ho Chi Minh City (the former Saigon) to issue visas to persons qualified to enter the United States under a family reunification plan. Thus, on the question of legal emigration, some progress was achieved during the first half of 1979 on paper. But the results to date have been disappointing.

In the summer of 1979 activity intensified. The leaders of the industrial nations took up the question of refugees ("a humanitarian problem of historic proportions," they said) at their economic summit in Tokyo in June. They called upon the Indochinese governments to put an end to the disorderly outflow and respect the right of peaceful departure. They promised to admit more refugees and increase their contributions to international refugee agencies. And they also endorsed a proposal put forward by Prime Minister Thatcher for a U.N. refugee conference to decide upon concrete measures of assistance.

The problem of refugees dominated the annual Foreign Ministers' conference of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Bali (Indonesia), a few days after the economic summit. For ASEAN countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines—the events in Indochina were a pressing concern. Vietnamese troops had reached the Thai border. Some feared that the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam were embarking upon a long-range design to dominate the region. All were alarmed at what they considered a weak response by the rest of the world to the flood of refugees that threatened them with inundation. They appealed to other nations to induce the Vietnamese to stop the flow, to speed up resettlement, and to create more refugee processing centers. To add emphasis to their position, they announced their refusal to accept further refugees and their right to expel those already present in their countries.

ASEAN's rejection of the policy of asylum was not carried out completely. Although in early July both Indonesian and Malaysian officials prevented many refugees from landing, the governments quietly accepted some refugees pending the results of the U.N. conference. Secretary Vance went to Bali after the Tokyo summit to confer with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. He urged them to continue their policy of

granting asylum and assured them that a major international effort to ease their problems was underway.

U.N. Conference on Indochinese Refugees

The U.N.-sponsored conference on refugees met in Geneva on July 20–21; 72 countries were in attendance, including all countries affected by the Indochinese refugee flow except Kampuchea and Laos. On the problem of speeding up resettlement there were notable achievements:

- Pledges to resettle refugees bringing total annual commitments up to 265,000.
- Pledges totaling \$200 million for the UNHCR (not including a pledge by Japan to carry half the budget); and
- Progress toward establishing refugee processing centers to give temporary housing to refugees who had guarantees of eventual resettlement elsewhere (the Philippines offered to construct a center capable of processing 50,000 refugees, and in May 1979 the Indonesian Government designated the island of Galang as a refugee processing center to accommodate 10,000 refugees).

Secretary General Waldheim also announced the willingness of the Vietnamese authorities to stem "illegal departures" for a "reasonable period of time." In addition there was general support for the agreement on legal immigration worked out by the Vietnamese and the UNHCR.

U.S. Initiatives

The United States has played a leading role in the 1979 deliberations. Concerned that other countries carry a fair share of the burden, the United States has been fully prepared to carry a heavier load itself. Immigration and financial assistance are both part of the American program. Since the April 1975 exodus, the executive branch, through repeated use of the parole, had admitted an additional 80,000 Indochinese refugees, and by April 1979 the authorized monthly intake was 7,000. In June President Carter raised this number to 14,000 per month.

Contributions to international agencies were increased. Pursuant to pledges made at the economic summit, the President in July requested Congress to raise the U.S. contribution to the UNHCR Indochina programs from \$41 million to \$105 million (that is, up to about one-third of UNHCR estimated needs for Indochina in 1980). And on July 21 he ordered the 7th Fleet

and military aircraft to mount an "intense, active" search-and-rescue effort in the South China Sea. From the beginning it has been U.S. policy to grant resettlement in the United States to anyone rescued at sea by American vessels if such a guarantee were necessary to disembark the refugees at the next scheduled port of call, and if the refugees could not qualify for admission to any other country.

At the Geneva conference Vice President Mondale made a proposal opening a new horizon in world refugee assistance. It called for creation of an international fund with the purpose of assisting the resettlement of refugees in developing countries. The rationale for the fund is that industrialized nations, and the ASEAN countries, cannot continue to absorb refugees in large numbers while many developing countries were in need of manpower which they had no means to attract. As proposed, the fund would supply money for transportation, training, and other resettlement costs from capital donated by national governments. These resettlement projects could be adapted to the development projects supported by the World Bank.

U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs

Meanwhile the United States strengthened its own refugee machinery. In February 1979 the President created the office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, the first incumbent being former Senator Dick Clark. The coordinator's mandate was to:

- Develop an overall U.S. refugee and resettlement policy;
- Coordinate all U.S. domestic and international refugee programs;
- Represent the United States on refugee matters with other governments and international agencies; and
- Develop liaison on refugee matters between the Federal Government and the voluntary agencies and local U.S. authorities.

Refugee Act of 1979

In March the Administration submitted a bill to reform U.S. refugee law. Congress and the Administration had long agreed that the provisions concerning refugees in the current law were too cumbersome and not equal to the current problem. The new bill, entitled "The Refugee Act of 1979," would rationalize procedures and regularize and fund what has been done on an ad hoc basis through parole author-

ity. The bill proposes to:

- Eliminate present ideological and geographical restraints on which refugees can be admitted to the United States;
- Set a normal yearly flow of refugee admissions at 50,000;
- Leave it to the President to decide which groups or classes of refugees are of special concern and should be admitted to the United States;
- Enable the President, after consultation with the Congress, to admit "emergency groups" of refugees outside the normal flow;
- Keep the parole authority; and
- Create a more comprehensive and equitable basis for Federal assistance to refugees settled in the United States.

Refugee Clearance

Clearing Southeast Asian refugees for admission to the United States is a difficult process which the new bill will not greatly change. Screening is conducted in the countries of first asylum where U.S. officials work in close cooperation with the international organizations and the voluntary agencies. The UNHCR is the general advocate of refugee rights toward the regional governments and also provides material assistance such as food, health care, and shelter. The ICEM arranges for transportation to countries of permanent asylum.

Refugees applying for admission to the United States are interviewed several times. First they are interviewed by U.S. voluntary agency and U.S. Embassy personnel who decide which refugees are the most highly qualified

for admission to the United States. First preference goes to those who have immediate family members in the United States, second those who had worked in positions of trust for the United States, third those associated with U.S. policies and programs, and fourth others who have not been accepted by another country. These priorities serve only as guidelines and may be disregarded for compelling humanitarian reasons. Refugees are then interviewed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which has the right of final decision. When a refugee is approved for admission the voluntary agencies take the necessary steps to search for an American sponsor.

Care is taken to keep out undesirables. All applicants are checked against records kept by U.S. Government agencies. There is an absolute prohibition on admission of former members of the Vietcong or those who have engaged in persecution. No refugee can be admitted whose state of health, determined by medical exam, is a hazard to others.

Famine in Kampuchea

The refugee crisis in Indochina is exacerbated by the famine in Kampuchea. After more than 3 years of brutality and dislocation by the Pol Pot regime, the Khmer are now caught in the fighting between the Pol Pot forces and Vietnamese invaders. Vietnam launched its invasion in December 1978 at the time of the primary harvest, and the subsequent scorched-earth strategy destroyed most of the rice crop and disrupted new planting. Starvation is already afflicting hundreds of

thousands of Khmer. Many of the Khmer who have fled since the spring of 1979 arrive in Thailand totally debilitated. Others—no one knows how many—are now huddled along the border not strong enough to complete the walk to the camps.

These conditions induced a new international effort. In March 1979 the United States began urging relief agencies to prepare for the possibility of famine in Kampuchea. The International Committee of the Red Cross and UNICEF are acting as agents for the concerned governments in arranging for the shipment of food. It was not until September 26, months after the initiative, that the Vietnamese-supported government in Kampuchea and Hanoi agreed to cooperate in an international relief program. To date the announced U.S. contributions to this effort is cash and commodities valued at about \$90 million. The United States has also arranged through its own facilities for the distribution of food and medicines to Khmer refugees along the Thai-Khmer border and has pledged to supply \$9 million, or one-third of the cost, of Thailand's own program of famine assistance.

The Future

To the crisis in Indochina there is no end in sight. Even if the famine in Kampuchea is checked, there is the problem of clearing the camps. With current resettlement pledges this could possibly be done within a year—assuming there are no new arrivals. But there is no doubt that the coming year will see a continuing flow of refugees. It is only a question of how many. □

THE PRESIDENT:

Iran and Energy

Remarks at the 13th constitutional convention of the AFL-CIO in Washington, D.C., on November 15, 1979.¹

For a brief time this afternoon I want to speak with you and all Americans about some fundamental principles upon which our nation was founded and which we must never forget. To some, these ideals may seem at times to be old fashioned or outmoded. But we have been clearly reminded in recent days that these principles mean just as much to us now as they have ever meant during any time of critical decision in the history of our nation.

These fundamentals have old names to which we must continually give new meaning—names like strength, courage, patriotism, independence, the love of freedom, human rights, justice, concern for the common good.

This is the 12th day that more than 100 innocent human beings, some 60 of whom are members of the U.S. diplomatic mission, have been held hostage in our Embassy in Iran. For a rare time in human history, a host government has condoned and even encouraged this kind of illegal action against the sovereign territory and official diplomatic relations of another nation. This is an act of terrorism—totally outside the bounds of international law and diplomatic tradition.

In this time of trial, our deep concern is for the lives of these brave hostages—our nation's loyal citizens and faithful representatives. Every American feels anger and outrage at what is happening to them—just as every American feels concern for their safety and pride in their great courage. This crisis calls for firmness, and it calls for restraint. I am proud that this situation has brought forth calm leadership by officials and private citizens throughout this country.

Firmness does require patience, and it requires perseverance. Firmness also means measured action—deliberate actions that clarify the real issues, reduce the likelihood of violence, protect our interests, and insure justice.

The United States has done nothing and will do nothing that could be used to justify violent or imprudent action by anyone. While we are pursuing all avenues of diplomatic resolution, we are also acting unilaterally as appropriate—with restraint, yes, but without hesitation.

First, in order to discourage violence and possible bloodshed here, which when televised and transmitted back to Iran might threaten the safety of the hostages, I have discouraged the issuing of permits for demonstrations on Federal properties here in Washington consistent with our laws and pursuant to my own powers and responsibilities. I have also encouraged local and State officials to take similar legal action.

Second, I have directed our immigration authorities to review the visas of some 50,000 Iranian students who

are guests here in our country. Our nation is fully committed to the enhancement of human rights, the protection of legal rights, and the enhancement of civil justice. All provisions of the U.S. Constitution will be honored. All foreign nationals who are here lawfully may continue here with their work or their studies. But those who are here illegally will be processed promptly and lawfully for deportation back to their own country.

Third, I want to remove any question that our principles might be compromised by our supposed need for Iranian oil. Early this week, therefore, I ordered an immediate halt to any purchases or shipments of Iranian oil to the United States of America.

I am determined to make clear that we will never allow any foreign country to dictate any American policy.

Fourth, in order to protect our economic interests and to insure that claims on Iran by the United States or by U.S. citizens are settled in an orderly manner, we have legally frozen official Iranian property and financial assets. The order does not affect any accounts other than those of the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or other government-controlled entities.

Yesterday I further instructed Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador [to the U.N. Donald F.] McHenry to oppose any discussion of Iran's problems in the U.N. Security Council as long as American hostages are being held. Only after the hostages are released will we be willing to address Iran's concerns and then under the provisions of international law and under the Charter of the United Nations. The members of the U.N. Security Council, I am pleased to announce to you, have agreed unanimously with our own proposal.

It is important for all of us to remember that we will not compromise our fundamental principles of justice no matter how grave the provocation nor how righteous our indignation. At the same time, we will continue to use our influence around the world to obtain the same kinds of human rights for people everywhere.

In this instance, we are upholding an important principle on behalf of the entire world community. It is a clear tenet of international law and diplomatic tradition that the host government is fully responsible for the safety and well-being of the property and the legal representatives of another country. Less than a year ago—and this is a fact not generally known or recognized—less than a year ago, 70,000 American citizens were in Iran. As you know, thousands of people were killed during the upheavals there but almost miraculously and because of the good work of Cyrus Vance and others, our people were brought home safely. I thank God for it. Despite the turmoil, each succeeding Iranian Government—and they were being changed, as you know, quite rapidly—protected the citizens of other countries.

Foreign visitors are often vulnerable to abuse. An embassy is not a fortress. There are no embassies anywhere in the world that can long withstand the attack of a mob, if the mob has the support of the host government itself. We had received repeated assurances of protection from the highest officials in the Iranian Government, even a day or two before the mob was incited to attack and before that protection was withdrawn at the last minute. The principle of inviolability of embassies is understood and accepted by nations everywhere, and is particularly important to smaller nations which have no recourse to economic or military power. This is why the U.N. Security Council has also unanimously supported our demand for the release of the American hostages.

In accordance with this principle as recognized and observed by all civilized countries, the Iranian Government and its leaders are fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our representatives in Iran, in Tehran, and they will be held accountable for that responsibility. It is unthinkable that any responsible government in today's modern world could regard the seizure and the holding of the diplomatic officials of another nation as a realistic means to advance any cause whatsoever. Terrorism is not an acceptable means to resolve disputes between individuals or between nations.

No act has so galvanized the American public toward unity in the last decade as has the holding of our people's hostages in Tehran. We stand today as one people. We are dedicated to the principles and the honor of our nation. We have taken no action which would justify concern among the people or among the Government of Iran. We have done nothing for which any American need apologize.

The actions of Iranian leaders and the radicals who invaded our Embassy were completely unjustified. They and all others must know that the United States of America will not yield to international terrorism or to blackmail.

These difficult days have reminded us of basic facts and principles which are fundamental to the existence of us as a people. We will honor all constitutional protections and international law and custom, and we will not let our freedom and our security be jeopardized.

The developments in Iran have made it starkly clear to all of us that our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a direct, physical threat to our freedom and security as Americans.

That is why we must all join together in the battle for an energy-secure America. This struggle demands the deliberate and the conscientious participation of every single citizen. Unfortunately, our dependence on foreign oil has been growing for the last 5 or 6 years, especially when it should have been diminishing. As a nation we have become dependent on the undependable and addicted to the unaffordable.

At Camp David this summer, one man summed up the significance of our energy problems better than any other person there. It was Lane Kirkland. He said to me: "Mr. President, the issue is freedom."

That is exactly the issue today. That is why I have been calling on the Congress and encouraging the

American people for the last 2½ years to recognize the danger of excessive dependence on foreign oil. That is why I have ordered phased decontrol of oil prices to make conservation pay and to stimulate domestic energy sources.

This is an extremely important—a vital—issue. Do not be misled by political demagoguery. I and every other public official in this country have an obligation to speak the truth and to deal responsibly with the hard facts, and they are hard facts. We cannot close down all nuclear power plants, burn less coal, refuse to build oil refineries, refuse to explore for new oil sources, oppose the production of synthetic fuels, and at the same time encourage the waste of energy by artificially holding down its price in order to encourage more consumption. This is a ridiculous combination of proposals which could only be put forward in an election campaign. America knows better.

I am very pleased that our national energy program is now moving steadily through the Congress, after enormous difficulty there and sharp debate. Now more than ever before it is essential that we have an energy security corporation and a windfall profits tax in order to take care of the poor, encourage production, build a better transportation system. Armed with these new programs, our technology, our creativity, our abundance, our vision, our firm will, America can finally control its own resources, and we can continue to control our own destiny.

Our love of freedom will not be auctioned off for foreign oil. Hundreds of thousands of our forebears gave their very lives for our freedom. Our freedom is not for sale—now or ever in the future.

Every important victory that this nation has ever won—with Americans struggling together—has made us stronger as a nation. So will it be with the energy problem. There is a clear choice for Americans to make: We can either keep pouring out billions and billions and billions of dollars to foreign countries to import oil—which also buys us inflation, unemployment, and national dependency and insecurity—or we can take some of that money and invest it in America to hire American workers, to unleash American ingenuity, to develop American resources, to promote American energy that Americans own and control. That is the way to approach the energy problem, and that is what we must do together.

There are millions and millions of people who can help directly with this challenge and there are hundreds of thousands of jobs involved. Next year we anticipate that we will send overseas \$70 billion to pay for foreign oil. Just think how many fine things we could do in America with that much money.

So in the last few days we have been reminded once again of our essential need of energy security so that we can continue to protect the basic principles of our country, and together that is what we must achieve, both for ourselves and, even more importantly, for our children and grandchildren. America must always be militarily strong and economically strong, and that America will always be.

One final comment I would like to make. America

must also maintain its moral and its ethical strength. We are not a selfish people. History has recorded many times America's great generosity, as it does today in Thailand and Kampuchea, formerly known as Cambodia. Even as we face problems of great economic concern in our own country, we are sparing no effort to help those who are suffering and starving in every way we can.

Compassion enhances American strength. It is one of our deepest values, one to which we will always cling and remain true. Concern for human life and justice is as vital as military power to our special place in the family of nations. Human rights is a compelling idea of our lifetime. Our hearts and our aid will continue to go

to those who are suffering, who are starving, or who are deprived of freedom.

In this time of tension and turmoil I am proud that our commitment to American strength and to American principles is unshakable. □

¹Text from White House press release (opening and closing paragraphs omitted).

For texts of remarks made by President Carter on November 12, Secretary Vance on November 8, and White House announcements of November 10 and 14 concerning the situation in Iran, see p. 49.

THE SECRETARY: *Where We Stand* With SALT II

Address at the Florida Blue Key Banquet in Gainesville, Florida, on October 26, 1979.¹

I want to talk to you tonight about where we stand in fulfilling the first purpose of our foreign policy—to promote the security of our nation and the safety of our people. We meet at a time when the U.S. Senate is in the midst of its work on a crucial element of our security policies—the second strategic arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

At one level, that debate is highly technical. The sophistication of modern weapons—and with it the complexity of agreements to limit those weapons—has grown dramatically. Those technical assessments of the treaty's impact are an indispensable part of the work of the Senate.

Opposing View

This evening, however, I want to address one of the broader currents in the public discussion of the treaty. It is a view that is sometimes stated, and sometimes implied, by those who are opposed to the treaty. It is the proposition that the United States cannot "afford" this treaty because we are allegedly in a position of weakness in the world.

That contention simply is wrong. It suffers from two fundamental errors.

First, it portrays the United States as weak, when in fact America is strong and growing stronger.

And second, it rests on the erroneous assumption that the SALT II treaty would detract from America's strength, when in fact the treaty is an integral part of our strategy for maintaining and building our strength.

I do not mean to imply for a moment that the United States does not face serious challenges. We do. We harbor no illusion about the continuing competition with the Soviets in many areas. There has been a steady buildup of Soviet military power over the past several years. It continues. The willingness and ability of the Soviets to take advantage of local conflicts and tensions in many parts of the world is self-evident.

We face other imposing challenges as well. The world is undergoing rapid and fundamental change—political as well as economic. Decisions which di-

rectly affect our lives can be made today not only in Washington and Moscow but in a host of other capitals around the world. Scores of developing nations around the world are grappling with a new generation of postindependence problems—problems of growth and equity, of internal consolidation and regional cohesion.

In such a world, no single nation, no matter how powerful, can dictate events or impose enduring solutions on others. Increasingly, our leadership must take the form of working with others toward goals we share and can best achieve together.

The fact that the world has changed, however, does not mean that America has grown weak or lost its will. The realization that we are not an island in the world should not make us either romanticize the past or fear the future. We have unmatched strengths as a nation. We are moving appropriately and effectively to deal with the challenges we face. And the SALT II treaty is an important part of that forward-looking strategy.

It is important to emphasize that a confident and outward looking America can thrive in a world of change. We obviously would jeopardize our future safety if we underestimated the difficulties we face. But our ability to act with clarity and firmness can be equally confused by underestimating America's strengths. For when Americans sell America short, so will our friends and potential opponents abroad.

Let me review our strengths, and how we are responding to new challenges, in the context of three aspects of our national security.

- The first is the balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union.

- The second is the balance in Europe, where we and our NATO allies must be prepared to defend against any level of threat.

- The third involves our influence and leadership throughout the world at a time of profound change in the international order.

Strategic Balance

Let me turn first to the strategic balance. Our strategic nuclear forces must be strong enough to meet two tests. We must be able to deter nuclear aggression by maintaining forces which can

respond in kind to any level of attack. And we must also maintain a balance of forces, for a strategic imbalance could lead some of our friends and allies to question our ability to protect our interests and theirs.

Today, we manifestly have the ability to meet both those requirements. The three elements of our strategic forces—land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and long-range bombers—have a combined striking power that is awesome. Together they carry some 9,000 nuclear weapons. The smallest is several times more powerful than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

The Soviet Union also has great nuclear power as do we. They lead in some categories. We lead in others. But in practical military terms, the two sides today are effectively the same.

The Soviet buildup of recent years, however, has considerable momentum behind it. We must take steps now to assure that the balance is preserved in the future.

We are doing so.

We are modernizing all three legs of our strategic forces—land, sea, and air.

- Our strategic bombers will be equipped with modern cruise missiles which will be able to penetrate Soviet air defense for the foreseeable future.

- Our new Trident submarines will be more capable than their predecessors. The new Trident missile has more than twice the range of our existing submarine-based missiles. Together these new systems will assure that our deepwater forces will continue to be invulnerable.

- And we are proceeding with an entirely new land-based missile—called the MX—which will be able to deliver more warheads with greater accuracy than our existing land-based missiles. It will also be mobile, so that it can survive a surprise attack.

With or without SALT II, we must make substantial new investments in our strategic forces. But the fact is that those efforts will be more effective and less costly with the SALT II agreement in force than they would be without it.

Let me give you a few of the reasons why this is true.

- The treaty limits will hold Soviet strategic forces significantly below where they would otherwise be. Based on past and present rates of construction, we can anticipate that the Soviets

would have many thousand more warheads by 1985 than will be possible under the treaty and several hundred more systems to deliver those weapons.

- Without the treaty, our ability to observe Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—could be impaired, since there would be no constraints on the deliberate concealment of such forces.

- Without the boundaries set by the treaty through 1985, our predictions of the level and the nature of Soviet forces into the future would be less certain. This would make our own defense planning more difficult.

- And without the treaty we would risk the opportunity to achieve further limits on nuclear forces, and thus a greater measure of safety, in the next round of talks.

In light of these advantages, it is simply wrong to imply, as some SALT opponents have done, that by agreeing to the SALT treaty we are weakening our defenses. Exactly the opposite is true. The treaty will contribute to a strong defense. The most sensible formula for a stable strategic balance is one that includes both greater American strength and restraints on nuclear arms.

The NATO Alliance

The second area I want to discuss is the balance in Europe. Here the NATO alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—is the backbone of our defense. It is an alliance founded both upon collective security and upon common values—a shared determination to defend the ideals of democracy and freedom.

The security of our NATO allies is inseparable from our security, and the strength of our allies multiplies our strength.

- Our European partners contribute more than 90% of the NATO ground troops stationed in Europe during peacetime.

- Some three-quarters of the Western military aircraft in the European theater are supplied by our allies.

- Together, we and our allies invest about 25% more in defense than the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

- Our allies are stronger and our alliance is more cohesive than the Warsaw Pact.

Nevertheless, there has been a sustained Soviet military buildup in Europe. Soviet troop levels there have grown significantly over the past 10 years. So has the number and sophistication of their tanks and artillery posi-

tioned in Europe. And in recent years they have also been adding significantly to their forces which can deliver nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

NATO is responding to this increased threat. Together, we and our allies have made major strides in strengthening the alliance—to assure its political unity and to enhance its military effectiveness.

In May of 1977, President Carter proposed a comprehensive program to modernize NATO's forces. Such a program was adopted by the NATO heads of state in 1978, and it is now in progress.

To assure that our defense needs are fully met, the NATO allies committed themselves to increase their defense expenditures 3% a year, after inflation. We met that target in the fiscal year just past, and we are seeking congressional funding that will assure that we meet it again in fiscal year 1980.

Our defense efforts must also include the modernization of our nuclear forces in Europe, to respond to the Soviet advances in this area.

Recently, the Soviets announced their intention to unilaterally withdraw men and tanks from Eastern Europe. We naturally welcome any step that would reduce Soviet military power in Europe. The Soviets have also offered to negotiate about some of their nuclear weapons directed against Western Europe on the condition that NATO not proceed with the modernization of its forces. The effect of this condition could be to prevent us from responding to the Soviet buildup. It would be a mistake for the alliance to accept any proposal which would perpetuate inequality.

Over the past year, we have been reviewing future modernization plans with our allies. Because these nuclear forces would be stationed in Europe, we must work together with our allies in formulating these plans. Our allies believe—as do we—that the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe must go hand-in-hand with a genuine effort to negotiate equal limits on such weapons with the Soviets. We believe that a broad consensus can be built in NATO based upon such a parallel approach.

Failure to ratify SALT II, however, would jeopardize that consensus. For as a practical matter, without SALT II there would be no basis for proceeding with SALT III, the forum in which we could pursue serious negotiations on limiting nuclear forces in Europe. It could lead to doubt and uncertainty in Europe. In such an atmosphere difficult political decisions would be even more difficult to make.

Thus, defeat of the treaty could

jeopardize what the treaty permits and our interest require—the modernization of our nuclear forces in Europe. Force modernization is needed in any case. But we cannot change the plain political fact that ratification of SALT II is the necessary foundation for both modernization and arms control.

Future U.S. Strategy

Finally, let me discuss the outlook for our relations throughout the world.

Our international relationships are increasingly diverse and complex. More and more nations share in shaping international events. At the same, within nations, people are seeking a fuller share in the economic and political life of their countries. In such a world of change, the possibilities for turmoil and conflict are ever present. These conditions can be unsettling; sometimes they can be harmful.

But it is profoundly wrong to conclude that a world of change is inhospitable to America's interest or that change foreshadows a decline for the values we cherish. On the contrary, there has been an unmistakable resurgence of democracy in many corners of the world. In southern Europe, in parts of Latin America and Africa, democratic institutions have gained new vitality in recent years. And everywhere the thirst for national independence is great and works against those who seek to dominate other nations.

We are prepared to assist our friends if outside forces seek to create or exploit local tensions for purposes of their own. That is why we have taken specific actions, in our own hemisphere, to strengthen our ability to assure that Soviet troops in Cuba will not threaten the security of any state in the region.

But it should not and will not be our policy to mirror Soviet tactics in developing nations. Nor will we treat the developing world simply as an arena for East-West competition, for such an approach would deny us our most effective diplomatic instruments.

In times such as these, we must not only be strong militarily, we must appreciate and employ our other powerful assets—our economic strength, our commitment to the growth of developing countries, our capacity to innovate and to share technology, our genuine commitment to peace and the just resolution of disputes, and the resonance between our ideals and the insistence of developing countries upon national integrity and respect.

Thus, we are pursuing a positive and forward-looking approach which ad-

addresses Third World issues primarily on their own terms.

Through our economic and security assistance and our human rights policies, this strategy supports the efforts of Third World nations to develop their own capacity to accommodate internal pressures and to resist external challenges. It includes greater attention to such dangerous problems as nuclear proliferation and escalating purchases of conventional arms by nations which neither need nor can afford them.

And our strategy involves active and patient efforts to help resolve regional disputes. This can be extraordinarily difficult; the complexity of these disputes is usually matched by their historic bitterness. But persistent effort is essential—to save lives, to spare precious resources, and to remove opportunities for external intervention.

Our strategy toward developing countries is thus one which seeks to bring other nations together rather than drive them apart. It seeks to heal differences rather than inflame them; to address needs rather than exploit them.

And I believe it is working. For our relations with the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are generally stronger today than they have been for many years.

Even in these broader relations SALT has a bearing.

- It will help us avoid a totally unrestrained arms race which would both increase international tensions and divert our resources and attention from other pressing priorities.

- It will preserve the credibility of our effort to curtail the spread of nuclear arms to more countries. They are watching intently to see if we accept restraint for ourselves as readily as we urge it on others.

- And above all, it will have a profound influence on the way our leadership is perceived in the world. Failure to approve the treaty would allow others to appear to be more interested in limitations on the weapons of war than we are. Ratification will reaffirm America's commitment to peace.

We face challenges—both domestic and foreign—which test our national creativity and will. To deal with these challenges effectively, we must look at the world realistically. It is, of course, a picture of somber as well as brighter hues. But, we should not so concentrate on the dangers that we overlook the opportunities or doubt our ability to seize them.

Approval of the SALT II treaty will provide a practical contribution to our security. It will also be a sign to the

Question-and-Answer Session in Gainesville

Secretary Vance held a news conference upon arrival in Gainesville, Florida, on October 26, 1979, before addressing the Florida Blue Key Banquet (see preceding article).¹

Q. The U.S. satellite had difficulty detecting the Soviet troop buildup in Cuba. How will they monitor Soviet military activity in Russia underneath SALT?

A. The kind of monitoring that's required to monitor a ground activity is completely different from the kind of activity which is necessary in monitoring a SALT treaty. What kinds of things you monitor in a SALT agreement are the following: how many missiles are there; how many submarines are there; what is being done in the testing of new missiles that are being developed. Those kinds of things require certain types of equipment and certain types of monitoring that are really totally different from the kind of monitoring that one carries out when you're trying to determine from a satellite overhead whether or not certain ground forces below do or do not have particular kinds of ground equipment.

This is particularly difficult in a situation like that in Cuba, where the equipment is exactly the same whether it be Cuban equipment or Soviet equipment. That kind of case obviously does not exist where you're monitoring or not a large missile is being implanted in a missile hole or whether a submarine exists and how many missiles are carried on that submarine, and the like.

Q. In your analysis, how great is the extent of concern at the State Department now over the discovery that there apparently has been a nuclear detonation in South Africa?

A. First, let me say it is not clear that there has been a nuclear detonation. We picked up on the 22d of September indications from one of our satellites that there may have been a low-order yield nuclear detonation between two and three kilotons. That has not been confirmed by any cor-

roborating evidence. We have, during the period since the 22d, been checking the situation by sampling and the like to see whether we could find corroborating evidence. That has not yet been obtained.

I would point out that within a period of an hour or so, the information picked up from the satellite had been reported back and we knew about it. I was involved in a conversation with the Secretary of Defense and National Security Adviser discussing it, so the equipment which we had worked perfectly. We just simply have not been able to have any corroborating evidence.

The area in which there are indications that an explosion may have taken place is a very large area. Some 4,500-square miles running from the southern Pacific to Antarctica all the way over to the south Atlantic and southern Africa. So it is a huge area, and we cannot say that an explosion has taken place in South Africa.

Q. Is the Shah of Iran going to be allowed to stay in this country to receive his chemotherapy treatments, and who made the arrangements to bring him into the country?

A. The Shah was allowed to come into the country for humanitarian purposes when he indicated that there was a possibility that his health was deteriorating. We, of course, worked with him and helped to set up arrangements whereby he could come and receive the tests, treatment, and, eventually, the operation. He obviously will be allowed to remain however long it takes for his recuperation.

Q. Cuba is being very aggressive in its policy in the Caribbean. What is the U.S. concern with the situation? How do you plan to take care of it?

A. Insofar as Cuba is concerned, we, after the identification of the Soviet combat brigade, took two kinds of steps. First, we received certain assurances from the Soviet Union with respect to the brigade, and secondly, we took unilateral steps on our part. Steps

world that Americans are as confident, again, as we are strong. It would be new proof that we have the maturity and determination to deal with the

world as it is and to help shape a new world as we would like it to be. □

¹Press release 284 of Oct. 29, 1979.

I think you all are very familiar with—there were eight different steps which the President took. We believe that the combination of the steps which we are taking, plus the assurances, will preserve the peace of the area and will prevent any threat to either the United States or the security of any other nation in the hemisphere.

Q. Back to South Africa. Have you been in touch with South African officials and what are they telling you?

A. I have not had time, myself, to be in touch with them. As to the conversations we may have had with the South Africans, I really don't want to get into that.

Q. Do you know what size bomb it was?

A. I think I told you that we have indications that there may have been a low-order yield detonation between two and three kilotons—considerably smaller than the Hiroshima bomb.

Q. The Soviets—any reaction from them?

A. None

Q. How closely tied is SALT II to NATO? If SALT II is rejected, could NATO break down?

A. I'm going to talk about that tonight in remarks which I am going to be making at the banquet. I think it is of vital importance for going ahead with much needed modernization of our theater nuclear weapons in NATO that SALT be passed. I think that if SALT is not passed, it will have an adverse effect on being able to go forward with the modernization, so it is of great importance.

Q. Should South Africa develop a nuclear weapon? Is the U.S. Government worried that it would upset the balance of power, specifically with regard to the developing nations in southern Africa?

A. First of all, we don't know, as I wanted to make very clear earlier and to make clear now, that anything has happened in South Africa. We have been working with South Africa for months and, indeed, over a couple of years trying to get them to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty which would preclude any development of nuclear weapons. They have refused so far to do that but have said they would not develop nuclear weapons. We do not yet have any evidence which would indicate that they have.

Q. Should they develop a nuclear weapon, how great a threat is that?

A. I think the development of a nuclear weapon by them, of course, would be a destabilizing and dangerous step forward. That's one of the reasons we support so strongly the Nonproliferation Treaty and adherence to that treaty.

Q. Has there been only one bomb indicated in the September 22d one and no other?

A. Let me say again, there is no indication that there has been a bomb developed. There are indications that there may have been a nuclear explosion and we are not certain of that.

Q. Just one?

A. Only one. One explosion.

Q. How do you think Moshe Dayan's resignation would affect the Arab-Israeli negotiations?

A. Let me say that I have the highest regards for Moshe Dayan, both personally and professionally. He is a man of great ability and of imagination. He is a patriot and defends the position of his nation with great skill. I personally will miss him because he has been a very constructive force in the negotiations which led to the Camp David accords and to the treaty between Egypt and Israel. He will continue to play a role, however, in the Knesset and that will be to the benefit of everybody. I do not know who will be his successor as Foreign Minister, but I can say that we will all miss him.

Q. Would you say what the State Department or the U.S. policy is regarding the Haitian refugees who have been flooding into southern Florida?

A. I discussed this matter on the plane coming down with Senator Stone, and I will be looking into the matter further. I think that's about all I want to say on it at this point.

Q. Are they now classified as political refugees or economic refugees?

A. I really just want to leave it right where it is for the time being.

Q. The Soviets have Backfire under SALT and our B-52 is becoming obsolescent—in fact, it probably already is. Does that confer a disadvantage upon this country?

A. Let me say first that the B-52, I do not consider and I don't believe the military consider it to be obsolescent. It has many more years of life left. It is a very good, very strong, and very powerful aircraft. It can continue to perform its function with great skill

and efficiency in the years ahead.

Insofar as the Backfire is concerned, the Backfire is a different aircraft. It is not a long-range bomber, designed as such. Its principal mission is that of a theater weapon to be used for what are called peripheral missions on land and also for naval missions. It does have the capability to conduct a one-way flight to certain targets in the United States if it flies at subsonic speeds from the Soviet Union to the United States; but it is not designed nor does it have anywhere near the capabilities that the B-52 does.

Q. How do you feel about civilians touring around the Middle East? How does that affect your foreign policy?

A. The negotiations in the Middle East are going to be conducted obviously between the governments—that's where the real business is going to be done. The fact that certain individuals go to the Middle East and as private citizens have conversations is obviously something they have the right to do, and we will not interfere with it. I don't think it helps in the negotiating process nor do I think that it really harms the negotiating process.

Q. Can the development of European nuclear weapons by NATO countries help offset any possible disadvantage that this country might have under SALT?

A. I think it is necessary to modernize our forces—our nuclear forces in Europe—and that is the reason that we, several months ago, started two studies which have been running in parallels. One is to examine what modernization there should be of our theater nuclear weapons, how many weapons should be developed and deployed as a result of modernization. And, side by side with that, there was started a study which has now been completed of what kinds of arms control initiatives could go parallel with the modernization of the theater nuclear forces. Both of those studies will be put before the meeting of the ministers of NATO in December. It is my best judgment that both the modernization program recommended and the arms control measures which have been developed to be discussed with the Soviet Union will be approved at the December meeting. I think this is a proper, appropriate, and constructive way to deal with the problems both of modernization and ultimately to try and limit the number of weapons on both sides. □

News Conference of October 31

I have a brief statement to make which relates to Kampuchea.

As another step in our continuing effort to deal with the human catastrophe in Kampuchea, I plan to return from Korea in time to attend the November special conference in New York that the Secretary General is calling. At this conference, individual countries will be asked to announce their contribution to the international relief effort. We will reiterate our own commitment of \$30 million for use inside Kampuchea in response to the appeal by UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), another \$30 million under congressional consideration for use in the next phase of the UNICEF-ICRC program, and \$9 million in the Thai border area.

The conference should also focus on practical means for delivering relief supplies to the people soon enough and in sufficient quantities to prevent massive death by both starvation and disease.

The United States supports all means of delivery, by air, sea, and land. Our own information and that of the international agencies and private organizations indicates clearly that only speedy and massive deliveries by all possible routes will provide the relief which is needed.

The international community is ready to respond. The relief supplies and means of delivery are available. Every day of delay will mean more lives lost.

What is needed is for those who control the territory and the population of Kampuchea to put humanitarian concerns ahead of political or military advantage. I can think of no issue now before the world community and before every single nation that can lay a greater claim to our concern and to our action.

Q. In your judgment were many lives lost by the United States preferring, if that is the proper word, to deal through international relief organizations rather than to hammer at Vietnam even despite the lack of relations to try to at least force aid into the areas controlled by the Vietnam-backed people in Phnom Penh?

A. We have been trying to move along both routes. As you know, in the summer of this year we made approaches ourselves and worked with

others in making direct approaches to try and move supplies into Kampuchea. This was done at the same time efforts were being made to try and proceed through the international organizations. So both routes were being tried.

Unfortunately, even though we were trying both routes, it has taken far, far too long to even get the process underway. But it is now underway, and we must now seek to increase the amount of aid that is flowing so that we can take care of the sick and needy people.

Q. Do you see anything in the recently discovered construction in Cuba which would lead the United States to believe that the Soviets now have or are moving toward a base—a military base—in this hemisphere?

And, second, do you see any pattern of Cuban involvement or support in the insurrections most recently in El Salvador and before that in Nicaragua?

A. First, on the question of the construction at Cienfuegos. I believe that is what you are talking about.

As I indicated yesterday to the meeting of the Hispanic leaders when asked about this question, there has been construction going on at Cienfuegos for about 2 years. There have been buildings which have been put up; there has been a pier which has been constructed; and there are some indications that there is now a second pier under construction.

There is no indication that this pier is for anything other than Cuban use. I can't rule out the possibility that when these facilities are completed it might be used for port calls if a Soviet ship should come into the area. But we have nothing now to indicate this is other than for Cuban use.

Q. Do you see any pattern of growing Cuban support or involvement in the various insurrections in Central America?

A. We can't rule out that there may be some Cubans involved in connection with some of the elements which have been involved in the fighting which has been taking place there. The extent of that, however, is not clear at this point, and, therefore, I do not want to speculate on it.

Q. I suppose it follows then that if

you cannot rule out port calls with the Soviet Union in Cuba, as I think you suggested—

A. That is correct.

Q. And if the Cubans may have been involved in Central America, is there any pattern of policy you intend to adopt as a result of this to forestall this kind of activity?

A. As far as port calls are concerned, port calls have never been prohibited under the 1962 agreement or the 1970 extension of the 1962 agreement. As long as they were port calls they have been permitted.

Insofar as the activities in El Salvador are concerned, again, I said the extent of any Cuban involvement there is a matter of not great moment at this point, and we will have to watch and see what happens.

I might indicate that, insofar as El Salvador is concerned, we have been following the situation there with, obviously, great interest. There are a number of steps that have been taken by the new government which we have taken note of and welcome.

The new government is being challenged by the extreme left and by the extreme right, both of which are trying to prevent it from consolidating its position. The violence of the last few days appears to be a deliberate attempt by the groups of the far left to provoke the Salvadorean Government for the purposes of the far left.

Still the United States is encouraged by the directions that the new government has said it intends to take, and we stand ready to assist them.

Q. Some people, including Senator Stone, are inclined to take a more ominous view of the developments at Cienfuegos. You, for example, don't mention the Soviet nuclear submarines in here or the possibility that the construction may be intended for future stationing of such submarines at Cienfuegos.

Are you inclined to take a more benign view of what is happening in Cuba and the Cuban involvement in the rest of Latin America because of your desire to protect the SALT agreement?

A. No. We are following closely what is taking place in Cuba and in the hemisphere, and we are trying to watch it, to monitor it, and to keep everything in its proper proportion.

We will take the necessary actions to carry out the steps which the President indicated in his speech of October 1. We believe those are proper and measured steps and will protect the coun-

tries of the hemisphere from any threat to their security.

Q. Prior to the latest events in South Korea the U.S. Government on several occasions had spoken out in favor of a more open political system in that country. Now the military seems to be running the country, although a civilian is nominally in charge. What is your view on how you would hope South Korea would evolve in the next few months?

A. Let me make, if I might, a general statement about Korea and answer your question at the same time.

As you know, the President has asked me to lead the U.S. delegation to the funeral of President Park which will be held in Seoul on Saturday. We were both saddened and shocked by the news of President Park's death. He was an able leader, a staunch ally of our country, and a key force behind the remarkable economic development which Korea has achieved.

We welcome the preservation of stability in this difficult period and hope that future developments will take place in an orderly manner.

We hope that political growth in the Republic of Korea will be commensurate with economic and with social progress.

And, as you know, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea through our statement which was issued earlier this week and through appropriate military steps. It is important that no actions be taken that might jeopardize the stability and the security in the area.

Q. Another question about Cienfuegos, please. If what is being constructed there turns out to be a Soviet conventional warfare base, would that be a violation of the 1962 agreement and its 1970 extension?

A. As I said before, we have no indication that that is the case. That is a speculative assumption at this point. The President has made a statement with respect to Soviet bases in Cuba to Senator Stone, with which you are all familiar.

Q. I understand that there is a dispute in the intelligence community over the existence of something called a cleristery building at Cienfuegos; that there are some people who believe that it is a signature building that is seen around the world where Soviet nuclear submarines are serviced. Do you have any information about that?

A. It is also used for other purposes around the world, including the storage

of surface vessels, patrol boats, and the like. And there are no indications at this point from the intelligence which we have of any storage sites for any nuclear materials.

Q. Have you asked the Soviet Union for any clarification on what is involved in this construction or what purpose they intend to use it for?

A. We have not at this time because there is no indication at this point that this is for Soviet use.

Q. With regard to Morocco, does King Hassan agree in principle to direct negotiations with the Polisario Front? And does he also agree that there might be a territorial compromise on Sahara?

A. I don't want to go into the details of the discussions which have been held between Mr. Christopher [Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher] and the King. I would merely like to state that they had a discussion during which they discussed the needs of Morocco in the military field in order to have the necessary weapons to defend its territorial integrity.

As you know, we have reviewed earlier this year with the Congress the question of the delivery of arms to Morocco. Since that review was made, and we sought the Congress' view on that, there have been further attacks on Morocco—not only on the western Sahara but in Morocco as well. We concluded that it is necessary to give more weapons to the Moroccans in order to give them the necessary strength to defend their own country and to put them in a position where they can negotiate a solution to the problem of the western Sahara.

I think that it is clear that none of us believe that there is a military solution to this problem. But clearly Morocco must have the weapons which it needs to defend itself.

Q. Do you agree with the intelligence report that says that the King may not survive—

A. I am not going to comment on any intelligence reports.

Q. North Korea recently invited a number of U.S. Congressmen to visit their country. Do you think this is some kind of reflection of a relaxation of North Korea's policy toward the United States and on the three-way talks? Will the three-way talks be affected by the assassination of President Park?

A. In answer to your first question, I do not know what motivated the invitation which was extended to a number

of Congressmen by North Korea. I do not know either whether any of them will accept that invitation. That is a decision that each one of them will have to make for themselves.

Insofar as the effect the death of President Park has made, I do not think that that will have a major impact upon the proposal for three-way talks that was made. As I have indicated previously, I do not take the initial rejection as a flat turndown that cannot be changed. I think that the door still remains open on that, and I hope that will be seized at some time.

Q. In a television appearance not long after President Carter's speech on the situation of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, you held out the possibility that over time there might be some change in the nature of that brigade. Have you detected anything now in the month or so since then?

A. I do not want to get into intelligence matters in an open session like this. Let me say that, as all of you know, we are following the situation which is taking place there on the ground by intensified intelligence collection. We are examining on a very frequent basis what is taking place. Some of the factors are different than they were before, and that is all I want to say.

Q. I wonder if I could ask you a general question about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Today, again there is another one of these periodic stories about severe differences within the Administration at the highest level. If that is, in fact, true, how does it affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy? If it is not true, to what do you attribute this continuing spate of stories?

A. This is another one of a continuing spate of stories that have been going on since the very early days that all of us came to Washington in this Administration. I have seen these kinds of stories in previous Administrations and I think, as I indicated to you earlier, I guess that this comes with working in Washington and particularly in having the kind of job that I do as Secretary of State.

I would like to comment, however, on the general thrust of the story. I am not going to comment on the details of the story because I just think it is fruitless to comment on this continuing spate of stories which try to draw, I think, exaggerated pictures of differences between various elements of the government in the decisionmaking process.

I do want to say that we have been

concerned about the activities of the Cubans and the Soviets in various parts of the world. We have conveyed our concerns to other countries and have kept them up to date on our thinking, our views, and our information with respect to these issues. And I have sent out the necessary messages to convey these facts to other governments at my instruction. So I think that, hopefully, will put to rest some of these stories.

Q. What role, if any, did the United States play in Canada's decision to keep its Embassy in Tel Aviv? And, secondly, would the United States now like to see a new, perhaps more moderate, government come to power in Israel? Do you think a change in governments would hurt the peace negotiations?

A. On the first question, we played no role whatsoever in the decision which was taken by Canada. That decision was taken by the Canadian Government itself, as one would expect it to be.

Secondly, as to your second question, that would involve me in the internal politics of another country and, as you know, I never comment on that kind of a question.

Q. Now that there is a political campaign underway and now that we have a new candidacy in effect by Senator Kennedy, are you finding that in the prosecution of your responsibility of running foreign affairs, other countries are not as eager to do business—that they are in a waiting period now and waiting for the outcome of an election?

A. Quite honestly, I have not found that. I have found that on the key issues with which we are dealing, there is no hesitancy on the part of any of our partners and colleagues or others who sit across the table from us in negotiations to try and drag their feet in these negotiations. They are all moving forward, insofar as I am concerned and in my dealings with them, at a normal and satisfactory pace.

Take, for example, the discussions which we have been having with respect to the modernization of theater nuclear forces and the companion work that has been done in the arms control field which will go as a pair of reports to the NATO ministerial meeting in December. Both of those have been proceeding, I think, at a very good pace. We made very good progress. We are nearing the completion of those studies, and they will go to the ministerial meeting well staffed, completed, and in advance of the deadline we set.

Q. To go back to Kampuchea, you said that only speedy and massive deliveries can save lives there.

A. Yes.

Q. I'd like to ask, one, why do you think that the conference can produce the results that have not been produced so far? I mean, why would the Vietnamese accede to a request now at the conference when they have turned everything down so far? And, two, have you urged the Russians to put pressure on the Vietnamese to change their policy?

A. I believe that this is such a matter of overriding international importance that it is the proper subject for a conference to be held at the United Nations with all the focus of public opinion, world opinion, directed at such a meeting.

I think it will serve two purposes. It will serve the purpose of helping to get the necessary funding to proceed with the programs which are underway and which must be expanded. And secondly, I hope it will have the purpose of focusing public opinion in such a way that this may have a positive effect upon those in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and in the Pol Pot area of Kampuchea to work in a more responsive way so that we can get the food in.

I think, as you know, in order to feed the people it is going to take somewhere between 26,000 tons and 30,000 tons a month in order to meet the needs of the people. Right now, all that we can get in with the facilities that we have available to us in about 15,000 to 16,000, so we're falling at least half-way short, and that means that thousands and thousands will die unless this is overcome. I hope, as I say, that by the further focusing of public opinion on this, this may have a positive effect.

Now, on your second question, have we discussed this with the Soviet Union? Yes, we have discussed it with the Soviet Union as well as with the Vietnamese, the Chinese, and many, many others.

Q. Last weekend, Under Secretary of the Treasury Tony Solomon unleashed a very vicious attack against our European allies, in particular for their increased collaboration with OPEC, [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and implicitly for their continuing moves toward the remonetization of gold. This Administration has previously attempted to blame OPEC for our economic problems. Do Solomon's statements indicate that there is now a change in U.S. policy and we will

try to blame Europe with obvious foreign policy implications?

If not, then, will Mr. Solomon be reprimanded for his statements or perhaps treated as General Singlaub was under similar circumstances? And if, in fact, he was speaking for Administration policy, then why shouldn't other nations consider Paul Volker's recent credit constrictions and interest rate hikes as hostile actions against their economies?

A. Let me try and focus on what I think is the key question. Insofar as the oil problem is concerned, there are two aspects to the oil problem: one is controlling the consumption of oil and reducing the demand for it. Steps are being taken by this country and by many other countries to reduce the oil which is being consumed and, indeed, which is being imported into those countries. This must be pursued, and it must be made more effective and increased as we move forward during the months ahead.

Secondly, however, is the responsibility on the producers' side. On the producers' side, they in like measure have a responsibility to keep the price of oil within such bounds as not to wreck the international economy with damage to the world economy and particular hardship to those in the developing world, as well as the adverse effect it will have on those of us who are better able to take care of it—those of us in the industrialized world. So they have an obligation as well as the rest of us who are the consuming countries, and I think that is one of the things Mr. Solomon was talking about.

Q. To clarify an answer to an earlier question, you said discussions were going well in NATO, as I recall, toward the winter meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. It now seems at least possible that the Senate will not have acted on the SALT treaty by the time of that meeting. What would be the consequences for the whole theater nuclear forces discussion if that should be the case?

A. It is important that affirmative action be taken on SALT ratification in order to bring about a positive result in the theater nuclear forces discussions. Tough political decisions are going to have to be made by the countries of NATO in making that decision; and from a political standpoint, the task of making those tough decisions will be greatly eased and enhanced if there has been positive action taken on the SALT ratification.

As to the exact timing on SALT ratification, this remains subject to the scheduling of the Senate in setting up its own calendar, and I don't want to make any predictions at this point exactly what that calendar is going to be.

Q. The Middle East autonomy talks have proceeded at a pace that has produced a sense of frustration not only to Mr. Dayan, but also to Ambassador Strauss. I just wonder at this stage whether you are still as committed as you were at the start of the Camp David summit to proceeding along with this scenario as was outlined or whether you are now tempted to explore some of the alternatives that have been proposed by King Hussein and others?

A. I am still deeply committed, as is our government, to continuing with the talks on the West Bank and Gaza, sometimes called the "autonomy talks." I think it is of extreme importance that we continue to pursue those talks and to pursue them to a successful conclusion. They have been moving slowly, as Bob Strauss has said. There was, however, some progress made at the talks recently held in London attended by Ambassador Strauss, Minister Burg, and Prime Minister Khalil. I might just say a word or two about what those two areas of progress were, because I think they are worth noting. They are modest steps, but I think they are important steps.

One of the key issues that has been before the negotiators since the beginning of the autonomy talks on the question of modalities has been: Who will conduct the elections? Will they be conducted by the military government of Israel or will they be conducted by civilians? To what extent will outside observers from outside the countries involved be a factor?

It was agreed at the London talks that the elections will be conducted by civilians—civilians from both Israel and from the West Bank and Gaza. It was further agreed that there would be invited expert observers from outside, plus, of course, the international media, to come in and have full and free access to observe the conducting of the elections. I think this is an important step and clears away one of the major obstacles that remained in the modalities area.

The second point related to the very, very tough question of how you deal with the issue of the powers and responsibilities. The issue which had been hanging the parties up, up to this point, had been whether or not you had to make a decision in principle now

that all of the powers and responsibilities had to go or would not go to the self-governing authority—this had prevented an examination of the individual powers and responsibilities.

It was decided at London that that would now be put aside, that they would now address themselves in the working group to going point by point through each one of the powers and responsibilities that is currently exercised by the military government or the civil administration which works with it. This will now, then, permit the parties to examine, on a continuing basis, each one of these separate powers and responsibilities to decide whether or not they can reach agreement that this one, yes, there is no question—it is accepted—so that you will then build up a body on which there is agreement and isolate the remaining issues on which there is not agreement. This is, I think, a very helpful, although modest, step to move toward the resolution of that problem.

Q. Getting back to Korea. In answer to an earlier question, you expressed the hope for political growth commensurate with economic growth and also for stability in the country. One of the questions facing them is what is going to be the method of selecting or endorsing a new national leader? There have been suggestions, at least by inference, that the United States goes along with a constitutional process. Do you intend, or does the United States have any views on the question of whether the Yushin Constitution there, which was imposed by President Park, should be followed or whether some other method should be followed to select a new national leader?

A. This is an important issue. It is an issue which is being discussed among the Koreans at this point. It is an issue on which perhaps they will wish to consult with us, and we will certainly not be hesitant to express our views when asked on that issue. I do not at this point, however, want to comment any further on it.

Q. Do you have any views now or are you going to—

A. I would just like to leave it where it is right now.

Q. In your answer on the presence of the Soviet troops in Cuba you said that there have been some factors that have changed. Now, is this a significant development? In other words, are you still stating, as was stated a month or two months ago, that there is a Soviet combat brigade

in Cuba? Or is there now some question about the status of this group?

A. I do not want to go into intelligence matters in this press conference. I want to leave it exactly where I left it before.

Q. Can you go to this extent: Is it a pleasant or an unpleasant development from the U.S. viewpoint? There could be a change for the worse, of course.

A. It is not unpleasant.

Q. Is it true that the U.S. Government is favoring the selection of the Park successor through the so-called National Council for the Reunification, which is a totalitarian political structure, an organ of the totalitarian constitution and structure?

A. Again, this is an internal matter for the Government of Korea and the Korean people to decide, and it is something that I don't think is helpful for me to discuss in open session.

In answer to an earlier question, I don't want you to leap to any optimistic conclusions as the result of the answer that I gave you to your question. I just say the factors have changed and that it is not unpleasant. □

Press release 286.

AFRICA: Communism in Africa

by David D. Newsom

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 18, 1979. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.¹

When we speak of communism in Africa, we are speaking almost exclusively of the role of the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries under Soviet domination, Cuba, and, to a much lesser extent, China.

A few African governments—Mozambique, Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia—describe their policies or ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist or scientific Socialist, but their policies are mixed and do not follow any rigid Soviet model. Even in Ethiopia, there is evidence of a resistance on the part of the leadership to the total adoption of the Marxist-Leninist pattern of internal policies and organization.

I do not wish to enter into the argument over whether the military and civilian personnel from the Communist states are in Africa according to a long-term design or simply through exploiting opportunities. It makes relatively little difference whether they created the opportunities or took advantage of them. The fact is that such personnel are in Africa, and they are there in relatively large numbers. Whatever the origin of their presence, that presence represents a threat to our interests and, in our view, to the long-term interests of the African states as well.

We believe these interests are affected particularly by the presence of substantial organized military forces, particularly from Cuba, and by the extensive flow of weaponry from Communist countries to Africa.

In both global and African terms, the highest priority must be given to a peaceful resolution of the tragic and complicated problems of southern Africa. The Communist states have not lent support to fair and peaceful solutions. They have advocated military options rather than urging all parties to pay the political price of peaceful settlements.

At a time when the African countries continue to struggle under the burden of enormous economic problems, the Communist presence and the military hardware represent an economic and

financial burden that diverts resources from constructive development.

The obligations incurred for the Communist nations' support can and do include facilities and rights to the naval forces of the Soviet Union—a clear and unwarranted extension of global competition to Africa.

While even those African states which have a substantial Communist military presence have sought to maintain their essential independence, we cannot discount the effect of the financial and political debts they must repay to the Communist world for this political and military support on their long-term outlook and international orientation.

It is well to keep in mind, as we consider how to meet this problem, that the Communist countries claim that:

- Their personnel are there at the invitation of recognized sovereign African states;
- They are there in support of liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU); and
- They are there to protect weaker black African states from the military power of South Africa or from outside aggression.

Neither the states directly involved nor the OAU challenge these assumptions—just as the OAU has never challenged the right of African states to call on the help of other non-African states to meet problems of defense or internal security and development.

To say that there has been no formal challenge, however, does not mean that African states, including some of those in which Communist bloc military personnel are present, are reconciled to these situations or wish to see them prolonged. African states have long made it clear that, while they recognize the right of governments to call on outside help, they would much prefer that African problems be resolved without outside intervention. The heritage of the colonial period has left a strong distaste for the influence and presence of non-African powers, whether Communist or non-Communist.

Whatever may be their private views, African states—including the more conservative ones—have publicly resisted actions and policies which appear to make African conflicts part of the larger East-West confrontation.

Most have preferred that the Western response to the presence of Communist personnel in Africa be through approaching the African problems which provided the original rationale rather than through global strategic moves.

Let me now turn to discuss where the Communist personnel and assistance are found in Africa, where their influence has been reduced, and, finally, to the policies of the United States with respect to this presence.

Countries Given Communist Assistance

It is my understanding that the focus of the committee's attention is on sub-Saharan Africa. I will, therefore, concentrate on that area. I would note that there are Soviet and other Eastern European and possibly Cuban military technicians in Algeria and Libya, but there are no organized Communist troop units in this portion of Africa. There is some Communist equipment provided by Algeria and possibly Libya to the Polisario in the Sahara.

Communist military personnel numbered in 1978, by our best estimate, approximately 41,000 in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these, an estimated 3,800 were from Eastern Europe, probably about half Soviets and the bulk of the remainder from East Germany. The largest concentrations were in Angola and Ethiopia, and the major groups were Cubans who numbered approximately 37,000, including 19,000 in Angola and 16,500 in Ethiopia.

The next largest concentration, after these two countries, was in Mozambique, where there were an estimated 1,130 personnel from all Communist countries. Other countries where there were Communist military personnel included Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Some of the Soviet, East German, and Cuban personnel in Zambia are assigned to help the Zimbabwe African People's Union, Joshua Nkomo's Rhodesian liberation movement.

While there has been some reduction in personnel in Equatorial Guinea and Guinea since these estimates, and probably some reduction in Cuban forces in Ethiopia, we believe that the overall total on the continent is substantially the same now.

Communist country technical experts in Africa in 1978 were estimated at 37,000, of whom about 7,500 were Soviets or East Germans. Approximately 18,000 were Cubans and 11,000, Chinese. They were present in at least 23 countries; the largest concentration was in Angola where about 10,000 were present, mostly Cubans.

The same countries which had concentrations of military personnel also had civilian technicians. The only other important concentration of Soviet civilian technicians is in Nigeria where there are about 1,600. The largest concentrations of Chinese technicians are in Somalia and Zambia—3,000 in the former; 5,000 in the latter.

It will be noted that, with the exception of Ethiopia, the largest concentration of Communist military personnel is in those former Portuguese territories where the successful liberation movements received strong preindependence Soviet support. With the departure of the Portuguese, these leaders, particularly in Angola, turned to the Soviets and their Cuban and East German allies for the military help required to secure power and for the civilian help required to replace the Portuguese.

In Ethiopia, a leftist revolution turned to the Soviets and the Cubans for military and civilian help, emphasizing to Africa and to the world, as a rationale for their intervention, the threat posed by the Somali military activities in the Ogaden region.

As I have noted, the bulk of the manpower has been supplied by Cuba. The Soviet Union has supplied the equipment and, undoubtedly, much of the financing. The East Germans supplement these contributions with technical skills and sophisticated equipment.

The Communist Approach

Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa are harmonious, but not necessarily synonymous. Cuba sent technicians to Africa before the more dramatic cooperation with the Soviets which we have witnessed in the last few years. Castro, emphasizing the African element in the Cuban population, sees a special mission for Cuba in that continent.

Soviet motivations are probably a mixture of geopolitical, strategic, and ideological. The Soviet approach continues to be one of seizing opportunities as they arise and of relying heavily on military rather than economic assistance to gain their objectives.

East Germany is a relative newcomer to the African scene. Until 1973 its actions in Africa were predominantly aimed at gaining international legitimacy and diplomatic recognition. Once this was achieved, its African priorities became more focused on supporting Soviet aims, spreading of Marxist-Leninist ideology, securing markets and long-term supplies of materials, and competing against the Federal Republic.

The Soviets probably attach the greatest importance to their help to Ethiopia. They continue to supply arms, training, construction services, and advice to the Ethiopian forces. Cuban combat forces continue to help protect Ethiopian frontiers in the Ogaden and probably provide some logistical and other support for the Ethiopian campaigns in Eritrea.

Despite the close ties, there are undoubtedly problems in the Moscow-Addis Ababa relationship. The Ethiopian inability to win a military success this past summer in their campaign against the Eritreans, despite massive Soviet support, was a disappointment to both and did nothing to promote mutual confidence in either's ability to achieve a military solution. Soviet economic assistance to the Mengistu regime has been relatively modest. Ethiopian failure to move quickly in the formation of a civilian Marxist party to replace the military regime must give pause to the more dogmatic Marxist-Leninists who support the Ethiopian revolution.

In Angola, the Soviets and Cubans continue to provide support for combat operations against the rival liberation movement of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. The East Germans also provide advisers, though they have vehemently denied reports that they have provided troops as well.

So, too, do Soviet and Cuban personnel provide significant support to the Mozambican military. So far these have been advisers rather than combatants.

In the Rhodesian conflict, the Soviets,

along with the East Germans, continue to provide military assistance almost exclusively to ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union] rather than the patriotic front as a whole. The Cubans, on the other hand, along with the Ethiopians, are providing training to both ZAPU and ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union].

Through their activities in Africa, the Soviets have had fairly regular naval access to repair facilities in Ethiopia and Angola. Soviet ships also call in Mozambique and a small West African patrol "shows the flag" using ports such as Conakry and Cotonou, as well as Luanda. A number of other countries have resisted Soviet attempts for naval access.

Reduction of Soviet Influence

The publicity afforded Soviet activities in Africa and the fact that Moscow is the dominant foreign influence in a few areas, like Ethiopia, gives the impression that Soviet policy in Africa is an across-the-board success. Such is not the case.

The Soviet's position over the years has been reduced in places like Ghana, Guinea, the Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. And even some of the states where the Soviets retain considerable influence have indicated a desire to strengthen ties with the West.

Recently we have seen the ouster of two more Soviet clients—Idi Amin in Uganda and Macias in Equatorial Guinea. Both of those regimes, well recognized as two of the grossest violators of human rights, received con-

COMMUNIST MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1978¹

Country	TOTAL	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ²			Cuba ³	China
Angola	20,300	1,300			19,000	—
Equatorial Guinea	290	40			150	100
Ethiopia	17,900	1,400			16,500	—
Guinea	330	100			200	30
Guinea-Bissau	205	65			140	—
Mali	195	180			—	15
Mozambique	1,130	230			800	100
Other	1,330	500			485	345
TOTAL	41,680	3,815			37,275	590

¹ Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.

² Mainly Soviets. Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.

³ Includes troops.

Conversely, continued turmoil, conflict, and a report to arms provide opportunities for Communist exploitation. This Administration has, therefore, placed a high priority on the search for peaceful conflict resolution in Africa, and we shall continue to do so.

Third, we shall continue to consider security requests from African nations with legitimate defense needs. While recognizing that we cannot and should not downplay African security concerns, any increase in our military assistance will be prudent. We have not attempted to compete with Communist nations in an indiscriminate arms race in Africa, for to do so would have been contrary to our own arms control restraints and counterproductive with respect to our other policy objectives.

Fourth, in Africa as elsewhere, this Administration has sought to foster respect for individual human rights. We have pursued this objective both because it is inherently right to do so and because we believe it to be a vital component in the peaceful development of the continent.

Fifth, we believe a continued respect for African nationalism to be a positive force in Africa's political, social, economic, and cultural development and in sustaining the ability of African nations to retain and strengthen their independence from outside powers.

Our reaction to the Communist presence, therefore, has been a part of a broader African policy designed to support:

- The resolution of those African problems which threaten the peace and provide the opportunities for Communist exploitation;
- The constructive participation of African nations in international fora; and
- The peaceful economic development of these nations.

To this end we have sought to maintain a dialogue even with those countries where there is a substantial Communist presence. In most instances, this is reciprocated by the African nations. Angola, for example, has cooperated closely with the U.N. plans for settlement in Namibia, as Mozambique has cooperated with us in the search for peace in Rhodesia.

In this dialogue, it is clear that we will take no steps which would suggest an endorsement or acceptance of their willingness to accept and maintain Communist troop presences in their territories. In such cases as Ethiopia, too, our dialogue is necessarily restricted by their failure to take actions required by our legislation.

The Soviet Union is not well equipped to contribute importantly to economic development, the fundamental long-term goal of Africa. The Soviets do not provide a market for most African goods; they are not part

ARMS CONTROL: *Senate Report on Salt II Verification*

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCT. 5, 1979¹

The principal findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence speak for themselves. They confirm that the SALT II treaty can be monitored to a degree that justifies the Administration's conclusion that the treaty is adequately verifiable.

The committee expressly finds that the SALT II treaty enhances the ability of the United States to monitor those components of Soviet strategic weapons forces which are subject to the limitations of the treaty. Additionally, the committee has found that in the absence of the SALT II treaty, the Soviets would be free to take more sweeping concealment and deception meas-

ures which could make monitoring of Soviet strategic forces even more difficult.

Thus, we believe the Senate can proceed to vote on the SALT II treaty with the full confidence that the issue of verification has been satisfactorily resolved.

We welcome this intelligence committee report and look forward to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of Chairman Bayh and Senator Goldwater next week. In addition, the President intends to meet personally with both Senators Bayh and Goldwater to discuss the report in more detail. □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 8, 1979

of the world economic system, not members of the IMF [International Monetary Fund]; they have no multilateral companies to spread technology; their ruble is not convertible. We prefer not to compete in the field of arms deliveries, where the Soviets are efficient and without scruples. While we provide military equipment within limits, we prefer to compete where we have comparative advantage—in the support for economic and social development.

This approach, I might add, depends heavily upon the willingness of Congress to provide adequate foreign aid resources.

The states of sub-Saharan Africa still look to us as the primary peacemaker. They still find in us ideals they would like to apply to their societies. They still find in the Western nations their best hope in their quest for development. The West remains their main trading partners.

Our African policy is on a firm footing which in the long run will serve both our own interests and those of Africa. Rather than contributing to conflict, we are attempting to foster peaceful solutions. Rather than treating the symptoms of unrest and turmoil, we are attempting to deal with the root causes. We reply on our trade, aid, and economic ties and on an open dialogue based on mutual respect. Our assistance is designed to meet the pressing needs of economic development and to

help countries meet their legitimate self-defense needs.

On balance, I believe that these policies have resulted in our being in a stronger position vis-a-vis the African Continent than the Soviets and other Communist states have achieved with their MiG's and Kalashnikov-bearing troops. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

EAST ASIA:

U.S.-China Trade Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, OCT. 23, 1979¹

In accordance with section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974, I am transmitting a copy of a proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the People's Republic of China. I also enclose the text of the Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, which was signed on July 7, 1979, and which is included as an annex to the proclamation.

The Agreement on Trade Relations will provide a nondiscriminatory framework for our bilateral trade relations, and thus strengthen both economic and political relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Conclusion of this agreement is the most important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries from this relationship. It will also give further impetus to the progress we have made in our overall relationship since normalization of our diplomatic relations earlier this year.

I believe that the Agreement on Trade Relations is consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Trade Act of 1974. It provides for mutual extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, while seeking to ensure overall reciprocity of economic benefits. It includes safeguard arrangements to ensure that our trade with the People's Republic of China will grow without injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for American workers.

The Agreement also confirms for American businessmen certain basic rights and facilities in establishing operations and conducting business in the P.R.C. Other provisions include those dealing with settlement of commercial disputes; financial transactions; government commercial offices; and protection for industrial property rights, industrial processes, and copyrights.

I am also enclosing a copy of my report to the Congress pursuant to section 402 (c)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974. I shall issue today an Executive order waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402.²

In the past year and a half, Chinese leaders on several occasions have called for facilitating family reunification and for simplifying the procedure for getting permission to enter or leave China. During this period we have noted a marked relaxation of Chinese emigration procedures. Processing time has been reduced for most cases and numbers of emigrants have jumped dramatically. We have recently had discussions with senior Chinese officials and firmly believe that Chinese statements and the marked increase in emigration reflect a policy of the Government of China favoring freer emigration.

I have reviewed the circumstances of emigration from the People's Republic of China in light of all these factors, and have determined that a waiver of the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 will substantially promote the objectives of that section.

I urge that Congress act as soon as possible to approve the Agreement on Trade Relations.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

PROCLAMATION, OCT. 23, 1979³

As President of the United States of America, acting through my representatives, I entered into the negotiation of an agreement on trade relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China with representatives of the People's Republic of China;

The negotiations were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978) ("the Act");

An "Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China", in English and Chinese, was signed on July 7, 1979, by representatives of the two Governments, and is annexed to this Proclamation;

The Agreement conforms to the requirements relating to bilateral commercial agreements specified in section 405 (b) of the Act;

Article X of the Agreement provides that it shall come into force on the date on which the Contracting Parties have exchanged notifications that each has completed the legal procedures necessary for this purpose; and

Section 405(c) of the Act provides that a bilateral commercial agreement and a proclamation implementing such agreement shall take effect only if approved by the Congress;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, proclaim as follows:

(1) This Proclamation shall become effective, said Agreement shall enter into force according to its terms, and nondiscriminatory treatment shall be extended to the products of the People's Republic of China in accordance with the terms of the said Agreement, on the date on which the Contracting Parties have exchanged notifications that each has completed the legal procedures necessary for this purpose in accordance with Article X of the said Agreement.

(2) General Headnote 3(e) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States is amended by deleting therefrom "China (any part of which may be under Communist domination or control)" and "Tibet" as of the effective date of this proclamation and a notice thereof shall be

published in the FEDERAL REGISTER promptly thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-third day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fourth.

JIMMY CARTER

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China;

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China;

Desiring to enhance friendship between both peoples;

Wishing to develop further economic and trade relations between both countries on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit as well as nondiscriminatory treatment;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Contracting Parties undertake to adopt all appropriate measures to create the most favorable conditions for strengthening, in all aspects, economic and trade relations between the two countries so as to promote the continuous, long-term development of trade between the two countries.

2. In order to strive for a balance in their economic interests, the Contracting Parties shall make every effort to foster the mutual expansion of their reciprocal trade and to contribute, each by its own means, to attaining the harmonious development of such trade.

3. Commercial transactions will be effected on the basis of contracts between firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the two countries. They will be concluded on the basis of customary international trade practice and commercial considerations such as price, quality, delivery and terms of payment.

ARTICLE II

1. With a view to establishing their trade relations on a nondiscriminatory basis, the Contracting Parties shall accord each other most-favored-nation treatment with respect to products originating in or destined for the other Contracting Party, i.e., any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity they grant to like products originating in or destined for any other country or region, in all matters regarding:

(A) Customs duties and charges of all kinds applied to the import, export, re-export or transit

of products, including the rules, formalities and procedures for collection of such duties and charges;

(B) Rules, formalities and procedures concerning customs clearance, transit, warehousing and transshipment of imported and exported products;

(C) Taxes and other internal charges levied directly or indirectly on imported or exported products or services;

(D) All laws, regulations and requirements affecting all aspects of internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of imported products; and

(E) Administrative formalities for the issuance of import and export licenses.

2. In the event either Contracting Party applies quantitative restrictions to certain products originating in or exported to any third country or region, it shall afford to all like products originating in or exported to the other country treatment which is equitable to that afforded to such third country or region.

3. The Contracting Parties note, and shall take into consideration in the handling of their bilateral trade relations, that, at its current state of economic development, China is a developing country.

4. The principles of Paragraph 1 of this Article will be applied by the Contracting Parties in the same way as they are applied under similar circumstances under any multilateral trade agreement to which either Contracting Party is a party on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

5. The Contracting Parties agree to reciprocate satisfactorily concessions with regard to trade and services, particularly tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, during the term of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of promoting economic and trade relations between their two countries, the Contracting Parties agree to:

(A) Accord firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the other Party treatment no less favorable than is afforded to any third country or region;

(B) Promote visits by personnel, groups and delegations from economic, trade and industrial circles; encourage commercial exchanges and contacts; and support the holding of fairs, exhibitions and technical seminars in each other's country;

(C) Permit and facilitate, subject to their respective laws and regulations and in accordance with physical possibilities, the stationing of representatives, or the establishment of business offices, by firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the other Party in its own territory; and

(D) Subject to their respective laws and regulations and physical possibilities, further support trade promotions and improve all conveniences, facilities and related services for the favorable conduct of business activities by firms, companies and corporations, and trading organiza-

tions of the two countries, including various facilities in respect of office space and residential housing, telecommunications, visa issuance, internal business travel, customs formalities for entry and re-export of personal effects, office articles and commercial samples, and observance of contracts.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Parties affirm that government trade offices contribute importantly to the development of their trade and economic relations. They agree to encourage and support the trade promotion activities of these offices. Each Party undertakes to provide facilities as favorable as possible for the operation of these offices in accordance with their respective physical possibilities.

ARTICLE V

1. Payments for transactions between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China shall either be effected in freely convertible currencies mutually accepted by firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the two countries, or made otherwise in accordance with agreements signed by and between the two parties to the transaction. Neither Contracting Party may impose restrictions on such payments except in time of declared national emergency.

2. The Contracting Parties agree, in accordance with their respective laws, regulations and procedures, to facilitate the availability of official export credits on the most favorable terms appropriate under the circumstances for transactions in support of economic and technological projects and products between firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the two countries. Such credits will be the subject of separate arrangements by the concerned authorities of the two Contracting Parties.

3. Each Contracting Party shall provide, on the basis of most-favored-nation treatment, and subject to its respective laws and regulations, all necessary facilities for financial, currency and banking transactions by nationals, firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the other Contracting Party on terms as favorable as possible. Such facilities shall include all required authorizations for international payments, remittances and transfers, and uniform application of rates of exchange.

4. Each Contracting Party will look with favor towards participation by financial institutions of the other country in appropriate aspects of banking services related to international trade and financial relations. Each Contracting Party will permit those financial institutions of the other country established in its territory to provide such services on a basis no less favorable than that accorded to financial institutions of other countries.

ARTICLE VI

1. Both Contracting Parties in their trade re-

lations recognize the importance of effective protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights.

2. Both Contracting Parties agree that on the basis of reciprocity legal or natural persons of either Party may apply for registration of trademarks and acquire exclusive rights thereto in the territory of the other Party in accordance with its laws and regulations.

3. Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall seek, under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.

4. Both Contracting Parties shall permit and facilitate enforcement of provisions concerning protection of industrial property in contract between firms, companies and corporations and trading organizations of their respective countries, and shall provide means, in accordance with their respective laws, to restrict unfair competition involving unauthorized use of such rights.

5. Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall take appropriate measures, under its laws and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of the other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Contracting Parties shall exchange information on any problems that may arise from their bilateral trade, and shall promptly hold friendly consultations to seek mutually satisfactory solutions to such problems. No action shall be taken by either Contracting Party before such consultations are held.

2. However, if consultations do not result in a mutually satisfactory solution within a reasonable period of time, either Contracting Party may take such measures as it deems appropriate. In an exceptional case where a situation does not admit any delay, either Contracting Party may take preventive or remedial action provisionally, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.

3. When either Contracting Party takes measures under this Article, it shall ensure that the general objectives of this Agreement are not prejudiced.

ARTICLE VIII

1. The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable settlement of any disputes arising from or in relation to contracts between their respective firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations, through friendly consultations, conciliation or other mutually acceptable means.

2. If such disputes cannot be settled promptly by any one of the above-mentioned means, the parties to the dispute may have re-

ECONOMICS: Opportunities and Challenges From the MTN

by Julius L. Katz

Address before the League of Women Voters in Providence, Rhode Island, on October 24, 1979. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

I am very pleased to have been invited as the principal speaker at this public meeting of the League of Women Voters. Last April 5, I had the pleasure of speaking at the National League for Women Voters' conference on international trade in Racine, Wisconsin. At that time, I spoke about the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), which were just nearing their conclusion in Geneva.¹

Shortly after that speech on April 12, the principal negotiators initiated the substantive results of the multilateral trade negotiations. The Administration, working closely with the Congress, then drafted the bill implementing the agreed results of these negotiations. This bill was passed by the House of Representatives by the unprecedented vote of 395-7 and subsequently passed the Senate by a vote of 90-4. On July 26, the President signed the bill into law thus concluding 5 years of difficult trade negotiations. But while this was,

in one sense, an ending, it is also a beginning of a new era of trade relations. Tonight I would like to briefly explore trade in the aftermath of the multilateral trade negotiations, for I believe that it presents the United States with both opportunities and challenges.

The success of this round of the multilateral trade negotiations—known as the Tokyo Round—is of great importance to the world. It is also a great success for the United States, the principal force behind these negotiations. This is especially remarkable when one considers that these negotiations were conducted during a period of worldwide economic recession and economic adjustment to higher energy costs.

Previous rounds of trade negotiations had largely concentrated on reducing tariffs charged on imported goods. And they had been relatively successful, with tariffs generally becoming a less important factor in world trade. However, the decline in protection provided by tariffs brought other means of protection and trade distortion to the fore. These practices, known collectively as nontariff measures, include such things as export subsidies, quotas, customs valuation, and discriminatory government procurement—practices that governments have increasingly used to

support and protect domestic industries from import competition or to increase their shares of world trade.

As a result, the Tokyo Round set out to bring greater discipline over government intervention in trade. Through a series of agreements dealing with these nontariff measures, we have set the stage for a major reform of the world trading system. If we start with the premise that our government is relatively less inclined toward intervention in the economy, then this greater discipline in the world trading system redounds to the benefit of our exports and our economy.

Of course, we did not meet all of our objectives in this negotiation, and since it was a negotiation, we had to offer to achieve. However, to a remarkable degree, our achievements have matched our objectives. What were some of these achievements?

MTN Achievements

Although tariffs are relatively less important as a trade barrier than formerly, tariffs still exist. After the results of the Tokyo Round are completely implemented, the tariffs of the major industrial countries will have been reduced by about one-third, and

course to arbitration for settlement in accordance with provisions specified in their contracts or other agreement to submit to arbitration. Such arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration institution in the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, or a third country. The arbitration rules of procedure of the relevant arbitration institution are applicable, and the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law recommended by the United Nations, or other international arbitration rules, may also be used where acceptable to the parties to the dispute and to the arbitration institution.

3. Each Contracting Party shall seek to ensure that arbitration awards are recognized and enforced by their competent authorities where enforcement is sought, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

ARTICLE IX

The provisions of this Agreement shall not limit the right of either Contracting Party to take any action for the protection of its security interests.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the Contracting Parties have exchanged notifications that each has completed the legal procedures necessary for this purpose, and shall remain in force for three years.

2. This Agreement shall be extended for successive terms of three years if neither Contracting Party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement at least thirty (30) days before the end of a term.

3. If either Contracting Party does not have domestic legal authority to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, either Contracting Party may suspend application of this Agreement, or, with the agreement of the other Contracting Party, any part of this Agreement. In that event, the Parties will seek, to the fullest extent practicable in accordance with domestic law, to minimize unfavorable effects on existing trade relations between the two countries.

4. The Contracting Parties agree to consult at the request of either Contracting Party to review the operation of this Agreement and other

relevant aspects of the relations between the two Parties.

In witness whereof, the authorized representatives of the Contracting Parties have signed this Agreement.

Done at Beijing in two original copies this 7th day of July, 1979, in English and Chinese, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LEONARD WOODCOCK

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

LI XIANG

¹ Text of identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979).

² For texts, see Weekly Compilation of Oct. 29.

³ No. 4697 (text from Weekly Compilation of Oct. 29).

the average tariffs in the United States, the European Economic Community, and Japan will be between 6% and 7%. Included are many reductions that will benefit U.S. manufactures, such as a reduction in tariffs on paper products by the European Economic Community; an elimination of tariffs on aircraft and parts by the Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians; and tariff reductions on electronic products and heavy machinery.

In addition, we have negotiated bilateral tariff arrangements with about 20 developing countries which are important trading partners with the United States.

Of all the nontariff measures codes, the one on **subsidies** perhaps ranks as the most important. No other issue has been more contentious recently in our trading relations, and none so clearly reflects the direct intervention of governments in trade. The agreement we have reached will prohibit the signatories from granting export subsidies on industrial products. If this agreement is breached, countries can take countervailing action. It also provides that where certain domestic subsidies—such as those to assist regional development—have trade effects which cause injury to other nations, their effects can be offset by countervailing action.

The code on **government procurement** will open up an estimated \$25 billion in annual foreign government procurement which was previously closed to international competition. U.S. firms should have a good opportunity to obtain a significant portion of this business.

The **standards** code will assure that product health and safety standards are legitimate and not used as a protective device. It also provides for nondiscriminatory testing of foreign goods in the standard-setting country. In the past, standards and testing procedures have been a problem for U.S. exports in a number of countries; for example, Japan.

The **customs valuation** code sets up a uniform system of valuation of goods for customs' purposes, and this will minimize arbitrary valuation of imports which was often used as a protective device. This should be especially important for U.S. trade with Canada.

In **licensing** the code should minimize the nuisance aspects of licensing requirements which waste time and cost importers money. This is especially important in developing countries.

The **aircraft** agreement will eliminate all duties on civil aircraft and limit the use of noncommercial factors (such

as the promise of landing rights) in the procurement of aircraft. Since the United States is the largest producer and exporter of civil aircraft, this agreement should be especially beneficial.

Of course, as I mentioned earlier, we didn't achieve these successes without cost. The United States, too, will be reducing its tariffs by about one third. But because of extensive consultations with business, labor, and agriculture, we attempted to cut tariffs by the greatest amount on the least sensitive items, while making no cuts—or only small cuts—on items particularly sensitive to imports. In addition, most tariff cuts will be phased in over a period of 8 years, which should allow domestic industry to adjust.

We also have adopted the provisions of the nontariff measure codes. While this will generally mean less change for the United States than other countries, since our system is already relatively more open, changes will be required. Some of our Federal Government procurement practices will be liberalized. For the first time the United States will have an injury test applicable to countervailing actions against foreign subsidy practices. We had been the sole major industrial country without such a test. Thus, before a countermeasure can be taken against a foreign subsidy, injury to a U.S. industry will have to be demonstrated.

Benefits to Rhode Island

It would be appropriate at this point to indicate some of the benefits we anticipate from the MTN for the State of Rhode Island.

Rhode Island exported \$268 million of manufactures in 1976, a 151% increase over the 1972 level and nearly four times the increase in production. About 5,800 jobs depended directly on exports of manufactured goods, and an additional 5,500 jobs depended on supplying goods and materials in support of exports. In all, one of every ten manufacturing jobs in the State depended on exports.

Rhode Island's principal export industry, and a major employer, is the jewelry industry. Tariffs will be reduced substantially in the major export markets for these goods: 42% in the European Economic Community, 48% in Japan, and 46% in Canada. In addition, the standards and licensing codes should benefit jewelry exporters.

Another important exporter is the metalmaking machinery industry. While tariff cuts of 33% have been made by the European Economic Community and Japan, the most im-

portant achievement is with the Canadians. Canada has agreed to liberalize its "made-in Canada" program which permits it to vary the duty applied to imports, depending on whether a particular machine is made in Canada. This should substantially reduce duties paid in Canada by U.S. machinery exporters.

The textile and apparel industry is also an important industry in Rhode Island. The Administration recognized the importance and import sensitivity of this industry, and thus U.S. tariff cuts in this area were small and carefully chosen so as not to have an adverse impact on the industry. We were also able to obtain some cuts from our trading partners in this sector. For example, the European Economic Community reduced tariffs 28% on U.S. weaving mill products of man-made fiber, and Japan reduced tariffs 17% on yarn and thread mill products.

Challenges from MTN

I believe that it is obvious from this brief summary that the new MTN agreements provide many opportunities for increased U.S. exports. But these agreements also present us with challenges.

The first challenge is perhaps the most obvious one. These opportunities are just that—opportunities. In order for these opportunities to be translated into benefits, American business and labor must seek to take advantage of them. This means going aggressively after export markets, particularly in areas where barriers have been reduced. U.S. industry can no longer be content with our huge domestic market. There is a much larger foreign market where U.S. products can be sold—indeed, must be sold—especially in the difficult economic situation that we find ourselves in today. Exports mean sales, profits, and jobs. But it requires effort to obtain these benefits. Without it, the opportunities provided by the MTN will be lost.

A second, related challenge is that American business and labor must improve their competitiveness. The MTN agreements underline the commitment of the United States and the world's other major trading nations to liberalized trade. U.S. business should not have to depend on the government to protect it from fair foreign competition. The United States can compete effectively both with imports in the U.S. market and with domestic production overseas. But U.S. business must increase its efficiency and modernize its equipment if necessary. And U.S. labor must improve its productiv-

ity. Otherwise, we will not be able to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the MTN.

A third challenge is the future of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization has not been completed with this round of the MTN. Trade restrictions—including some prohibitively high tariffs—still remain, and governments will undoubtedly develop new ones.

In addition, we must continue to attempt to bring the developing countries, which are playing an increasingly important role in international trade, more fully into the world trading system. And we must recognize that our economy is changing, and that certain goods can be produced more efficiently and cheaply in the developing countries than in Providence, Rhode Island. In my opinion, future liberalization will require the United States and other industrial countries to recognize this fact: to recognize that they can not continually protect weak industries from competition; to recognize that high tariffs and inefficient industries only result in higher costs to their economy and consumers; to recognize the necessity of economic adjustment. These will be the tough trade decisions of the future.

The fourth challenge is perhaps the most serious. As I mentioned earlier, these trade agreements represent the beginning of a new era of international trade relations. Codes of conduct have been established affecting a wide range of government actions. These codes and the rules in them are intended to lead to freer and fairer trade. I believe that this will be the case. But unless we are careful, protectionist forces will be able to pervert these codes and rules to increase the protection for domestic industry. This could lead the world into a downward spiral of retaliation and protection with catastrophic implications for the world economy and international security.

How is this possible? On the international side, the agreed codes are a series of negotiated understandings. There were very difficult issues involved in these negotiations, and it is likely that there will be differences of interpretation. And, of course, the codes are only as good as the signatory countries make them. They cannot be enforced by force—only by the good faith of the signatories.

In order for the codes to be successful, the first year or two—and the first cases brought under the codes—will be crucial. All countries must show restraint and not bring frivolous, weak cases under the codes. Countries must also show restraint domestically, and not get so committed to a case that they are unable to back off if the interna-

tional decision goes against them. The danger is that weak, frivolous cases will result in signatories not taking the provisions of a code seriously, eventually lessening the value of the code—even for more serious cases. And there is a danger that a country may become so committed to a weak case that it may be tempted to disregard an adverse finding under the code's procedures and take retaliatory action. Not only would this make a mockery of the code itself, but it could also lead to counterretaliation and increased protectionism worldwide.

Danger of Increased Protectionism

The danger that the MTN agreements could lead to increased protectionism is even more serious on the domestic side. As I mentioned, the implementing legislation passed both houses of Congress by landslide margins. Primarily, this was a result of hard work and skillful presentation on the part of the Administration, especially by the President's Special Trade Representative, Bob Strauss. There was very close consultation with the Congress and the private sector throughout the negotiations, and we brought home a good agreement, a real success for the Administration.

However, trade bills—no matter what the quality—have traditionally never had an easy time on the Hill. One congressional observer stated after the House passed the bill with 395 votes in favor that he didn't think you could even get 395 votes in the House for a Mother's Day resolution. So there must be further reason for this large vote—beyond the fact that it was a good package and that Congress had been consulted throughout the process. In fact, I believe there is an additional reason.

The bill implementing the MTN results is, in many ways, all things to all people. Those who favor freer trade supported the bill because it implemented the results of the MTN—thus reducing barriers to trade and limiting trade distorting practices. Protectionists see the implementing legislation as a way to restrict imports by bringing cases against foreign producers either under the provisions of the codes or under Section 301 of U.S. law as an unfair trade practice. The fact that both the codes and implementing legislation contain—of necessity—ambiguous points enforces such differing perceptions.

A further cause for concern is that the implementing bill is a lawyers' paradise. As a result of the codes, there

is likely to be an increase in the number of cases alleging some violation or unfair trade practice. The implementing legislation sets up quasilegal procedures for most of these complaints, with public hearings, consultations, and final decisions all to be done within definite time limits. This is a tremendous challenge. How the codes and our legislation are used, interpreted, and administered will largely determine whether the MTN lives up to its potential as a trade liberalizing measure and the beginning of a new international trading system, whether trade policy continues more or less as it has in the past or whether it actually leads to more protectionism in the world.

The League of Women Voters has always recognized the benefits that accrue to the country and world as a whole through freer trade. The League has thus long been in the forefront in supporting free trade policies and combating protectionism. However, with the conclusion of the MTN and the large margin by which the MTN package passed the Congress, it is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security. It is easy to think that protectionism has been defeated.

The message I would like to leave with you and others who support the benefits of freer trade is that we should not rest on our laurels. The MTN results can be a great force for liberalized trade. But we must insure the protectionism doesn't increase under the guise of these liberalizing documents. Should this happen, 5 years of important work on the MTN would be lost, and the postwar trend toward increased trade liberalization would be reversed. But even more importantly, the consequences for our economy, which depends increasingly on foreign trade, would be devastating. □

¹For text, see BULLETIN of June 1979, p. 27.

ENERGY: Crude Oil Transportation Arrangements

by Julius L. Katz

Statement before the joint hearings of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, and Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 27, 1979. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.¹

I am pleased to appear before this joint hearing to discuss the status of west to east crude oil transportation arrangements. My prepared statement is brief and focused on the U.S.-Canadian dimension of this important subject, especially the status of inter-governmental consultations.

Since the enactment of Title V of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Federal agencies under Interior Department leadership have been actively engaged in a comprehensive evaluation of the various transportation proposals designed to deliver crude oil to Northern Tier and inland U.S. markets. The recommendations that result from this evaluation will be transmitted to the President next month. Throughout this period, in keeping with Section 510 of the act, the Departments of State, Interior, and Energy have also consulted closely with the Government of Canada.

As you know three of the four proposals submitted under Title V would involve construction of facilities to transport Alaskan and other crude oils across Canadian lands (and waters, in the case of Kitimat) for delivery in the United States.

The fourth applicant, Northern Tier, has proposed to construct and operate a crude oil transportation system entirely within the continental United States; consequently, apart from environmental concerns shared by both countries, which will be addressed in the permit process, the effect on our bilateral relations of this proposal is negligible for no Canadian approvals would be required.

U.S.-Canadian Consultations

Consultations with Canadian authorities concerning the timing and characteristics of the Title V decision process have taken place on several occasions during 1979. In January repre-

sentatives of the Departments of State, Interior, and Energy met with Canadian officials in Ottawa to outline the U.S. timetable for evaluating the Title V proposals and for submitting recommendations to the President.

The proposed transportation systems were discussed again in March at the first meeting of the U.S.-Canadian Consultative Group on Energy. This mechanism was established earlier this year by the two governments to oversee the management of bilateral energy activities. Oil transportation systems were also discussed at a more recent meeting of the consultative group which I chaired for the U.S. side on September 6 in Ottawa.

During the course of these contacts, we have asked the Canadian Government to provide us with its views and preferences concerning the proposed transportation systems so that they might be taken into account in the recommendations prepared for the President.

In May, the Canadians gave us a preliminary response outlining the review and permitting procedure for any trans-Canadian route option. They informed us that before the Government of Canada could make a final decision on any of the three crude oil transportation proposals to transit Canada, there would have to be an inquiry by the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB). This board controls pipeline construction applications as well as pipeline tariffs. If its findings are positive, the NEB issues a "certificate of necessity and public convenience," indicating that the pipeline is in Canada's national interest.

After a favorable evaluation by the NEB, and approval by the government, permission to begin construction is granted. Formal approvals are not required from provincial governing bodies since all the proposed Canadian routes are interprovincial; consequently, they fall under the jurisdiction of the NEB. Intraprovincial pipelines are controlled by the province in which they are located. In practice, however, provincial bodies are fully consulted prior to the issuance of the approval to begin construction. The provinces, therefore, have an opportunity to make their views known and to influence whether or not a pipeline will be constructed.

In April 1979, the NEB received an

application from the Trans Mountain Oil Pipe Line, Ltd., seeking a certificate on a pipeline from Sumas to Edmonton, Alberta, and an application from Foothills Oil Pipe Line, Ltd. (Northwest Energy), seeking a certificate for construction of a pipeline along the right-of-way of the Alaska highway gas pipeline. An earlier application for project certification had been received from the Kitimat Pipeline, Ltd., but we understand that Canadian authorities have opposed a Kitimat site and that it is no longer an active proposal.

The trans-Canadian applications are now under review by the NEB. The public hearing process is now expected to begin on October 2, followed by an evaluation period and announcement of the NEB's findings. Thus, an NEB decision on certification for any of the proposals is unlikely before sometime in December.

In addition to NEB approval and permitting, environmental impact analyses and approvals may be required from other Canadian Federal agencies such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Department of Environment, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Also a socioeconomic review by the NEB may be required.

Earlier this year we told the Canadians that we would need to have Canada's views and recommendations on the trans-Canada routes by September 28 for inclusion in the recommendation being prepared for the President. We were informed this week by the Canadian Embassy that we can expect to receive by September 28 an indication of their government's preferred route, subject, of course, to normal NEB regulatory review and other approvals as appropriate.

I will certainly insure that this committee is fully informed concerning this important Canadian communication.

I would like to address briefly three additional aspects of this issue—its impact on our bilateral relations with Canada, generally, the environmental question, and our energy relationship with Canada.

As you know the Department has submitted a foreign relations analysis as part of the Interior Department's preparation of recommendations for the President. In brief, we conclude that market assessments of risk and return should decide which proposal offers the most efficient and economic alternative. We indicate that from the standpoint of foreign relations, the President can approach his decision concerning

an oil delivery system on an essentially "neutral" basis as between route options in either country. Should a joint route be chosen, we consider that the mutual assurances contained in the 1977 Transit Pipeline Agreement between Canada and the United States should serve to guarantee U.S. interests.

This treaty applies to any pipeline carrying U.S.-owned oil across Canada (and Canadian oil across the United States). It covers all existing or future pipelines which transit the territory of each nation, and it applies to all forms of hydrocarbons including crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, petrochemical feedstocks, and coal slurries.

The treaty guarantees throughput. It also provides for nondiscriminatory treatment of transit pipelines with regard to taxes, tariffs, or other monetary charges. The jurisdiction of normal regulatory authorities is recognized, but the treaty also requires that all regulatory measures be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. The 35-year term of the treaty also provides equitable sharing of pipeline capacity in the event of emergencies. Both parties are committed to arbitration in the event disputes cannot be resolved by negotiation.

Environmental Considerations

With respect to international environmental considerations, it is our understanding that although the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act does not apply to the trans-Canadian portions of the various route proposals, the Canadian Government's environmental review and assessment procedures will be applied. We expect to consult closely with the appropriate Canadian authorities to insure adequate environmental safeguards are in place whatever route is chosen.

It is worth noting in this respect that the United States and Canada have reached ad referendum agreement to provide for an improved management system in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and parts of Puget Sound. Such a system, once installed, is expected to improve safety and operating conditions for all vessels transiting the area, particularly for the large tankers which would be required for operation of Northern Tier or Trans Mountain proposals.

Energy Relationship With Canada

Finally, I would like to make some brief remarks about the subject of joint energy cooperation with Canada. Energy trade has been and will con-

tinue to be an important element in our economic relations with Canada. Although our net oil imports from Canada are in the process of virtual elimination, oil exchanges with Canada contribute importantly to the supply of certain Northern Tier refineries traditionally dependent on Canadian oil transportation facilities. We import nearly 3 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, or nearly 5% of U.S. consumption, and applications are now pending for an additional billion cubic feet per day. We have an extensive and growing electricity trade with Canada—last year we imported nearly 20 billion kilowatt hours. Canada depends on us for nearly half its thermal coal supplies.

In addition to this substantial energy trade relationship, we are jointly pursuing a variety of important energy cooperation activities with Canada including the Alaskan gas pipeline project and joint research and development on tar sands and heavy oils. These and other activities are being developed and managed through the work of the Energy Consultative Group as well as the broad range of continuing private sector, academic, and government relationships in the energy area. These mutually beneficial cooperative activities will be an important element in the discussions President Carter and Prime Minister Clark will have in Ottawa later this fall. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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EUROPE: An Overview of U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Marshall D. Shulman

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 16, 1979. Ambassador Shulman is Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs.¹

This is my third appearance before your committee to review the current status of key issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.² As in previous years, the relationship centers around the effort to keep in reasonable balance its two essential elements: the competition which flows from the different and sometimes opposing philosophies and foreign policy objectives of the two societies and the necessity of achieving the degree of cooperation required to prevent these differences from leading to a general nuclear war that would end in the destruction of both countries and jeopardize life on the planet.

The contrast between these two elements has, if anything, emerged even more sharply since I last appeared before you in September 1978. On the one hand, we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of a SALT II treaty that provides balance in central strategic systems and begins the process of reducing nuclear weapons systems.

On the other hand, the recognition of mutual interest in bringing the arms race under control has not extended to a broad understanding on ground rules for our continuing political competition, especially in the Third World. At a time of extraordinary turbulence in international politics, the lack of such an understanding makes it particularly difficult to moderate the competitive aspects of the relationship. Moreover, the relationship is marked on both sides by a persistent strong mistrust stemming from the very different political systems of the two countries and reflecting their divergent views about the nature of the individual and the state, as well as their different geographic situations and historical experiences.

Current State of Relations

It is understandable that the signing of the SALT II treaty in Vienna [June 18, 1979] did not evoke the euphoria of the first SALT accords—both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have recognized that detente is not built on SALT alone. While SALT addresses

the priority issue of how best to strengthen our national security in an age of nuclear weapons, it does not and cannot resolve the other political and even military issues which are a source of tension in the relationship.

Perhaps the best way to characterize the present situation is to acknowledge that SALT fixes our attention on the vital issues of war and peace and that it keeps channels open for dealing with the strategic balance. While rejection of SALT could exacerbate tensions, both we and the Soviets have come to recognize that solutions to political conflicts do not flow automatically from agreement on strategic weapons. We still need the determination, the military strength, and the diplomatic skill to deal with the changing international situation and to protect our vital interests and strengthen the international system so that our essential values may survive and flourish.

It is clear that neither we nor the Soviets are satisfied with the current state of our relations. This arises partly from real differences on specific issues but is compounded by mutual suspicions and doubts about the very nature of the other country and its intentions. Before turning to the individual issues that have dominated the relationship in the past year, it might be useful for us to examine some general aspects of this complex and changing relationship.

- There are substantial differences between the Soviet and American views of the desired world order. These views are unlikely to be reconciled in the near future, and we are obliged, therefore, to deal with tangible problems in the real world, with full consciousness of the conflicting purposes which underlie specific problems.

- We should not lose sight of the dynamics of Soviet society, however slow may be the process of change. Internally, the Soviet system has become more complex as it has moved toward a higher level of industrialization. Although it is still characterized by a high degree of centralized concentration of political power and by a formidable political police apparatus, it has, in some respects, modified some of the repressive practices which were widespread a generation ago. Externally, the Soviet Union, while still seeking to increase its political influence and while continuing to increase its military capabilities, is no longer

committed to the inevitability of war, and it has become more deeply involved in international economic and political intercourse with the non-Communist world.

- The closed nature of Soviet society reinforces rather than dispels worst case assumptions abroad about their intentions and capabilities. Among the encouraging developments of the past year have been the widening of contacts, including the frequent and rather frank discussions between Members of Congress and Soviet officials through parliamentary exchanges. These are useful in airing problems that would otherwise be insulated from political give and take.

- Our own society, accustomed as it is to multiple political viewpoints representing various segments of the society, does not always present a unified face to the Soviets, and this has been a source of uncertainty to them. The Soviets mistrust the volatility that sometimes results from the projection of our pluralism onto the foreign policy plane.

- While we have become increasingly international in our thinking, multinational in our commerce, and interdependent on global issues, the Soviet Union still emphasizes the primacy of sovereignty and national independence.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The single most significant development in the U.S.-Soviet relations during the past year has been the conclusion of the SALT II negotiations and the subsequent Vienna summit at which the treaty was signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev. There are two aspects of SALT II that require special emphasis at this juncture: the significance of SALT II for our European allies and the relationship of SALT to other aspects of the Soviet-American relationship.

One long-term aim of postwar Soviet foreign policy has been to take advantage of divisions within the NATO alliance and promote, in place of NATO, the concept of a European entity in which the Soviet Union can play a leading role. This is evident in the Soviet approach toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and we saw it reflected in President Brezhnev's speech of October 6 regarding the military balance in Europe.

As its relations with the United States have declined, the Soviet Union has sought to give more effective emphasis to its European political strategy. In doing so, it has shown an increasing awareness lately that the scale of Soviet military deployments bearing upon Europe has impaired Soviet political objectives by heightening European apprehensions. The initiatives set forth in the speech by President Brezhnev are addressed to those mounting European concerns. We are actively engaged in consultation with our European allies on the measures required to maintain a military equilibrium in Europe at moderate and stable levels. These measures include both the modernization of NATO's capabilities and active exploration of the possibilities for arms control negotiations.

The NATO alliance is vital to our defense posture as well as to our foreign policy generally. As many prominent European spokesmen have pointed out, the rejection or postponement of SALT II will have a serious negative effect upon NATO's assessment of our ability to lead and will make it more difficult for them to have the domestic support required for modernization of NATO. You will recall that this very point was made to the subcommittee by a panel of distinguished European parliamentarians on September 12 of this year. Should SALT II fail to pass the Senate, the Soviet Union will turn to its advantage the severe disruptive effect of such failure upon our NATO alliance.

The other aspect of the recent national discussion of the SALT treaty that has been a source of some expressed uncertainty is how it relates to other aspects of Soviet behavior. SALT does not provide an effective instrument for restraining the Soviet exploitation of crisis areas in Africa or in this hemisphere, since it does not confer greater advantage upon the Soviet Union than it does upon the United States. It would be a fateful error, in my judgment, to lose the opportunity to attain some measure of stabilization in the strategic competition in a misguided effort to constrain Soviet expansionism by this means. SALT II has become central to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and, to a large degree, to East-West relations generally. It should be seen as a linchpin in the East-West relationship rather than as a lever to force concessions in other areas of the relationship.

As a result of the hardening of public attitudes in this country toward the Soviet Union, many have raised the question why we should be engaged in

SALT negotiations with a country that has been repressive at home and expansionist abroad. It is often asked whether, if the Soviet Union is in favor of SALT, this should not lead us to oppose it.

There are many aspects of the Soviet system and Soviet foreign policy that we quite properly abhor, but in the nuclear age we cannot overlook the fact that in some areas our interests and those of the Soviet Union overlap. There should be no doubt but that the effort to reduce the danger of a general nuclear war represents such an area of overlapping interests, regardless of other differences. Given the painstakingly careful negotiations over 7 years, with vigilant attention to the security interests of each side, SALT represents an agreement which serves the interests of both sides, without disadvantage to either.

Why, despite a fundamental antagonism toward the United States and our way of life, is the Soviet Union interested in concluding arms control measures with us? I believe the following factors are central to Soviet thinking.

- From the standpoint of their own national security, the Soviet leadership clearly recognizes that to engage the United States in nuclear warfare would have catastrophic consequences for both countries.

- The Soviet leadership has recog-

Northern Ireland

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, OCT. 29, 1979¹

We welcome the announcement of the British Government that it is seeking to arrange a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland to consider ways to transfer some powers of government to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland.

As the President said in his August 1977 statement on the tragic Northern Ireland situation, the people of Northern Ireland "... have our complete support in their quest for a peaceful and just society."² We would be most pleased if the current British undertaking leads toward those goals. □

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

²For full text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1977, p. 410.

nized that, in the absence of a SALT agreement, it would be obliged to allocate still more of its scarce resources and technology to the production of strategic weapons, thus further complicating and postponing the resolution of major problems in the civilian industrial sector.

- The Soviet leadership is concerned over the potential military threat to the U.S.S.R. from China, which would be still more difficult if it were at the same time engaged in an unregulated strategic competition with the United States.

- And, probably not the least important, the Soviet leadership has committed itself to a political strategy of reduced international tension, as the most prudent course for the advancement of its interests and sees SALT as a testament to the efficacy of this policy as well as a symbol of equal status which it seeks.

It is apparent that these Soviet interests are not wholly congruent with our own and do not signify a harmony of political interests—far from it. But the advent of nuclear weapons requires a reexamination of traditional approaches to national security. The traditional pursuit of security through superiority can confer usable advantages on neither side and can lead only to an unregulated nuclear competition. We have no choice, therefore, but to seek the maximum feasible measure of stability in the nuclear military competition we can achieve through the SALT process, notwithstanding the realistic recognition of the fact of the fundamental opposition of our interests in many other respects.

Other Arms Control Issues

As with SALT I and SALT II, each arms control endeavor with the Soviet Union should be carefully assessed in the light of our own national interests. In my testimony before this subcommittee last year I mentioned several arms limitation negotiations apart from SALT. Noteworthy developments in these negotiations over the last year include the following.

- **Comprehensive Test Ban.** The current round in these negotiations, which involve the British as well as the Soviets and ourselves, got underway in Geneva late last month. Progress has been made toward the acceptance of the principle of verification by means of national seismic stations on the territory of the respective countries, but many problems remain to be worked out in the implementation of this sensitive issue.

Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). We and our allies in these complicated talks have been unable to resolve the disagreement with the Soviets and their allies over the number of troops they presently have in the reduction area. It is not yet clear how the Soviet decision to withdraw unilaterally some troops and tanks from East Germany will affect MBFR. But

thus far the data issue has been a serious stumbling block.

Conventional Arms Transfer Limitations. The fourth formal round of talks was held in Mexico last December. We made progress on general guidelines for limiting such transfers but ran into difficulties in establishing a mutually satisfactory regional ap-

proach. Progress on this enormously complex problem remains slow because of the political sensitivity of the regional conflicts involved.

Antisatellite Arms Control. The latest round in these talks took place in Vienna last April. We reached some agreement on activities that would be prohibited under such an arms control measure, although a number of thorny issues remain. We hope to schedule another round within the next several months.

Indian Ocean. The status of these discussions has not changed over the past year—they remain in recess. In our view, the recent increase in our naval presence in the Indian Ocean is required by changes in the area and does not foreclose the possibility of progress should the talks be resumed.

Chemical and Radiological Weapons. We continue to discuss chemical weapons with the Soviets in Geneva. Verification is the key issue. We and the Soviets have presented a joint agreed proposal on radiological weapons to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Further action will depend upon that committee.

Current Issues in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Outside the realm of arms control negotiations detailed above, there were several international and bilateral issues that affected the course of relations over the past year.

China. We have stated that our relations with China are based on our interest in normalizing those relations and are not aimed against any other country. Nevertheless, this remains a matter of sensitivity to the Soviet Union. Perhaps the strongest source of concern to the U.S.S.R. remains whether the United States will enter into a military supply relationship with China. We have made it clear that we do not intend to supply military equipment to China, but we have not attempted to speak for our allies on this matter.

The Soviet Union sought to implicate the United States in the Chinese military incursion into Vietnam, arguing that the visit to the United States by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping [January 29-February 4, 1979] in some way represented tacit U.S. acquiescence in the invasion. This line of argument served Soviet propaganda needs but seemed more designed to divert attention from Soviet involvement in Vietnam than a real assessment of the circumstances by the Soviet leaders.

Visit of His Holiness Pope John Paul II

His Holiness Pope John Paul II visited the United States October 1-7, 1979 (Boston October 1-2, New York October 2-3, Philadelphia October 3-4, Des Moines October 4, Chicago October 4-6, and Washington October 6-7). While in Washington His Holiness met with President Carter. Following is the text of a White House statement issued at the conclusion of their meeting on October 6.¹

President Carter welcomed His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the White House October 6, 1979. The Pope's visit to Washington concluded an historic week-long papal journey to six American cities.

In their private talks, the President and the Pope discussed, in particular, situations of concern to world peace and justice. They also reviewed ways of best serving the cause of peace, freedom, and justice in the world.

Sharing the belief that respect for human rights and the dignity of the individual must be the cornerstone of the domestic and international policies of nations, the Pope and the President underlined their support for international covenants on human rights and for international organizations and entities which serve the cause of human rights. They agreed that the international community must mobilize its concern and resources to deal with the problems of refugees, to protect human rights, and to prevent hunger and famine.

The President and the Pope urged all states to support humanitarian efforts to deal with the plight of starving people and refugees.

The Pope and the President agreed that the cause of peace in the world is served by international efforts to halt the proliferation of armaments and to eliminate the weapons of war.

The President discussed the importance of the Camp David accords and his efforts to end the bitter conflict in

the Middle East. He emphasized the determination of the United States to seek a comprehensive peace, including resolution of the Palestinian and Jerusalem questions, the establishment of peace and stability in Lebanon, and genuine security for all countries in the Middle East. The Pope reiterated the special interest which the Holy See attaches to the Middle East peace process and to the need for an internationally acceptable solution to these grave problems.

The Pope and the President discussed the tragic situation in Northern Ireland. They jointly condemned resort to violence, by any party for any reason, and recalled the appeals which both have recently made for a peaceful solution.

The Pope reviewed his trips to Poland and to Mexico and stressed the universal longing for human dignity and freedom which he had encountered during his pilgrimage.

The President and the Pope also discussed recent developments in southern Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The President noted that the United States seeks conditions of stability, prosperity, and peace in all these areas in the belief that these will promote human rights. The President emphasized that the international community, and especially the industrial nations, must undertake a greater effort to assist less developed countries to achieve a better way of life for their peoples. The Pope and the President agreed that efforts to advance human rights constitute the compelling idea of our times. □

¹This statement also included a list of Vatican and U.S. participants and topics discussed at a meeting in the Cabinet Room (not printed here); text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 15, 1979, which also includes remarks made at the arrival ceremony and the White House reception on Oct. 6.

The earlier Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea had occurred with Soviet acquiescence and logistical support, if not by actual Soviet instigation. While we condemned both the Vietnamese action against Kampuchea and the Chinese action against Vietnam, the potential escalation of the situation that could have arisen if the Soviet Union had initiated direct action against China was averted, largely because both Moscow and Beijing seemed aware of the great risks involved.

Cuba. There are two aspects of the Soviet-Cuban relationship that recently have burdened U.S.-Soviet relations: first, the use of Cuban troops supported by Soviet logistics and using Soviet weapons to fight in regional conflicts elsewhere in the world, particularly in Africa; second, the provision of military assistance to Cuba, as well as the construction of military facilities in Cuba, which could constitute a threat to American security or to the security of other countries in the hemisphere.

Apprehensions have been raised on three occasions over the past year in the context of Soviet activities in Cuba: first, when MiG-23's were first observed in Cuba; second, when an expanded naval facility was noted under construction at Cienfuegos; and third, when the presence of a Soviet ground force combat unit was detected.

Throughout our discussions with the Soviets on these issues, they have declared their continued adherence to the 1962 understanding that brought an end to the Cuban missile crisis and the confirmation of that understanding in 1970, but they have insisted on their right to implement the military component of their special relationship with Cuba insofar as it does not infringe on the 1962 accord. Our current concerns are to insure that the 1962 understanding as confirmed in 1970 is, in fact, being observed and to deal with situations affecting our security that are not covered by that understanding. The measures announced by the President on October 1 were designed to satisfy our requirements on both counts.³

Afghanistan. The course of events unfolding after the Afghan coup of 1978 brought this previously neutralist government into close alignment with the Soviet Union, at a cost of major internal resistance. The Soviet Union evidently feels committed to defending what it terms the "Afghan revolution" and is providing substantial military assistance to the Kabul government, consisting of modern equipment and military advisers numbering several thousands.

As the insurgency threat to the cen-

tral government has become more acute, the Soviet Union has faced a dilemma: How far should it go to save a leftist revolutionary government on its periphery? Some indication of the acuteness of this dilemma can be seen in President Taraki's departure from office just a few days after he met with Soviet President Brezhnev.

For our part, we are opposed to intervention by any country in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We are consulting widely with other countries in the region and have found they share our concern about this situation.

Iran. The winds of political change that brought down the Shah of Iran were largely internal in origin; this was not a movement instigated or substantially supported by outside powers. Although Moscow has sought to work with the new Islamic Republic and lost no opportunity to blame the evils of the past on U.S. involvement in Iran, there are signs of strain between the Soviet Union and Iran; the Soviets have openly criticized the Islamic movement that has emerged.

It is difficult to predict how things might go in the future, but for the moment it is notable that the setback to U.S. interests in the political transition in Iran has not been accompanied by a corresponding gain for Soviet interests.

Africa. With fingers crossed, I would point to what did *not* happen as the most important aspect of U.S. and Soviet involvement in Africa. The Soviet Union has continued to follow the lead of the front-line states on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia problem and has been prepared to let the negotiation process go forward. Soviet political and military support for the patriotic front forces has remained steady but has not grown substantially.

Similarly, the Soviet Union has remained in the background while efforts are underway to resolve the problem of independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, the potential for escalation of violence in southern Africa remains the most serious potential problem on the horizon in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Ethiopia. Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the Mengistu government has continued, but the Ethiopians have been unable to silence the insurgency in either Eritrea or the Ogaden. Moscow has moved to consolidate its position, and Premier Kosygin was the ranking foreign guest at celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution. Despite outward signs of close cooperation, however, Soviet-Ethiopian relations have been troubled by Mengistu's refusal to agree

15th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 25, 1979¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

In my last Cyprus report to the Congress, dated July 25, I noted that UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff were seeking to bring the two parties back to the conference table. Unfortunately, the recess in the intercommunal talks continues, largely because the two sides still have major differences both with regard to their approach to this negotiation and to the content of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The UN Secretary General, through his staff, is continuing to consult informally with the parties. He has had some success in creating a foundation on which the talks might resume. We are giving strong and continued support to this effort. We have frequently discussed the situation on Cyprus in a frank manner with all parties, reminding them that negotiation is preferable to stalemate, and that their broad interests would be served by a return to the conference table. Other interested third parties have made similar points to them.

Despite the difficulties, we continue to believe that a way can be found to end the present impasse and to permit the two sides to commence a serious negotiation of the Cyprus problem.

This Administration will continue to strive for progress in that direction. In pursuit of this goal, we shall remain in close touch with the United Nations, the parties to the Cyprus dispute, and our close European allies.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER □

¹ Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1979).

to Soviet demands that he create a Marxist civilian party. There have also been reports of Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the level and quality of Soviet economic aid.

Angola. Soviet-Angola relations have been troubled by the death of former Angolan President Neto during a visit to Moscow. Prior to Neto's death, the

Soviets were reported to be unhappy with his decision to cooperate with the U.N. plan for Namibia and his policy of establishing ties with the West. Neto's successor, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, appears intent on continuing those policies, and it remains to be seen how the Soviets will react. Meanwhile, the level of Soviet and Cuban military assistance has remained constant, as has the challenge from insurgent groups which operate freely in major areas of the country.

Yemen. Following the end of border hostilities in March, relations between North and South Yemen have focused on talks, so far unsuccessful, aimed at achieving unity between the two countries. Soviet relations with South Yemen were high-lighted by Premier Kosygin's stopover on his return from Ethiopia. Although Soviet military assistance has continued, as has a Cuban military presence, there has been no recent upswing or indication that the Soviets are encouraging aggressive behavior on the part of their South Yemen allies. Our own military assistance program to North Yemen continues to go forward with the intention of helping the Sana government to better provide for its own security.

Kampuchea. Vietnam's current dry season offensive in Kampuchea has again raised fears of a spillover of the fighting into Thailand and of mass starvation in Kampuchea. We have been in contact with both the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to urge restraint in Vietnamese military operations near the Thai border. We have also urged both countries to continue to facilitate international relief efforts to provide food to civilians in all areas of the country. We would hope that the Soviet Union would use its influence with Vietnam to the end that these relief efforts could alleviate the suffering of the peoples of the area.

The United States will honor its commitment to Thailand's security and is accelerating the delivery of key items of military equipment. We are also working with those involved in the relief effort. The President has announced an initial U.S. contribution of \$7 million for Kampuchea.

Human Rights. There has been no reversal of the Soviet crackdown on dissidents but neither has there been a recurrence of the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the trials of 1978. A few prominent dissidents have been released and allowed to leave the U.S.S.R., most notably in an exchange earlier this year which resulted in the release of five activists and their families. But several of the most

prominent dissidents, including those seeking to monitor Soviet performance under the Helsinki Final Act, remain imprisoned. Little has been done to resolve the hundreds of longstanding emigration cases of "refuseniks" in the Soviet Union, but the overall rate of emigration is currently running at a record annual rate of over 50,000.

One celebrated incident which raised the fundamental question of freedom to choose one's place of residence occurred following the decision of a visiting Bolshoi ballet dancer to remain permanently in the United States. Soviet officials ignored a requirement that the dancer's wife be interviewed in

Czechoslovak Dissidents

**DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 24, 1979¹**

We condemn both the trial and the unreasonably harsh sentences handed down in the trial of the Czechoslovak dissidents in Prague yesterday. It is a matter of serious concern to us that the Czechoslovak Government has again punished some of its own citizens for attempts to exercise their fundamental rights.

We cannot agree that the acts which the defendants were accused of committing were in any way criminal or that they warranted punishment. They were working to see that the government acted according to its own laws, legal procedures, and international commitments on human rights. We believe that the trial contradicts the spirit and letter of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Final Act.

We are and will continue to be concerned about violations of human rights wherever they occur. We have and will continue to speak out forcefully against these actions. In the case of Czechoslovakia, we are particularly disappointed, given its past tradition and experience of democracy and respect for law and the rights of individuals. The human rights of Czechs and Slovaks and their freedom to exercise these rights have obviously been a matter of interest to some of Czechoslovakia's neighbors who have had more than a little influence over the "internal affairs" of that country, in particular during the past 11 years. □

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

a noncoercive atmosphere to permit her to choose whether she would remain in the United States with her husband or return to the Soviet Union. After 3 days of negotiation while the plane remained at the departure gate, a satisfactory interview was conducted in a mobile lounge under U.S. control. Such interviews had often been conducted in similar cases in the past, and we believe the unwise Soviet decision to defy an official requirement was probably the result of inept handling rather than a new policy.

Economic Relations. While trade recovered in 1978 to a level of \$2.789 billion, the level of sales of U.S. manufactured goods continued to fall far short of its potential. Agricultural sales, on the other hand, were again high at \$1.694 billion, and the poor 1979 Soviet grain harvest is responsible for a continued strong demand for U.S. agricultural commodities. We recently made possible Soviet purchases of 25 million tons of our surplus grain, which will benefit both our countries.

Exploratory conversations were carried out in 1979 to determine whether an acceptable way could be found to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status to the U.S.S.R. under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. The increase in emigration from the Soviet Union suggested that the Soviet Government might also wish to resolve the MFN impasse, but the Soviet position continued to be that formal acquiescence in these legislative requirements would constitute an acceptance of interference in their internal affairs. We continue to hope that circumstances will permit favorable action in the same general time frame for both China and the Soviet Union, although we believe it would not be reasonable to delay the China agreement for reasons unrelated to U.S.-China relations. We will, of course, continue to consult with the Congress on the U.S.S.R. trade agreement.

Conclusion

It has been the practice of the Soviet Union to respond to opportunities for the expansion of its influence thrown up by local disruptions, wherever the balance of risks and gains appeared to offer advantages to the Soviet Union. The heightened pace of turbulent change in many parts of the world has resulted in an increase of such opportunities in recent years. There are three new factors in this realm of Soviet behavior. One is the Soviet military buildup, which allows the Soviet Union to project its military power over very long distances. Second, the Soviets

have increasingly supported Vietnamese aspirations to dominate South-east Asia. And third, the Soviets have engaged in arming, training, and transporting Cuban soldiers to participate in local conflict situations.

Although these interventions, against the background of a continued improvement in Soviet conventional military capabilities, have resulted in some gains for the Soviet Union, it appears probable that these gains may prove as transitory as were earlier positions won and subsequently lost in the face of local nationalist resistance to the spread of Soviet control. While we cannot be complacent about such Soviet gains in strategically important parts of the world, however transitory they may prove to be in the future, we can have confidence in our ability to compete effectively if we address ourselves to the interests and concerns of the people of the areas affected and do not think of them as abstract elements in an East-West game.

In this competition, the effective instrumentalities are not always military, but it is evident that a military equilibrium—conventional as well as strategic—is a necessary condition for the regulation of the competitive aspects of the Soviet-American relationship.

There is a temptation for us, beset by our problems, to regard the balance of Soviet strengths and weaknesses disproportionately. Both at home and abroad, the Soviet Union confronts problems that are a source of major concern to its leadership.

There is also a temptation to think of our policy toward the U.S.S.R. as being either too hard or too soft. Neither extreme is sensible. Either could encourage a more militant policy on the part of the Soviet Union. What makes better sense, although less dramatic headlines, is a policy characterized by firmness and clarity of purpose and priorities. We must continue to conduct the relationship in a way that protects and advances our interests, but as President Carter has said: "... we have a special responsibility to maintain stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations." Every problem with which we are concerned in the world would be more difficult and more dangerous if the United States and the Soviet Union were locked into a relationship of high confrontation.

As we traverse the period ahead, with its upheavals and conflicts, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have fateful decisions to make about the conduct of their relationship. Ahead lies the uncertainty of the di-

GENERAL: U.S. Foreign Policy Achievements

by Matthew Nimetz

Address before the international affairs group of the American Bankers Association in Washington, D.C., on October 24, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor of the Department of State.

The foreign policy of the Carter Administration has been well conceived and, on the whole, successful in pursuing our national interests. Yet our foreign policy does not receive deep and broad support; the public mood reflects attitudes of frustration, defeatism, and confusion. I want to discuss with you today this dichotomy between the overall soundness of our policy and the way it is perceived by the public.

Changing World—Growing Challenge

Let me comment first on the reality in which the United States must act. We live in a world marked by rapid change, with frequent outbreaks of violence and conflict. The Soviet challenge still exists, and the basic philosophic difference between their system and ours remains fundamental. Twenty percent of the world's ever-growing population does not have enough to eat. The disparity between haves and have-nots is a growing global issue. Nations newly emerged from colonialism are torn between traditionalism and modernization. Their people demand a better life, and their demands oftentimes bring turmoil instead. Many nations are wracked by ethnic, religious, and ideological strife. Governments have access to ever larger

stockpiles of ever more sophisticated and destructive conventional weapons, and over all stands the foreboding specter of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.

This is the world we live in—it is confused and dangerous. And, for the first time in history, what happens in any one country has immediate consequences worldwide, especially when modern methods of communication bring up-to-the-minute news to remote villages.

Recognizing this interdependent and highly politicized world environment, President Carter and Secretary Vance perceived at the start of this Administration that the United States, as a strong, stable, democratic, and wealthy nation with worldwide interests, has a large stake in the maintenance of peace, the enhancement of democratic and humanitarian institutions, and the encouragement of cooperative economic and social development. They recognized that foreign policy cannot be made in a vacuum—that the Congress must participate in and assist our efforts, and the American people must understand and support our broad foreign policy goals if we are to act effectively abroad, particularly after the searing events of the past decade. Our foreign policy has, therefore, sought to reestablish a national consensus based on a strong national defense, close relations with our allies, a dynamic engagement with Third World problems, and a clear articulation of our traditional democratic and humanitarian values. Our first objective, as Secretary Vance said recently, is to persist in the search for peace to reduce

reactions in which a new generation of leadership will take the Soviet Union, in the solution of its internal problems and the advancement of its interests abroad. We cannot directly affect the choices they will make, but we can continue to make it clear, with steadfastness and patience, that if future Soviet leaders see their national self-interest in a policy of restraint and responsibility, they will find the United States responsive to that course.

Our best hope of evoking such a response from the Soviet Union will be to demonstrate quiet firmness in the defense of our interests, together with a

readiness to work toward a widening of the area of cooperation between our two countries whenever and wherever this becomes feasible. □

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For texts of Ambassador Shulman's previous statements, see BULLETINS of Jan. 1978, p.1, and Nov. 1978, p. 28.

³ For text of President Carter's address to the nation on Oct. 1, 1979, see BULLETIN of Nov. 1979, p. 7.

both the danger and the destructiveness of war.

Let us look at the record.

A Practical Approach to National Defense

We are today a nation at peace. Under President Carter and Secretary Vance's stewardship no U.S. Armed Forces have been involved in active combat anywhere in the world.

In national defense matters, the Carter Administration has a remarkable record of achievement. The trend of the prior decade—that is, reduced attention to our defense—has been reversed. Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sound planning and steadiness of purpose have been the benchmarks. This Administration has avoided a flashy and sensational approach to national defense issues. It has chosen instead one that is realistic about our needs but neither panic stricken nor bellicose. President Carter has approved an MX mobile basing mode that will protect our land-based strategic forces. We have undertaken a far-reaching modernization of the other legs of our strategic triad—with cruise missiles for our manned bombers and the new Trident missile and submarine. A 3% real increase in defense expenditures last year and a recent budget amendment proposal for a 3% real increase in defense spending this year will maintain this momentum. The President has also moved to enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to respond to requests for help from our allies and friends.

Perhaps the clearest indication of this Administration's dedication to a sound defense has been in President Carter's work to reinvigorate the NATO alliance. Discussions in NATO of a strengthened and modernized allied force—including a theater nuclear force, our joint commitment with the allies to upgrade both our forces and our spending for defense, and the efforts to strengthen NATO's southern flank through the lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey—are concrete manifestations of a solid commitment to the nation's and allied security.

In short, this Administration, in cooperation with the Congress, is forging an important new consensus that will insure a strengthened and modern military force that is neither wasteful of our own precious resources nor needlessly provocative in today's world but is, nonetheless, capable of meeting any challenge to our security interests.

Maintaining World Peace

The preservation of our security does not depend simply on military strength. Our interests around the world can be threatened by bitter regional conflicts which pose the constant danger of wider confrontation. Under the leadership of President Carter and Secretary Vance, the United States has been a leading force in seeking to cool dangerous hot spots around the world—not because we want to control others but because we have a genuine interest in peace.

Thus, we are engaged in unprecedented efforts to secure a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, including nine trips by Secretary Vance to the region and the President's personal and successful mediation at Camp David. Although much obviously remains to be done, the return of the Sinai, the peace between Israel and Egypt, and the recognition of the importance of the Palestinian issue are all important accomplishments. No other nation could have played the role the United States has played in bringing Egypt and Israel to talk seriously of peace and in creating a new momentum for positive change in the Middle East.

The Carter Administration has reversed the earlier policy of passive neutrality toward the grave and explosive problems of southern Africa and has undertaken active and intense efforts to avert the tragedy of civil and racial war. On African issues, Secretary Vance announced in July 1977 that the "... Administration has decided to pursue actively solutions to all three southern African problems—Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situation within South Africa itself." The continued denial of racial justice in southern Africa, he said, "encourages the possibilities for outside intervention." Our objective, the Secretary said, "must be to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace with itself and with the world."

We have vigorously supported and worked with the United Kingdom in efforts to find a settlement for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is now biracially governed, and negotiations are in process to make its government truly representative. In Namibia, through our joint efforts with the United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, and France, working through the United Nations and with affected African states, prospects for a settlement are more hopeful now than they were a few years ago. Our efforts in southern Africa have won for us a new respect and trust throughout the continent. These volatile situations—though still dangerous and by no means

resolved—are still contained. Outside forces have not been able to exploit these essentially localized problems nor have they turned into major areas of East-West confrontation.

We have been active in other areas of peacekeeping as well. The Cypriot problem has caused human suffering and instability in the Mediterranean. Together with the British and Canadians, we have presented a framework proposal for its resolution. Again while the problem has not been solved, our work has assisted Secretary General Waldheim in his skillful diplomacy that we believe in time will establish a mutually acceptable framework for a federal biregional republic.

In dealing with all of these trouble spots—and I can name others: Lebanon, Kampuchea, Shaba—our role has been constructive. We have respected the interests of those most directly concerned. We have enhanced the role of international institutions like the United Nations. We have worked closely with our allies. We have brought our influence, not our military force, to bear.

While working to resolve problems, we have also seized important opportunities. In Asia, for example, this Administration has taken a dramatic and skillful step forward in the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. That has been accomplished without jeopardizing the peace of the area or the future of the people of Taiwan, without affecting our close relations with Japan and without harming our relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, we have ended more than 25 years of hostile silence between the world's most powerful nation and the world's most populous. Normalization of our relations now enables us to deal directly with the government which represents a quarter of the world's people.

In Latin America we have made what Secretary Vance has called a concerted effort to fashion a course that recognizes the new realities of the hemisphere and the distinctive differences among Latin American nations and peoples. We solved an old problem—the status of the Panama Canal. Skillfully negotiated by Ambassador Bunker and Linowitz, the Panama Canal treaties were concluded, a merit persuasively argued to the Senate, and a successful resolution of congressional concerns achieved. We are proud of this accomplishment and believe it marks a turning point in U.S. relations with Latin America.

We are satisfied also with our responsible approach to the extremely difficult events in Nicaragua. Tho-

no believe we should stand firmly for the status quo whatever it may be, even when it is apparent that popular sentiment overwhelmingly favors change, is simply wrong. We do have important interests in Central America, and these long-term interests are best served by the emergence of democratic broadly based governments that will cooperate with others in the region and with us to achieve economic development and political stability. As Secretary Vance said in New York on September 27: "We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold . . ." in Nicaragua. "But if we turn our backs," he said, ". . . we can almost guarantee that democracy will fail."

The presence of Secretary Vance at the inauguration of President Guzman of the Dominican Republic and President Roldos of Ecuador; the steady work at forging a relationship with Mexico that is based on equality and respect and a mutuality of interest; the support we have given to the strengthening of democracy in the Andean nations; the increased attention we are giving the Caribbean; the alleviation of human rights abuses with emphasis on the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, El Salvador, and elsewhere; and, perhaps most important, a policy that treats the nations of this hemisphere as separate and important entities in their own right rather than lumping them together in a framework that distorts their individuality, all attest to a solidly based long-term strategy to develop our relations with the countries of our hemisphere.

World Economic Issues

In economic policy, a major success of the decade was the successful conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations, under Ambassador Robert Strauss, with an agreement which was recently approved nearly unanimously by the Congress. The importance of the new trade arrangement is not widely recognized. It did not involve a dramatic issue. It was not an appealing subject for television. But it was a masterful achievement and one that will mean more to the average working American than any other international event of the past 3 years.

America's strength rests on the vitality of its economy, and our exports provide Americans with jobs (one out of every eight in the manufacturing sector) and income (one out of every 3 acres of American farms produces for export). We have also worked to better

coordinate our own economic policies with those of other industrialized countries. We have instituted regular economic summits with them and have worked closely with them to regularize and stabilize the monetary system.

We have taken a responsible and mature approach to the so-called North-South dialogue, guarding our interests carefully but taking serious steps to help the developing countries become full and responsible participants in the world economy. We have endorsed the concept of a common fund to help finance international buffer stocks. We have increased our development assistance, facilitated Third World access to technology, and helped them to draw on our own advanced technologies—using satellites, for example, to develop their natural resources and improve their internal communication.

Many nations of the Third World are still unsatisfied, but here again, the path Secretary Vance has charted will, I believe, mean more in the long term than the rhetoric we hear from Havana. Our approach is straightforward: The imbalance between the wealthy countries and the less developed countries is real. It poses a long-range threat to peace and stability. And, for the poorest nations, it is tragic in human terms.

We are prepared to address these issues in concrete ways. We will negotiate responsively in accepted forums. Secretary Vance has made world economic issues a major personal priority. He spoke primarily of economic issues in his U.N. General Assembly addresses both in 1978 and 1979. Again, we have avoided theatrical initiatives, flashy proposals, and publicity-seeking doctrines. Instead we have chosen careful analysis, painstaking negotiations, and the creation of lasting institutions.

This has been done consciously. We have our own interests to preserve. We will not seek to curry favor abroad at the expense of domestic interests, but neither can the greatest economic power in the world refuse to engage in a serious dialogue with those in less fortunate positions. The best hope of achieving progress in North-South issues is to lower the level of rhetoric and seek to delineate what can be done and what very simply cannot be done. This is our approach.

Response to the World Energy Shortage

The Administration has acted particularly vigorously and with farsighted

leadership in responding to the world energy shortage. We have worked consistently to promote improved relations with the oil-producing countries, both in the Mideast and elsewhere. For example, our relations with Nigeria, which provides us with well over 10% of our oil imports, have been greatly improved.

We have also reached a natural gas arrangement with Mexico. We have launched long-term efforts to help developing countries increase their own energy production and thereby reduce the demand for oil on the world market. We have broadened our own foreign aid programs for these purposes and have encouraged the World Bank to double its lending for exploration and development of oil resources. With U.S. leadership, we and the other member nations of the International Energy Agency have agreed to a 5% cut in our expected oil consumption.

Most important of all, perhaps, President Carter has sought to put our own house in order by presenting to the country and the Congress a comprehensive energy program. Without a realistic energy policy at home, we cannot put our economy in order, nor can we act from a position of strength in affecting the energy situation.

U.S.-Soviet Relations—Maintaining a Stable Balance

In U.S.-Soviet relations, this Administration recognizes the essential dichotomy of our relations with the Soviet Union. As the President has said, there are competitive as well as cooperative aspects to our relationship, and we must work diligently to expand cooperation wherever possible, while being firm where our interests are concerned. No issue has taken more of Secretary Vance's personal attention.

The painstaking negotiation of the SALT agreement and the discussion of U.S.-Soviet differences—on European issues, Cuba, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa—have been tough and professional. We have raised humanitarian concerns with the Soviet Union in a serious way and specifically pursued implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. Some success in increased emigration and family reunification, although not so much as we would have hoped for, has been achieved.

We have pursued a number of important arms control discussions with the Soviet Union—SALT, MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], CTB [comprehensive test ban], Indian Ocean talks, and restraint in conventional arms deliveries.

There is no doubt that our differ-

ences with the Soviet Union will last for many years. But, as Secretary Vance noted in his address to the United Nations on September 24: "We must not react now in frustration and unleash a spiral of rhetoric which can deepen rather than resolve our divisions." Nothing is more dangerous than an impulsive polemical or hysterical approach to sensitive foreign policy issues like that of the Soviet role in Cuba. The approach we have taken, which we believe is consistent with our interests, is to rely on calm but determined negotiations to find practical solutions to East-West problems, while at the same time insuring that our military forces preserve the balance. Any other approach might bring an unstable world to the brink of disaster.

The President and Secretary Vance have worked with particular interest on the strategic arms negotiations. Almost since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945, the nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has been a central fact of international life. The advent of nuclear weapons meant that, for the first time, it was possible to conceive of military arsenals that would not only break the war-making capacity of an adversary, but which could actually destroy that country itself as a functioning society. Against such power, it was inevitable that the Soviet Union would bend every effort to match our nuclear might.

With the stakes so high—national survival hanging in the balance—neither side could accept a lasting nor significant advantage for the other. As a result, both countries have accumulated unimaginable nuclear power. In the absence of mutual restraints, the progression could continue indefinitely. Neither side has been able to decide by itself how much is enough, for that decision always depends on what the other side does.

The SALT process is helping both sides cool this dangerous competition. In 1972, SALT I made a vital beginning. The detailed and painstaking negotiation of the SALT agreement by Secretary Vance and Ambassador Warnke [former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] has brought both sides for the first time to agree on several principles which we view as essential for authentic arms control limitation.

The agreement is a substantial accomplishment, and the many weeks of serious and important hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Select Committee on Intelligence have, in my opinion, amply supported the conclusion that the treaty is

solid, balanced, and in our national interest for the following reasons.

Equal overall limits. It is this essential equivalence in strategic arms which allows us to make further progress. If one side were far ahead, it would feel no urgency about arms control, and the side that was behind would refuse to negotiate from a position of weakness. Under SALT I, the Soviets had a numerical advantage; SALT II for the first time provides for equal aggregates in strategic weapons, imposing limits that require the Soviets to reduce their present numerical superiority in strategic systems.

Qualitative limits. The Soviets agreed for the first time to some limits on the improvements in the quality of weapons and on the creation of new systems. The limit on warheads is one important new limitation. Without such qualitative controls on the arms race, unexpected technological breakthroughs on either side could have destabilizing consequences that could in and of themselves seriously threaten the prospects for peace. With the threat known and better defined, our planning is eased, the pressure to overreact is lessened, and we can plan more intelligently our defense spending.

Verification. The treaty outlaws concealment of strategic weapons or interference with national technical means of verification. For the first time the Soviet Union has agreed not to encrypt telemetric information from their missile tests when so doing would impede our verification of compliance to treaty obligations.

Actual reduction. For the first time, in the SALT II treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its number of nuclear launchers and dismantle existing missiles—more than 250 nuclear systems—each one capable of delivering one or potentially more bombs each with 70 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. The United States need not dismantle any presently operational system.

There is no doubt in any of our minds that the SALT agreement is a masterful achievement—for our internal security and for world peace.

Human Rights— A Major Goal

I want to say a few words at this point about the encouragement of human rights, another major goal of American foreign policy which received new impetus in the Carter Administration. Our support for human

rights is grounded in the ideals we value most as a people—human freedom and dignity, the rights of the individual, and the belief that governments exist to serve, not control, their citizens.

Our consistent support of human rights helps other governments cope with the growing demand by people around the world to share fully in the political affairs and economic growth of their nations. Secretary Vance articulated the broad outlines of our human rights policy in his Athens, Georgia, address of April 30, 1977, noting the three essential components of our policy: the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; the right to fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health, and education; and the right to enjoy civil and political liberties.

Our own traditions should remind us that such demands can most often be met best through democratic processes and respect for human rights. We should not be diverted by the myth that if we deal with the forces of change we only encourage radicalism. These aspirations do sometimes lead to convulsions and turmoil, but they are also producing new institutions which may better be able to shape change in a democratic and ultimately stable way in many nations throughout the world. In the last few years there have been a number of encouraging developments

- International institutions dealing with human rights have been strengthened, and documents that speak of human rights—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act—have been given vitality.

- India has returned to democracy and democracy flourishes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Democratically elected civilian governments have recently replaced military rule in Ghana and Nigeria, and a similar trend is evident in several Latin American countries.

- The call for human rights has been a significant factor in replacing Amin Bokassa, and Macias in Africa; Somoza in Central America; and Pol Pot in Southeast Asia.

- Political prisoners in many nations have been pardoned or otherwise released.

- The tragic refugee problems in Southeast Asia and elsewhere are dealt with directly, not covered up as in the past.

We do not claim that the Administration's human rights policy directly caused all of these developments, but we can claim that the clear and consistent articulation of our policy on the

international scene, and the actions we have taken—often without publicity—have sensitized international public opinion from central Africa to the walls of the Kremlin. Violators of basic human rights now do so at serious cost, and they know it.

Summary

Why, then, with all these accomplishments—a nation at peace, strengthened defense programs, a major step forward in the Middle East, the SALT II treaty, the Panama Canal treaties, a major international trade agreement, solid relations with our allies and a strengthened NATO alliance, normalization with China, better access to Third World nations, a new self-confidence in expressing our humanitarian ideals and concrete achievements in the world human rights picture—why with all these accomplishments do we not see widespread enthusiasm for our foreign policy? Why, indeed, do we see a disparaging of our accomplishments, an exaggeration of our problems, an emphasis on U.S. weakness, a downgrading of our strengths?

I do not think we should minimize our problems. We must deal decisively with the domestic issues of energy and inflation which have such detrimental effects on our foreign policy. We have to meet the challenge of growing Soviet military strength and Soviet-Cuban involvement abroad. We must face the phenomenon of instability, even revolution, in Third World nations, with the recent events in Iran as the major example. Even recognizing the problems we face, I submit to you that the balance between positive and negative developments is heavily in favor of the positive. Yet this reality is not reflected in public perceptions nor in the national political debate.

There are many reasons for this dominance of the negative, but I will mention one. It is in our national interest to defuse dramatic confrontations and to build functioning relationships. Yet it is in the nature of the public dialogue on foreign policy to concentrate on crisis. Thus, we tend to ignore the development of fruitful relationships with the European Community, the ASEAN group [Association of South East Asian Nations], Japan, China, and Egypt; the improvement of our relations with Nigeria and the better security situation in Zaire; the achievement of excellent relations with Yugoslavia and steadily improved political, cultural, and economic ties we have developed recently with Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria;

MIDDLE EAST: *Situation in Iran*

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, NOV. 8, 1979¹

Since the first word that our Embassy had been taken over in Tehran, the President, aided by his senior advisers, has been directing the efforts of our government to secure the safe release of our people. We have been assured repeatedly that those being held have not been physically harmed. We expect those assurances to be observed.

The situation is extremely difficult and delicate. I am sure that all Americans understand that the efforts we are pursuing cannot take place in the glare of publicity. Let me assure you, however, that we are pursuing every avenue open to us to secure their safe and early release. Our actions will continue to be guided by that overriding objective.

Let me say, in particular, to the families of those being held in Tehran that we understand fully your anguish, and we will continue to work around the clock to achieve their release.

We have announced our readiness to have the personal representatives of the President go to Iran to discuss with the Iranian authorities the release of our Embassy people. Many governments and others have been helping. We appreciate those efforts.

the achievement of democracy in Spain, Portugal, Greece, India, Nigeria, and Ghana; the movement toward stability and democracy in important areas of Latin America; and the strengthening of new international institutions for economic development—all these to a great extent are unnoticed.

Events that we do not control are seen as signs of American impotence rather than as a manifestation of a diverse and multipolar world. It is not a sign of weakness to recognize that we alone cannot dictate events elsewhere. It is, rather, a sign of American maturity in a complex world. The foreign policy leadership of President Carter and Secretary Vance is based on strength, not belligerence; on thought, not impulse; on confidence, not paranoia.

When the debate is over, I believe we will find that the American people want a safer, less volatile world and

We need the continued support of the American people as we pursue these efforts. It is a time not for rhetoric but for quiet, careful, and firm diplomacy.

In this situation, the United States has no higher obligation than to do all that it can to protect the lives of the American citizens. We will honor that obligation.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 10, 1979²

The President has directed the Attorney General to identify any Iranian students in the United States who are not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas and to take the necessary steps to commence deportation proceedings against those who have violated applicable immigration laws and regulations.

As an initial measure, the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice will issue a notice requiring all Iranian students to report their present location and status immediately to the nearest INS office and will take additional steps to locate and identify such students to determine legal status. For students found to be in illegal status, deportation proceedings

appreciate that reasoned, intelligent, and steady leadership is needed to achieve it. I believe the approach we are taking deals correctly with the fundamental changes taking place in the world and is protecting our interests and values with real effectiveness.

The voices of doom we hear today are particularly strange because it was American leadership that triggered the rapid changes now taking place worldwide. Our democracy, our technology, our concept of personal freedom are envied and emulated throughout the world. While the Soviet Union worries about potential defectors trying to flee the stultifying Communist society, we concern ourselves with all those millions who are not U.S. citizens but who want to study, work, and live in our country. In short, the tide of human affairs is running very much in our favor. To maintain our leadership and our security, we need only have the good sense to act in a reasoned and responsible way. □

will be conducted in accordance with constitutional due process requirements.

PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 12, 1979³

We continue to face a grave situation in Iran, where our Embassy has been seized, and more than 60 American citizens continue to be held as hostages in an attempt to force unacceptable demands on our country. We are using every available channel to protect the safety of the hostages and to secure their release.

Along with the families of the hostages, I have welcomed and I appreciate the restraint that has been shown by Americans during this crisis. We must continue to exhibit such constraint, despite the intensity of our emotions. The lives of our people in Iran are at stake.

I must emphasize the gravity of the situation. It is vital to the United States and to every other nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other citizens abroad be protected and that we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and the holding of hostages to impose political demands.

No one should underestimate the resolve of the American Government and the American people in this matter. It is necessary to eliminate any suggestion that economic pressures can weaken our stand on basic issues of principle. Our position must be clear. I am ordering that we discontinue purchasing of any oil from Iran for delivery to this country.

These events obviously demonstrate the extreme importance of reducing oil consumption here in the United States. I urge every American citizen and every American business to redouble efforts to curtail the use of petroleum products. This action will pose a real challenge to our country. It will be a test of our strength and of our determination.

I have directed Secretary [of Energy Charles W.] Duncan to work with the Congress and with other Federal, State, and local officials and with leaders of industry to develop additional measures to conserve oil and to cope with this new situation. We will strive to insure equitable and fair distribution of petroleum products and to insure a minimum of disruption of our nation's economy.

These American measures must be part of an effective international effort, and we will consult with our allies and with other oil-consuming nations about

Israelis and Palestinians

by Donald F. McHenry

Address before the Appeal of Conscience Foundation awards dinner in New York on October 23, 1979. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.¹

It is a great honor for me to accept the foundation's kind invitation to speak here this evening. As Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, I believe that an important part of my responsibilities is to engage in discussing the central issues of our foreign policy, not only with delegates at the United Nations but also with our own citizens.

I am particularly pleased to do so from this platform. In its 14-year history, the Appeal of Conscience Foundation has devoted its efforts to preserving the most basic and essential values of free people—the unfettered expression of beliefs and the protection of civil and religious freedoms. The foundation has urged world leaders to sustain a moral vision and not to regard policy simply as the maximization of national self-interest.

Tomorrow is U.N. Day, celebrating the 34th anniversary of the world body. Many of you who are here tonight remember personally, and we all know, of the 6 years of war and of the enormous human tragedy which befell millions in the 1930's and the 1940's. After that war, the hope of the founders

of the United Nations was that a new start could be made in international affairs. Our collective goal, in the words of the charter, was "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. . . ."

No one, either in our country or in the United Nations, can have any illusions. We have not yet succeeded in eliminating the scourge of war. Conflicts—little and large, hot and cold, known and unknown—are an everyday occurrence. Even the fundamental assumption on which the United Nations was founded—the assumption of great power cooperation—is only rarely realized. The United Nations of 1979 is an accurate reflection of the difficult world in which we live, mirroring not only our accomplishments but also our divisions, reflecting consensus on the basic objective of peace but also the profound differences which still persist about how best to proceed toward the peaceful resolution of conflicts. We should be neither surprised nor dismayed by this state of affairs. Ours is a pluralistic society in which we expect to air our differences openly. And the same is true of the United Nations.

Today's United Nations is, of course, profoundly different from the organization as it was in 1945. There are three times as many member countries, most of them young and poor, the progeny of colonial empires. The peoples of the so-called Third World are going through wrenching and dif-

further actions to reduce oil consumption and oil imports.

America does face a difficult task and a test. Our response will measure our character and our courage. I know that we Americans shall not fail.

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 14, 1979²

The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in U.S. banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to insure that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in an orderly manner.

The order does not affect accounts of persons other than the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved cannot be ascertained at this time, but there is no reason for disturbance in the foreign exchange or other markets.

The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." □

¹ Press release 294.

² Text from White House press release.

³ Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House (text from White House press release).

Let us look at the concerns of each for a moment. The basic Arab argument against the Camp David agreements is that Israel's purpose is not attainment of a comprehensive peace but the destruction of Arab unity. The Arabs see Egypt as having been pulled out of a united Arab strategy, of having entered into a "separate deal." They

believe Israel may seek other separate treaties, in effect sidestepping or ignoring the Palestinians. Many Arabs believe Israel's true purpose is to expand its territory to the Jordan River, to keep the million plus Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli control, and to deny what they see as the Palestinian's legitimate right to self-determination.

Israel has a diametrically opposite perception of what is at stake. It fears that the Palestinian demand for self-determination is not confined to working out the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Many Israelis fear that Arab strategy envisages the present phase as a way-station to absorbing Israel into the dream of a "secular-democratic" Palestine. There is also profound concern that the contiguity of the West Bank and Gaza to the population centers of Israel creates unique problems for Israel's security. The basic anxiety is that the Arab nations will only pretend to accept Israel's existence and sovereignty.

There is a special dimension here—the deep attachment of Judaism and Islam to the city of Jerusalem. We have to recognize the profound religious significance of that city for Jews and Arabs, the intense emotions which are involved on both sides. In addition, there is concern on both sides that the

other's religious or ideological arguments may be a cover for expansionist ambitions.

Present Negotiations

In developing the Camp David frameworks, we recognized that we could not bridge the gap between Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of each other's motivations at one stroke. The idea underlying the present negotiations is to engage the parties in an evolutionary process of mutual accommodation. The transitional 5-year period provides an opportunity for building trust and confidence to replace the decades of distrust and suspicion. In order for this to happen, however, we have to be able to persuade the Palestinians and the Jordanians that the arrangements for a self-governing authority under negotiation are genuine and not, as many of them presently believe, a sham.

I do not want to try this evening to address in detail the complex questions of the hard choices and decisions facing the negotiators, or those facing the rest of the Arab world. Instead, I want to raise the question of how we can best encourage the continuation of the peace process. I want to suggest to you that the starting point is to extend our vision to encompass the concerns and

historical experience of both sides. Four wars in the Middle East have taken a heavy toll of life and injury for the people of the area. Those wars inevitably heightened Israel's concerns about the security of its people, particularly since so many of those people were themselves survivors of the Holocaust. Those wars also have created two generations of Palestinian refugees.

These experiences and memories account for the profound reciprocal distrust which has been at the heart of the Middle East conflict. This distrust, as I have suggested here tonight, is a root cause of Israel's security concerns and of the refusal of the Palestinians so far to join the negotiating process.

We cannot change or obliterate these experiences and memories. But we can understand and try to deal with them. We can encourage Israelis and Palestinians to avoid becoming prisoners of the past. Hard as it is, Israel and Egypt are in the process of doing so. We must now work to bring about the foundation for a new relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

Beneath the daily headlines, I believe that there are indications that the Palestinians are carefully considering their next steps and that a greater sense of realism is emerging within their ranks. There is also, I believe, a greater awareness in Israel of the need for fresh thinking about the Palestinian movement and about Israel's own policies. In our own country there is a widespread recognition that we cannot run away from the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East conflict.

Eighth Report on the Sinai Support Mission

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, OCT. 5, 1979¹

I am pleased to transmit herewith the Eighth Report of the United States Sinai Support Mission. It covers the Mission's activities during the six-month period ending October 1, 1979. This Report is provided to the Congress in conformity with Section 4 of the Public Law 94-110 of October 13, 1975.

The Peace Treaty which Egypt and Israel signed in Washington on March 26, 1979 calls for the United States to continue monitoring responsibilities in the Sinai until January 25, 1980, when Israeli armed forces withdraw from areas east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. This mission will be completed on schedule.

Trilateral talks in Washington on September 18 and 19 resulted in tentative agreement for the United States, using the Sinai Field Mission, to verify force levels specified in Annex I of the Treaty, in the area of the Sinai west of the Interim Buffer Zone. Administration officials have been in touch with appropriate Congress-

sional committees on various aspects of the U.S. undertaking and will provide Congress with all agreements and understandings to which the United States is a party.

This year's funding of the Sinai Support Mission is authorized under Chapter 6, Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, "Peacekeeping Operations." A request has been made to Congress to restore \$6.1 million of the Sinai Support Mission funds for FY 1980, to cover anticipated outlays associated with the new U.S. undertaking in the Sinai.

The American peacekeeping initiative in the Sinai has been highly successful. I know the Congress will continue its support of the Mission, as part of United States efforts to meet our goal of permanent peace in the Middle East.

JIMMY CARTER □

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct 8, 1979.

Violence in the Area

I have no illusions about the difficulty of the course I am describing. It is hard to begin a process of reconciliation given the conflict of claims, the history of suspicions and sufferings. A necessary first step is for all concerned to give up recourse to violence. Let me repeat that: A necessary first step is for all concerned to give up recourse to violence.

We have witnessed for many months in Lebanon a fatal pattern. Each act of violence—viewed as "terrorism" by Israel and as "armed struggle for freedom" by Palestinians—produced a more determined Israeli response. Each Israeli response produced another act of violence. This pattern must be broken. Israeli citizens must no longer have their lives jeopardized by attacks and bomb explosions. There must be a final stop to violence directed against Israelis by Palestinians from Lebanon. There must also be a final stop to vio-

lence directed against Lebanese and Palestinians in Lebanon from Israel.

A very fragile cease-fire was attained by the United Nations in south Lebanon at the end of August. It has been broken briefly but violently several times this past week. We must do all we can to turn this cease-fire into a permanent end to violence. This requires cooperation by all concerned with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Private armies must be seen as a source of instability. The authority of the Lebanese Government must be restored. Villagers must be allowed to return to their homes, and refugees who fled to Beirut and the north must be allowed to return to the South. In the words of Lebanon's Ambassador to the United Nations, south Lebanon must become a "zone of peace." This is not only in Lebanon's interest; an end to violence will affect Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of each other. It will make it possible to consider difficult political questions in a much better atmosphere.

A separate but equally serious aspect of the problem of violence is that which emanates from the West Bank and Gaza. An essential condition for building trust among Israelis about a Palestinian self-governing authority certainly must be for this violence to end. Each time that a bomb is detonated in Jerusalem or another city, each time a bus is attacked, each time an agricultural settlement or a person's house is entered by armed force, the prospect of improving relations between Israelis and their Arab neighbors is set back. It is very hard, indeed, to ask people to take chances for peace when the lives of their families and relatives are perceived to be in jeopardy.

It is also in the interest of all concerned for Israel to begin now to ease the conditions of its neighbors living on the West Bank and in Gaza. The steps which would make a real difference to Palestinian Arabs include allowing the reunion of families, releasing those still under administrative detention, and allowing political activity in preparation for the election of the self-governing authority. Israelis should be sensitive to correct any official action which in some measure, even unintentionally, offends the sense of human dignity and worth of their Palestinian Arab neighbors. These would be not only humanitarian actions; they would be a token of genuine intention to move toward better relations in the years ahead.

Before concluding these remarks, I want to say a word about the role of the United States at the United Nations on Middle East issues. Unfortunately,

SOUTH ASIA: *Situation* in Afghanistan

by Harold H. Saunders

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 26, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*¹

As you know from your own recent visit to South Asia, Afghanistan is today the scene of continuing human suffering. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party came to power in Kabul in a violent coup. Since then, the prospects for reform under the new government have been overshadowed by internal strife. Much Afghan blood has been shed in this conflict, and to our sorrow a number of foreigners have also fallen victim, including our late friend and colleague Ambassador Spike Dubs.

Important U.S. interests are affected by developments in Kabul. Our effort to encourage peace and stability in that troubled region of the world is clearly made more difficult by Afghanistan's internal unrest and the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan. The reorientation in Afghanistan's foreign policy away from its traditional genuine nonalignment is one we regret.

Our interest in the welfare and economic development of the people of Afghanistan—one of the world's poorest nations—has been amply demonstrated by the fact that we have provided over \$500 million of assistance in the past 30 years. In the present situation, economic development has largely come to a standstill, and our own aid program will be phased out after October 1, in conformance with legislative requirements.

We are especially disturbed by the growing involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs. Afghanistan

and the Soviet Union, as neighbors, have always had close relations. Never before in recent times, however, have the Soviet military—and, apparently, the political—roles been as extensive. Direct interference in Afghanistan by any country, including the Soviet Union, would threaten the integrity of that nation and peace in the area and would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. We have repeatedly impressed on the Soviet Government the dangers of more direct involvement in the fighting in Afghanistan. We will continue to monitor developments in this area closely.

Afghanistan's relations with its other neighbors—Pakistan, Iran, and China—have been severely strained by the internal conflict which affects nearly all areas of Afghanistan. We will be supportive of any efforts by these countries aimed at better relations and which reduce the possibility of conflict between them and Afghanistan.

For its part, the U.S. Government seeks no special position in Afghanistan. We look for a relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests in regional stability, the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area, and nonintervention. We have important differences with the Afghan Government, including our deep concern about the human rights situation in Afghanistan. Security concerns and the decline in our programs have required us to reduce our Embassy staff in Kabul and to withdraw dependents of U.S. Government personnel. Nevertheless, we have continued to express to the Government of Afghanistan our desire for normal and friendly relations. We consider that the initiative for such relations lies with them.

Narcotics control may be one area in which closer U.S.-Afghan cooperation is possible. Afghanistan has become a

others often perceive us as irretrievably one-sided. We must be seen to be fair, to be just, to understand the concerns of both sides. This does not imply any change in our friendship and strong support for Israel or our deep commitment to its security. It does imply, however, the need for us at all times to be true to our principles and to make the positions we take at the United Nations and elsewhere continue to be consistent with them.

I can think of no greater challenge for the years ahead than the opening of a new chapter in relations between Israelis and Palestinians. This, in starkly simple terms, must be the goal. Barriers built over decades will not go down overnight. But this is certainly the time to start. □

¹ USUN press release 100 of Oct. 24, 1979.

Afghan Refugees

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 26, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have an opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to hear about your first-hand impressions of the Afghan refugee situation and to share with you the views of the executive branch.

At the outset, let me express our appreciation for the interest which you and the subcommittee have shown in this growing problem, in particular your recent visit to a refugee camp in Pakistan which has helped to bring about greater international awareness of the situation there. We are as concerned as you about the nearly 200,000 Afghans who have fled to Pakistan in the last year, and we believe the United States has a deep humanitarian interest in seeing that the world community does everything possible to assist the Government of Pakistan in caring for them.

In our view the principal cause for the influx of large numbers of Afghans into neighboring Pakistan is the unsettled and violent conditions which currently exist in Afghanistan. The flow of refugees continues at the rate of about 4,500 per week. This exodus will undoubtedly continue until the internal Afghan situation stabilizes and greater security can be offered to the Afghan people. Indeed, we must be prepared for the possibility of an even faster flow as cold weather sets in.

Pakistan is to be commended for its

humanitarian action over the past many months in providing food, clothing, and shelter to these thousands of Afghan refugees—many of whom have strong ethnic and kinship ties with Pakistani tribal groups. It is clear now, however, that the financial burdens of this generosity are unfairly taxing Pakistan's limited resources, and the international community should offer its help.

As you know the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has looked into this situation carefully, and we understand that an international assistance program is already getting underway. As a start, the UNHCR has announced an interim emergency program of \$190,000 to provide shelter and blankets for refugees. UNICEF, we understand, will be setting up a medical program.

We have encouraged the UNHCR to plan and implement a program as soon as possible and are prepared to contribute our fair share if additional funds are requested. I hope we will have the subcommittee's support in this endeavor. It is our expectation that required funds will come from the UNHCR's general program. While precise figures are not yet available, we would estimate that an international program of at least \$10 million will be needed over the next year and perhaps more if the flow of refugees increases this winter.

I should add that we are deeply troubled by the suffering and loss of life which the fighting has brought in Afghanistan. Our hope is that conditions of peace and prosperity can be created in Afghanistan which will reflect the will of the people, so that the refugees can return to their homeland at an early date. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

(Afghanistan (Cont'd))

major source of illicit narcotics, and we have a strong interest in developing greater cooperation in the field of narcotics enforcement and control. The present government has made some noticeable progress in opium seizures but has had little time to concern itself with long-term solutions to the growing problem of illicit opium production.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that we are deeply troubled by the suffering and loss of life which have resulted from the fighting in Afghanistan. The violence in Afghanistan has already generated a continuing flow of

refugees into Pakistan as well as a smaller number to Iran. It has the potential of undermining the peace of the region. We urge all parties concerned in Afghanistan to look toward resolution of their differences through peaceful means in a way that will reflect the desires of the Afghan people themselves and obviate external involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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UNITED NATIONS: *Economic Dialogue –* *A Challenge to Our Times*

by Donald F. McHenry

*Statement to the General Assembly on October 22, 1979. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.*¹

For over 30 years, the United Nations has been a force for peace. It has been an obstacle to aggression and a pacifying presence in the midst of ancient conflicts. It has provided a place for private consultations which have enabled public solutions to be reached. It has offered a prestigious platform where national frustrations could be expressed, international hopes extolled, world opinion mobilized, and global action undertaken.

The horrors of war have not been avoided during the lifetime of the United Nations. But in large part because of this institution, the international community has survived intact through what has probably been the most volatile, dangerous, and dynamic period in recorded history.

The mandate of the U.N. system, however, must and does range beyond the concerns of peace and security. It encompasses virtually all areas of human association from enhancing human rights to protecting our physical environment. In recent years, it has become the central focus of the international deliberations concerning economic relations between and among developing and developed nations. The question before us is whether the dialogue is capable of being transformed into even more negotiations than are presently underway. The answer is neither clear nor simple, but in the debate in which we are now engaged, both the question and the answer are crucial.

Why have global economic issues become a priority item on the international agenda? Because the economic interdependence of nations is a profound reality. The economic futures of our countries, whatever their economic systems, are inseparably linked—through trade, direct investments, public and private capital flows, technology, labor mobility, and bilateral and multilateral institutions. We can be competitive. We can be supportive. But we cannot be destructive of one another's material objectives without hurting—maybe even destroying—ourselves.

I intend to be candid today—perhaps more so than diplomacy traditionally permits. I do so out of a strong personal commitment to the U.N. system, to the needs and aspirations of the developing countries, and to the many people on this planet—the poor, the sick, the hungry—who continue to look to this assembly of nations with hope and confidence. I am convinced that if we define our objectives carefully, understand our limitations intelligently, and speak to each other frankly, we can navigate this sea of economic distress successfully. But if some of us—and this applies to countries in all regional groups—choose the easy path of confrontation, we will fail.

The United States will do its share to strengthen and reform the international economic system so that all nations have access to economic opportunity and to increasing prosperity in a framework of social justice.

To affect the direction of the international economy, all of us must work together. There was a time when the size of the U.S. economy was so overpowering that a decision by my government alone could move the global economy in a new direction. For example, in 1950 the United States accounted for 67% of the world's industrial production. That era is over. Not because the United States has become poorer but because the rest of the world has become richer. We sought this new relationship, we facilitated it, and we welcome it. It is no longer possible for one country, or for even a few countries, to decide the direction of our international economy. It is now for all of us—the industrialized countries, the oil-producing countries, the developing countries, and the Socialist countries—to act as united nations in reordering the international economy and eliminating the worst aspects of global poverty before the end of this century.

Changing Global Economy

We do not advance our common objectives by unending speeches over whether, how, and when the new international economic order will occur. Whether we like it or not, the global economy is undergoing constant and accelerating change. A new order is arising before our eyes, and our task is to see that this order serves our com-

mon interest. The institutional structure of today's economy is not the same as that created by Bretton Woods. Tomorrow it will be different—significantly different—from today. And this transformation will result from a combination of market forces, actions by governments and the individual, and collective efforts of our nations, our peoples, our entrepreneurs, and our workers. As we guide and participate in this change, we must steadily pursue real progress and concrete results. We must be rigorous in our analysis and realistic in our expectations. We must not only talk, we must find a way to agree on how to move forward.

Our dialogue has been confused by the frequent insistence on a rigid division of the world into developed and developing nations. The fact is that there is a spectrum of development along which each nation occupies a specific space, from the poorest nations to the richest. Moreover, different parts of all countries occupy different parts of the spectrum. Some sectors of the developing countries now compete on a world market scale. Some parts of the developed countries themselves are in urgent need of development. Our common task is to move all nations and all sectors toward the more developed end of the spectrum. Our institutions must have the flexible capacity to help all countries while fulfilling a basic obligation to provide the appropriate assistance to the poorer countries. The more developed the country, or sector, the greater its obligations toward making the entire system function.

In saying this, I am aware of the political reality that groups of countries have a need to maintain unity. My plea is simply that such legitimate coalitions should not serve as obstacles but rather as catalysts which enhance our efforts to reach genuine consensus.

Too often, all of us fail to temper with realism our demands on others. In their just calls for assistance and investment, the developing countries should understand the restraints on other governments because of economic austerity, rising unemployment and inflation, and the need to marshal the support of public opinion and parliaments. Moreover, developing countries must recognize that the engine of growth in OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries is the response of private initiative to eco-

conomic incentives. If other countries want to use that engine, they must find ways consistent with their sovereignty to make their economies attractive to foreign investment.

By like measure, when insisting on economic reforms in developing countries, the developed nations should realize the acute social and political problems such reforms present and the political difficulties those countries' leaders face in pressing these changes vigorously and consistently.

Progress and Problems in the Global Economy

If effective joint action—not debating points—is our goal, let us not pretend that there has been no progress in reorganizing the global economic system. This is simply not so. There has been important progress.

The International Monetary Fund has significantly expanded its facilities and made them more responsive to the needs of all members, particularly the developing countries. The creation of the Trust Fund, the Extended Finance Facility, the Supplementary Financing Facility, and most recently the substantial liberalization of the Compensatory Finance Facility are examples. The Fund has also agreed to consider a lengthening of the repayment terms under the Extended Finance Facility and means of lowering the interest costs of the Supplementary Finance Facility.

The lending levels of bilateral and multilateral assistance programs have been raised, and negotiations for major replenishments of the World Bank and the regional banks have been or are nearing completion. Special attention is being devoted to innovative new national and international endeavors in energy exploration and development and in science and technology development and transfer.

International trade has been liberalized, most recently with the multilateral trade negotiations and generalized preferences provided and expanded for developing countries. The International Fund for Agricultural Development was created with initial financing of \$1 billion. A common fund for commodities could be completed in the near future. Price stabilizing agreements have been reached on sugar, tin, coffee, rubber, and work is underway on commodities. It is important to recognize the progress that has been made, so that governments, citizens, and parliaments will be encouraged to work for more of it.

Despite the progress in international economic cooperation and develop-

ment, the global economy is clearly in trouble. The industrialized countries face mounting inflation and unemployment, sharply declining growth rates, deteriorating trade accounts, and intensifying protectionist pressures. The situation in most developing countries is also gloomy: development prospects impeded and often undermined by the exploding costs of energy and other imports, the slow growth of foreign markets for their exports, constraints on real aid levels, growing deficits, and the growing uncertainty about the ability of the system to recycle petrodollars equitably.

It is unproductive to be critical of the oil-exporting countries without understanding that their favored circumstances are tempered by special problems. Some OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] themselves are poor. Some find that their financial bonanza is real only if the international economy is healthy. On the other hand, the oil-exporting nations have a major responsibility for insuring the growth and stability of the global economic system, a responsibility that they cannot ignore in their production and pricing policies. The jolt to the international economy of inadequate oil production levels could be devastating to the oil-exporting nations as well as to oil-consuming countries. Oil prices should reflect the depleting nature of the resource but also the unique role of oil for the health and prosperity of all nations.

Global economic conditions increasingly affect as well the centrally planned economies. Their growing reliance on food, energy, and manufactured imports and their increasing borrowing from the international banking system link them tightly into the global economic system and to its fate.

Mutual Solutions to Common Problems

And so, all of us must acknowledge that the economic destinies of our nations are tied together. We must find mutually acceptable solutions to common problems.

- Together we must find the means to end the tragic paradox that in the most prosperous era in human existence, one-fourth of the world's citizens live in abject poverty. We must rapidly complete a new food aid convention and encourage governments to give urgent attention to adopting food sector strategies. We must act to prevent famine anywhere and at any time.

- We must be sure that the growing deficits of countries can be managed in

a way that strengthens the global economy.

- We must intensify cooperative bilateral and multilateral efforts to insure that the international community can achieve the goal of adequate health care for all by the year 2000. It is unacceptable that many of the Earth's inhabitants do not have access to basic health care. The United States hopes many other countries will join in sponsoring a resolution for adoption by this General Assembly calling on all relevant U.N. organizations and programs to give greater priority in their activities to health care and its improvement.

- Together we must confront and overcome the energy crisis. We must have the imagination and courage to fashion international solutions to the energy problem based on a sharing of responsibilities and benefits. We add our voice to those urging speed in the international community's consideration of this issue.

- Let us find innovative means for increasing literacy and insuring education, fundamental ingredients in any viable development strategy.

- Let us begin implementation of the agreements reached in Vienna at the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development.

Ongoing Negotiations

The G-77 group of nations put forward for our consideration at the Committee of the Whole an important resolution suggesting a "round of global and sustained negotiations on international economic cooperation for development." Secretary Vance has already stated in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly that "...the United States would participate, in the Committee of the Whole, in consultations to decide the most effective way of conducting such negotiations." Clearly the G-77 had made a major contribution to this Assembly's deliberations.

In discussing this resolution, let me go back to my earlier theme—the difference between dialogue and negotiation, a difference clearly understood by the sponsors of the resolution.

The air, and millions of pages of U.N. documents, have been filled by dialogue—a process the dictionary defines as "a conversation between two or more persons." These conversations have been useful, illuminating, sometimes brilliant, often dull, and too often unheard by the other participants. They can go on as long as the United Nations—and some cynics think they will. But I understand this resolution to

propose something else—negotiations—a process the dictionary defines as “treating with another with a view to coming to terms.”

If it is truly the sea of global negotiations we are to travel, then we must build a solid ship and navigate a course that offers all of us the prospects of a successful voyage. The Committee of the Whole is destined to be the shipyard, and the craftsmen in that institution will have an awesome responsibility. They will be entrusted with forging a consensus among all nations on the direction, procedures, and scope of these negotiations, a consensus required for the proposed round to be successfully launched. They will certainly have to take account of the various negotiations already in progress and the progress already achieved. They must create an environment for their discussions that emphasizes over and over again the global aspect of the proposed negotiations and the global responsibility for our objectives.

I am not suggesting that any of us can or would forget our geographical, political, or economic identities, but I am urging that we embrace a larger self, that we listen as well as talk, that we welcome the opportunity to be more than what we have been—each of us for each of us.

The possibilities of success will depend in important measure on avoiding recrimination. I have never been in a successful negotiation which began with one party calling the other selfish, destructive, arrogant, ignorant, lazy, or pointless. If that is the sport intended, let us stay in a dialogue where new participants in the conversation can forget what was said or tear out a page of the record without anyone caring. But if we are serious about negotiations, let us be serious and respectful of one another.

I read the resolution as saying that the global negotiations will not be duplicative of negotiations going on elsewhere in the U.N. system. Rather our intention is “to reinforce and draw upon” those ongoing processes. That makes sense considering the limitations of time and resources that face us. Which of our peoples would forgive us if, in the face of crisis, we carelessly allowed duplication of negotiations already going on elsewhere in the U.N. system? With the possible exception of energy, the issues which have been suggested for global negotiation do not need new fora or organizations—our predecessors have done a good engineering job in building enough structures where any possible discussion can take place.

Those charged with planning these

negotiations must subject them to helpful schedules. By “helpful,” I mean precise enough to encourage decision but not so difficult so that they cannot be met, thereby detracting from their seriousness of purpose.

Let us leave no doubt that all countries will have the right to participate in these negotiations. Of course, all of us are prepared to examine devices to facilitate our work. It is difficult to imagine the essential preparatory work being done unless such devices as limited working groups are employed in the process.

The major issues enumerated in the resolution can certainly be interrelated, but clearly they are also entitled to different priorities and different timetables of progress. In a serious negotiation, the different parties can be expected to use their negotiating assets to maximum advantage, and in that sense I have always understood the various attempts to link the apples and oranges of past negotiating efforts. Sometimes this is effective, or at least is worth the effort, but too often the unhappy result of this linkage is stalemate, not progress.

We should not be so ambitious as to believe that if these global negotiations take place, they will solve all of our problems. If we are seeking agreement, we should be very careful about conditioning progress in one area upon equivalent progress in another. Linkage may be good for sausage makers, but it has rarely helped progress in substantive negotiations where political pressures are an important element.

As has been already said in this Assembly: “Defining the problem constitutes a substantial part of the solution.” Those words should be engraved on the door of the meeting room of the Committee of the Whole if negotiations in the spirit of the G-77 resolution are to be successful.

If this Assembly envisions negotiations and not just a continuation of the present dialogue, then all participants should be expected to give as well as take, to offer as well as demand, to suggest as well as to criticize, and to compromise instead of censure.

The United Nations has shown that it can be a successful negotiating forum for global economic issues. The common fund is an example although important work remains to be done before it can prove its possibilities. What we have learned in this multilateral process is clear: The issues must be clearly defined; substantive experts who know the problem areas must be important contributors to the process; those who conduct the negotiations must have a special talent to see the faint sparks of

possible agreement and fan them gently into flame; the strength of any agreement in these fora rests on consensus, and with goodwill and political will the nations of the world have shown that consensus is available for all important decisions in significant negotiations.

And one further lesson all of us have learned: We will not always agree. That is the nature of multilateral life, and we should understand it. We can disagree without acrimony. We can disagree and even understand one another. But the task that the resolution calling for global negotiations gives to us is to find areas where our disagreements can be resolved, where our hopes can be made realities, where progress can be made together.

President Carter has said: “We need to share responsibility for solving problems and not to divide the blame for ignoring the problems.” This is the challenge for all of us—and a challenge the United States enthusiastically accepts. □

¹ USUN press release 99.

Kampuchean Credentials

by Richard W. Petree

Statement in the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 1979. Ambassador Petree is U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N. for Special Political Affairs.¹

The matter before us is the report of the Credentials Committee. We can accept or reject that report.

The proposal of India contained in document A/34/63 is not an amendment. It does not merely add to or delete a part of the recommendation of the committee as required by Rule 90 of the Rules of Procedure. It amounts to producing the opposite result and consequently constitutes a new and separate proposal.

My government supports, on technical grounds, the recommendation of the Credentials Committee to accept the credentials of the representative of the Democratic Kampuchean authorities. In the absence of a superior claim, the General Assembly should seat the representatives of the government whose credentials were accepted by the previous General Assembly.

Current State of the World Economy

by Robert D. Hormats

Statement to the U.N. Committee of the Whole on September 11, 1979. Mr. Hormats is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs and U.S. Representative to the committee.¹

In May of last year, this committee began its substantive work with a review of the state of the world economy. A considerable number of delegations spoke and submitted analytical papers. Finally, with the help of Under Secretary General Ripert [Jean Louis Ripert

of France, in charge of the U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs] and his staff, agreement was reached on a number of substantive paragraphs.

Useful as this exercise was, I cannot but feel that it proceeded in somewhat of a vacuum. The committee was anxious to get on with its discussion of transfer of resources and, in its desire to cover all aspects of this question, left no time for reflection on the broader subject. Moreover, we did not make the necessary effort to link the global analysis to the immediate question.

Credentials (Cont'd)

The Heng Samrin regime, installed and maintained by Vietnam through its military invasion and continuing occupation of Kampuchea, does not present such a superior claim. This conclusion parallels the position taken during the Security Council meetings held in January and March of this year to consider the situation in Southeast Asia and is one supported by the governments of the region which are most directly concerned with the problem.

However, I wish to make it absolutely clear that our position on the technical question of credentials in no way implies any degree of support or recognition of the Pol Pot regime itself or approval of its atrocious practices. For 3 years we have been in the forefront of international efforts to effect fundamental changes in these practices and policies by peaceful means. We condemn and abhor the brutal human rights violations which have taken place under the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. We have spoken against those abuses in the Security Council, in the Human Rights Commission, and in the General Assembly, and I reiterate that condemnation today. The brutal practices of the Pol Pot regime are clearly contrary to internationally accepted principles of human rights as set forth in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

However, the so-called Heng Samrin regime, both because it was imposed by Vietnamese military force on the Khmer people and because of its treatment of the Khmer people, is also open to condemnation. One indication of that regime's cruel attitude toward the

Khmer people is the serious threat of famine which affects over 2 million people and the obstacles which the regime continues to pose to an effective international relief effort.

Moreover, in the case of the Vietnamese invasion, U.N. members confront an important principle of the charter—the sovereign independence of member states. The United Nations cannot condone the action of one nation to invade, occupy, and control the internal political life of another.

My Government believes that while it is incumbent upon the General Assembly to address the fundamental issues involved in the situation in Kampuchea, this is not the time to do so. We believe the overall human rights situation and the political aspirations of the Khmer people need further investigation through U.N. machinery, and there will be appropriate occasions to deal with these questions. During the consideration of the item of the situation in Kampuchea, for example, my government will spell out in greater detail ideas on what should be done to deal with these very serious problems.

The United States looks forward to working with the governments of the region and with all U.N. members to encourage withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, an end to outside interference, and emergence of a genuinely independent government in Kampuchea which is at peace with its neighbors, represents the aspirations of the Khmer people, and respects their human rights. □

This is not intended as a criticism. Indeed, since our first days as a committee, we have done much to find our way. We have clarified the committee's mandate. We reached agreement on a text on transfer of resources this January and then on food and agriculture in March. We should continue to learn from experience and to improve our committee's effectiveness.

Discussions and resolutions over the last 5 years have shown that we cannot construct a new international economic order as an exercise in scholarship, diplomacy, or even justice. We must find our route to a new order beginning with a realistic understanding of the current state of the world economy. Thus, we will know at the start where action is needed and where it is possible. Further, we must be aware that no all goals are obtainable at once and that the identification of practical objectives and the establishment of priorities permit a better focus more conducive to progress.

I would add, too, that the essence of development lies not in the adoption of texts. If our efforts are to be of real use, they must be translated from the theoretical, and indeed the diplomatic level, into day-to-day policy planning and policymaking in our individual countries. This applies to all countries and groups of countries. The ability of any one of them to do what is needed is clearly related to the willingness of others to bear their share of the burden as well.

Current Statistics and Policy Problems

For most countries represented here the need for hard thinking about our national and collective futures is considerably more pressing than it was when we began these exchanges well over a year ago. This is certainly true of my own country.

After a strong increase in output in the last quarter of 1978, the anticipated leveling off of our economy has taken a more severe turn than expected. Our real gross national product declined by 0.4% in the first half of this year, and there are expectations that negative growth and increases in unemployment will continue throughout this year. At the same time, inflation in our country hit an annual rate of 10% or 11% for the year as a whole and will be only somewhat less in 1980.

On the external side, the burden of the additional costs of imported oil will retard the progress we have been making in reducing our current account deficit. However, our underlying trend is positive. This, coupled with appro-

¹USUN press release 81.

priate monetary and fiscal policy, can be expected to assure a strong dollar during this period.

With respect to the economies of other developed countries, while no one projects a decline as pronounced and general as that of 1974-75, there has been a distinct worsening in prospects for the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a group. In many OECD countries, the problem of the 1970's has been a slower rate of growth at a higher rate of inflation than in the 1960's. The oil price increases over the last year did not cause these problems, but they did seriously exacerbate them and made their solution considerably more difficult. In all, by the end of 1980, the cumulative effects of the oil price increase will be to reduce OECD growth by 1½-2 percentage points less than it might have been. This represents some \$120 billion in potential OECD-country goods and services lost and an additional 2.8 million people out of work. Inflation will increase as a result of the oil price increase by 2-2½ points more than had been projected earlier. Average growth rates are now expected to decline to 3% in 1979 and to roughly 2% in 1980. Inflation, at 6.5% for the group in 1978, is expected to hit 9.2% in 1979 and could remain at 9% in 1980.

The slower growth in the industrialized countries will translate into reduced markets for exports from developing countries and increased current account deficits for many of them. As in 1974-75, some developing countries will do reasonably well despite the slow growth in developed countries by increasing their borrowings or improving the competitiveness of their exports. But others, particularly the least developed countries, will be especially injured. Under Secretary General Ripert has made a useful contribution in describing the difficulties facing the developing countries in maintaining growth despite current economic problems. These difficulties include the rising prices of energy imports. But energy is not the only problem facing the developing countries, and I shall turn to some of these problems a bit later.

For almost all countries, the confluence of economic slowdown and heightened inflation poses difficult choices among policies of stimulation and stabilization. Too much economic contraction could lead to the kind of generalized decline that occurred in 1974-75; accelerating growth in such a way as to strengthen inflationary pressures is also undesirable.

Slower Growth in the Future?

On the basis of current projections, it appears that industrialized market economies could be entering a period of slower growth, accompanied by levels of unemployment and inflation higher than those to which we had earlier become accustomed. While the immediate situation is less acute than the slump of 1974-75, it is accompanied by a greater awareness that these problems may be with us in one form or another for several years.

One must then ask why we face the problems of slower growth with high inflation. A central reason is that of supply constraints. Traditionally, economists and economic policymakers have focused their attention on problems of demand. If demand could be properly managed through monetary and fiscal policies, the necessary supplies would, it was felt, be available.

In recent years, however, the problem of supply and structural rigidities

and the uncertainties they bring with them have become major factors in higher inflation and slower growth. Seen in a macroeconomic way, this is a matter of a mismatch between old, but available, capacities and new demand. Thus, in some cases countries run up against constraints imposed by lack of availability of skilled labor, manufacturing capacity, raw materials, or energy at lower growth rates than in the past. From a microeconomic viewpoint, we have the image of a businessman who is unsure of the availability of human or material inputs necessary for his products. Because of these doubts—to which may be added market uncertainties due to inflationary expectation, import barriers, and exchange rate fluctuations—his attitude toward investments grows more cautious. New facilities are not built; research and development may be neglected. The result is a further decline in the rate of increase of productivity. Supply constraints tighten further, and even lower levels of growth trigger new inflationary pressures.

Another reason for current problems is the near institutionalization of the wage-price spiral. Wage increases, which once bore a direct relation to increases in productivity, now relate statistically, and even formally in many cases, to present or anticipated rises in prices. These increases, in turn, are passed on again to the consumer, and the spiral begins all over again. Productivity increases, even at a good rate, cannot keep pace.

In many cases, countries have chosen policies of growth moderation in order to reduce the rate of inflation or avoid rekindling inflationary pressures which would occur by attempting to achieve growth rates which would bump up against supply constraints.

One difficulty with slower growth, of course, is that new jobs are created at a slower pace, and new investment which increases productivity and helps reduce supply constraints does not take place at a desirable rate. While the main effects of this are domestic, it also means less scope for adjusting to new imports from abroad. Thus slow growth both slows demand for imports and reduces the capacity to adjust to imports—leading to inevitable protectionist pressures. This has obvious negative implications for export and development prospects in developing countries.

Finally, and of particular concern to the most disadvantaged countries, is the question of concessional assistance flows. All developed market economy countries, whether or not they have formally accepted specific targets, are

Venda Homeland

by Herbert K. Reis

*Statement in the Security Council on September 21, 1979. Mr. Reis is U.S. Alternate Representative to the Security Council.*¹

The United States would like to commend you for calling the attention of the international community to this latest attempt by South Africa to grant a fraudulent independence to another of the tribal homelands. We wish to reaffirm that the policy of the United States is to withhold recognition and all forms of official relations from the so-called independent homelands of Transkei and Bophutatswana already created by South Africa. We shall apply the same strict policy to Venda.

My country fully supports the spirit and thrust of your statement. We take its main point that there is no such entity as Venda; that the territory which South Africa chooses to call Venda is in fact an integral part of South Africa. We agree with this position. We will treat Venda exactly as we treat South Africa. □

¹ USUN press release 82.

pledged to continue to increase flows of such assistance, particularly to low-income countries whose access to capital is limited.

In the United States, the emphasis on helping the low-income countries and in eliminating world poverty is not only the policy of the Administration but the desire of our Congress and our people as well. This national commitment stems from our belief that growth and equity, for the world as a whole and for each country, are inseparable. It was for this reason that we supported establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Trust Fund, endorsed special benefits in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) for least developed countries, are directing much of our aid to the special problems of the low-income countries, and were pleased to join in the consensus for special action for the least developed countries at UNCTAD V [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development].

Our commitments with regard to assistance to the developing nations remain unchanged. Yet, it takes no political or economic wizardry to see that when budgetary restraint is called for, when domestic welfare demands grow and the revenue base shrinks, obtaining the necessary appropriations is more difficult.

Should the world follow a scenario of low growth such as I have outlined, we all know it would produce grim effects on developing countries—with tragic effects on their peoples. Certainly, in those countries, demand for goods would slow, their imports would cost more, and aid would be tighter. In addition, a decline in growth in the developing countries would impact adversely on the prosperity of the industrialized market and Socialist countries whose economic prospects are increasingly dependent upon the expansion of the economies of the developing countries.

In our interdependent world, the circle is complete. We cannot spend our time looking back at one group of countries or another and saying your growth is too low, your inflation is too high, your aid is too low, your oil prices went up too sharply. The question is, rather, what together we can do to reverse this kind of scenario, and to replace it with one of new, sustained, mutually beneficial and equitable growth?

International Responses

Much work already has been done which will enable the international community to respond better to the

present situation than it did to the situation in 1974-75.

- The IMF—as a result of major increases in its resources, creation of the Witteveen facility, modifications in its approach to conditionality, and a significant liberalization of the Compensatory Finance Facility—is in a vastly better position to support efforts of countries to reduce payments imbalances.

- The large payments deficits of some developed countries, which forced them earlier to draw heavily on the Fund and borrow large amounts in international capital markets, have been reduced.

- The large surpluses of some industrialized countries, which were matched by deficits on the part of other countries, have been in many cases reduced or eliminated.

- The recently concluded MTN have resulted in a more liberal trading system—one based on rules which reduce the potential for arbitrary increases in trade barriers. These have led to important benefits for developing nations. Contrary to assertions, there is, as the result of the MTN, considerably less, not more, protection in the world today than in the past.

- The system of generalized tariff preferences has led to important improvements in market access for developing countries. In my country alone, over \$5 billion in imports came in under the GSP system in 1978.

- Substantial increases in contributions to the multilateral development banks have been made by developed countries and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and commitments for still greater contributions have been undertaken.

- Agreements have been reached on measures to stabilize prices in tin, sugar, and coffee.

Together, these developments constitute an important set of structural improvements in the international economy and a major response by international institutions to needs of developing nations. We must continue to press ahead in seeking improvement of international economic mechanisms. This means moving forward on key issues we have been negotiating in many forums, such as:

- Full implementation of the agreements reached at the MTN, including the various codes;

- In that context, agreement on the outstanding issue of safeguards in a way which does not discriminate against individual countries;

- Agreements on international grain reserves, on food aid levels, and on

means of furthering food production in developing countries;

- Agreement on the articles of a common fund, together with further progress in individual commodity negotiations;

- Follow-up to the agreed conclusions of the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD);

- A speedy implementation of the measures in favor of the least developed and other categories of developing countries which were agreed on at UNCTAD V;

- Conclusion of a treaty on illicit payments;

- Conclusion of the codes relating to transfer of technology, transnational corporations, and restrictive business practices;

- Agreement on mechanisms to promote the production of both conventional and nonrenewable energy in developing countries; and

- Further improvements in the IMF and making good use of the already major improvements in the international trust fund which have taken place in recent years.

As we make or add to such lists, however, we must avoid the temptation to believe that the primary answers to economic problems lie in international discussion and agreement. We can and will reach agreements here and elsewhere, but the present economic situation I have outlined suggests that the most important answers are to be found and implemented at home, in all of our countries.

Structural Change in World Industry

Factors Supporting Industrialization. The industrialized countries have particularly important responsibilities at the present time. Clearly my country and others share the objective of curbing inflation and resuming the path toward stable growth. But beyond this is the goal of structural adjustment through an expansion of industrial capacity in sectors with a promising future. Through such an expansion, new jobs will be created, and our flagging rate of productivity growth can be revived. To accomplish this, we need greater savings, more investment, particularly in research and development and in new facilities, and greater mobility of resources. In developed and developing countries alike, savings are often discouraged by policies directed to achieve other objectives.

Because we are this week addressing the industrial development of develop-

ing countries, it is particularly appropriate to note that countries successful in pursuing industrialization strategies and competing in the international economy have been those where policies encourage a high rate of savings and investment. Other key factors, identified by recent studies carried out under the aegis of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) include: the efficient utilization of human and physical capital; educational and training programs relevant to the industrial and technological needs of the individual country; the encouragement of entrepreneurship; and the availability of a commercial infrastructure including banking, market research, and other services.

No doubt, the examination of the industrial achievements of countries such as South Korea, Singapore, and Brazil might suggest other factors as well. What is clear from their experience, however, is that the world economy today provides significant opportunities for developing nations to compete. The success of such countries—rather than any internationally mandated redeployment of industry—has given an important impetus to global change.

The Role of Positive Adjustment. The commitment to a progressive shift to more positive adjustment policies, as an integrated part of efforts for more sustained and better balanced global growth, was made by the OECD Ministers in June 1978 and reconfirmed at their meeting in June 1979. It was also an important focus of the Tokyo economic summit.

Positive adjustment policies mean more than just palliatives to ease the burden of change on workers, enterprises, and communities most directly affected by it. They facilitate the development of new facilities to employ the resources freed through the play of comparative advantage in international trading patterns.

The United States and other OECD governments are working together to develop sound and effective positive adjustment policies. One aspect of positive adjustment policies is trade adjustment assistance. The United States has an active program of trade adjustment assistance for industries and workers injured by increased imports. In 1975 a greatly improved program was put into effect. Since 1975 benefits of over \$724 million have been extended to more than 458,000 workers. Over 100 U.S. firms have received \$150 million in loans, guarantees, and technical assistance to facilitate their adjustment. Our government is seeking to make trade adjustment assistance

even more dynamic and forward looking.

Enhanced efforts to stimulate positive adjustment represent an important new challenge. There is a hard-to-define line between facilitating change which is basically in response to market forces and artificially stimulating economic developments which may, in fact, be contrary to these forces and, therefore, create inefficiency in the long run. If the commitment to positive adjustment of the OECD governments is to be fully realized, however, we must do everything feasible to facilitate orderly structural change. In this way, we can assure that positive trends of the past can be further accelerated. For example, total OECD imports of manufactures from developing countries rose from \$11.7 billion in 1972 to about \$27 billion in 1978, an annual rate of 21%. Moreover, this figure should increase substantially in the future since manufactured exports as a share of total developing country exports may rise from the current level of 40% to 55% in 1985.

Mutual Responsibilities for Expanding Global Trade. The responsibility for such change in world industrial trade does not rest with the industrialized countries alone. New jobs and new opportunities for workers and capital can only exist in a situation of expanding world trade. While an open trading system in the "North" will insure growing import demand, the greatest new impetus to world trade can come from the developing world. The importance developing countries are giving to increasing exchanges with each other, and the growing flow of goods of all categories between North and South, indicate a potential for a new configuration and a new dynamism to world trade in which the role of developing countries will be far more important.

For this to happen, however, a common basis for global trade must be maintained and strengthened. The Geneva agreements, terminating the Tokyo Round, are the most recent and significant steps in this process. However, the agreements and the codes which were developed at the MTN represent the end only of a negotiation. The codes are a new beginning to a more open international trading system. Their successful implementation domestically and internationally will insure that their further evolution opens new avenues of trade. In the long run, it is this evolution which will determine the nature of change in world trading patterns. The developing countries have an opportunity to exert a sig-

nificant influence on this process. They and the developed nations lose if they do not. My government renews its appeal to them not to stand aside from this process but to bring to it the enhanced participation which we have all recognized as essential in a more prosperous and just world order.

Consistent with the common interest our nations have in expanded trade must be the willingness of the developing countries, as they industrialize, to open their borders to the products of others.

One of the characteristics of the earlier phase of expansion of world trade, which still remains true of trade among developed countries today, is the massive exchange of manufactured goods among economies that are on similar levels of development. This has promoted economies of scale and has certainly provided for levels of welfare far higher than would have existed had each country tried to meet all of its own demand. Despite this history, statistics show that only one-fifth of trade in manufactures among developing countries is among countries having the same level of industrial development. This suggests that some of these countries are not extending to others in similar situations and, ultimately, their own people as well, the benefits of economies of scale and regional integration.

Developing countries also have reasons to open their doors further to the exports of developed countries. First, consumers in developing countries would obviously benefit. In addition, I need only point out that theoretical and statistical arguments demonstrating the minimal effects of economic displacement through imports from developing countries will not be convincing to affected workers and industries in developed countries if new market opportunities for their goods cannot be shown. In short, if industrial production and exports in each developing country are to increase, so too must the individual and collective willingness of developing countries to absorb each other's exports and the exports of the developed countries.

Responsibility for the Earth's Resources

Raw materials, energy, and the basic qualities of the land and sea are critical elements in the problem of supply. With regard to the first, the World Bank has noted that inadequate incentives and low investment priorities have been accorded primary commodities in developing countries in recent years. While each nation may have

its own view on the reasons for this development, there is no doubt that, in the longer term, it could lead to critical shortages.

To head these off, both national and international action is required. Commodity agreements and compensatory financing facilities should lessen the risks to developing countries in further developing their raw materials potential. Each country, however, must make its own decision on whether it wants foreign investment and, if so, create a well-understood and dependable set of conditions to promote such investment. A code of conduct providing guidelines that reflect the interests of all can certainly be helpful in this regard.

Earlier in this discussion, I noted the greater awareness we now have of the fundamental problem of limited supply and growing world demand for oil. Neither individual states nor the international community as a whole can be said to have fully responded to this major concern. At the Tokyo economic summit, leaders of a number of industrialized democracies undertook a bold set of commitments to limit oil imports and increase energy production and conservation. In my own country, agreement between the executive and legislative branches on a national program of energy conservation and development has proved elusive. We expect, however, that in response to President Carter's policy pronouncements of this July, the Congress will take action to insure the achievement of our national energy objectives.

Oil exporters have a parallel responsibility, while efforts at enhanced conservation and the search for new energy sources are taking place, to be more sensitive to the impact of their actions on the world economy. Many of us may be reluctant to recognize publicly the disruptive impact of the energy situation on the international economy. However, a discussion of the problems of the world economy, and of the developing countries in particular, without such recognition would be as incomplete as an attempt to understand the problems faced by Noah without mentioning the fact that it rained.

I mention energy not because I intend that it be a divisive issue. On the contrary, it is a global problem which should unite all of our countries in a common effort to insure more stable energy markets, the absence of supply and price disruption, increased conservation, and a more vigorous search for new sources.

One point on which we can all agree was underlined by the Secretary General of the United Nations—the need to

help developing countries increase energy production. In many cases, their economic prospects will depend increasingly on their ability to meet more of their energy needs from domestic production than on any other single factor. Assisting them to develop new sources of both conventional and non-conventional energy is in the interest of the entire international community.

An issue on which there has been veritable international agreement is that of food. Many of our countries are currently cooperating actively to enhance agricultural research to help developing countries increase food production, to reduce postharvest food losses, and increase food assistance. We welcome the recent decision of the World Food Council to assist developing countries elaborate comprehensive food sector strategies which can lead to increased production and improved distribution, particularly for nutritionally vulnerable groups. Greater efforts are clearly required. One out of every five of our fellow human beings is sick or weak or hungry because he or she simply does not have enough to eat. No nation, no person can feel that equity is served while this problem persists; each of our nations can and must do more to eliminate it.

There are other key natural resources which do not normally enter into international commerce. I refer to forests, arable cropland, water, and even the air we breathe. We are living in a period of desertification and deforestation. We have held a U.N. conference on that theme. Major causes of these problems are the stripping of forests for firewood and the depletion of the soil because of overuse, lack of irrigation, and higher price of fertilizers. We must address these problems both as part of the global energy and food problems and also as a transcendental issue which, if not reversed soon, can dramatically affect the global environment and economy for decades to come.

The International Dialogue

There will be much discussion during this week of the form the international economic dialogue is to take as we move into the 1980's. We agree with the Secretary General of the United Nations that new institutional arrangements are not substitutes for addressing real substantive issues. New institutions should be created if they are needed. But in assessing their need, we would want to insure that they would not duplicate the work of existing bodies. We would want to be convinced that they would provide opportunities that do not now exist for progress

in the dialogue. Moreover, we would need to take into account the expense, both in financial and human terms, of establishing new bodies, particularly since work will continue elsewhere.

We believe that the record indicates that advances have been made on many important North-South issues. Yesterday Under Secretary General Corea [Gamina Corea of Sri Lanka, Director General of UNCTAD] identified the progress made at the Manila meeting and in UNCTAD's other fora; we, too, think progress has been made. We agree with Executive Director Khane [Abd-el Rahman Khane of Algeria, Executive Director of UNIDO] that the UNIDO consultations have proved useful and that their sector focus and broad participation are conducive to meaningful progress. We share your judgment that the Committee of the Whole is demonstrating increasing effectiveness in addressing specific items of common interest. And we can take considerable satisfaction from the major improvements in the IMF, the increased lending of the multilateral development banks, the trade liberalization in the MTN, and the structural changes in the world economy resulting from countries taking advantage of new opportunities.

The importance of the future of the dialogue, and the long-term consequences of our decisions, argue, I believe, that we not try to reach a definitive answer this week on the proposition before us. Instead, over the next weeks, we should reflect on whether a new round of global negotiations will strengthen our dialogue and enhance its utility or whether, on the contrary, it risks diverting attention and energy from those arenas where the dialogue is now going on and where, as noted, progress is being made, as the technical and political obstacles are sorted out and overcome. When these points are clear, we will be better able to decide together on the most appropriate means by which we can seek to deal effectively with global economic problems to our common benefit. Once agreement has been reached on this, you can count on the United States to play an active and constructive role. □

¹USUN press release 77 of Sept. 12, 1979.

U.N. Reforms

by Charles William Maynes

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 26, 1979. Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.*¹

I appreciate your invitation to appear before this subcommittee to discuss our ongoing efforts to bring reform and improved functioning to the United Nations.

As you know, we have made a number of specific proposals and suggestions on U.N. reform in the Secretary of State's report to the President and the President's report to Congress on U.N. Reform and Restructuring in March 1978. Since you are familiar with these reports, I will focus on some of the most important areas for reform.

In some, such as improving the functioning and effectiveness of the General Assembly, progress has been made. In others such as enhancing the role of the Security Council and the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and in the area of human rights, more progress needs to be made. In yet others, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes and use of the International Court of Justice, progress is decidedly too slow.

Improved Procedures of the General Assembly

There has been marked improvement in the functioning and effectiveness of the U.N. General Assembly. As I stated in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on September 13, the Secretary General has issued a report outlining suggestions and recommendations for making the General Assembly more efficient. The report incorporated many of our own proposals and has already had a positive influence on the work of the current session of the Assembly. The General Committee of the 34th General Assembly recommended that the Assembly approve the suggestions and recommendations of Secretary General Waldheim on the organization of the session, and on September 21 the General Assembly adopted those recommendations.

A key element of the Secretary General's proposals is the recommendation

on ways the General (Steering) Committee may be used to advance the rational organization and general conduct of the Assembly's proceedings. This calls for having the committee regularly review the progress of work of the session and for staggering the consideration of items over 2 or more years.

Other important proposals included in the report were the early selection of candidates for election to the General Committee so that presiding officers and the committee itself might prepare more thoroughly for upcoming sessions; the requirement that candidates for presiding officer have 2 years' prior experience in the U.N. system; and that committee officers conduct, whenever appropriate, informal negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on specific issues. Several of the main committees of the General Assembly have already implemented this latter proposal.

The United States and numerous other member nations have been concerned by the organizational chaos that affected last year's session. We believe the Secretary General's report, and the action of the Assembly in approving it, will have a major positive effect on this and future General Assemblies.

Enhancing the Role of the Security Council

The President's report on U.N. reform put forward a cluster of proposals to strengthen the role of the Security Council in encouraging and assisting in the peaceful resolution of disputes threatening international peace and security. These proposals are designed to identify areas of threats to peace and to explore actions the Security Council might take to defuse potential crises.

Our proposals include:

- Greater use of informal meetings or consultations among members of the Security Council on particular disputes;
- Greater use of periodic meetings—perhaps, as foreseen in Article 28 of the Charter, with participation of officials for capitals;
- Greater use of informal consultations of the Council; and
- More frequent use of committees of the Council comprised either of all Council members or a few members of the Council, as well as periodic oral

reports by the Secretary General to informal sessions of the Council.

In preparation for this session of the General Assembly, we have devoted increased attention in our bilateral discussions to enhancing the role of the Security Council. I personally participated in consultations with officials of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and found them supportive of several of our proposals. We have also seen a growing appreciation, on part of other members of the Council, of the need for a broadened informal role for the Council.

Strengthening Peacekeeping Capabilities

U.N. peacekeeping operations are among the most successful—and unheralded—of the U.N. activities. There were, until the U.N. Emergency Force completed its mandate on the Sinai, almost 13,000 officers and men from 27 nations involved in six separate U.N. peacekeeping operations. The technique of peacekeeping is one of the true contributions of the U.N. membership to the maintenance of international peace and security.

We continue to seek support for our proposals which we feel would strengthen the U.N.'s peacekeeping capabilities. For example, our proposals for a U.N. peacekeeping reserve and for the training of standby units and observers would make U.N. peacekeeping operations more flexible and effective and less expensive.

We have introduced our proposals on peacekeeping in the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. We also delivered a report containing our views to Secretary General Waldheim in June, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 33/114, which invited all member states to supply the Secretary General with information on possible standby capacities and on experience gained in peacekeeping operations and national training programs. I will supply a copy of our report for the record.

We have consulted a number of other governments over the last several months to see if there is sufficient support for a new resolution on peacekeeping in this General Assembly. We have also called the attention of a number of governments to the text of our June report to the Secretary General, urging them to make similar reports if they had not already done so. While most other governments did not support the idea of a new resolution on peacekeeping at this stage, a number of

them have indicated their intention to make reports to the Secretary General.

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Under the charter, member states have an obligation and a responsibility to settle their differences by peaceful means. In addition, the charter contains specific provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Resort by states to institutionalized third-party disputes settlement procedures is, unfortunately, not frequent. This state of affairs periodically generates initiatives for institutional reforms. It is doubtful that the establishment of new institutions would, by themselves, persuade parties to a dispute to have more frequent recourse to third-party dispute settlement.

We believe, first, that existing methods can be made more efficient. We also feel that until the reasons are known why states do not use existing machinery, the establishment of new machinery would probably have the effect of simply increasing the size and expense of international bureaucracies. We have proposed an analysis of these reasons in the Charter Review Committee and in the Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force.

International Court of Justice

We feel that far greater use should be made of the ICJ. It is a forum before which all states—large and small—may come as equals. We have suggested that its role as a potential dispute settler and as a source of international law be studied and expanded if we are ever to elaborate a coherent body of norms to govern the ever increasing interactions of states. However, there is no sense in speaking of greater use of advisory opinions unless there is at least a

political commitment to accord such advice a very high measure of respect.

In 1970 the United States introduced into the General Assembly an agenda item intended to focus renewed international attention on the Court. Among the principal suggestions made were expansion of the Court's jurisdiction, broadening access to the Court's advisory opinion procedures, simplification of the rules of the Court in order to reduce costs and time delays, and increased flexibility in the use of chambers of the Court. The General Assembly was unable to agree on any concrete positive measures and in 1974 merely adopted a resolution calling upon states to consider recourse to the Court for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

While there have been some promising modifications of the Court's rules designed to make use of the Court less complicated, these have not yet led to any increased use of the Court. There is still widespread reluctance among states toward third-party dispute settlement.

Steps can, of course, be taken to enhance the use of the Court. For instance, it should be our standard practice to examine every treaty which the U.S. negotiates with a view of accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ in disputes arising under the treaty. Even if there is no mention of the Court, there should be a provision for binding third-party settlement of disputes arising under the treaty.

Unfortunately, any proposal by the United States to expand the use of the Court and strengthen it is likely to raise serious doubts as to our bona fides. The continued limitation upon U.S. acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction imposed by the Connally reservation is an obstacle to U.S. leadership to reform in this field.

Human Rights

At the current General Assembly, there are a number of reform proposals which we feel will enhance the efforts of the United Nations in the area of human rights. The Canadian Foreign Minister, in her speech to the Assembly, recommended the creation of an Under Secretary General for Human Rights. At other General Assemblies developing nations have urged the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights. These and similar proposals have been warmly received and we believe will escalate efforts to strengthen the status and program of the Secretariat's Human Rights Division. There is a good deal of support for moving the division back to New York from Geneva.

We are encouraged by signs that human rights is becoming more of a priority area in international organizations. U.S. initiatives in this area have served as a catalyst for active participation by individuals and groups in the grievance process. The procedures under the Human Rights Commission for petitions against countries have produced growing response, and more countries are adhering to procedures under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Perhaps most importantly, U.N. members are more sensitive to human rights issues and, therefore, are more willing to consider human rights initiatives and the human rights records of individual countries. □

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: OAS General Assembly Convenes

The ninth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in La Paz, Bolivia, October 21-31, 1979. Following is Secretary Vance's statement at that session on October 23.¹

All of us understand that the problems we face require that we lift our sights to a more distant horizon. We face imposing challenges in the 1980's. Our ability to surmount them will determine whether we can achieve three fundamental goals which our people share:

- To live in peace;
- To participate freely in the decisions which affect their lives; and
- To share equitably in the benefits of steady economic development.

We approach these goals from distinct and sometimes diverse perspectives, but I believe each of us recognizes as well that our futures are interwoven. Thus, it is essential that we understand each other's goals as we shape our individual courses and our collective direction in the decade ahead.

Peace

Our OAS Charter seeks to assure that each nation in the hemisphere will be free from external aggression. The charter's guarantees of nonintervention and self-determination, which are reinforced by the Rio treaty, are intended to free our energies and our resources for the works of peace—to enhance the freedom and the well-being of our people.

Strengthening the fabric of peace in the Americas is the first goal that must shape our vision of the 1980's. It is a goal that could be endangered in the decade ahead by territorial disputes and other tensions among countries, by breakdowns in processes of peaceful and democratic change within countries, or by the terrible dangers created by modern armaments.

President Carter has made clear our support for efforts to resolve differences within the hemisphere peacefully.

• Working together, the United States and Panama have forged a new partnership that insures the sovereignty of Panama and the security of the canal.

• We strongly endorse the efforts of the distinguished mediator Dr. Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero to help El Salvador and Honduras find a just and lasting solution to their border conflict.

• We are indebted to the Holy See for undertaking to mediate the long-standing and troubling differences between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel.

• We hope that a mutually acceptable solution to Bolivia's landlocked status can be found and that this Assembly will take positive steps in this direction.

This organization and its member states can play an important role in the search for peaceful settlements to these and other disputes between nations in the hemisphere.

Tensions and injustices within nations can also produce disturbances that reverberate beyond national boundaries and create opportunities for outside interference. Thus, responding to popular aspirations is an essential element in assuring the preservation of national sovereignty and self-determination. Peaceful and democratic change within nations is vital to the security of the hemisphere.

But if a strong and prosperous region made up of strong and prosperous countries is the best assurance of peace in today's world, we must also be alert to any threat of interference from outside powers.

Earlier this month, President Carter reported Soviet assurances that their troops in Cuba would not threaten the security of any nation in this hemisphere. At the same time, he announced certain specific actions by the United States to assure that they would not in fact do so. Our interest is in helping to preserve the freedom of choice and action of the member states of this organization.

The Caribbean region, in particular, can ill afford the emergence of tensions or confrontations that could divert scarce resources badly needed for development. Few regions of the world have suffered more from this decade's international economic dislocations. We welcome the suggestion made by the Dominican Republic 3 weeks ago that an ad hoc committee be established to allow for regular consultations between the United States and the countries of the Caribbean. Such regional

collaboration can contribute to a climate of confidence and peace—a climate where all countries can concentrate on pressing economic and social needs.

The resources we must marshal for human needs can be diverted as well by the unnecessary accumulation of destructive weaponry. The leaders of this hemisphere have long recognized this inescapable reality. The regional goal of limiting conventional arms was first proclaimed by the signatories to the declaration of Ayacucho in 1974. It was reaffirmed by the same states just last year. The Government of Mexico has put forward concrete proposals.

President Carter has expressed my country's strong support for these initiatives. The United States and, we believe, most other arms exporting countries, would respect and cooperate with restraint agreements among arms importing countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Such agreements would parallel this region's leadership in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. We all look forward to the day when the treaty of Tlatelolco will enter into force throughout the hemisphere. As we enter the 1980's, each of us has an interest in assuring that the expanding developments of nuclear energy will be free of the dark shadow of nuclear arms.

Human Rights

The second goal which shapes our vision of the future is to open our societies to the full participation of all citizens. In this respect, it is especially significant that we are meeting in Bolivia. We join other delegations in expressing our respect and support for Bolivia in its transition to democratic rule.

Significant progress had been made in many countries of the Americas in recent years.

• A revitalized Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is giving new vitality to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission performs an invaluable service as an authoritative, impartial body whose reports provide a basis for practical improvements in the lives of many of our citizens.

• The American Convention of

Human Rights has now entered into force, creating the Inter-American Court of Human Rights—another milestone in our system.

- In a number of nations in the hemisphere, people live today in greater freedom. Democratic institutions have grown stronger. And, in turn, the democracies have assumed a growing role in the activities of the OAS. We warmly welcome this development, for it can only serve to strengthen the inter-American system as a whole.

- The leadership exercised by the OAS has through the 17th meeting of consultation on Nicaragua contributed significantly to bringing about necessary change in that country. Let me say to the delegation from the Government of Nicaragua that we know that a new day has come to your country. We will join with others in the hemisphere to support your efforts to build a democratic and equitable Nicaragua.

We welcome the declarations of the new Government of El Salvador and hope that peaceful and democratic change will take root there.

The adoption of democratic norms in an increasing number of countries allows us to look to a hemisphere that is united in its appreciation for shared human values. Governments that hold democratic values in common will find it easier to understand each other and to work together.

As we review the progress that has been made to strengthen democracy and human rights, we must also recognize that distinct cross-currents are still present. We cannot close our eyes to torture or killings, to disappearances or arbitrary detention—wherever they occur. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that respect for the rule of law and for freedom of speech, press, and association is not honored in some countries.

Where terrorism exists, whether within nations or across borders, it must be dealt with firmly and in accordance with the rule of law. At the same time, we must distinguish between violence and subversion on the one hand and legitimate dissent on the other. The suppression of legitimate rights cannot be justified in the name of national security.

In the decade ahead, we must continue to press for the full recognition of human rights and freedoms, and we must insure that progress achieved is reinforced by institutions that safeguard against continued or renewed oppression.

As we look to the 1980's, let me strongly reaffirm the commitment made

by President Carter at the eighth session last year: "... we will continually support and encourage political systems that allow their people to participate fully and democratically in the decisions that affect their lives."

Cooperation for Development

Our long-term success in building more open and pluralistic societies will depend in part on our ability to work to sustain economic growth and to assure that the fruits of that growth are shared fairly.

As we move into the 1980's, we all will be grappling with serious economic dilemmas: controlling inflation without choking growth; expanding world trade in ways that are fair to both developing and industrial nations; limiting energy consumption without disrupting development; holding down expenditures when necessary, but without placing the burden of adjustment on the poor.

Democratic institutions provide the best means for meeting such economic tests, for citizens who are participating in decisions that affect their well-being are more likely to accept sacrifices that serve the common good.

Regional institutions, including the OAS, can help us to devise more creative approaches to these economic quandaries. In the past, Latin America has led the way in designing new developing strategies that respond to changing world conditions. It can do so again.

As we adjust to new forms of interdependence, there inevitably will be differences among us, but the need for cooperation will be more compelling than ever before.

One area for which this is particularly true is energy. As the President of Mexico, Lopez Portillo, said in his perceptive speech to the U.N. General Assembly last month: "Within a few decades, the age of petroleum will come to an end. We have reached a watershed between two different eras in the life of mankind."

While each of us must put our own energy house in order, there are important steps we can take together.

- There are no plans for regional preparatory meetings for the 1981 World Conference on New and Renewable Energy. This organization and the nations of the region—some of which are world leaders in the development of renewable energy—should consider ways of contributing to the development of an effective program of action.

- We should pursue the promising IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] initiative to see whether a work-

able program can be established to encourage investment in energy and minerals projects in the hemisphere.

- And we should intensify our efforts to share in the development of new energy technologies. The recent consultations between President Carter's science adviser and a number of governments in the region have contributed to this process. Energy developments will be among the highest priorities of our new institute for scientific and technological cooperation.

Beyond energy, this organization is now addressing a number of other economic challenges we face together. The OAS Economic and Social Council (CIES) meeting in Barbados last month agreed to consider whether the scope of the inter-American process for trade consultation could be widened. A clear consensus also emerged in Barbados that social development programs should receive greater priority in the OAS budget. We should implement those decisions rapidly.

In defining our regional agenda, we must consider together:

- How we can more effectively confront the conditions of poverty which still afflict millions of our people;

- How to stimulate greater subregional economic cooperation—in the Caribbean, in Central America, and among the countries of the Andean pact;

- How to strengthen the IDB, already an institution with a worldwide reputation for successful development lending and one of my country's highest priorities among the international financial institutions, as well as the subregional development banks, such as the Caribbean and Central American Development Banks; and

- How better to coordinate our respective positions in global negotiations when matters of vital concern to us are under consideration.

The Organization of American States

Such cooperative efforts demand a strengthened OAS. The forces of change reshaping the political and economic landscape, in this hemisphere and the world, will intensify in the coming decade.

We must decide how this organization should meet these new realities. What are the themes and subjects we should deal with in the decade ahead? What are our priorities? If the organization is not to become irrelevant, it must deal with the major issues of our day—global and regional—and the priority interests of its members. The

organization will be what its members want it to be—nothing more or less. I suggest that a prime task before us is to reexamine and redefine the role and function of this organization and how it should relate to the problems of today's world.

The organization's structure must enable us to meet these new challenges. Toward that end, the United States supports the proposals before us to authorize the Secretary General to reorganize and streamline the Secretariat and to rationalize the national offices in the member countries. And we would support efforts to strengthen the Secretariat's technical and economic expertise.

The financing of this organization must also be addressed. Specifically, there must be a wider sharing of costs. The existing assessment system simply does not accord with our present relationships. We are convinced that a new formula is needed now.

We have recently proposed a formula which we consider a fair compromise. I hope that we can resolve this issue here in La Paz.

In closing, let me say that I look to the 1980's with hope. The future is not without dangers, but I have a hopeful vision. I see a new and more equitable balance among us. I see a hemisphere increasingly united by the common practice of democracy. I see new leadership bringing extraordinary talents to bear on accumulated social problems. I see a Latin America at peace with itself and reaching out to greater participation in matters of global concern. Let me reaffirm to you today the United States wants to join with you in realizing this vision. □

¹Press release 279 of Oct. 25, 1979.

TREATIES: Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977, at the 9th Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting.¹

Notification of approval: Australia, Oct. 17, 1979.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force for the U.S. Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Oct. 16, 1979.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Accessions deposited: Afghanistan, Aug. 29, 1979; Vietnam, Sept. 17, 1979.²

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Accession deposited: Vietnam, Sept. 17, 1979.²

Amendments to Article V of the 1956 agreements on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland (TIAS 4048, 4049). Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal Sept. 27, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1979.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.

Accession deposited: Seychelles, Oct. 16, 1979.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1976, definitively Aug. 1, 1977. TIAS 8683.

Accession deposited: Angola, Oct. 17, 1979.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.

Acceptance deposited: Colombia, Sept. 4, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Acceptance deposited: China, Oct. 30, 1979.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein, Oct. 31, 1979.

Nuclear Material

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 21st instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.³ TIAS 8733.

Ratification deposited: Norway, Oct. 1, 1979.

Postal

Second additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, July 27, 1979; Bhutan, Sept. 7, 1979; Guatemala, July 2, 1979;⁴ Kenya, May 25, 1979; Mali, June 25, 1979; Upper Volta, Aug. 31, 1979; Venezuela, Sept. 12, 1979; Yemen (Aden), Mar. 20, 1978.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

Ratification deposited: Yemen (Aden), Mar. 20, 1978.

Approval deposited: Upper Volta, Aug. 31, 1979.

Property, Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1–12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13–30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Uruguay, Sept. 28, 1979.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Indonesia, Sept. 20, 1979.^{2,5}

Property, Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Sept. 18, 1979.

Accession deposited: Uruguay, Sept. 21, 1979.

Publications

Statutes of the international center for the registration of serial publications. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 1976; for the U.S., Mar. 31, 1978 (provisionally).

Accession deposited: Sweden, May 29, 1979.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.

Notification of succession: Suriname, Oct. 12, 1979.

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. Mar. 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification of succession: Suriname, Oct. 12, 1979.

South Pacific Commission

Memorandum of understanding modifying procedures under the agreement of Feb. 6, 1947

(TIAS 2317). Done at Canberra and signed at Noumea Oct. 20, 1976. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1976.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 16, 1979.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.³

Approval deposited: Czechoslovakia, Aug. 9, 1979.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.³

Approvals deposited: Japan, Aug. 17, 1979; Netherlands, Aug. 31, 1979;⁶ United Kingdom, Aug. 27, 1979.⁷

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

Notification of de facto application: Kiribati, July 12, 1979.

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939.

Acceptance deposited: Brazil, Sept. 26, 1979.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.¹

Ratification deposited: Honduras, Sept. 20, 1979.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Accessions deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Nov. 7, 1979.⁸

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Nov. 7, 1979.⁸

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Sept. 13 and 24, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1979.

Canada

Agreement concerning support of U.S. activities at the Canadian National Research Council Space Research Facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Mar. 19 and Sept. 20, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 20, 1979. Effective July 1, 1979.

Agreement extending application of the agreement of May 8, 1974, on air transport pre-clearance to Edmonton (TIAS 7825). Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Aug. 23 and Oct. 15, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1979.

China, People's Republic of

Agreement amending the agreement of May 11, 1979 (TIAS 9306) concerning the settlement of claims. Effected by exchange of notes at Beijing Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1979.

Dominica

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities for Department of Defense engineering personnel temporarily in Dominica for the purpose of emergency repairs. Effected by exchange of letters at Bridgetown and Roseau Sept. 17, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1979.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for major cereals improvement system, with annex. Signed at Cairo July 25, 1979. Entered into force July 25, 1979.

Project grant agreement for Shoubrah El Kheima thermal power plant, with annex. Signed at Cairo Aug. 29, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1979.

Project grant agreement for Alexandria wastewater system expansion, with annex. Signed at Cairo Aug. 29, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1979.

Project grant agreement for improvement of Egyptian telecommunications system, with annex. Signed at Cairo Aug. 29, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1979.

Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at Cairo Aug. 29, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1979.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of Aug. 29, 1979, for Alexandria wastewater system expansion. Signed at Cairo Sept. 22, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1979.

Project grant agreement for private investment encouragement fund, with annex. Signed at Cairo Sept. 22, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1979.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855), with agreed minutes. Signed at Cairo Oct. 4, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1979.

Agreement between Egypt and the U.S. and United Kingdom relating to liability and insurance for architects and contractors working on sewerage projects. Signed at Cairo Oct. 19, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1979.

Fiji

Air transport agreement. Signed at Suva Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1979, definitively Oct. 11, 1979.

France

Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes on income and property of July 28, 1967, as amended by the protocol of Oct. 12, 1970, with exchange of notes (TIAS 6518, 7270). Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 27, 1979.

Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 20, 1979.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement on social security, with final protocol. Signed at Washington Jan. 7, 1976.

Entry into force: Dec. 1, 1979.

Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security of Jan. 7, 1976. Signed at Washington June 21, 1978.

Entry into force: Oct. 30, 1979; effective Dec. 1, 1979.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17, 1977 (TIAS 8677), for sales of agricultural commodities and the exchange of letters of Dec. 16, 1977 (TIAS 8984), concerning development projects. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta Oct. 2, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1979.

Japan

Agreement extending the period of operation of the Tokai Reprocessing Facility referred to in the joint communique of Sept. 12, 1977 (TIAS 8734), relating to reprocessing of special nuclear material of United States origin. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Korea

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and the encouragement of international trade and investment, with related notes. Signed at Seoul June 4, 1976. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1979.

Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 23, 1979.

Malaysia

Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperation in combating illicit international traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Signed at Washington Sept. 19, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1979.

Mexico

Agreement on natural gas. Announced Sept. 21, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1979.

Minute 261 of the International Boundary and Water Commission: recommendations for the solution to the border sanitation problems. Signed at El Paso Sept. 24, 1979.

Entry into force: Oct. 2, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8952, 9251), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Sept. 27 and 28, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting

December 1979

in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico Oct. 2 and 11, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 11, 1979.

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of May 17, 1976 (TIAS 8309), with agreed minutes. Signed at Rabat Aug. 28, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1979.

Panama

Panama Canal treaty, with annex and agreed minute, related agreements, notes, and letters. Signed at Washington Sept. 7, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 24, 1979. Treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal, with annexes and related protocol. Signed at Washington Sept. 7, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 24, 1979.

Papua New Guinea

Air transport agreement. Signed at Port Moresby Mar. 30, 1979. Entered into force provisionally Mar. 30, 1979, definitively June 27, 1979.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 22 and 24, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9223), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Sept. 4 and 12, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1979.

Sierra Leone

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 23, 1979, for sales of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown Sept. 5 and 6, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1979.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 4 and 10, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1979.

Syria

Project loan agreement for rural roads. Signed at Damascus Sept. 12, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1979.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bangkok Aug. 21 and Sept. 25, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1979.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Oct. 18, 1972, as amended and extended (TIAS 7772, 8958), relating to establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the procurement of equipment for the Kama River truck complex. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Oct. 2 and 16, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1979.

Western Samoa

General agreement for special development as-

sistance. Signed at Apia Sept. 20, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 20, 1979.

Zaire

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of July 27, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa Aug. 29 and 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979. □

¹ Not in force.

² With reservation.

³ Not in force for the U.S.

⁴ With declaration.

⁵ For articles 13 through 30.

⁶ For the Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands Antilles.

⁷ In respect also of the territories under the territorial sovereignty of the U.K., as well as the State of Brunei, and, within the limits of jurisdiction therein, the Condominium of the New Hebrides.

⁸ Applicable to Berlin (West).

CHRONOLOGY:

October 1979

- Oct. 1 A new civilian government in Nigeria is sworn in headed by President Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Under terms of the Panama Canal Treaty, Panama resumes territorial jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. The U.S. retains rights in Panama to operate and defend the Canal until Dec. 31, 1999.
- Oct. 2 Liberian President Tolbert visits Washington, D.C., Sept. 25-Oct. 2.
- Oct. 4 U.S.S.R. President Brezhnev visits East Germany, Oct. 4-8 to attend ceremonies marking the 30th anniversary of the formation of the German Democratic Republic.
- Oct. 7 Japan holds parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Ohira's Liberal Democratic Party remains in control of the government.
- Oct. 9 25th assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association meets in Washington, D.C., Oct. 10-13.
- Oct. 11 Cuban President Castro visits New York Oct. 11-15 to address the U.N. on Oct. 12.
- A division of the Bolivian Army, located in the northern region of Beni and led by Lt. Col. Tito Vargas, rebels against the civilian government of President Walter Guevara. The uprising fails to evoke any support and is suppressed within the day.
- Oct. 12 The following newly appointed ambassadors to the U.S. presented their credentials to President Carter: John A. Tzounis of Greece, Enrique Antonio del Rosario Ceballos of the Dominican Republic, Raoul Schoumaker of Belgium, Joshua Luejimbazi Zake of Uganda, and Ricardo Crespo Zaldumbide of Ecuador.

- Oct. 14 Turkey holds parliamentary elections resulting in a serious reverse for ruling Republican People's Party. Prime Minister Ecevit resigns and major opposition party leader, Demirel, is asked to form new government.
- Oct. 15 Armed forces oust President Carlos Humberto Romero of El Salvador and proclaim the country will be ruled by a joint civilian-military junta.
- Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng arrives in France for a 3-week tour of Western Europe including West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
- Syrian President Assad visits U.S.S.R. Oct. 15-18.
- Oct. 17 U.S. lands 1,800 marines at U.S. naval base in Guantanamo.
- Oct. 20 Secretary Vance visits La Paz, Bolivia, Oct. 20-23 to attend 9th OAS General Assembly meeting held Oct. 21-31.
- Oct. 21 Switzerland holds parliamentary elections. There is a slight gain by major parties on the right, mainly at the expense of Social Democrats and Independents. Composition of government is not affected.
- Oct. 22 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, deposed Shah of Iran, is flown into New York from Mexico to undergo medical tests at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.
- Oct. 24 President Carter announces U.S. assistance efforts in emergency aid program for Kampuchea.
- Oct. 26 South Korean President Park is fatally shot in Seoul.
- Oct. 28 Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan resigns.
- Oct. 31 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, departs for Algiers to attend celebrations for the 25th anniversary of the start of the Algerian revolution against French rule. □

PRESS RELEASES: Department of State

October 15-November 14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*264	10/15	U.S., Canada research consultation group on the long-range transport of air pollutants.
*265	10/16	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Sept. 14 and 28.
*266	10/15	U.S., India amend textile agreement, Aug. 31 and Oct. 4.

- *267 10/12 Thomas J. Watson, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (biographic data).
- †268 10/23 Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1951, Vol. II, "The United Nations: The Western Hemisphere" released.
- *269 10/18 U.S., Poland amend textile agreement, May 10 and Sept. 3.
- *270 10/18 U.S., Thailand amend textile agreement, Aug. 21 and Sept. 25.
- *271 10/18 U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 2, Nov. 14.
- *272 10/18 CCIR, study group CMTT, Nov. 15.
- *273 10/18 Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Nov. 16.
- *274 10/19 Assistant Secretary Barbara Watson leads regional congressional staff workshops on consular services, Los Angeles (Oct. 23) and San Francisco (Oct. 25).
- *275 10/23 Conference on Trade, Investments, and Development (Conference on the Caribbean), Miami, Nov. 28-30.
- *276 10/23 George B. Roberts, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Guyana (biographic data).
- *277 10/25 Horace G. Dawson, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana (biographic data).
- *278 10/25 Joint communique following meeting of Andean Pact officials with representatives of the U.S. Government and the private sector, Oct. 22-23.
- 279 10/25 Vance: statement at the OAS General Assembly, La Paz, Oct. 23.
- *280 10/26 State Department and San Antonio Chamber of Commerce to present conference on U.S. security and the Soviet challenge, Nov. 7.
- *281 10/26 Conference on the Middle East, St. Louis, Nov. 6.
- 282 10/29 Vance: question-and-answer session following Gainesville address, Oct. 26.
- *283 10/27 Vance: remarks at United Nations Day concert.
- 284 10/29 Vance: remarks at Florida Blue Key Banquet in Gainesville, Oct. 26.
- *285 10/29 Vance: remarks before the Hispanic Conference.
- 286 10/31 Vance: news conference.
- *287 10/30 U.S. and 13 maritime nations of the Consultative Shipping Group (CSG) open 3 days of shipping talks, Washington, D.C., Oct. 30.
- *288 10/31 U.S., Macau amend textile agreement, Oct. 17.
- *289 11/9 Barbara W. Newell sworn in as Ambassador to UNESCO (biographic data).
- *290 11/5 Program of official visit of Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch and Mrs. Lynch, Nov. 7-15.
- 291 11/5 Vance: statement before U.N. General Assembly pledging conference on Kampuchea.
- *292 11/5 U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Sept. 10 and 14.
- *293 11/5 U.S., Romania amend textile agreement, July 24 and Aug. 27.
- 294 11/8 Vance: statement on situation in Iran.
- *295 11/9 CCIR study group 5, Dec. 7.
- *296 11/9 Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, Dec. 4.
- *297 11/13 U.S., Romania amend textile agreement, July 23 and Sept. 14.
- *298 11/13 U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, Oct. 4 and 10.
- *299 11/14 Proposed consular convention with the P.R.C. □

†Held for a later issue.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO SALES

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

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Pub. 7841 5 pp.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979. Selected Documents No. 11. Pub. 8976. Near Eastern and South Asian Series 91. 28 pp. \$1.50. (Stock No. 044-000-01732-6.)

United States Contributions to International Organizations. Twenty-sixth report to the Congress listing U.S. contributions to international organizations during fiscal year 1977. Includes tables. Pub. 8965. International Organization and Conference Series 138. 133 pp. \$4. (Stock No. 044-000-01743-1.)

Arms Control 1978—U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Eighteenth annual report to the Congress. Includes tables and appendixes. Pub. 102. 85 pp. \$3.25. Stock No. 002-000-00065-2.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, 1979. A complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, together with their jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. Department and Foreign Service Series 128. 107 pp. \$2.50. Stock No. 044-000-01693-1.

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Argentina. TIAS 8978. 48 pp. \$1.80. (Cat. No. S9.10:8978.)

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Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

COLLEEN SUSSMAN
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editors

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